10 results on '"CAPITAL OWNERS"'
Search Results
2. A Solution Is in Sight for the ESG Controversy.
- Author
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Ramaswamy, Vivek
- Subjects
- *
ENVIRONMENTAL responsibility , *SHAREHOLDER activism , *ASSET management , *SUSTAINABLE investing , *BUSINESS enterprises , *LEGAL liability - Published
- 2023
3. 'Det rättvisaste är utan tvekan, att personalen i samtliga fabriker ha lika stora förtjänstmöjligheter' : Moralisk ekonomi i relationen mellan arbetare och kapitalägare
- Author
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Brunnström, Pål
- Subjects
Moral economy ,Wehtje ,Humanities and the Arts ,Humaniora och konst ,Cement ,Capital ,Slite ,Capital owners - Abstract
E.P. Thompsons lanserade 1971 begreppet ”moral economy” som ett sätt att begripliggöra arbetarklassprotester i England under 1700-talet. Kraven handlade om att priserna på bröd och spannmål skulle sättas utifrån moraliska principer snarare än marknadsekonomiska. Thompson exkluderar explicit paternalism och de praktiker av över och underordning som kopplas till begreppet från det han menar med moralisk ekonomi, men den här texten argumenterar för att det finns ett värde i att vidga begreppet till att omfatta alla typer av moraliskt och etiskt baserade ekonomiska logiker. Moralisk ekonomi används då som ett generiskt begrepp för att mer allmänt tänka kring de normer som gäller för ekonomiska relationer, bortom de specifika historiska skeendena. Ansatsen ligger i linje med James C Scotts användning av begreppet och det sätt som det använts i senare forskning. De teoritiska poängerna illustreras utifrån ett empiriska material och forskningsläge som behandlar vad som hände i den lilla gotländska orten Slite när den tidigare lokalt ägda cementfabriken 1931 köptes upp av storkoncernen Skånska Cementaktiebolaget. Materialet består i huvudsak av brev skriva till och av Ernst Wehtje den yngre, verkställande direktör för Skånska Cementaktiebolaget och centralfigur i Wehtje-koncernen, en av dåtidens mäktigaste företagsgrupper, samt högerpolitiker och ledande person i Industriförbundet. Moralisk ekonomi används i texten som ett sätt att betona föränderligheten i de värderingssystem som styr ekonomiska praktiker, hur de kan sammansmälta och förhandlas med alternativa moraluppsättningar och utifrån föränderliga maktrelationer. Begreppet ska inte ställas i motsättning till analyser som lyfter fram materiellt baserade maktordningar som klass, utan att den moraliska ekonomin blir det ideologiska uttryck som används för att förklara och legitimera de maktordningar som uppstår även utifrån andra logiker. Särskilt betonas de dubbelriktade relationer mellan arbetare och kapitalägare som är synliga i exemplet, där uppfattningar om legitima krav från arbetargrupper sammanvävs med föreställningar om kapitalägarnas förpliktelser, i linje med delar av forskningsläget och i anslutning till Gramscis hegemonibegrepp. E.P. Thompsons suggested in 1971 the concept of "moral economy" as a way of understanding working class protests in England in the 18th century. The protestors demand was that prices for bread and cereals would be based on moral principles rather than market economy. Thompson explicitly excludes paternalism and practises of domination and subordination linked to the term from what he means by moral economy, but this text argues that there is a merit in broadening the concept to all types of morally and ethically based logics of economy. Moral economy is thus used as a generic term to think more generally about the norms of economic relations, beyond the specific historical events. This approach is in line with James C Scott's use of the term and the way it has been used in resent research. The theoretical arguments are illustrated by an empirical material and research about what happened 1931 in the small town Slite on the island Gotland in Sweden, when the formerly locally owned cement plant was bought by the large group Skånska Cementaktiebolaget. The material consists mainly of letters written to and by Ernst Wehtje Jr., CEO of Skånska Cementaktiebolaget and the central figure in the Wehtje Group, at the time one of the most powerful corporate groups in Sweden, as well as a right wing politicians and leading person in the Industrial Federation. Moral economy is used in this text as a way to emphasize the changing character of the value systems that govern economic practises, how they can negotiate and merge with alternative sets of moral codes and in interaction with changing power relations. The concept should not be seen in opposition to analyses that emphasize material power relation such as a class, but instead that moral economy can be seen as the ideological framework used to explain and legitimize the power relations that arise from other logics. A particular emphasis is on the bi-directional relations between workers and owners that are visible in the example, where perceptions of legitimate demands from the workers are entwined with notions of obligations for the owners of capital. This in line with parts of the research field and connected to Gramsci's concept hegemony.
