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The embodied approach states that memory traces are retrieved, at least in part, through a sensorimotor simulation of the original events, i.e., during retrieval we use our body and its sensorimotor pathways to simulate what happened during encoding. Thus, body manipulations that are incongruent with the motor elements involved at encoding should modulate memory performance. To test this hypothesis, we devised two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants had to observe (observation task) or observe and also perform an action on (enactment task) a series of objects. At recognition, they recognised the enacted objects faster and more accurately than the observed ones. Crucially, in Experiment 2, we manipulated body posture during recognition: one group was asked to hold their hands/arms in front of them (non-interfering group), and the other group was asked to block their hands/arms behind their back (interfering group). The results on reaction times, but not those on accuracy, showed a critical interaction: while the noninterfering group recognised enacted objects faster than observed objects, this advantage disappeared for the interfering group. This suggests that adopting a posture inconsistent with action at encoding could influence the time needed to correctly recognise the objects, but not the accuracy of the recognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a theory of recursion in thinking and language. In the logic of computability, a function maps one or more sets to another, and it can have a recursive definition that is semi-circular, i.e., referring in part to the function itself. Any function that is computable – and many are not – can be computed in an infinite number of distinct programs. Some of these programs are semi-circular too, but they needn't be, because repeated loops of instructions can compute any recursive function. Our theory aims to explain how naive individuals devise informal programs in natural language, and is itself implemented in a computer program that creates programs. Participants in our experiments spontaneously simulate loops of instructions in kinematic mental models. They rely on such loops to compute recursive functions for rearranging the order of cars in trains on a track with a siding. Kolmogorov complexity predicts the relative difficulty of abducing such programs – for easy rearrangements, such as reversing the order of the cars, to difficult ones, such as splitting a train in two and interleaving the two resulting halves (equivalent to a faro shuffle). This rearrangement uses both the siding and part of the track as working memories, shuffling cars between them, and so it relies on the power of a linear-bounded computer. Linguistic evidence implies that this power is more than necessary to compose the meanings of sentences in natural language from those of their grammatical constituents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Memory for series of action phrases improves in listeners when speakers accompany each phrase with congruent gestures compared to when speakers stay still. Studies reveal that the listeners’ motor system, at encoding, plays a crucial role in this enactment effect. We present two experiments on gesture observation, which explored the role of the listeners’ motor system at recall. The participants listened to the phrases uttered by a speaker in two conditions in each experiment. In the gesture condition, the speaker uttered the phrases with accompanying congruent gestures, and in the no-gesture condition, the speaker stayed still while uttering the phrases. The participants were then invited, in both conditions of the experiments, to perform a motor task while recalling the phrases proffered by the speaker. The results revealed that the advantage of observing gestures on memory disappears if the listeners move at recall arms and hands (same motor effectors moved by the speaker, Experiment 1a), but not when the listeners move legs and feet (different motor effectors from those moved by the speaker, Experiment 1b). The results suggest that the listeners’ motor system is involved not only during the encoding of action phrases uttered by a speaker but also when recalling these phrases during retrieval. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A well-established literature reveals that a speaker’s gestures have beneficial effects on the listener’s memory for speech. A main assumption of our investigation is that gestures improve memory through the exploitation of the listener’s motor system. We tested this prediction in four experiments in which the participants listened to action sentences uttered by a speaker who either stayed still or accompanied the speech with congruent gestures. The results revealed that when the listeners observed gestures their memory for speech improved (Experiment 1), but loading up the listeners’ motor system during gestures observation cancelled the beneficial effect when the motor task involved the same effectors used by the speaker (arms and hands, Experiments 2–3). The beneficial effect of gestures persisted when the motor task involved different effectors (legs and feet, Experiment 4). These results support the assumption of a main involvement of the motor system in the beneficial effect of observed gestures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the study on whether gestural information uptake is a deterministic process. The study reportedly involved several experiments and an analysis of the role of unrelated speech gestures which are not relevant to the speech they accompany. The results revealed that gestural information uptake is non-deterministic.

