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This article argues for the importance of considering ideology in any analysis of major political judgements. Through an exploration of British Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron's judgement – an actor sometimes referred to as a pragmatist – the article shows that to understand why a referendum was held on Britain's membership of the EU, we must consider Cameron's ideology. His interpretation of conservatism showed an affinity with 'reform to conserve' – an idea that functions like a metaphor within British Conservative traditions for interpreting a core political concept within conservatism: that of managing what Freeden has called the 'problem of change'. In setting out Cameron's beliefs, and his perception of the beliefs and actions of others, the contingency of the referendum judgement is revealed – and existing explanations for the referendum decision are reframed. Narratives that approach an 'inevitability thesis' regarding Cameron's decision should be resisted. Instead, we should recognize and consider the beliefs that inform such narratives and the assumptions they make. Outcomes based on ideological motivations can be unintended or even appear contradictory. For Cameron, a strategy of 'reform to conserve' resulted in something close to a political revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the main idea of the governments of David Cameron after 2010, the Big Society intended to place civil society at the heart of the Conservative agenda while also serving as a rhetorical tool to distance the 'modern' Conservative party from the Thatcherite legacy. In comparing Margaret Thatcher's view on citizenship to the one upheld by David Cameron, this article argues that despite many similarities, Cameron broke with Thatcher in the way he reinterpreted the nature of the state, as well as how he planned to remake civil society and to inspire 'active citizenship'. Unlike Thatcher, who believed that a dynamic civil society would spontaneously flourish once the state was reduced, Cameron believed that society could be rebuilt only through the work of the state. From this perspective, it is possible to reassess the academic debate about the Big Society and to regard it not as a means of justifying a smaller state at a time of economic austerity, but rather as an initiative which failed at least in part because of austerity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As factionalism becomes increasingly prominent within the Conservative Party, understanding the worldviews of the respective groupings has become key to understanding the party itself. This is especially true regarding the one nation group which is the most numerous in Parliament. From the Cameron era, the term 'one nation' expressed leaders' attempts to modernise the party, reckon with the Thatcherite social legacy, and carve out a distinct centre‐right identity which contained both socially liberal and distinctly conservative elements. However, reconciling 'modern' and 'conservative' views has been singularly difficult. Whilst bridging the two rhetorically and intellectually has been possible, leaders have struggled to translate such a synthesis into a viable governmental agenda that unites the party. Underlying this difficulty is fierce disagreement on immigration, sovereignty, nationhood and cosmopolitanism, resulting in one nation conservatism becoming a signal of intra‐party disagreement rather than unifying leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Case for Conservatism is the first report of the Onward think tank's Commission on The Future of Conservatism. It examines present discontents and offers a set of principles for addressing them. It argues that Conservatives need to shift their ideological position away from the economic liberalism of Margaret Thatcher and the social liberalism of David Cameron and adopt a position which is socially conservative and economically interventionist in order to rebuild a successful electoral coalition and an effective programme for government. They seek to re‐found Conservatism on the pillars of family, community and nation, and the obligations of citizenship rather than the freedom of the individual. They provide a distinctive voice on where Conservatism has gone wrong and how it should change, but they may struggle to become the dominant voice shaping the party's future, because the doctrines of economic liberalism still command strong support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK's referendum vote to leave the EU in June 2016 generated deep divisions in British politics. It led to the resignation of incumbent Prime Minister David Cameron the following day, and an inability to deliver Brexit led to the resignation of his successor Theresa May in 2019. In addition, it has led to a number of legal challenges to the policies and processes of implementing these by both May's and Boris Johnson's governments. Those who support leaving the EU have characterised this period as one of 'crisis', in which politicians—unable to agree on a means of leaving—were pitted against the electorate or public will. Judicial challenges to the terms of exit and means of achieving Brexit were further incorporated into notions of crisis to the extent that failure to implement Brexit was portrayed as a crisis affecting the entire political system, or a constitutional crisis. In this article, we