- Published
- 2017
4. Ägare och kapital : klass och genus hos kapitalägare i Sverige 1918-1939
- Author
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Brunnström, Pål
- Subjects
History ,Ernst Wehtje ,family ,gender ,masculinity ,capital owners ,capitalists ,Ann-Ida Broström ,Dan Broström ,Class - Abstract
"Owners and capital. Class and gender among capital owners in Sweden 1918-1939" The thesis examines practices of gender and class among capital owners in Sweden during the period 1918-1939, through the analysis of two of the most powerful families of the time: Broström and Wehtje. The theoretical frame is an attempt to develop an intersectional perspective through the combination of several theoretical perspectives: Eric Olin Wright's model of class analysis; Pierre Bourdieu´s concept of social and cultural capital, Raewyn Connell´s understanding of gender and hegemonic masculinity and Robert Miles analysis of racism through the term racialisation. The empirical material is a qualitative text analysis based on personal/private letters and business correspondence. Four relevant outcomes have been identified. The first one point to the difficulties in defining class on the basis of cultural criteria due to the variation in cultural practices among capital owners, which make the group appear as elusive and contradictory. Instead, the thesis argues for a distinction between class as position, which in line with Wright’s model is defined by the relation to the means of production, and class as a practice, which is examined on the basis of Bourdieu's metaphor of cultural and social capital. The second highlights variations in the practices of masculinity visible in the empirical material, variations that confirms Demetriakis Demetrious’ expansion of the concept of hegemonic masculinity toward the notion of a hegemonic block. The third illuminates the concept of moral economy as a means to analyse the contradictory norms that shaped and regulated the capital owner´s economic behaviour. The study also analyses the emotional regime expressed in the ways through which the capital owners studied relate to key topics as technology and management, and emphasises how norms and emotions influence economic decisions. Finally, some women within these families had, despite their subordinated position, an arena for agency and relative autonomy. Avhandlingen är en fallstudie som undersöker praktiker av klass och kön hos kapitalägare i Sverige under perioden 1918-1939, utifrån exempel från två av tidens mäktigaste familjer: Broström och Wehtje. Den teoretiska utgångspunkten är ett försök att ur ett intersektionellt perspektiv förena en klassanalys utifrån Eric Olin Wrights modell med Bourdieus begrepp socialt och kulturellt kapital, kombinerat med analyser av genus framför allt inspirerade framför allt av Raewyn Connells begrepp hegemonisk maskulinitet och analyser av rasism utifrån Robert Miles begrepp rasifiering. Det undersökta materialet utgörs i huvudsak av personliga brev och affärskorrespondens vilka analyserats i en kvalitativ textanalys. Undersökningens har fyra centrala teoretiska poänger. För det första att klass är svårt att definiera utifrån kulturella kriterier, då variationen i kulturella praktiker gör att gruppen kapitalägare framstår som svårfångad och motsägelsefull. Istället argumenteras för en uppdelning i klass som position, som i linje med Wrights modell definieras utifrån relationen till produktionsmedlen, och klass som praktik vilket undersöks utifrån Bourdieus kapitalmetafor. Undersökningens andra poäng är att lyfta fram spännvidden i de maskulinitetspraktiker som blir synliga i materialet, något som bekräfta Demetriakis Demetrious utveckling av begreppet hegemonisk maskulinitet till att förstås som ett hegemoniskt block, där de maskulinitetsuttryck som knyts till gruppen kapitalägare förstås som föränderliga och motsägelsefulla. En tredje poäng är att lyfta fram begreppet moralisk ekonomi som ett redskap för att fånga in de motsägelsefulla praktiker och normsystem som styrde kapitalägarnas ekonomiska agerande. Undersökningen betonar också den emotionella dimension som kapitalägarna gav uttryck för i relation till teknik och administration, något som understryker behovet av att analysera hur känslor och normer påverkar ekonomiska överväganden. En fjärde poäng berör det handlingsutrymme som kvinnor hade inom familjerna, där undersökningen visar att även om en genushierarki som premierade underordnade femininitetskonstruktioner upprätthölls, så fanns det ett visst utrymme för självständigt agerande och alternativ kvinnligheter från några av de här undersökta kvinnorna.