Following the assumptions of the mental model theory and its account of moral judgements, we argue for a main role of reasoning in moral judgements, especially in dealing with moral conflicts. In four experiments, we invited adult participants to evaluate scenarios describing moral or immoral actions. Our results confirm the predictions deriving from our assumptions: Given a moral or immoral scenario, the manipulation of the propositions which refer to norms and values results in a scenario eliciting a moral conflict (Experiment 1); when invited to create conflict versions from no-conflict versions of moral or immoral scenarios, individuals manipulate the propositions in the scenario which describe norms and values rather than emotional factors (Experiment 2); the evaluation of conflict scenarios takes longer than the evaluation of no-conflict scenarios (Experiment 3), and this is because conflict scenarios involve more deliberative reasoning (Experiment 4). We discuss our results in relation to competing theories of moral judgements. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The main assumption underlying the present investigation is that action observation elicits a mandatory mental simulation representing the action forward in time. In Experiment 1, participants observed pairs of photos portraying the initial and the final still frames of an action video; then they observed a photo depicting the very same action but either forward or backward in time. Their task was to tell whether the action in the photo portrayed something happened before or after the action seen at encoding. In this explicit task, the evaluation was faster for forward photos than for backward photos. Crucially, the effect was replicated when instructions asked only to evaluate at test whether the photo depicted a scene congruent with the action seen at encoding (implicit task from two still frames, Experiment 2), and when at encoding, they were presented a single still frame and evaluated at test whether a photo depicted a scene congruent with the action seen at encoding (implicit task from single still frame; Experiment 3). Overall, the results speak in favour of a mandatory mechanism through which our brain simulates the action also in tasks that do not explicitly require action simulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies in the literature have revealed that a speaker's co-speech gestures favor the construction of a complete and articulated mental model of the discourse by the listener; moreover, from the literature on co-speech gestures we know that they help the speaker to organize the stream of thought. Given these data, we hypothesized that a person who listens to a discourse accompanied by gestures would produce fewer co-speech gestures in recollecting the discourse compared to a person who listens to a discourse not accompanied by gestures. The analysis of the co-speech gestures produced by the participants in two experiments while recollecting the content of a discourse confirmed our predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Communicative contexts may affect how the speaker proffers a discourse. In particular, we assumed that uni-directional (as compared with bi-directional) and audio (as compared with audio-visual) contexts induce the speaker to elaborate and then use an articulated mental model of the discourse because they do not allow the exploitation of all the communicative means. Uni-directional contexts do not allow recovery of communicative failures, and audio contexts do not allow access to extralinguistic communication. The results of an experiment involving 84 adult participants confirmed the predictions deriving from these assumptions: linguistic indices of the exploitation of an articulated mental model of the discourse are greater in uni-directional and audio contexts as compared with bi-directional and audio-visual contexts, respectively. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This study concerned the role of gestures that accompany discourse in deep learning processes. We assumed that co-speech gestures favor the construction of a complete mental representation of the discourse content, and we tested the predictions that a discourse accompanied by gestures, as compared with a discourse not accompanied by gestures, should result in better recollection of conceptual information, a greater number of discourse-based inferences drawn from the information explicitly stated in the discourse, and poorer recognition of verbatim of the discourse. The results of three experiments confirmed these predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In the classical philosophy of language a distinction is made between direct and indirect speech acts. In the present paper we propose that a new distinction, between simple and complex communicative acts, can include any kind of pragmatic phenomena, including deceit and irony. In particular, we assume that a complex act, with respect to a simple act of the same sort, e.g., irony, requires a complex inferential chain in order to grasp the communicative intention of the speaker. Therefore, we predict that complex acts are more difficult to comprehend than simple acts. Furthermore, we assume that simple acts of different sorts, e.g., deceit and irony, involve mental representations of different degrees of complexity. Therefore, we predict that simple standard acts are easier than simple deceits, which are in turn easier than simple ironies. Overall our predictions are confirmed by the results of an experiment carried out on 96 children aged 6;6–10 years. Some unexpected results are also interpretable within the proposed framework. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The aim of the study is to investigate the ability to recognize mistakes and deceits in communicative interactions. Our assumptions are that (1) on the basis of the mental representations involved it is possible to predict difference in difficulty of recognition for mistakes and deceits, and (2) on the basis of the inferential load involved it is possible to predict difference in difficulty of recognition for simple and complex mistakes, as well as for simple and complex deceits. Furthermore, we improved our account of the ability to recognize mistakes and deceits by presenting several assumptions concerning this ability''s relation with mindreading, attention capacity, and verbal span. As failures in recognition of mistakes and deceits are more likely to occur in young children, we validated our predictions with one experiment on 300 children aged 4–11 years. The results of the experiment confirmed all the predictions except that concerning simple deceits versus complex deceits. Indeed, children tend to recognize complex deceits more easily than simple deceits. We interpret this result in terms of the complexity of the mental representations and processes involved in communicative interactions as a cue for suspicion and for searching for possible deceitful intentions of the speaker. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The aim of our study is to analyze the cognitive processes underlying recognition and repair of communicative failures. In particular, following the tenets of Cognitive Pragmatics, a theory of the mental processes underlying the comprehension and production of communicative acts, we propose an original taxonomy of the different kinds of failure which may occur in communicative interaction: Failure of the expression act, Failure of the actor''s meaning, and Failure of the communicative effect. In particular, we operationally define both recognition and repair of the communicative failures. Finally, we predict a different trend in difficulty for the recognition and the repair of the three possible kinds of failure. The hypotheses are preliminarily confirmed by the results of an experiment conducted with children aged 3–8 years. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The aim of the present study is to compare the pragmatic ability of right- and left-hemisphere-damaged patients excluding the possible interference of linguistic deficits. To this aim, we study extralinguistic communication, that is communication performed only through gestures. The Cognitive Pragmatics Theory provides the theoretical framework: it predicts a gradient of difficulty in the comprehension of different pragmatic phenomena, that should be valid independently of the use of language or gestures as communicative means. An experiment involving 10 healthy individuals, 10 right- and 9 left-hemisphere-damaged patients, shows that pragmatic performance is better preserved in left-hemisphere-damaged (LHD) patients than in right-hemisphere-damaged (RHD) patients. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Deontic assertions concern what one ought to do, may do, and ought not to do. This paper proposes a theory of their meanings and of how these meanings are represented in mental models. The meanings of deontic assertions refer to sets of permissible and impermissible states. An experiment corroborated the ability of individuals to list these states. The most salient were those corresponding to the mental models of the assertions. When individuals reason, they rely on mental models, which do not make all states explicit. The theory predicts the most frequent conclusions drawn from deontic premises. It also predicts the occurrence of illusory inferences from assertions of permission, i.e., inferences that seem highly plausible but that are in fact invalid. Assertions of prohibitions, according to the theory, should reduce the illusions. Further experiments corroborated these predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a taxonomy of the different categories of context which contribute to reconstruct the communicative intention of a speaker. In particular, we investigate the following categories: Access, Space, Time, Discourse, Move, and Status. We propose that different contexts pertaining to the same category make the hearer assign different communicative meanings to the same expressive act. We validate our expectations through an experiment on three groups of children aged 3–7 years. The results confirm our predictions and reveal that different context categories and within them, different contexts, play different roles in the reconstruction of the communicative intentions in children belonging to the different age groups. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We propose a framework for explaining difference in difficulty of various pragmatic phenomena. In particular, we investigate the ability to comprehend direct, indirect, deceitful, and ironic communicative acts. Our main prediction is that there is a gradation of difficulty in their comprehension. Such a prediction is grounded on the assumptions that the various phenomena involve both mental representations of different complexity and different inferential load. A further prediction is that a communicative act has in principle the same difficulty of comprehension, whether performed through speech acts or communicative gestures. The underlying assumption is that the construction of the meaning of a communicative act is independent of the input modalities. We validate our predictions through an experiment on 160 children, with 40 in each of the following age groups: 2.6 to 3 years, 3.6 to 4 years, 4.6 to 5.6 years, and 6 to 7 years. The results confirm the predicted gradation of difficulty both for the different sorts of speech acts and for the communicative gestures. Also, the results, when broken down by each phenomenon, show that participants performed equally well in speech acts and in communicative gestures. We conclude with a discussion of the possible implications of our results for linguistic and gestural communication research. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Unifies the main types of deductive reasoning into a single set of basic procedures. Consolidation of the microtheories developed from a mental models perspective in a single theory; Validation of a theory through a computational model which allows predictions of the performance of the subjects in different reasoning domains; Testing of the performance of the model against the performance of experimental subjects in the three areas of reasoning.

