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Our work aims to renew interest in the structural dynamics of the banking system, updating theoretical approaches that have contributed in the past to modeling distribution structure in Italy. Our research question is the following: what is the real degree of banking penetration in Italy, and what are the development prospects for networks of branches over the next few years?

The paper examines the possible definitions of business models in the banking sector, in order to highlight their distinctive features, also based on several surveys conducted in literature. The focus will then move to the characteristics of retail models and business prospects with specific reference to the Italian market, whereby retail banking trends in Italy and in the EU area will be compared. The objective is twofold: on the one hand the differences between Italian retail banking and European banks will be highlighted by examining the characteristics of financial statements and the structure of the economic performance; on the other hand the actual breakdown of business models will be assessed within the retail sector as compared to the one usually included in literature. Possible effects of the forthcoming structural reform of the regulation on business models and risk orientation are also discussed in the paper.

This paper investigates the effects of the disclosure of the list published by the FSB/BCBS on SIFIs’ market equity value. Using event study methodology applied to a sample of 70 of the world’s largest banks, we assess whether following the release of information regarding the methodology used to identify SIFIs and the new capital requirements (July 19, 2011), and the disclosure of the list of 29 SIFIs (November 4, 2011), stock prices of SIFIs reacted significantly and differently from those of other large banks. Our work contributes to the ongoing debate concerning the regulation of SIFIs.

The ongoing financial crisis has made it clear that bureaucratic supervisors and public enforcement authorities are encountering serious difficulties in ensuring both bank safeness and stability. According to part of the literature, securities class actions (SCA) can represent a complementary tool to public supervision in regulating and supervising markets and corporations. This paper aims at investigating whether SCA can also play a role in banking supervision acting as an effective incentive device for banks’ management to carefully evaluate risks and/or can represent a warning signal of risk of insolvency, which could be taken into account by public supervisors. Two groups of US banks are compared in the period 2000-2008. The first – treated – group includes banks that have faced a SCA in the past, while the second – control – group includes banks never involved in such a procedure. Results seem to suggest that collective private litigation procedures can be used to improve ex post regulation in the banking sector. Despite the fact that the empirical analysis is focused on the US experience, some general implications are derived. These may contribute to the current European debate concerning the banking sector regulation and the introduction of class action procedures

Drawing on a large set of listed banks from Europe, the US and Japan we start noticing that smaller-sized banks suffered less than larger banks in conjunction with the unfolding of the Great Crisis of 2007-09. Was this a small-bank anomaly analogous to the classic small firm effect? We conjecture that what seems to be a small bank anomaly might, in fact, signal a generalized market reassessment of the banking business model and tested whether stock markets penalized less the banks that kept more rooted to the traditional “originate-to-hold” (OTH) model while forgoing the opportunities disclosed by the “originate-to-distribute” (OTD) model. Using an event study methodology, we focus our analysis on two specific events: i) August 9th 2007, when the main Central Banks were forced to intervene and the world at large learned about the subprime crisis; ii) September 15th 2008, the day in which the bankruptcy of the second largest Wall Street investment bank (Lehman Brothers) surprised many. Our results detect that, indeed, banks that had kept closer to the OTH model – as proxied by a higher net interest income/operating income – experienced less negative abnormal returns. The fact that size is still negative and significant seems to suggest that our proxy for the OTH model may be imperfect and size might still be capturing a residual effect stemming form the banks’ specialization model.

In a given geographical area, what happens when a farmer, a craftsman, or a small merchant has the opportunity to chose between participating in a group loan or resorting to an informal money-lender? This paper presents a theoretical model that examines such situations, placing group lending and informal credit in a competitive market context, and also allowing for some degree of market power of the informal lender. Results show that the higher the extra-value.as compared to the market value.that the borrower perceives on his collateral, the more he will tend to prefer group lending, but there is no collateral e¤ect if the borrower evaluates his collateral as the market does. Important determinants of the choice are the value of loosing future credit opportunities.generally called .reputation.., the e¢ ciency of lenders in managing funds and subsidies granted to group lenders. We also .nd that subsidies can help lowering the impact of opportunistic behavior on the preference for group loans. Furthermore, group lending does not seem to o¤er particular risks of adverse selection, since it can be preferred both by borrowers with highly secure projects and those with highly risky projects.