- Published
- 2014
5. Agricultural Price Distortions, Inequality, and Poverty : Introduction and Summary
- Author
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Anderson, Kym, Cockburn, John, and Martin, Will
- Subjects
REDUCTION IN POVERTY ,CUSTOMS ,NONFARM INCOME ,INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS ,PRICE SUBSIDIES ,SOCIAL PROGRAMS ,GLOBAL POVERTY ,VALUE ADDED ,EXTREME POVERTY ,WORLD TRADE ,DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS ,HOUSEHOLD INCOMES ,TRADE POLICY REFORM ,COMMODITIES ,AGRICULTURAL LAND ,CONSUMER PRICES ,TRADE DISTORTIONS ,NATIONAL ECONOMIES ,UNEMPLOYMENT ,INCOME ,AGRICULTURAL SECTORS ,FARM INCOME ,TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ,FARM INCOMES ,URBANIZATION ,POOR FARM HOUSEHOLDS ,HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION ,FARM WORK ,FARMERS ,CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE ,SKILLED WORKERS ,PRICE INCREASES ,POVERTY IMPACT ,EMERGING ECONOMIES ,MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS ,REGIONAL AVERAGES ,LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES ,REGIONAL AVERAGE ,GLOBAL ECONOMY ,DEMAND CURVE ,PURCHASING POWER ,TRADE BARRIERS ,RURAL POOR ,NATIONAL POVERTY LINE ,EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES ,POVERTY LEVEL ,INCOME INEQUALITY ,INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS ,ELASTICITY ,INCOME TAXES ,DEVELOPMENT POLICY ,POVERTY REDUCTION ,POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS ,CAPITAL OWNERS ,IMPORT BARRIERS ,MULTILATERAL TRADE REFORM ,MULTILATERAL TRADE ,TRADE IN SERVICES ,WEALTH ,PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH ,CONSUMERS ,NATIONAL POVERTY HEADCOUNT ,HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ,WTO ,GDP ,MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION ,COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY ,FARM WORKERS ,POLITICAL ECONOMY ,TAXATION ,ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ,EXPORT DEMAND ,INCOME TAX ,EXPORTS ,EXTERNAL TRADE ,UNSKILLED LABOR ,ECONOMETRICS ,INTERNATIONAL TRADE ,RURAL HUMAN CAPITAL ,EXCHANGE RATE ,POOR PEOPLE ,AGRICULTURAL PRICES ,ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ,LIVESTOCK ACTIVITIES ,MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ,SOCIAL SAFETY NETS ,POVERTY DATA ,FARM PRODUCTS ,BENCHMARK DATA ,TARIFF REVENUE ,TAX REVENUES ,IMPORT COMPETITION ,DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ,GLOBAL MARKETS ,REAL GDP ,POVERTY LINES ,TARIFF PROTECTION ,ECONOMIC SIZE ,GLOBALIZATION ,INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES ,POVERTY ALLEVIATION ,IMPERFECT COMPETITION ,RURAL ,TRADE TAXES ,ECONOMIES OF SCALE ,FOREIGN DEBT ,HOUSEHOLD HEAD ,FACTORS OF PRODUCTION ,VOLATILITY ,INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL ,TRADE LIBERALIZATION ,MARKET ACCESS ,ADVERSE EFFECT ,RURAL BASE ,GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ,DEVELOPING COUNTRY ,ECONOMIC GROWTH ,ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ,DOMESTIC PRICE ,COMMODITY ,TERMS OF TRADE ,FARM LABOR ,RURAL HOUSEHOLDS ,EXTREME POVERTY LINE ,PARTICULAR COUNTRY ,POOR ,CONSUMER DEMAND ,HOUSEHOLD WELFARE ,TRADE TAX ,FINANCIAL CRISIS ,CUSTOMS REVENUE ,FOOD PRICES ,INCOME SHOCKS ,GINI COEFFICIENT ,AGRICULTURAL TRADE ,TRADE DATA ,EXPORT TAX ,TRADE POLICY ,RAPID GROWTH ,DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME ,WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ,INCOME DYNAMICS ,POVERTY REDUCING ,DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ,EXPORT PRICES ,AGRICULTURAL LIBERALIZATION ,TAX REVENUE ,RURAL INCOME ,WAGES ,SHOPS ,OPEN ECONOMY ,RURAL AREAS ,RURAL POVERTY ,LABOR MARKET ,NATIONAL ECONOMY ,PARTICULAR COUNTRIES ,GDP PER CAPITA ,DEBT ,COST OF CAPITAL ,MULTILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ,DIVIDEND ,TRADE POLICIES ,PROTECTIONIST ,EXTREMELY POOR PEOPLE ,TRADE POLICY REFORMS ,AGRICULTURAL POLICY ,HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS ,INEQUALITY ,TRADE REFORMS ,GOVERNMENT BUDGETS ,AGRICULTURE ,AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ,DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ,FREE ACCESS ,FREE TRADE ,MACROECONOMIC POLICIES ,RURAL INEQUALITY ,IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ,WAGE RATES ,IRRIGATION ,TRADE-DISTORTING POLICIES ,PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS ,TOTAL POVERTY ,INCOME DISTRIBUTION ,INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ,NATIONAL POVERTY ,GLOBAL TRADE ,PRODUCT MARKETS ,FARMER ,BENCHMARK ,GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS ,FARM HOUSEHOLDS ,TRANSITION ECONOMIES ,AGRICULTURAL INCOMES ,POVERTY HEADCOUNT INDEX ,AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ,INCIDENCE OF POVERTY ,HOUSEHOLD INCOME ,INCOME GAP ,POVERTY INCIDENCE ,TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ,IMPORTS ,BENEFITS OF TRADE ,FOOD MARKETS ,POOR HOUSEHOLDS ,AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS ,POWER PARITY ,PRICE DISTORTIONS ,REGIONAL LEVELS ,DOMESTIC PRICES ,FOREIGN CURRENCY ,POVERTY RATE ,NATIONAL MODELS ,PRICE DISTORTION ,EXPORT TAXES - Abstract
Reforms in recent decades have sharply reduced the distortions affecting agriculture in developing countries, particularly by cuts to agricultural export taxes and by some reductions in government assistance to agriculture in high-income countries, but international trade in farm products continues to be far more distorted than trade in nonfarm goods. This paper summarizes a series of empirical studies that focus on the effects of the remaining distortions to world merchandise trade for poverty and inequality, especially in developing countries. To obtain different insights into the various impacts, two global studies are undertaken using the World Bank's Linkage model, one multi-country study uses the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, and ten country case studies are also included, each using a national economy-wide model. The Linkage model results suggest that liberalization will reduce international inequality, largely by boosting farm incomes and raising real wages for unskilled workers in developing countries, and will reduce the number of poor people worldwide by 3 percent. The analysis based on the GTAP model for a sample of 15 countries, and the ten stand-alone national case studies, all point to larger reductions in poverty, especially if only the non-poor are subjected to increased income taxation to compensate for the loss of trade tax revenue.
