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Job satisfaction is sensitive to economic fluctuations; it rises during economic growth and falls in recessions. Job satisfaction also depends on relative comparisons. For workers less affected by business cycles-as is typical in the public sector-job satisfaction may thus be countercyclical due to comparisons with other sectors. Previous laboratory results confirm this countercyclical trend. This study reports new results from the German Socio-Economic Panel confirming the overall countercyclical job satisfaction trend but also revealing this trend is present only among men, not women. We consider three possible drivers of this gender gap. Competitiveness and pro-sociality differ between men and women both in the laboratory and in the field and plausibly interact with job satisfaction countercyclicality. Another potential explanation of countercyclicality is that men are more commonly the primary household providers. We conducted an experiment to explore these three channels. The experiment replicated the countercyclical job satisfaction trend. While identifying a significant gender gap in competitiveness, pro-sociality, and job satisfaction, we found no difference in job satisfaction cyclicality between men and women, nor a correlation with these traits. Our findings suggest that the fundamental gender differences we identified in the laboratory do not drive the gender differences observed in the survey data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I show that stochastic contracts generate powerful incentives when agents suffer from probability distortion. When implementing these contracts, the principal can target probability distortions in order to inflate the agent's perceived benefits of exerting high levels of effort. This novel source of motivation is absent in contracts traditionally regarded as optimal. A theoretical framework and an experiment demonstrate that stochastic contracts implemented with small probabilities, which expose the agent to a high degree of risk, generate higher performance than cost‐equivalent contracts with lower or no risk exposure. I find that probability distortions that result from likelihood insensitivity—cognitive limitations that prevent the accurate evaluation of probabilities—account for this finding. The results highlight the limits of contracts traditionally regarded as optimal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do people attribute responsibility when an outcome is not caused by an individual but results from a decision chain involving several people? We study this question in an experiment, in which five voters sequentially decide on how to distribute money between them and five recipients. The recipients can reward or punish each voter, which we use as measures of responsibility attribution. In the aggregate, we find that responsibility is attributed mostly according to the voters' choices and the pivotality of the decision, but not for being the initial voter. On the individual level, we find substantial heterogeneity with three overall patterns: Little to no responsibility attribution, pivotality-driven, and focus on choices. These patterns are similar when praising voters for good outcomes and blaming voters for bad outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experimental and behavioral economists, as well as psychologists, commonly assume conditional independence of choices when constructing likelihood functions for structural estimation of choice functions. I test this assumption using data from a new experiment designed for this purpose. Within the limits of the experiment's identifying restriction and designed power to detect deviations from conditional independence, conditional independence is not rejected. In naturally occurring data, concerns about violations of conditional independence are certainly proper and well-taken (for well-known reasons). However, when an experimenter employs the particular experimental mechanisms and designs used here, the findings suggest that conditional independence is an acceptable assumption for analyzing data so generated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does exposure to cognitive load affect key properties of economic behavior? In this experiment, subjects face a series of simple binary decision tasks between prospects, testing for monotonicity in monetary payments, consistency with (first-order) stochastic dominance, reduction of compound lotteries, risk attitudes, and ambiguity attitudes. Cognitive load is manipulated via simultaneous memory tasks. Our data show treatment differences resulting from cognitive load for decision tasks with risky outcomes. However, cognitive load has no impact on monotonicity and ambiguity attitudes. Under a dual-process view of human decision-making, our findings suggest that ambiguity attitudes and preferences for "more certain money" are intuitive, not reasoned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The burnout literature has focused on the determinants of burnout, whereas its careers consequences remain understudied. Therefore, we investigate whether recently burned-out individuals differ in job preferences from non-burned-out workers. We link these differences in preferences with (1) perceptions of job demands and resources, as well as (2) the weighting of such perceptions. To this end, a sample of 582 employees varying in their history of burnout judged job offers with manipulated characteristics in terms of their willingness to apply as well as perceived job demands and resources. We find that recently burned-out employees appreciate possibilities to telework and fixed feedback relatively more, while being relatively less attracted to learning opportunities. These findings can be partially explained by differences in the jobs’ perceived resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We address a concern about the external validity of an experiment conducted with university students related to the representativeness of the sampled population in particular. We do so by conducting large-scale (partly) incentivized online surveys of students at a Japanese university and of a sample of Japanese adults to measure individual characteristics such as cognitive ability, mentalizing skills, preferences for risk and distribution, and personality traits. While significant differences between these two samples are observed in many of these characteristics, the correlational structures among these