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Errors of source monitoring are widespread human memory challenges, and our memories are subject to distortion upon the presentation of subsequent misinformation. Less is known about if and when misinformation effects occur in nonhuman species' memory. Here we tested a symbol-trained chimpanzee's recall memory of a hidden food item's identity after a 10-min delay. During this delay, the subject was sometimes (depending on the condition) shown consistent or inconsistent video information about the identity of the food, before being asked to name the item to a second experimenter blind to the reward and condition. Across all conditions, our subject, Sherman, correctly named the food item at above chance levels. In the Inconsistent condition, in which Sherman was shown a video with misleading information, his performance was the worst of all conditions (although accuracy was still high). Interestingly, however, during three of the four trials in this condition in which Sherman made a mistake, he incorrectly named the food item shown during the misleading video information. These results provide evidence that chimpanzees, like humans, may be vulnerable to misinformation effects, even when that misleading information is presented in a different modality (video) than the original live event memory, demonstrating further commonality between human and ape memory systems.

In a reflection of my academic career thus far, I review the various aspects of my undergraduate and graduate training experiences that were pivotal in establishing myself as a doctoral candidate in comparative psychology. Key components of my undergraduate training consisted of influential faculty members, firsthand research experience, and inspiring course work across a variety of subjects. Key components of my graduate training consist of a well-suited graduate program and various leadership opportunities. I also discuss the importance of attending conferences, both as an undergraduate and graduate student. It is my hope that by highlighting these experiences future students in comparative psychology will have a greater understanding of potential avenues into this field. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The ego-depletion hypothesis states that self-control diminishes over time and with exertion. However, there is mixed evidence among human adult and comparative studies as to whether such depletion occurs. It is an important issue, given that evidence for or against this hypothesis could have implications for remediation efforts with individuals who show high impulsivity and low self-control. In a study of potential depletion effects on self-control, capuchin monkeys were presented with two consecutive self-control tasks back-to-back within sessions. Monkeys first completed the accumulation task, in which they were presented with food items one-by-one until the subject retrieved and ate the accumulating items, at which point no more food would be delivered. This required continual inhibition of food retrieval in the face of an increasingly desirable reward. Then, monkeys completed a food exchange task with exchange combinations that either decreased or increased in food quality. Self-control was required in foregoing eating an immediately available food for a potentially better reward later in the trial. Individual differences in accumulation performance were observed, but no depletion effects were seen in the monkeys’ exchange performance. Next, monkeys were presented with task order counterbalanced across individuals. No order effects were observed in the monkeys’ performance on either self-control task. Monkeys’ exchange performance was not significantly correlated with accumulation performance in either experiment. These results indicate no depletion effects and that these tasks may not be related in terms of underlying mechanisms that support self-control performance, even though at face value both require inhibition of eating available food.

The reverse-reward contingency task presents 2 food sets to an animal, and they are required to choose the smaller of the 2 sets in order to receive the larger food set. Intriguingly, the majority of species tested on the reverse-reward task fail to learn this contingency in the absence of large trial counts, correction trials, and punishment techniques. The unique difficulty of this seemingly simple task likely reflects a failure of inhibitory control which is required to point toward a smaller and less desirable reward rather than a larger and more desirable reward. This failure by chimpanzees and other primates to pass the reverse-reward task is striking given the self-control they exhibit in a variety of other paradigms. For example, chimpanzees have consistently demonstrated a high capacity for delay of gratification in order to maximize accumulating food rewards in which foods are added item-by-item to a growing set until the subject consumes the rewards. To study the mechanisms underlying success in the accumulation task and failure in the reverse-reward task, we presented chimpanzees with several combinations of these 2 tasks to determine when chimpanzees might succeed in pointing to smaller food sets over larger food sets and how the nature of the task might determine the animals' success or failure. Across experiments, 3 chimpanzees repeatedly failed to solve the reverse-reward task, whereas they accumulated nearly all food items across all instances of the accumulation self-control task, even when they had to point to small amounts of food to accumulate larger amounts. These data indicate that constraints of these 2 related but still different tasks of behavioral inhibition are dependent upon the animals' perceptions of the choice set, their sense of control over the contents of choice sets, and the nature of the task constraints. (PsycINFO Database Record

