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Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Motivated by research from the late 1990s and early 2000s, researchers often examine analyst performance as a function of individual analyst characteristics using variables representing analysts' experience, busyness, and resources. Studies make different choices for variable construction and fixed effects, sometimes with varying results, suggesting there is no standard approach to evaluating the effect of analyst characteristics. We reproduce analyses from two early studies (Clement (1999) and Clement and Tse (2003)) and extend these analyses to a more recent sample period and across different methodological approaches and alternative analyst performance measures. We provide robust evidence that analyst experience is positively associated with earnings forecast accuracy but that associations for analyst resources and busyness are sensitive to variable measurement and fixed effect choices. Our results can inform accounting and finance scholars examining analyst performance as they consider which analyst characteristics to include and how to test the robustness of their findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY: This article provides a summary of recent research by Bratten, Causholli, and Sulcaj (2022), who examine whether issuers with audit committees who report strong oversight over the audit function have higher audit quality. Using a novel dataset from Audit Analytics that summarizes reported audit committee activities, Bratten et al. (2022) create a composite measure that captures the strength of the audit committee's oversight of the audit process. The study uses several measures to capture audit quality, including audit fees, discretionary accruals, and propensity to meet or just beat earnings benchmarks. The authors show that, when issuers' audit committees report activities consistent with being more active in overseeing the external auditor, issuers, on average, have better audit quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we examine whether banks' use of the loan loss provision (LLP) to manage earnings is associated with (a) the extent to which banks hold assets subject to fair value reporting and (b) the use of an industry specialist auditor. We find that banks with a greater proportion of assets subject to fair value reporting (i.e., higher fair value exposure) use less LLP-based earnings management but more transaction-based earnings management (i.e., earnings management achieved by timing the realization of gains/losses). We also find that banks engaging industry specialist auditors use less LLP-based earnings management. Our findings suggest that banks' use of the LLP to manage earnings is more limited when they have access to alternative earnings management tools and when they engage an auditor with more industry knowledge. Our results should be informative to regulators, members of the banking industry, and academics interested in the earnings management behavior of banks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysts' street earnings forecasts are sometimes based on GAAP earnings and sometimes based on non-GAAP earnings, which exclude various GAAP earnings components. Therefore, differences in analysts' street earnings forecasts may capture differences in not only expected performance but also the earnings metric forecasted. We argue that analysts who forecast non-GAAP, rather than GAAP, street earnings are more likely to separately analyze earnings components. Consistent with this argument, we find that analysts who forecast non-GAAP street earnings issue relatively more accurate forecasts. We also argue that excluded earnings components often reflect negative transitory items, and that variation across analysts in the earnings metric forecasted suggests that the negative excluded items are forecasted by only a subset of analysts. Consistent with this assertion, we find that variation across analysts in the earnings metric forecasted is associated with a lower consensus GAAP earnings surprise and lower stock returns around the earnings announcement. Finally, although variation in the earnings metric forecasted is a source of analyst forecast dispersion, we find that it is also incrementally associated with a lower earnings response coefficient, consistent with the existence of transitory items. We therefore find that the variation in the earnings metric forecasted is an important source of analyst forecast dispersion that predicts not only a lower earnings surprise but also a lower earnings response. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Funding: Financial support from the Gatton College of Business & Economics, the KPMG Fellowship at the Mendoza College of Business, and the Goizueta Business School is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4553. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this study we examine whether the reported performance of one firm affects the discretionary reporting behavior of another firm. We do this by identifying the leader within each industry, defined as the first large announcing firm. We find that the discretionary performance of followers (those firms announcing after the leader) relates positively to the leader's reported performance. Specifically, when the leader misses analysts' expectations, followers report lower discretionary accruals, have fewer income-decreasing special items, and are less likely to meet analysts' expectations. In contrast, when leaders report good news, followers report higher discretionary accruals and are more likely to meet expectations (although we do not find evidence of a positive association between leaders' good news and followers' income-decreasing special items). Overall, the results are consistent with managers of followers perceiving that earnings news of the leader will affect investors' and others' performance expectations for their firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R suggests that lattice valuation models may improve the estimates of reported employee stock option values relative to the more commonly used Black-Scholes (BS) model. However, lattice model critics have expressed concerns that managers may use lattice models' flexibility to opportunistically understate option values. In this study, we investigate a sample of firms that recently adopted a lattice model to value employee stock options to provide evidence on this issue by identifying the determinants of lattice model adoption and examining the effect of lattice model use on reported option values. We report three main results. First, we find that firms are more likely to adopt a lattice model when it is more likely to produce lower values than the BS model and when managers have incentives to lower stock option expense. Second, we find that firms adopting a lattice model increase understatement of reported option values more than firms that continue to use the BS model and that the incremental understatement is due to use of the lattice model. Third, we conduct several tests to examine whether the valuation effect of lattice model use is consistent with efforts to correct for documented shortcomings in the BS model and find no evidence that this is the case. Taken together, the evidence in this study suggests that firms adopt and implement lattice models primarily to lower reported option values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study provides new evidence on the relation between institutional ownership and the equity incentives provided to CEOs by their portfolio holdings of stock and stock options. We show that when firms' CEOs have abnormally high equity incentives, higher institutional ownership is associated with a larger reduction in the incentives. Conversely, when firms' CEOs have abnormally low equity incentives, higher institutional ownership is associated with a larger increase in these incentives. To achieve this, we find that firms with higher institutional ownership that have abnormally high (low) incentives experience a greater reduction (increase) in CEO annual option grants and a substitution between CEO equity-based compensation and cash-based compensation. Our findings highlight the important role of institutional investors in enhancing efficiency in the top executives' compensation contracting process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]