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Based on a conjoint survey experiment we explore the support among European citizens for a European Union (EU) budgetary assistance instrument to combat adverse temporary or permanent economic shocks hitting Member States. Suitably designed, there is quite substantial support for such an EU instrument generally and across the sample countries. Support is broader when budgetary support is conditional on debt reduction in normal times and spent in specific policy areas, in particular healthcare and education. Support also increases when there is a role for the European Commission in terms of monitoring and providing guidance. However, there is little support for policy packages that terminate a program and impose a fine in the case of non-compliance. Further, there is broad acceptance of long-run redistribution towards poorer countries. Financing the assistance through a progressive tax increase is more popular than through a flat tax increase. In general, there is substantial scope for constructing assistance packages that command a majority support in all sample countries. The survey was fielded in the midst of the Covid-19 crisis, in which the prospect of a severe economic shock became realistic. However, the results of our survey are based on respondent views in a (partially) pre-political environment: respondents had the opportunity to reason and form their own opinion about the assistance package before concrete policy proposals were debated by political parties that seek the edges of polarization.

Infectieziekten zoals corona kennen geen landsgrenzen, maar toch is de bestrijding ervan nog steeds primair een nationale aangelegenheid. Met een gezamenlijke inkoop, opslag en toewijzing van medische middelen op EU niveau kunnen infectieziekten sneller bestreden worden. Maar zou daar onder burgers draagvlak voor zijn?

In this paper we confront the role the EU traditionally plays in the domain of health with the urgent need for collective action triggered by the corona virus pandemic. In the face of such a crisis, we argue that the joint procurement, stockpiling and allocation of medical countermeasures is a key component of true European solidarity, besides maintaining the integrity of the Single Market. We present the first results of a survey experiment taken before the current crisis on citizens’ attitudes towards centralizing at the EU level of policies to combat infectious diseases, which indicates considerable support. We conclude that a more robust policy framework with substantial centralization of procurement, stockpiling and allocation is warranted.

In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, proposals to share the risk of unemployment shocks have been high on the political agenda. Welfare states have built-in automatic stabilisers to cushion economic shocks, notably unemployment insurance. The argument with regard to the Eurozone is that a monetary union needs mechanisms to buttress or complement the automatic stabilizers of its member states; support for national unemployment insurance might achieve this. However, are European citizens ready to share the risk of unemployment crises hitting their countries? This report sheds light on that crucial, yet unresolved question by conducting a conjoint survey experiment on public support for European unemployment risk sharing (EURS) among a representative sample of 19641 respondents in 13 European member states in October and November 2018. The conjoint experiment studies citizen preferences for policy proposals, implementing EURS, that vary on six dimensions: (1) generosity, (2) education and training conditions, (3) between-country redistribution, (4) national versus European administration, (5) impact on taxes, and (6) conditions with regard to individual job search effort. Our results show that policy design matters for public support. They also highlight variation across countries and socio-economic and ideological differences among citizens. Most importantly, fundamental opposition to EURS is confined to a small segment of the European population. In all countries in the sample, there are potential majorities for specific policy packages that organize EURS. A summary of the report (15 pp.) is available in German, French, Italian and Dutch. Click EURS Report and you will find, under the heading Materials, these summaries.

This article explores whether private regulatory activity to promote labour and social standards might hollow out traditional public regulations to provide welfare and labour protection at home and abroad. Such exploration has hitherto been frustrated by empirical limitations of measures of private regulatory activity and its implications for public regulation. The present article extends those limits by focusing on how new measures of labour‐related private regulation affect attitudes in 27 European polities towards welfare redistribution and for foreign assistance. Our analysis suggests that private‐regulatory CSR promoting labour and social standards may directly and indirectly diminish public support for domestic welfare redistribution, but appears to have little effect on support for foreign aid. We see, hence, possible crowding‐out only with respect to domestic, not international, assistance.

In our contribution to this volume, we argue that Dutch science-funding practices should be recalibrated because the status quo fails to meet its own stated objectives and is causing non-trivial harm along the way. We challenge, in particular, the existing bias toward identifying and awarding scholarly niches and national champions with large grants to ever tinier shares of the submitted proposals. We argue that this is wasteful spending and, when scrutinized, based on unrealistic assumptions about the nature of scientific research and the composition of the scientific community. The bias also skews the incentives for young researchers: by creating a...