unpack this discourse, and by distinguishing between different forms of crises challenge the existing understanding of Brexit as a constitutional crisis. Rather, we suggest that these problems stemmed from constitutional weaknesses, specifically that the constitution is based on a reductionist understanding of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of the 2011 England riots, the then Prime Minister David Cameron referred to a 'small number of families as the source of a large number of problems in society' (Cameron, 2011). Soon after, the Troubled Families Programme was set up by the government to 'turn around' 120,000 troubled families. Despite government rhetoric focusing on 'neighbours from hell' (ibid.) the initial estimate of the number of troubled families did not include any indicators of problematic behaviours, such as crime or anti-social behaviour. Instead, a measure previously used by government to classify families with multiple social and economic disadvantages was used (Social Exclusion Task Force, 2007a). This article revisits the research behind the initial identification of the 120,000 troubled families and explores more widely the overlap between families with multiple social and economic disadvantage and their engagement in problematic behaviours. Our reanalysis of the original research data reveals that although families experiencing multiple social and economic disadvantage were at an increased risk of displaying problematic behaviour, only a small minority did so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his rhetoric on Britain and Britishness, David Cameron sets out a vision of the nation and its national story built upon the premise of exceptionalism. I argue this was challenging to reconcile with continued EU membership. His efforts to rhetorically define the nation and his ethos subsequently came to undermine his stewardship of the Remain campaign and Britain's EU membership. In this article, I analyse Cameron's party conference rhetoric on Britain and Britishness between 2006 and 2015 using the framework of Rhetorical Political Analysis. I argue that Cameron styles the nation as in possession of an exceptional history, spirit, and set of values. The British people are said to be uniquely principled, generous, and tolerant, with an uncommon aptitude for leadership. Additionally, the country is framed as having an exceptional past, present, and future. His conception of Britishness, built upon the myth of exceptionalism, jars with continued membership of the EU due to contrasting values, and along with his Eurosceptic credentials, ultimately left a weak foundation for the Remain campaign in 2016. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes strategies and tactics used in online political communication. It examines political actors' communication traits and how they affect Facebook users' engagement. The focus of the article lies on different dimensions of personalization and how they are used as tactics. To answer these questions, I conducted a manual content analysis of posts from Barack Obama's and David Cameron's Facebook pages published from 2008 to 2016. Negative binomial regressions were used to estimate the effects of different predictors of users' engagement. The findings suggest that both leaders used Facebook primarily as a tool to communicate about political topics, mobilize supporters, and display their political and private virtues. In the context of personalization of communication, the study identifies three main levels of privatization--low, medium, and high. Furthermore, the analysis of users' interactions on Facebook pages (likes, comments, and shares) revealed that citizens preferred privatized and emotionalized posts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit has occasioned a rightward shift in British politics as successive leaders have grappled with the difficulties of negotiating with the European Union and the vicissitudes of politics in the governing Conservative party. Explanations for the hardening of Eurosceptic preferences focus on the demands of 'taking back control' and the polarisation of post-referendum politics as key drivers. But they have not explored the ways in which negotiation strategies shaped – rather than reflected – domestic political developments. Drawing on two-level games accounts of 'synergistic' bargaining, this article argues both David Cameron and Theresa May sought to leverage Eurosceptic sentiment in their respective negotiations to make it more credible the United Kingdom would walk away if its demands were rejected. While both leaders failed to convey their resolve, they inadvertently strengthened Eurosceptic constituencies back home, contributing to the paucity – and the rejection – of their negotiated agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit was often associated with a recent upsurge of populism in Western democracies, with the idea of re-engaging with the people being construed as a populist strategy to disengage from Europe. This article seeks to explore the populist hypothesis by stepping outside the dominant literature on populism to take a closer look at Peter Mair's 'populist democracy' as applied to two defining moments: David Cameron's decision to hold a referendum on EU membership and Boris Johnson's process of implementing Brexit. Mair's notion encompasses two aspects—procedural and substantive populism—which seem to apply to both moments. While Cameron's long leadership (2005–2016) reveals changes in governing practices and party management which have altered the nature of the relationship between the leader and the 'people', Boris Johnson's (2019–) more contemporary leadership can be described as an illustration of a new populist rhetoric in its combination of hard Brexit, anti-immigration and anti-Parliament discourse. Although both leaderships expose ingredients of Mair's two variants of populism, the 'populist hypothesis' does not hold in the light of the type of leaders that Cameron and Johnson have actually turned out to be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