- Published
- 2009
6. Welfare and Poverty Effects of Global Agricultural and Trade Policies Using the Linkage Model
- Author
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Anderson, Kym, Valenzuela, Ernesto, and van der Mensbrugghe, Dominique
- Subjects
CUSTOMS ,EXPORT SUBSIDIES ,REAL INCOME ,TERMS OF TRADE EFFECTS ,VALUE ADDED ,EXTREME POVERTY ,WORLD TRADE ,FOOD PRICE ,TRADE POLICY REFORM ,COMMODITIES ,AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION ,AGRICULTURAL LAND ,EXTERNALITIES ,CONSUMER PRICES ,TRADE DISTORTIONS ,UNEMPLOYMENT ,INCOME ,FARM INCOME ,TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ,BANANAS ,FARM INCOMES ,DAIRY PRODUCTS ,TARIFF RATE ,TRADE PREFERENCES ,CONSUMER PRICE INDEX ,PRIMARY PRODUCTS ,TRADE AGREEMENTS ,AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS ,FARMERS ,CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE ,REAL EXCHANGE RATE ,SKILLED WORKERS ,IMPORT TARIFF ,WELFARE GAINS ,SUGAR ,ECONOMIC SECTORS ,GLOBAL OUTPUT ,AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES ,GLOBAL ECONOMY ,FARM PRODUCTION ,DOMESTIC MARKETS ,IMPORT PROTECTION ,EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES ,RAW MILK ,APPAREL ,BORDER MEASURES ,AGRICULTURAL POLICIES ,ELASTICITY ,DEVELOPMENT POLICY ,EXPORT ,FOOD PRODUCTION ,CAPITAL OWNERS ,FARM VALUE ,IMPORT BARRIERS ,MULTILATERAL TRADE ,VEGETABLE OILS ,AGRICULTURAL TARIFF ,TARIFF REVENUES ,PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ,PUBLIC GOOD ,PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH ,CONSUMERS ,AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUPPORTS ,REDUCTION IN TARIFFS ,WTO ,GDP ,AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS ,TRADE BALANCE ,BASE YEAR ,POLITICAL ECONOMY ,TAXATION ,GLOBAL TRADE ANALYSIS ,ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ,EXPORT DEMAND ,INCOME TAX ,EXPORTS ,UNSKILLED LABOR ,GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL ,CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE ,REGIONALISM ,EXCHANGE RATE ,PRODUCTION STRUCTURES ,HOUSEHOLDS ,PREFERENTIAL ACCESS ,EXPORT SUBSIDY ,PRICE FLUCTUATIONS ,FARM PRODUCTS ,AGRICULTURAL GOODS ,BENCHMARK DATA ,FULL LIBERALIZATION ,URUGUAY ROUND ,TARIFF REVENUE ,AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY ,DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ,GLOBAL MARKETS ,INTERVENTION MEASURES ,MARKET FAILURES ,ECONOMIC SIZE ,GLOBALIZATION ,CROPS ,FOREIGN INVESTMENT ,POVERTY ALLEVIATION ,NEW MARKETS ,COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE ,TRADE TAXES ,LOSS OF TARIFF REVENUE ,TERMS OF TRADE EFFECT ,BILATERAL TARIFFS ,FACTORS OF PRODUCTION ,FINANCIAL FLOWS ,AGGREGATE IMPORTS ,INTERNATIONAL PRICES ,TRADE LIBERALIZATION ,MARKET ACCESS ,DOMESTIC PRODUCTION ,TAX RATES ,AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS ,TAX ,FARM SECTOR ,RATE QUOTAS ,GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ,DEVELOPING COUNTRY ,AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM ,BEET ,FARM ,TARIFF BARRIERS ,TARIFF LINE ,MILK ,AGRICULTURAL VALUE ,ECONOMIC WELFARE ,TERMS OF TRADE ,AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ,TRADABLE GOODS ,PERFECT COMPETITION ,TRADE PATTERNS ,CUSTOMS REVENUE ,GLOBAL COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ,IMPORT TARIFFS ,EXOGENOUS SHOCKS ,IMPACT OF TRADE ,AGRICULTURAL MARKETS ,COTTON ,GINI COEFFICIENT ,AGRICULTURAL TRADE ,PROTECTION DATA ,TRADE POLICY ,DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME ,WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ,COUNTRY MARKETS ,MARGINAL COSTS ,DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ,AGRICULTURAL PRICE ,GLOBAL EXPORTS ,EXPORTERS ,ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ,FARMS ,INTERNATIONAL MARKETS ,WAGES ,APPLIED TARIFF ,NATIONAL INCOME ,UNILATERAL REFORMS ,NATIONAL ECONOMY ,COST OF CAPITAL ,TARIFF STRUCTURE ,EXPORT PRICE ,FATS ,TRADE POLICIES ,VOLUME ,DOMESTIC SALES ,TRADE POLICY REFORMS ,AGRICULTURAL POLICY ,INEQUALITY ,PROTECTIONISM ,AGRICULTURE ,DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ,FREE ACCESS ,FREE TRADE ,AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES ,DEMAND SHOCKS ,TRADE REFORM ,IMPORT INCREASES ,INTENSIVE FARMING ,INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ,GLOBAL TRADE ,MEAT ,BENCHMARK ,GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS ,FREE MARKETS ,BILATERAL TARIFF ,TRANSITION ECONOMIES ,TRADE FLOWS ,CURRENT ACCOUNT ,TREASURY ,DAIRY ,EXPORT SHARE ,BILATERAL TRADE ,ECONOMIC POLICY ,GRAIN ,IMPORTS ,SUGAR CANE ,UNSKILLED WORKERS ,TARIFF RATE QUOTAS ,PREFERENTIAL TRADE ,WORLD ECONOMY ,MEAT PRODUCTS ,ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS ,FOOD PRODUCTS ,DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION ,LIVESTOCK ,PRICE DISTORTIONS ,ITC ,NON-TARIFF BARRIERS ,SAVINGS ,VALUE OF OUTPUT ,ANTI-TRADE ,PRICE DISTORTION ,COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES ,EXPORT TAXES - Abstract
This paper analyzes the economic effects of agricultural price and merchandise trade policies around the world as of 2004 on global markets, net farm incomes, and national and regional economic welfare and poverty, using the global economy wide Linkage model, new estimates of agricultural price distortions for developing countries, and poverty elasticity's approach. It addresses two questions: to what extent are policies as of 2004 still reducing rewards from farming in developing countries and thereby adding to inequality across countries in farm household incomes? Are they depressing value added more in primary agriculture than in the rest of the economy of developing countries, and earnings of unskilled workers more than of owners of other factors of production, thereby potentially contributing to inequality and poverty within developing countries (given that farm incomes are well below non-farm incomes in most developing countries and that agriculture there is intensive in the use of unskilled labor)? Results are presented for the key countries and regions of the world and for the world as a whole. They reveal that, by moving to free markets, income inequality between countries will be reduced at least slightly, all but one-sixth of the gains to developing countries will come from agricultural policy reform, unskilled workers in developing countries the majority of whom work on farms will benefit most from reform, net farm incomes in developing countries will rise by 6 percent compared with 2 percent for non-agricultural value added, and the number of people surviving on less than US$1 a day will drop 3 percent globally.
- Published
- 2009
7. A Handbook for Tax Simplification
- Author
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International Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and World Bank
- Subjects
TAX PROVISIONS ,TAX EXEMPTIONS ,TAX LIABILITIES ,POLICY REFORM ,INFLATION ,TAX PURPOSES ,COST OF FUNDS ,EXPROPRIATION ,POLICY MAKERS ,TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS ,INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ,TAX INSTRUMENTS ,FISCAL SPACE ,ECONOMIC STRUCTURES ,PERSONAL INCOME ,SUB-NATIONAL ,JUSTICE SYSTEM ,DEMOCRACIES ,TAX REFORMS ,PUBLIC FINANCES ,ADDED TAX ,MEDIUM ENTERPRISE ,PUBLIC SPENDING ,POLL TAX ,SMALL ENTERPRISE ,PROGRESSIVE TAXATION ,EXCHANGE COMMISSION ,GOVERNMENT BUDGET ,TRANSPARENCY ,ESTATE TAX ,TAX AVOIDANCE ,CORPORATE INVESTMENT ,TAX LIABILITY ,INCOMES ,INTERNAL REVENUE ,HOLDING ,INFORMATION SYSTEMS ,INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ,TAX POLICY ,SMALL BUSINESSES ,TAX OFFICES ,TAX EXPENDITURES ,TAXATION REVENUES ,TAX CODES ,INDIRECT TAXATION ,INFORMATION SYSTEM ,PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS ,TAX COLLECTIONS ,BARRIER ,CORPORATE INCOME TAX ,EXPORT ,AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT ,CAPITAL OWNERS ,LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS ,FUNGIBLE ,CASH FLOW ,STATUTORY TAX ,BUSINESS TAXES ,INTERNAL AUDITS ,TAX RATE ,TAX SYSTEMS ,TAX OBLIGATION ,MINISTRY OF FINANCE ,COLLECTION PROCESS ,TAX REGIMES ,POLITICAL UNREST ,BANKRUPTCY ,TAX OBLIGATIONS ,BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT ,POLITICAL ECONOMY ,TAX BASE ,LENDERS ,POLITICAL SYSTEM ,LEGAL SYSTEM ,TAXATION ,TAX EVADERS ,TAX PAYMENTS ,CAPITAL MARKETS ,SUSTAINABLE GROWTH ,STAMP DUTIES ,EFFICIENCY OF TAXATION ,FISCAL POLICY ,POLL TAXES ,TAXABLE INCOME ,JUDGMENT ,TAX BURDEN ,TAX PROCEDURES ,TRANSFER PRICING ,GOOD GOVERNANCE ,TAX REVENUES ,PUBLIC FINANCE ,TAX INCREASES ,BANK CREDIT ,TAX COLLECTION PROCESS ,DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ,ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ,SECURITIES ,REDISTRIBUTION ,TAX LAWS ,EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES ,TAX ON CONSUMPTION ,REVENUE SOURCES ,SUBNATIONAL ,FOREIGN INVESTMENT ,ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ,COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER ,COMPLIANCE COST ,HYPOTHECATION ,COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE ,CREDIT MARKETS ,TRADE TAXES ,SOCIAL CAPITAL ,TAXABLE ACTIVITIES ,PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ,TAX POLICIES ,POTENTIAL INVESTORS ,FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS ,TAX EVASION ,TAX SYSTEM ,TRANSACTION ,INTERNATIONAL TAX LAWS ,TAX COMPLIANCE ,TAX ,INVENTORY ,ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING ,ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES ,TREATIES ,GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ,JUDICIAL PROCESSES ,FINANCE CORPORATION ,BUSINESS RISK ,EASE OF DOING BUSINESS ,TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ,EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ,CORPORATION TAX ,INSTRUMENT ,ESTIMATED TAX ,TAX AUTHORITIES ,CAPITAL GAIN ,CAPITAL INVESTMENTS ,CIVIL WAR ,RULE OF LAW ,TAX STRUCTURES ,POLITICAL POWER ,TAX RETURN ,TAXPAYER ,LONG-TERM CAPITAL ,POLITICAL STABILITY ,POLITICAL ECONOMIES ,TAX LAW ,POLICY DECISIONS ,TAX SIMPLIFICATION ,SETTLEMENT ,TAX COLLECTION ,FEDERAL BUDGET ,PAYMENT SYSTEM ,MINISTRY OF EDUCATION ,FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT ,WITHHOLDING TAXES ,DEMOCRACY ,TAX REFORM ,TAX STRUCTURE ,COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM ,INFORMAL ECONOMY ,TAX REVENUE ,LAND HOLDINGS ,COLLECTIVE ACTION ,VALUE ADDED TAX ,LEVIES ,PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ,TAX STATUTES ,TAX OFFICIALS ,SALES TAX ,INEFFICIENT STATE ,DEBT ,TAX RETURNS ,APARTHEID ,INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT ,BUSINESS TAX ,COMPETITIVE MARKETS ,MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES ,CAPITAL LOSS ,JURISDICTIONS ,RENTS ,FREE TRADE ,INVESTMENT CLIMATE ,TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE ,TAX CHANGES ,CDS ,ELECTRONIC CASH ,TAX INCENTIVES ,FEDERAL CONSTITUTION ,PROPERTY TAXES ,TURNOVER TAX ,TAXPAYERS ,FLAT TAX ,ACCOUNTING ,TAX COST ,INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ,USE TAX ,ComputingMilieux_GENERAL ,DEDUCTIONS ,OUTPUT ,COST OF COLLECTION ,RATE OF RETURN ,TURNOVER ,REVENUE AUTHORITY ,SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS ,TREASURY ,TAX ASSESSMENT ,DOUBLE TAXATION ,PERSONAL INCOME TAX ,GOVERNMENT REVENUE ,TAX AUTHORITY ,TAX PAYMENT ,TAX RULINGS ,TAX LEGISLATION ,TAX HAVENS ,PUBLIC POLICIES ,TAX PREPARERS ,MONETARY FUND ,ACCOUNTANT ,TAX RULES ,JOB CREATION ,COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE ,PROGRESSIVE TAX ,CASH FLOWS ,LEVY ,SAVINGS ,TAX BASES ,TAX EXPENDITURE ,CAPACITY BUILDING ,TAX ADMINISTRATION ,CHECKS ,TAX BURDENS ,TAX CODE ,TAX CONCESSIONS - Abstract
The purpose of this handbook is to provide policy makers with a framework to assess a tax system in its entirety, measure its various parameters and how it is administered, and defines best practices for tax policy and administration that will yield a tax system that is simple and predictable and does not create an undue burden on private enterprise. This handbook is primarily designed for policy makers and tax practitioners. The goal is to analyze the impact of income tax, the value added tax (VAT), and other local taxes that are imposed on business. This handbook does not analyze the effects of trade and labor taxes such as social security. The administration of the customs duty is unique and has been addressed extensively in the literature on customs modernization. Labor taxes primarily imposed on salaried individuals are not covered by this handbook, even though their incidence affects business. VAT has been included even though it is a tax on consumption because the administrative burden to comply with it is primarily on business.
