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This article complements Wlezien’s review of ‘conceptualisation, measurement and interpretation in representational research’ by considering how these operate within five predictive theories validated against comparative evidence, as recommended for cumulative research by Taagepera: and related to their wider institutional and methodological context by Budge. Methodologically, the article illustrates how predictive theories can be set up to explain political processes and validated against statistical evidence. Substantively, the theories both highlight and resolve the ‘Paradox of democracy’ – how can ideologically based political parties effectively match public policy to popular preferences with only weak guidance from citizens? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We endorse G. Bingham Powell's cautionary corrective to challenge Paul Warwick's conclusions that the median mandate thesis needs to be jettisoned because there is not a close match between median voter and government left‐right positions. More to the point, however, we go beyond Powell's mild caution to challenge Warwick's rejection more assertively and thoroughly. We show his rejection mistakes responsiveness for congruence, misapprehends how and why the median mandate thesis distinguishes between those two concepts, and fails to take account of a measurement artifact associated with his survey data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Saliency approaches derive from the basic idea that political parties define their policies by emphasising certain topics more than others, particularly in public documents and debates. However, the approaches diverge on whether parties always emphasise the same ‘owned’ issues or can emphasise different ones in different elections with a view to winning votes. The article explores the way these differences developed and summarises them in a typology of ‘issue ownerships’, within which models linking ‘ownership’ to election outcomes can be located. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The extensive estimates of party policy preferences produced by the CMP (Comparative Manifesto Project, now MARPOR) have proved robust and valid over a wide variety of research applications. But all estimates carry some error. We demonstrate that one of the two existing assessments of non-systematic error in the CMP data strongly overstates their reliability while the other understates it, leaving much potential for mis-estimation. We develop a new method which extends classical test theory and directly estimates overall data reliability; reliabilities and standard errors of measurement for each party system; and standard errors of measurement for each data-point. These should facilitate use of the CMP policy scores which are usually the only ones available for extended party and policy research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In practice, democracies privilege plurality parties. Theories of the democratic process challenge the democratic credentials of this practice. Abstract social choice theory wonders whether an electoral majority even exists. A more optimistic line of argument, prominent in research on collective representation, assumes that the policy position of the median voter embodies the majority electoral preference. The conflict between what democracies actually do and what two leading theories of the democratic process say calls for a comparative inquiry into electoral majoritarianism. For each of a dozen countries, the authors ask whether any political party commands a predominant majoritarian position among voters—that is, is a Condorcet winner—and, if so, which party it is. They find that a Condorcet winning party exists in all 12 countries and that the plurality party can lay more claim to representing the popular majority than the left—right median party. These findings have important implications for the study of democratic representation, which the authors consider in their conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The purpose of this response is to point out that claims of undue centrism in the MARPOR data are directly contradicted by its use to correct centrism in other leading policy measures including expert surveys. Secondly it demonstrates that there are grave problems with the logorithmic Left–Right scale proposed by Benoit and his colleagues (2011–12). Thirdly we reassert that MARPOR’s measurement formulation of Left–Right party positions is a proper one, on both conceptual and technical grounds. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The extent and ways in which popular preferences influence government policy are absolutely central to our understanding of modern democracy. Paul Warwick's discussion of these in the European Journal of Political Research in 2010 puts itself at the heart of the debate with its critique of the median mandate theory of McDonald and Budge, proposing an alternative 'bilateralist' concept of representation. This article questions whether this concept has much to add to our theoretical understanding of representational processes. However, Warwick's further conceptual points deserve serious consideration. These concern the time horizons within which representative processes work, and the status of the median position given multi-motivated voting. At the evidential level, Warwick argues that survey-based measures of voter and party left-right positions fail to produce the correspondence between median and government policy positions that median mandate theory would have us expect. However, survey-based measures of median voter and party placements obscure important cross-national variation. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (), as Warwick does, this article shows that survey respondents norm their own and their country's party positions to their national context. The consequence is to make the political centre in all nations appear similar. Allowing for the relevant cross-national differences brings the relationship between the median voter and government position back in line with expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Operationalized as a simulation and checked against 1,737 policy shifts in twenty-four post-war democracies, this theory of party position-taking offers both an explanation and specific postdictions of party behaviour, synthesizing some previous approaches and linking up with mandate theories of political representation. These wider implications are considered at the beginning and the end of the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article raises important questions about the standing of citation indices as true reflections of the flow of influence in political science. Are citations being used strategically to enlarge personal standing in the profession? A recent experience suggests that sanctions against unacknowledged appropriation of others' research may be decreasingly severe or non-existent. This has serious implications for collective research and the ‘free marketplace of ideas’ within the discipline.European Political Science (2007) 6, 302–305. doi:10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210143 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Policy scorings of political actors are crucially important in operationalising rational choice models and other important theories in political science. Doing them more cheaply and quickly by computer is important for the advancement of the discipline. But we can hardly substitute these for hand-coding or even use them in new fields without being sure of their validity and reliability. We check this by comparing the mappings produced by word frequency methods with the policy series available from the work of the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP). Using an aggregate calibrating/reference ‘document set’ for the time period in question evades reliability problems with pairwise comparisons and provides an authoritative text which enables individual party platforms to be scored and mapped over long time periods. Comparisons of the techniques for two countries (US and UK) are not encouraging. Wordscores in their current operationalisation flatten out party movement just as previous computerised approaches have done. Sensitivity testing with British party manifestos 1979–1997, using an expert scoring, does not reveal any improvement in performance. The reliability problems which arise with policy series are also likely to recur with cross-sectional applications of the word frequency approach. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Public policy is supposed under democracy to be necessarily linked to popular preferences through elections. Election outcomes are however shaped not only by the votes cast but also by the party-policy options on offer and the rules by which votes are aggregated into seats. A crucial question is whether rules exert their influence through the party system they help shape or whether public policy is directly affected by them. We examine these points here over the post-war period with evidence on policy preferences at electoral and governmental levels in 21 countries. Under single member constituency systems (SMD), election rules and party systems have independent and equal effects on short run representation, while under PR it is the party systems which produce (limited) distortion. Over time however SMD itself emerges as the main source of representational bias in the countries where it operates, with little bias under PR from either election or party systems. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Elections are the defining institution of democracy, in the sense of directly linking popular preferences to public policy. Which programme gets chosen depends on the outcome of the election. However, voters' choices are very much constrained by the policy packages parties put forward in the first place. In most representative elections, no alternatives can be voted on apart from those advocated by established parties, who thus play a role almost equal to electors in defining the election outcome. This article examines the policy choices offered by parties in their published programmes over 17 post-war democracies—uncovering a wide variety of patterns with only limited links to type of election system or number of parties. Voters always have a choice, though in some countries it is more limited and less nuanced than in others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the rise of political parties has rendered classical distinctions between direct and representative democracy largely obsolete. This is particularly true for representative democracy where, rather than selecting candidates as individuals, electors are now asked to choose between party policy packages. Party-mediated rather than unmediated policy voting is also the order of the day so far as direct democracy is concerned. The real contrast between the two thus boils down to periodic voting on medium- term party programmes versus frequent votes on individual policy. We argue here that there is a place for both in any modern democracy that truly aims at creating a necessary connection between public policy and popular preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most discussions of democratic theory assume that parties should offer clear choices to voters but also show themselves sensitive to public concerns. Under certain circumstances, however, party convergence on these may preclude electoral choice, thus creating conflict between two democratic 'goods'. We examine possible tradeoffs between choice and responsiveness, and see which actually occur in 16 postwar democracies. Party policy positions turn out to be more strongly related to party ideology than popular concerns, thus privileging differentiation and choice over sensitivity and responsiveness. Implications for democratic theory and practice are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the party policy and ideology of the Labour Party in Great Britain from 1997 to 2001. It analyzes the British party manifestos and the Five Year Plans for comprehensive social development issued by any organisation in democratic societies. It evaluates the left-right movement of the parties and the separation of Labour from Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in 1945. It compares the manifestos with campaign handling of policy issues and public opinion. It assesses the elections and the creation of a left-right scale from manifesto emphases.