Recent studies of delay of gratification in capuchin monkeys using a rotating tray (RT) task have shown improved self-control performance in these animals in comparison to the accumulation (AC) task. In this study, we investigated whether this improvement resulted from the difference in methods between the rotating tray task and previous tests, or whether it was the result of greater overall experience with delay of gratification tasks. Experiment 1 produced similar performance levels by capuchins monkeys in the RT and AC tasks when identical reward and temporal parameters were used. Experiment 2 demonstrated a similar result using reward amounts that were more similar to previous AC experiments with these monkeys. In Experiment 3, monkeys performed multiple versions of the AC task with varied reward and temporal parameters. Their self-control behavior was found to be dependent on the overall delay to reward consumption, rather than the overall reward amount ultimately consumed. These findings indicate that these capuchin monkeys’ self-control capacities were more likely to have improved across studies because of the greater experience they had with delay of gratification tasks. Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 tested new, task-naïve monkeys on both tasks, finding more limited evidence of self-control, and no evidence that one task was more beneficial than the other in promoting self-control. The results of this study suggest that future testing of this kind should focus on temporal parameters and reward magnitude parameters to establish accurate measures of delay of gratification capacity and development in this species and perhaps others.

We assessed metacognitive monitoring in 3- to 5-year-old preschool children using a non-verbal behavioral paradigm of confidence. Children responded to a variety of computerized tasks, during which rewards could be collected after each trial at a location spatially distant from the computer. Critically, auditory cues indicating performance were delayed by five seconds after each trial. A metacognitive response indicating confidence in their performance would lead children to move towards the reward location before receiving trial feedback. Results indicated that early movements reflected confidence and non-movements reflected uncertainty. Movements differed as a function of task performance (correct vs. incorrect responding) and objective trial difficulty (easier vs. harder trials) across most cognitive tasks. For some tasks, performance and metacognitive movements also varied as a function of age. These data, from a non-verbal measure of confidence, match other reports of emerging metacognition in children in this age range.

The density bias, documented within the foraging domain for some monkey species and for human infants, emerges when perceived numerosity is affected by interstimulus distance such that densely arranged food items appear more numerous relative to the same amount of food sparsely arranged. In this study, capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys were presented with a computerized relative discrimination task that allowed for the control of stimulus size, interelemental distance, and overall array pattern. The main objective was to determine whether the density bias was a more widespread and general perceptual phenomenon that extends beyond the foraging domain, similar to other numerosity illusions and biases. Furthermore, we compared the current results to these same monkeys' data from a previous study on the Solitaire numerosity illusion to investigate a potential link between a density bias and this related numerical illusion. Capuchin monkeys showed a density bias in their perceptual discrimination of dense versus sparse stimuli; however, rhesus monkeys perceived this bias to a lesser degree. Individual differences were evident, as with the Solitaire illusion. However, there was not a relation between susceptibility to a density bias and susceptibility to the Solitaire illusion within these same monkeys. (PsycINFO Database Record

In a midsession reversal (MSR) task, animals are typically presented with a simple, simultaneous discrimination (S1+, S2-) where contingencies are reversed (S1-, S2+) half-way through each session. This paradigm creates multiple, relevant cues that can aid in maximizing overall reinforcement. Recent research has shown that pigeons show systematic anticipatory and perseverative errors across the session, which increase as a function of proximity to the reversal trial. This behavior has been theorized to indicate primary control by temporal cues across the session, instead of the cues provided by recent reinforcement history that appear to control behavior shown by humans. Rats, however, appear to be guided by recent reinforcement history when tested in an operant context, thereby demonstrating behavior that parallels that seen in humans, but they appear to be guided by temporal cues when tested in an open-field apparatus, showing behavior more akin to that seen in pigeons. We tested rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) on the MSR with a computerized simultaneous visual discrimination to assess whether they would show errors indicative of control by time or by recent reinforcement history. When a single reversal point occurred midsession, rhesus macaques showed no anticipation of the reversal and a similar level of perseveration to rats tested in an operant setting. Nearly identical results also were observed when the monkeys were trained with a single, variable reversal point or with multiple, variable reversal points within a session. These results indicate that temporal cues are not guiding response flexibility in rhesus macaque visual discrimination.