Provides information on a study which presented a computer model that implements the account of syllogisms. Computer implementation of the mental model theory; Details on the two studies of the spontaneous use of diagrams; Role of alternative models in syllogistic reasoning.

Presents a study in which the syllogistic reasoning of children 9-10 years of age, adults and adolescents were investigated. Methodology used to conduct the study; Discussion based on the results of the study.

Deontic assertions concern what people should and shouldn't do. One sort concern moral principles, such as: People should care for the environment ; and another sort concern social conventions, such as: People should knock before entering an office. The present research examined such deontic assertions and their corresponding factual assertions, such as: People care for the environment and People knock before entering an office. Experiment 1 showed a correlation between emotions and beliefs for both sorts of deontic assertion, but not for their factual counterparts in which the word "should" had been deleted (as in the preceding examples). Experiment 2 showed that changing the pleasantness of participants' emotions about social conventions changed their strength of belief in them. Experiment 3 showed conversely that changing the participants' strength of belief in social conventions changed the pleasantness of their emotions about them. These results corroborate the mental model theory of deontic assertions, which postulates that emotions and beliefs about deontics depend on parallel systems that interact with one another. • Our dual-process theory predicts that beliefs and emotions about deontic assertions are correlated and can affect one another. • The present study corroborated these predictions for assertions about social conventions. • Beliefs in such conventions correlate with their pleasantness; but no such correlation occurs for factual assertions. • A change in the emotional pleasantness of social conventions changes strength of belief in them. • A change in strength of belief in social conventions changes their emotional pleasantness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After viewing an image representing an action on an object, we recognize the forward states of the seen action faster than the backward states. The present study exploits a variant of a new experimental paradigm to investigate cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect. Participants viewed a series of still photos of unfolding actions on objects, each followed by a photo depicting either one of three (instead of two of the original paradigm) different and temporally distant moments after the image or one moment before the image, along with photos of different actions. Experiment 1 revealed the classical forward effects in this new context: when the task was to judge whether the action in the second photo was the same as in the first photo, evaluations were faster for all forward photos than for backward photos. In Experiment 2, we examined the role of participants' attention to the object alongside the role of attention to action kinematics in triggering these "forward effects" by manipulating participants' attentional focus. As the results showed, evaluations were faster for all forward photos when the focus was on the action kinematics, but when the focus was on the object, evaluations were faster only for the last forward photo showing the final action state. These results seem to suggest that focusing on the object triggers a representation of the action goal and thus modulates the mental simulation underlying action anticipation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A dual-process theory postulates that belief and emotions about moral assertions can affect one another. The present study corroborated this prediction. Experiments 1, 2 and 3 showed that the pleasantness of a moral assertion – from loathing it to loving it – correlated with how strongly individuals believed it, i.e., its subjective probability. But, despite repeated testing, this relation did not occur for factual assertions. To create the correlation, it sufficed to change factual assertions, such as, "Advanced countries are democracies," into moral assertions, "Advanced countries should be democracies". Two further experiments corroborated the two-way causal relations for moral assertions. Experiment 4 showed that recall of pleasant memories about moral assertions increased their believability, and that the recall of unpleasant memories had the opposite effect. Experiment 5 showed that the creation of reasons to believe moral assertions increased the pleasantness of the emotions they evoked, and that the creation of reasons to disbelieve moral assertions had the opposite effect. Hence, emotions can change beliefs about moral assertions; and reasons can change emotions about moral assertions. We discuss the implications of these results for alternative theories of morality. • Our dual-process theory predicts that beliefs and emotions about moral assertions are correlated and that they can affect one another. • The present study corroborated these predictions. • As results showed, the degree to which individuals believed moral assertions, but not