- Published
- 2009
8. General Equilibrium Effects of Price Distortions on Global Markets, Farm Incomes and Welfare
- Author
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Valenzuela, Ernesto, van der Mensbrugghe, Dominique, and Anderson, Kym
- Subjects
AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES ,EXPORT SUBSIDIES ,REAL INCOME ,TERMS OF TRADE EFFECTS ,VALUE ADDED ,BEVERAGES ,WORLD TRADE ,FOOD PRICE ,COMMODITIES ,AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION ,FOOD POLICY ,AGRICULTURAL LAND ,TRADE DISTORTIONS ,FRUITS ,UNEMPLOYMENT ,EXPORT GROWTH ,FARM INCOME ,TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ,BANANAS ,FARM INCOMES ,DAIRY PRODUCTS ,TARIFF RATE ,TRADE PREFERENCES ,CONSUMER PRICE INDEX ,PRIMARY PRODUCTS ,TRADE AGREEMENTS ,AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS ,FARMERS ,CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE ,SKILLED WORKERS ,IMPORT TARIFF ,EMERGING ECONOMIES ,AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES ,SUGAR ,ECONOMIC SECTORS ,GLOBAL OUTPUT ,GLOBAL ECONOMY ,FARM PRODUCTION ,DOMESTIC MARKETS ,IMPORT PROTECTION ,VEGETABLES ,RAW MILK ,BORDER MEASURES ,AGRICULTURAL POLICIES ,PRICE INDEX ,EXPORT ,FOOD PRODUCTION ,AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE ,EQUILIBRIUM ,CAPITAL OWNERS ,IMPORT BARRIERS ,MULTILATERAL TRADE ,VEGETABLE OILS ,AGRICULTURAL TARIFF ,WEALTH ,PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ,PUBLIC GOOD ,CONSUMERS ,AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUPPORTS ,WTO ,GDP ,FOOD POLICY REFORM ,TRADE BALANCE ,BASE YEAR ,POLITICAL ECONOMY ,TAXATION ,ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS ,EXPORTS ,UNSKILLED LABOR ,GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL ,CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE ,EXCHANGE RATE ,AGRICULTURAL PRICES ,PRODUCTION STRUCTURES ,HOUSEHOLDS ,PREFERENTIAL ACCESS ,MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ,EXPORT SUBSIDY ,PRICE FLUCTUATIONS ,FARM PRODUCTS ,BANANA ,AGRICULTURAL GOODS ,FARM POLICIES ,BENCHMARK DATA ,WHEAT ,URUGUAY ROUND ,AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY ,IMPORT COMPETITION ,DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ,GLOBAL MARKETS ,IMPORT PRICES ,TARIFF PROTECTION ,CROPS ,FOREIGN INVESTMENT ,COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE ,TRADE TAXES ,SHEEP MEAT ,TERMS OF TRADE EFFECT ,FACTORS OF PRODUCTION ,FINANCIAL FLOWS ,VOLATILITY ,TRADE LIBERALIZATION ,MARKET ACCESS ,ADVERSE EFFECT ,DOMESTIC PRODUCTION ,TAX RATES ,AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS ,TAX ,FARM SECTOR ,RATE QUOTAS ,GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ,DEVELOPING COUNTRY ,AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM ,BEET ,FARM ,TARIFF BARRIERS ,TARIFF LINE ,MILK ,AGRICULTURAL VALUE ,TERMS OF TRADE ,FOOD OUTPUT ,BEEF ,AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION ,FOOD INDUSTRIES ,FOOD PRICES ,IMPORT TARIFFS ,AGRICULTURAL MARKETS ,COTTON ,AGRICULTURAL TRADE ,GRAIN PRODUCTION ,AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS ,EXPORT TAX ,TRADE POLICY ,GRAINS ,WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ,COUNTRY MARKETS ,PROCESSED FOODS ,DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ,AGRICULTURAL PRICE ,FREE TRADE IN GOODS ,EXPORT PRICES ,FARMS ,INTERNATIONAL MARKETS ,WAGES ,FOOD IMPORTS ,NATIONAL INCOME ,NATIONAL ECONOMY ,COST OF CAPITAL ,TARIFF STRUCTURE ,EXPORT PRICE ,FATS ,TRADE POLICY REFORMS ,AGRICULTURAL POLICY ,MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES ,INEQUALITY ,DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ,FREE ACCESS ,FREE TRADE ,DEVELOPING ECONOMIES ,AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES ,TRADE REFORM ,IMPORT INCREASES ,INTENSIVE FARMING ,INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ,AGRICULTURAL EXPORT ,OILS AND FATS ,GLOBAL TRADE ,MEAT ,BENCHMARK ,PADDY ,GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS ,FREE MARKETS ,MILK PRODUCTS ,TRANSITION ECONOMIES ,TRADE FLOWS ,TREASURY ,DAIRY ,BILATERAL TRADE ,AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT ,GRAIN ,EXPORT SUPPORT ,SUGAR CANE ,FOOD MARKETS ,TARIFF RATE QUOTAS ,PREFERENTIAL TRADE ,WORLD ECONOMY ,AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS ,MEAT PRODUCTS ,ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS ,FOOD PRODUCTS ,LIVESTOCK ,PRICE DISTORTIONS ,ITC ,NON-TARIFF BARRIERS ,DEVELOPING COUNTRY ECONOMIES ,SAVINGS ,IFPRI ,VALUE OF OUTPUT ,COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES ,EXPORT TAXES - Abstract
