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The Black Sea is an enclosed sea surrounded by six coastal countries, of which Bulgaria and Romania are EU Member States. The Convention for the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution was ratified in 1994 by all coastal countries. This Convention is the only European regional sea convention to which the EU is not a Party. While Romania and Bulgaria are in favor of EU accession to the Convention, Turkey, Russia and Ukraine thus far have blocked accession. In this paper, we develop a negotiation model with endogenous enforcement and exogenous fraud to analyze the different positions of groups of coastal countries relative to EU accession to the Convention. Our model contributes to defining a proposal that the EU could make to the opposing states such that they accept the EU as a Party to the Convention. In that context we investigate also whether Romania and Bulgaria might be better off delegating their decision power to the EU, rather than retaining their individual voting rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider an endogenous learning-by-doing process where countries can invest in research that reduces the systematic uncertainty about climate change damages. We analyse a coalition model in which countries decide whether to join a treaty and then choose their level of research and abatement. Countries can cooperate on research and abatement or only on one of these items. We consider the entire range of possible research spillovers. Cooperation on all issues and large research spillovers are generally welfare improving, but lead to smaller coalitions, as they encourage free-riding. However, on balance, in equilibrium, we find that cooperation should not be confined to research and should include abatement, and research findings should freely travel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We refer to the discrete-time market model under ambiguity introduced in [Cinfrignini, A., Petturiti, D. and Vantaggi, B., Dynamic bid–ask pricing under Dempster-Shafer uncertainty. J. Math. Econ., 2023a, 107, 102871], formed by a frictionless risk-free bond and a non-dividend paying stock with bid-ask spread. For a European derivative, we generalize the classical binomial pricing formula by allowing for bid-ask prices and investigate the properties of the ensuing replicating strategies. Next, for an American derivative, we propose a backward bid-ask pricing procedure and prove that the resulting discounted price processes are the bid-ask Choquet-Snell envelopes of the discounted payoff process, respectively. Moreover, for an American call option, we prove a generalization of the well-known Merton's theorem [Merton, R.C., Theory of rational option pricing. Bell J. Econ. Manage. Sci., 1973, 4, 141–183] holding for both the bid and the ask price processes. Finally, we introduce a market consistent calibration procedure and show the use of the calibrated model in bid-ask option pricing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces the new class of two-bound core games, where the core can be described by a lower bound and an upper bound on the payoffs of the players. Many classes of games turn out to be two-bound core games. We show that the core of each two-bound core game can be described equivalently by the pair of exact core bounds, and study to what extent the exact core bounds can be stretched while retaining the core description. We provide explicit expressions of the nucleolus for two-bound core games in terms of all pairs of bounds describing the core, using the Talmud rule for bankruptcy problems, and study to what extent these expressions are robust against game changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this research is to delve deeply into the complex dynamics of doping in various sports disciplines, seeking to uncover the underlying mechanisms that contribute to its proliferation. Our approach involves employing ecological and biological models in conjunction with evolutionary game theory, an original aspect of this study. These models will be instrumental in simulating and understanding the intricate interactions and competitive strategies that drive athletes toward doping.The study seeks to propose effective and efficient policies and measures that can be implemented to combat the spread of doping and to identify innovative approaches that could be more effective at deterring athletes from doping, thereby ensuring a fair and level playing field in competitive sports.

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale–Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long‐lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short‐lived players (workers) in every period. I define history‐dependent and self‐enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment and characterize the firms' payoffs. Firms fall into one of two categories: some firms must obtain the same payoff as they would in static stable matchings, and this holds at every patience level; meanwhile, repetition and history dependence can enlarge the set of sustainable payoffs for the other firms, provided that the firms are sufficiently patient. In large matching markets with correlated preferences, the first kind of firms corresponds to "elite" firms that make up at most a vanishingly small fraction of the market. The vast majority of firms fall into the second category. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How to select participants for a sports tournament when they are divided into different sets, and one should find a fair number of slots for each set? We propose to address this question by resorting to standard tools from the fair allocation literature. To frame our discussion, we focus on the increase in the number of participating teams in the FIFA World Cup. We explore the allocation of additional slots among continental confederations. We consider 10 different allocations. Based on our analysis, we can argue that the European soccer confederation (UEFA) has a solid basis to claim for additional slots. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combination of a TU-game and an undirected graph representing cooperation restrictions among the players is called a TU-game with communication structure. For TU-games with communication structure, the average tree solution is defined as the average of the marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all spanning trees of the undirected graph. In this paper, we provide new characterizations for the average tree solution and the Myerson value on the class of TU-games with connected cycle-free communication structure. On this class of games, we show that the average tree solution is the unique solution satisfying linearity, efficiency, satellite symmetry, and satellite marginality. Together with linearity and efficiency, by using network symmetry and network marginality we also characterize the Myerson value and provide a comparison with the average tree solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]