factual assertions, correlated with their emotional reactions to it, from loving it to loathing it. • As other results showed, a change in emotion can change degrees of belief in moral assertions, and a change in degrees of belief can change emotions about moral assertions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Several theoretical approaches suggest that language comprehension and action observation rely on similar mental simulations. Granted that these two simulations partially overlap, we assumed that simulations stemming from action observations are more direct than those stemming from action phrases. The implied prediction was that simulation from action observation should prevail on simulation from action phrases when their effects are contrasted. The results of three experiments confirmed that, when at encoding the phrases were paired with pictures of actions whose kinematics was incongruent with the implied kinematics of the actions described in the phrases, memory for action phrases was impaired (Experiment 1). However, the reverse was not true: when the pictures were paired with phrases representing actions whose kinematics were incongruent with the kinematics of the actions portrayed in the pictures, memory for pictures portraying actions was not impaired (Experiment 2). Also, in line with evidence that simulations from action phrases and those from action observation partially overlap, when their effects were not contrasted their products were misrecognized. In our experiments, when action phrases only presented at recognition described actions depicted in pictures seen at encoding, they were misrecognized as had already been read at encoding (Experiment 1); further, when pictures only presented at recognition portrayed actions described in phrases presented at encoding, they were misrecognized as seen at encoding (Experiment 2). A third experiment excluded the possibility that the pattern of findings was simply a consequence of better memory for pictures of actions as opposed to memory for action phrases (Experiment 3). The implications of our results in relation to the literature on simulation in language comprehension and action observation are discussed. Highlights • A direct simulation mediates action observation whereas an indirect simulation is at stake in language comprehension. • When the effects of these two simulations were not contrasted their products were likely to be misrecognized. • However, when their effects were contrasted memory for action phrases but not memory for action photos was impaired. • Language comprehension and action observation rely on similar, but not identical, sensorimotor mental simulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the assumption that spatial reasoning relies on the construction of mental models of the states of affairs described in the premises, and on evidence that sensory-motor imagery can enhance cognitive abilities, we hypothesised that imagining moving the objects mentioned in the premises to the specific spatial locations should favour spatial reasoning. The results of Experiment 1 confirmed the prediction: when participants imagined moving the objects mentioned in the premises (dynamic-engagement condition), they drew accurate inferences faster compared with participants who merely read the premises (static-non-engagement condition). Experiment 2 was in part a replication of Experiment 1 but included two additional experimental conditions to control for possible effects of self-engagement in reasoning: in one condition, participants imagined that someone else was moving the objects (dynamic-non-engagement condition), and in the other condition, participants imagined that they were observing the objects (static-engagement condition). The results revealed an interaction between motor imagery and engagement in decreasing response times to spatial problems. We discuss the practical implications of the current results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The deep comprehension of a text is tantamount to the construction of an articulated mental model of that text. The number of correct recollections is an index of a learner's mental model of a text. We assume that another index of comprehension is the timing of the gestures produced during text recall; gestures are simultaneous with speech when the learner has built an articulated mental model of the text, whereas they anticipate the speech when the learner has built a less articulated mental model. The results of four experiments confirm the predictions deriving from our assumptions for both children and adults. Provided that the recollections are correct, the timing of gestures can differ and can be considered a further measure of the quality of the mental model, beyond the number of correct recollections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classical studies on enactment have highlighted the beneficial effects of gestures performed in the encoding phase on memory for words and sentences, for both adults and children. In the present investigation, we focused on the role of enactment for learning from scientific texts among primary-school children. We assumed that enactment would favor the construction of a mental model of the text, and we verified the derived