Focuses on textual analyses of party election programs. Statements of policy made at a particular place and time by a specific person or organization; Policy time-series assembled by the Manifesto Research Group of the European Consortium; Measurement of policy spaces.

Presents a systematic account of different constraints on government formation and their frequency in ten parliamentary democracies. Treatment of political parties by the coalition theory; Hypothetical and empirical examples demonstrating the influence of minor constraints on the range of coalition options; Redistribution of bargaining power among political parties.

Considers how political parties can decide on policy when there is no reliable information about the effect of these decisions on voting. Basing of standards on a priori assumptions about appropriate priorities, or political ideologies; Indication of general policy area a party should occupy.

Examines the correlation of British political party and government policy. Policy-based theories of coalition formation; Use of postwar party election programs and government declarations of different countries to study policy positions of parties and governments; Operationalization of policy-based models of government formation; Performance of model predictions based on the party platform data.

Looks at broad patterns linking the policy emphasis of party election programs to subsequent expenditure priorities within the British political process. Attempts to answer whether party manifestos matter to government policy. Use of content analysis to code and classify policy emphasis within the post-war election programs of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties; Traditional mandate theory within the context of the `Westminster model'; More.

Capital to the best-known classification of Political Arguments is a distinction between want-regarding and ideal-regarding principles, upon which this paper bases alternative representations of the dynamics of political debate. These are discussed with specific reference tot eh possibility that want-regarding goals are served less well by British planning decisions than if ideal-regarding arguments were permitted. The representations provide a limited explanation of how such a situation might come about and be maintained. Initially the draw on Down's models of voting and party competition, but explore alternatives because of: (1) the possibility that some assumptions needed for a Downsian representation cannot realistically be made about political arguments; and (2) the probability that factors other than verbal arguments enter into planning decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political parties in the United States are usually regarded as too weak and decentralized, too much the prey of office-seeking politicians and special interests, to function effectively as programmatic, policy-effecting agents within the separation of powers. This has been taken as a serious flaw in the U.S. version of representative democracy, prompting cycles of proposed reform; criticisms of the existing set-up as a capitalistic sham; or alternative justifications of the system as pluralist rather than strictly party democracy. Our research challenges these assumptions by demonstrating the existence of strong links between postwar (1948-1985) election platforms and governmental outputs. Platforms' sentences, coded into one of 54 subject categories, are used as indicators of programmatic emphases and are related to corresponding federal expenditure shares. Resulting regression models demonstrate the full applicability of party mandate theory to the United States, and they operationalize its U.S. variants concretely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democracy is often described as a system in which a majority of electors choose one out of a number of competing parties to form a government and carry out its programme. Unfortunately, spontaneous majorities rarely form in support of one party. We generalize from a 'government' to a `median' mandate, in which the median elector chooses the pivotal party in parliament, which then translates his or her preferences into public policy. To check this we investigate how accurately parliaments and governments represent the left-right position of the median voter in each of twenty parliamentary democracies. Distortions depend on the type of electoral arrangement, being relatively smaller under proportional representation than under single-member districts. Distortions do not equate to biased representation, however. Once we consider how distortions at one step or one time are compensated by distortions in the opposite direction at another, overall representation of the median voter position is reasonably accurate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]