This chapter explores the empirical challenges of understanding the socioeconomic implications of social investment welfare reform. Such understanding is crucial to gauging the pay-offs and pitfalls of social investment, but is also extremely difficult, given the complex character of social investment and its multiple and interacting consequences for work and well-being. Such complexity, the chapter contends, yields an unusually strong tension between relevance and rigour that dooms any dialogue among social scientists and practitioners with clashing methodological commitments. The present study argues in favour of a practical pluralism to facilitate such dialogue. This pluralism entails combining and comparing empirical work across the full spectrum of relevance and rigour. The chapter illustrates the problems and pluralist solutions with a combination of macro-country-year and macro-individual-year analysis of how active labour-market policies (ALMP) affect the poverty of vulnerable citizens.

Immigration has risen substantially in many European economies, with far-reaching if still uncertain implications for labour markets and industrial relations. This article investigates such implications, focusing on employment flexibility, involving both ‘external flexibility’ (fixed-term or temporary agency and/or involuntary part-time work) and ‘internal flexibility’ (overtime and/or balancing-time accounts). The article identifies reasons why immigration should generally increase the incidence of such flexibility, and why external flexibility should rise more than internal flexibility. The article supports these claims using a dataset of establishments in 16 European countries.

In recent years, developments in intergovernmental organizations and transnational private governance organizations have created new opportunities and constraints for the promotion of global labour-standards governance by civil society organizations (CSOs). This article describes how European CSOs (including trade union organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) respond to these developments. It argues that European civil society is witnessing a threefold shift in priorities of labour-standards advocacy: from pushing regulatory approaches to organizational capacity building; from corporate responsibility strategies focused on compliance to strategies focused on transparency; and from fair labour standards within the sustainable development agenda to a host of other issues. The overall result is that labour-standards advocacy in general and private labour governance in particular are receiving less attention from European CSOs.

This chapter studies the complex relationship between income inequality and the legitimacy of politics. By focusing on outcomes concerning national and supranational politics, the chapter argues that political correlates to inequality may not only widen cleavages in political interest, attitudes to democracy, and political representation, but may additionally have serious repercussions on the legitimacy of the democratic political system. The chapter demonstrates that a potential threat to the political system originates from ill-suited representation of lower income groups, and of their interests concerning the income distribution in society. Low salience of redistributive issues is not only observed through subjective political identification, but also through unequal political representation.

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Immigration can be expected to have offsetting implications for public support for redistribution. On the one hand, immigration poses individual or collective economic risks that might make citizens more likely to support government redistribution, but on the other it can generate fiscal pressure or undermine social solidarity to diminish such support. These offsetting conditions may be responsible for the substantively and statistically modest net effects of redistribution for welfare state politics in existing studies. This paper argues that these effects are strongly mediated by the economic and social integration of immigrants - the degree to which they have unemployment levels, reliance on the welfare state, and harbor social attitudes in line with those of the native population. Such integration should influence how immigration affects solidarity and poses fiscal and macro-economic pressures but not so much how immigration spurs economic risks. In societies where immigrants are more integrated by such measures, proportionately higher foreign-born population should have less negative or more positive implications for native support for government redistribution than where immigrants are less integrated. The paper finds support for this argument in European Social Survey data of publics in 22 European countries between 2002 and 2008. The economic and social integration of immigrants, hence, may be crucial to dampening any negative effects that immigration has for redistributive policies and welfare states.

This paper investigates political-economic backlash to economic globalization in industrialized polities. It analyzes data on the content of party platforms to develop measures of party support for, or opposition to, political-economic closure, anti-democratic nationalism, and xenophobia in all party platforms of 23 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries for all national elections between 1960 and 2003. These allow broader judgments of trends in autarky and autarchy than focusing on electoral success of particular extreme-right parties. Based on these measures, the paper quantitatively analyzes how international trade and capital openness and flows, and immigration flows, all influence the embrace or rejection of political-economic backlash among parties. The main explanatory finding is that immigration and capital flows and openness tend to increase marginally such backlash when national welfare compensation is very modest, but to reduce it when national compensation is generous, cushioning citizens from globalization's economic risks. This finding provides evidence that the current wave of globalization only marginally resembles the dark politics ending its nineteenth-century predecessor, and that welfare protection may help make the difference between political-economic backlash and liberalism in contemporary globalization.