characteristics are very similar in the two samples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a novel way of measuring trust in institutions, which draws on the experimental method used to elicit time preferences. Our measure is provided in the meaningful metric of the subjective probability of trustworthiness of the trustee. In a lab‐in‐the‐field setting in the Philippines, we measure trust in two different financial institutions. Additionally, we exploit exogenous variation in the eligibility for a future payment to examine whether a promise fulfilled by the institution increases trust and changes individual financial behavior. We find that eligible individuals significantly increase savings held with the institution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We experimentally study how people form predictive models of simple data generating processes (DGPs), by showing subjects data sets and asking them to predict future outputs. We find that subjects: (i) often fail to predict in this task, indicating a failure to form a model, (ii) often cannot explicitly describe the model they have formed even when successful, and (iii) tend to be attracted to the same, simple models when multiple models fit the data. Examining a number of formal complexity metrics, we find that all three patterns are well organized by metrics suggested by Lipman (1995) and Gabaix (2014) that describe the information processing required to deploy models in prediction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although many papers have examined the Saudi stock market, to date none have explored the influence of religiosity on the behavior of stock prices, taking into account the dominance of individual investors. These characteristics distinguish the Saudi stock market from other mature and immature markets. Therefore, we study the reaction of the Saudi stock market to announcements by imams regarding firms' sharia compliance, using a two-step procedure. First, we distribute a questionnaire to gauge individual opinions about imams' announcements. Then, we conduct an appropriate event-study to capture the potential abnormal returns. Our findings indicate that imams’ announcements convey valuable information to the stock market.

We compare efficiency-enhancing cooperation and its underlying motives in Iceland and the US. The two countries are distinct along all measures of national culture known to us. They are however both developed democracies with similar GDP/capita (PPP adjusted). These similarities make it possible to hold constant aspects of culture related to wealth and institutions. In an experimental Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM), we prime the participants with different social foci, emphasizing either their directly cooperating team or their wider social unit. With a team focus, cooperation levels do not differ between the two cultures, but this superficial similarity masks deep-seated differences: When the focus is on the wider social unit cooperation increases in Iceland and declines in the US. Both when the contribution levels are the same and when they differ, members of the two cultures differ in their motives to cooperate: Icelanders tend to cooperate unconditionally, and US subjects conditionally with a strong emphasis on reciprocity. Our findings indicate that different cultures can achieve similar economic and societal performance through different cultural norms and suggest that cooperation should be encouraged through culturally tailored persuasion tactics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether voluntary sanctions induce subjects to coordinate more efficiently in a repeated minimum-effort game. While most groups first experience Pareto inferior coordination in a baseline treatment, the level of effort increases substantially once ex post sanctioning opportunities are introduced, that is, when one can assign costly punishment points to other group members to reduce their payoffs. We compare the effect of this voluntary punishment possibility with the effect of ex post costless communication, which in contrast to the punishment treatment increases efforts only temporarily and fails to bring the players to higher payoff equilibria permanently. Our results indicate that decentralized sanctions can play an important role as a coordination device in Pareto-ranked coordination settings. They also suggest that the motivations behind voluntary sanctions may be more general than usually put forth in the literature on cooperation games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic preferences are often taken as given, yet evidence shows that preferences respond to life events and change over time. We examine the evolution of other-regarding preferences for a cohort of university students over 5 years, starting before they matriculate and extending one year beyond graduation. Using survey and incentivized measures of preferences, we show that altruism declines over the university years. This decline is reflected in changes in charitable giving over three donation opportunities. We rule out several alternative explanations for the observed change, including cohort differences, perceptions of the charities, and experience with experiments. We show evidence of a 'giving type' in charitable giving, with consistency in behavior across giving opportunities. Methodologically, we also show that the incentivized and survey measures are similar at predicting giving types. We conclude that preferences reflect common tendencies over time, while simultaneously showing an overall decline in generosity during the university years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Donations are often made through charitable intermediaries that can fund themselves from these same donations. After intermediation, only a fraction of the amount donated may reach the intended beneficiary. The price of charitable output is therefore higher after intermediation than if donors donated directly toward the end cause. At the same time, this price is hidden from donors since they cannot verify how much intermediaries pass on. We show that while donors reduce their donation in intermediation itself, and also reduce their donation because they expect the price of charitable output to increase, both reactions are either fully or partly compensated by their ethical preferences for the recipient's rights. Charitable output, therefore, can be a Giffen-good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]