David Cameron's leadership of the Conservatives took as its starting point the assumption that the party needed to modernise, requiring a move towards the political 'centre ground'. This shift presented the party leadership with a series of challenges, including brand detoxification, party management, and policy renewal. Modernisation also implied ideological change, to distance the Conservatives from the legacy of Thatcherism and realign conservatism with the values of a wider section of the electorate. In this respect, Cameronite modernisation can be judged a failure. This article suggests that ontological contradictions inherent in central elements of Cameron's conservatism, specifically the 'Big Society' and the 'social justice agenda', fatally undermined its ideological coherence. It argues that this is an important and hitherto overlooked part of the explanation for the shortcomings of Conservative Party modernisation as a political project. Although this is only one part in a wider explanation for the failure of Conservative modernisation, this case study demonstrates that ontological assumptions matter in political practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a critical narrative analysis of the way recent Conservative leaders have used storytelling to talk about themselves and reinforce their political ethos during the annual party conferences. We will use David Cameron’s transformative tenure as a starting point, as he tried to usher in a new Conservative creed, more compassionate and voluntarily different from Thatcherism. We will then see how his successors have also resorted to narratives to establish a strong political ethos. The main objective of the article is to examine the evolution of the image of the Conservative leader and to assess the role storytelling has played in this important communicational process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This section offers parliamentary news briefs in Great Britain as of January 2024. Topics discussed include the Parliament's holding of the King's Speech with King Charles III which is the first King's Speech since 1950, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak's move to reshuffle the Cabinet appointing former prime minister David Cameron as foreign secretary, and the introduction of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill.

Prime Minister Boris Johnson's decision to merge DFID with the FCO in June 2020 subordinated development policy to an ill-defined conception of the national interest. It represented the latest twist in the Conservative Party's fluctuating relationship with the institutionalisation of development policy in Whitehall since 1964. This article contextualises that evolving debate within the Conservative Party, situating it alongside parallel developments in the relationship between DFID and other Whitehall departments since 1997. The article argues that intra-party Conservative debate about DFID is disconnected from the contemporary history of institutional reform and interdepartmental coordination, both during the New Labour years and under Conservative-led governments since 2010. The article emphasises the specific domestic political context of David Cameron's commitment as Conservative leader to support DFID's independence and increase development spending, highlighting the equivocal reception of his commitments on the right of the party. The article concludes with criticism of the logic of the Johnson administration's case for the merger, underlining its similarity with Thatcher era arguments. The merger highlights salient differences between Johnson's and Cameron's electoral challenges and party statecraft strategies, reflecting changes in the party and its electoral coalition since the 2016 EU referendum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of "Britain and Europe" that David Cameron emphasised in his speech on 23 January 2013 is a curious one -it evokes a shared history full of intricate twists, which spans over several centuries, and at the same time, preserves the apparent incompatibility of the island nation and the continent. Cameron even proposed an "in-out referendum" to determine the future of the British people, and its realisation in 2016 made Brexit an unexpected reality and signifies a crucial setback in the recent history of the European project. Brexit is furthermore an expression of "a perceived cultural distinction between Britain and Europe" (Spiering 2015) that seems to persist in British discourse specifically. The paper thus uses Menno Spiering's concept of "British Euroscepticism" (2004), a unique form of Euroscepticism in terms of history, politics and culture, to discuss the cultural aspects of British differentness as entailing not only an opposition to Europe