predictions that gestures at the time of encoding would result in greater numbers of correct recollections and discourse-based inferences at recall, as compared to no gestures (Exp. 1), and in a bias to confound paraphrases of the original text with the verbatim text in a recognition test (Exp. 2). The predictions were confirmed; hence, we argue in favor of a theoretical framework that accounts for the beneficial effects of enactment on memory for texts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a theory, and its computer implementation, of how mental simulations underlie the abductions of informal algorithms and deductions from these algorithms. Three experiments tested the theory's predictions, using an environment of a single railway track and a siding. This environment is akin to a universal Turing machine, but it is simple enough for nonprogrammers to use. Participants solved problems that required use of the siding to rearrange the order of cars in a train (experiment 1). Participants abduced and described in their own words algorithms that solved such problems for trains of any length, and, as the use of simulation predicts, they favored "while-loops" over "for-loops" in their descriptions (experiment 2). Given descriptions of loops of procedures, participants deduced the consequences for given trains of six cars, doing so without access to the railway environment (experiment 3). As the theory predicts, difficulty in rearranging trains depends on the numbers of moves and cars to be moved, whereas in formulating an algorithm and deducing its consequences, it depends on the Kolmogorov complexity of the algorithm. Overall, the results corroborated the use of a kinematic mental model in creating and testing informal algorithms and showed that individuals differ reliably in the ability to carry out these tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We present a study on the linguistic and extralinguistic pragmatic abilities of deaf children. Following the tenets of Cognitive Pragmatics theory, which provides a framework for explaining differences in difficulty as regards various pragmatic phenomena, we investigate the ability to comprehend direct, indirect, deceitful, and ironic communication acts performed through linguistic and extralinguistic means. Our main prediction is that there is a gradation of difficulty in comprehending these communicative phenomena, in deaf children as well as in hearing children. This prediction is grounded on the assumptions that the construction of the meaning of a communication act is independent of both the communicative means (i.e. linguistic or extralinguistic) and the input modalities (i.e. oral or visual). Rather (as supported by previous studies on hearing children), the gradation of difficulty is determined by mental representations of different complexity and inferential chains of different loads. Our aim was to validate the predictions on (46) deaf children aged 2–4 years and 4;6–7 years. The results confirm our expectations. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Action observation triggers by default a mental simulation of action unfolding in time. We assumed that this simulation is "embodied": the body is the medium through which observer's sensorimotor modalities simulate the observed action. The participants in two experiments observed videos, each depicting the central part of an action performed by an actress on an object (e.g., answering the phone) and soon after each video they observed a photo portraying a state of the action not observed in the video, either depicting the initial part or the final part of the whole action. Their task was to evaluate whether the photo portrayed something before (backward photo) or after the action in the video (forward photo). Results showed that evaluation of forward photos was faster than evaluation of backward photos (Experiment 1). Crucially, participants' body posture modulated this effect: keeping the hands crossed behind the back interfered with forward simulations (Experiment 2). These results speak about the role of the observer's body posture in processing other people's actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Memory for action phrases improves in the listeners when the speaker accompanies them with gestures compared to when the speaker stays still. Since behavioral studies revealed a pivotal role of the listeners' motor system, we aimed to disentangle the role of primary motor and premotor cortices. Participants had to recall phrases uttered by a speaker in two conditions: in the gesture condition, the speaker performed gestures congruent with the action; in the no-gesture condition, the speaker stayed still. In Experiment 1, half of the participants underwent inhibitory rTMS over the hand/arm region of the left premotor cortex (PMC) and the other half over the hand/arm region of the left primary motor cortex (M1). The enactment effect disappeared only following rTMS over PMC. In Experiment 2, we detected the usual enactment effect after rTMS over vertex, thereby excluding possible nonspecific rTMS effects. These findings suggest that the information encoded in the premotor cortex is a crucial part of the memory trace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]