We challenge recent findings by Abiad and Mody (2005) which suggest that financial liberalization has little to do with political variables. This analysis is at odds with some of the established literature, and only with difficulty comes to terms with the considerable cross-national variation in the pace, phasing, and extent of financial reforms over time. Using Abiad and Mody's own index of financial liberalization, but slightly unbundling and refining their measures of 'ideological affinity' and 'regime type', we examine what Abiad and Mody call the 'triggers' of liberalisation and the dynamics of the subsequent 'cumulative transformation'. We demonstrate the role of political variables in relation to initial liberalisation episodes, and as variables affecting the cumulative dynamics and sustainability of ongoing financial reform processes, including those which affect the acceptability and costs of liberalization. These factors include (i) shifts to - as opposed to levels in - Left government; (ii) the incidence of Left governments combined with low levels of democracy; (iii) international voter support for free markets; (iv) the extent of social safety nets; (v) the presence of multilateral and bilateral aid programs. Our empirical investigation confirms these factors as statistically significant determinants of financial liberalization, and reveal what Abiad and Mody identify as 'learning' to be a highly political process.

This paper examines how economic globalization affects work-place arrangements regulating working time in industrialized countries. Exposure to foreign direct investment and trade can have off-setting effects for work-place bargaining over standard hours and work-time flexibilization, and can be expected to more strongly spur the latter than the former given stronger employer support for and weaker employee opposition to flexible time management in open economies. The paper also considers, however, how works council or other work-place representation likely mediate which of globalization’s effects dominates the shaping of work-time. Based on enterprise-level panel data from the German Federal Labor Office, the analysis supports two major findings consistent with such expectations. First, globalization measured at the establishment or branch level – including total foreign direct investment (FDI), trade, and export orientation (share of foreign sales) – tends to have either no or weakly negative effects on total standard working hours, but to yield higher incidence of overtime, temporary and fixed-contract work. Second, works councils mediate these effects in ways that differ between standard hours and flexibilization. With respect to standard weekly hours, globalization measures tend to trigger more standard hours among firms without works councils, but fewer hours among firms with works councils. With respect to flexibilization, however, globalization tends to modestly spur incidence of temporary- or fixed-term contracts and overtime, and to do so more strongly where works councils are present than when they are not. These results suggest how economic openness can have important, uneven consequences for working time, and that firm-level institutional context can channel those consequences, highlighting an area of agency in responses to globalization.

This paper examines how economic globalization affects work-place arrangements regulating working time in industrialized countries. Exposure to foreign direct investment and trade can have off-setting effects for work-place bargaining over standard hours and work-time flexibilization, and can be expected to more strongly spur the latter than the former given stronger employer support for and weaker employee opposition to flexible time management in open economies. The paper also considers, however, how works council or other work-place representation likely mediate which of globalization’s effects dominates the shaping of work-time. Based on enterprise-level panel data from the German Federal Labor Office, the analysis supports two major findings consistent with such expectations. First, globalization measured at the establishment or branch level - including total foreign direct investment (FDI), trade, and export orientation (share of foreign sales) - tends to have either no or weakly negative effects on total standard working hours, but to yield higher incidence of overtime, temporary and fixed-contract work. Second, works councils mediate these effects in ways that differ between standard hours and flexibilization. With respect to standard weekly hours, globalization measures tend to trigger more standard hours among firms without works councils, but fewer hours among firms with works councils. With respect to flexibilization, however, globalization tends to modestly spur incidence of temporary- or fixed-term contracts and overtime, and to do so more strongly where works councils are present than when they are not. These results suggest how economic openness can have important, uneven consequences for working time, and that firm-level institutional context can channel those consequences, highlighting an area of agency in responses to globalization.

This article argues that annual hours per employed person and per working-age person capture important dimensions of political-economic success that should be weighed against aggregate employment and wealth patterns. It also argues that partisan-driven work-time policies and welfare-regime institutions give rise to diverging Social Democratic, Liberal, and Christian Democratic “worlds” of work time in terms of these two measures. Descriptive statistics for eighteen Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries reveal broad clustering and trends suggestive of the Three Worlds, while panel estimation suggests the influence of partisan and welfare-institutional conditions underlying them. Case study of Finland, the United States, and the Netherlands further illustrates the political process and sequence of the Three Worlds.