but also a potential to reflect on shared values and experiences. Based on this, the paper will trace the presentation of Europe in contemporary literature that emerged as a reaction to Brexit, especially poetry by Simon Armitage, Sean O'Brien and David Clarke, to ascertain the British perspective on the continent as either the paradigmatic Other or a constituent part for defining British identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The royal prerogative is one of the most significant elements of the UK's government and constitution. During the premiership of Gordon Brown and the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition led by David Cameron, there was momentum for a reform of the royal prerogative. During the Conservative premiership of Theresa May, the impetus for reform of the royal prerogative has seemingly diminished. This article analyses how the UK Government has made use of the royal prerogative in terms of deploying the armed forces, making and unmaking international treaties and proroguing Parliament. It asserts that while such powers have not been compromised, the ability of Prime Ministers to use them without parliamentary consent has been subject to greater contestation. This has appeared to rein in the discretion of Prime Ministers. However, this article argues that Prime Ministers' discretion has in fact become more meaningful as their political capital is invested in decisions concerning prerogative powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recognizing that the past does not necessarily pass of its own accord but rather is made to pass is crucial for understanding relationships between collective memory, temporality and the past. Analyzing processes of temporal negotiation reveals that changing the ending (or, in some cases creating one at all) requires re‐envisioning the entire sequence of events. Thus, the ending (if there is one) depends on the beginning. British prime ministers' references to 9/11 in public addresses demonstrate this process of temporal negotiation about whether and how to create an ending. Tony Blair constructed the attacks as a legacy, thus sustaining the past as part of the present. To unwind this construction and consign 9/11 to the past, Gordon Brown and David Cameron needed to disrupt the flow of contingent incidents in which Blair had embedded 9/11. By redefining the narrative's beginning, they made it possible to bring 9/11 to an end. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the most recent Conservative Party Conference, the British Prime Minster David Cameron ridiculed Richard Murphy's I Joy of Tax: i "64 positions and none of them work", the badly delivered punchline went. The Gates Foundation's now US$42 billion endowment (p. 25), McGoey submits, cannot be definitively exposed as a disingenuous sleight of hand. Despite the apparent antipathy between Murphy's earnest progressivism and Cameron's faux jocularity, however, the world occupied by the tax enthusiasts, on the one side, and the tax adversaries, on the other, no longer exists, if ever it did. [Extracted from the article]

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Emotions are inseparable part of speeches of political leaders, however, they often continue to be omitted from discourse analysis, even though they can influence the political behaviour of citizens. The literature analysing emotions in discourse in speeches made by British leaders is still limited and this article attempts to fill this gap. It analyses the presence and evocation of emotions in 50 speeches in total delivered by the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, using the NVivo software for qualitative analysis. The article analyses speeches delivered between 9/11 and 2019 by Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Theresa May. It finds that all of the analysed Prime Ministers use emotions in their speeches, both positive and negative. Even though each Prime Minister uses these emotions to a different extent, they all attempt to influence public opinion and gain support for counterterrorism policies. This demonstrates that Prime Ministers may be contributing to the problem by manipulating emotions and creating fear and hate in society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thinking back, it could be argued that Britain was preparing to leave the European Union almost as soon as it joined in 1973. Within two years, opposition to membership led Prime Minister Harold Wilson to call a referendum. The public voted overwhelmingly to stay. But the honeymoon was short-lived. For Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Brexit was all about getting sovereignty back. The United Kingdom would take back control of its money, borders, laws and waters. But as the detail of the recent treaty is examined, his claims may turn out to be as vacuous as Chamberlain's 'peace in our time' proclamations. Cracks are already appearing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the unsuccessful attempt by US President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron to rebrand the ties between their countries as 'the essential relationship'. The failure of that initiative revealed the enduring attachment of ordinary Britons to the notion of a UK–US 'special relationship' regardless of how accurately it reflected the changing reality of the two nations' interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]