Earnings from farming in many developing countries have been depressed by a pro-urban bias in own-country policies as well as by governments of richer countries favoring their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. Both sets of policies, which reduce national and global economic welfare and contribute to global inequality and poverty, have been undergoing reform since the 1980s. Using the linkage model of the global economy and modifications to the pre-release of version 7 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) protection database for 2004, this paper seeks to compare the effect of those reforms to date with those that would come from removing remaining agricultural and trade policies. Two sets of results are thus presented: one showing the effects of policy reforms between 1980-84 and 2004, the other showing what the removal of remaining distortions as of 2004 could be. Both sets of results indicate improvements in the real value of agricultural output and exports, the real returns to farm land and unskilled labor, and real net farm incomes in most developing country regions despite the adverse effect on the international terms of trade for some developing countries that are net food importers or are enjoying preferential access to agricultural markets of high-income countries. Landowners in those high-income countries still offering their farmers price supports could readily afford to compensate them from the benefits of removing remaining agricultural protectionism.
- Published
- 2008
9. Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries
- Author
-
Marcelo Olarreaga, Jaime de Melo, and Olivier Cadot
- Subjects
FOREIGN TRADE ,TRADE LIBERALIZATION ,SOCIAL WELFARE ,TAX ,GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ,DEVELOPING COUNTRY ,VALUE ADDED ,GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ,WORLD TRADE ,Gross domestic product ,ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ,DOMESTIC PRICE ,TERMS OF TRADE ,ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY ,Economics ,Open economy ,MARKET ENTRY ,Free trade ,EQUATIONS ,PRICE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY ,Stylized fact ,BENEFICIARIES ,INCOME ,NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY ,INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY ,POLITICAL POWER ,TARIFF RATE ,WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS ,RETURNS ,GOVERNMENT GRANTS ,DUTY DRAWBACKS ,PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND ,TRADE POLICY ,WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ,CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE ,BENEFICIARY ,CLAIMANTS ,Tariff ,INCOMES ,Development ,DEMOCRACY ,DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ,LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES ,GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS ,BID ,ECONOMICS RESEARCH ,WAGES ,EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF ,OPEN ECONOMY ,IMPORT PROTECTION ,OPTIMIZATION ,LABOR MARKET ,SAFETY NET ,ELASTICITY ,INDUSTRIALIZATION ,International economics ,GDP PER CAPITA ,INCOME LEVELS ,TARIFF STRUCTURE ,FOREIGN TRADE POLICY ,EQUILIBRIUM ,TRADE PROTECTION ,CAPITAL OWNERS ,PROTECTIONIST ,PROTECTIONISM ,ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ,RETURN ,WEALTH ,AGRICULTURE ,EQUILIBRIUM VALUE ,PRICE CHANGE ,DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ,CONSUMERS ,PRICE ELASTICITY ,DEVELOPING ECONOMIES ,WTO ,GDP ,UTILITY FUNCTION ,REPUBLIC ,LOBBYING ,TRADE REFORM ,POLITICAL ECONOMY ,PUBLIC FUNDS ,POLITICAL SYSTEM ,INCOME DISTRIBUTION ,TAXATION ,INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ,POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE ,Commercial policy ,EXPORTS ,INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS ,DERIVATIVES ,GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL ,INTERNATIONAL TRADE ,CONSUMER SURPLUS ,CD ,OUTPUT ,PRODUCTION STRUCTURES ,Economics and Econometrics ,LDCS ,URUGUAY ROUND ,World Development Indicators ,TARIFF REVENUE ,EXPENDITURES ,POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY ,IMPORTS ,IMPORT COMPETITION ,DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ,ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ,INTERNATIONAL BANK ,Accounting ,TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS ,POSITIVE TARIFFS ,TARIFF PROTECTION ,LABOR MARKETS ,INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES ,DERIVATIVE ,IMPERFECT COMPETITION ,TRADE TAXES ,TARIFF ESCALATION ,Protectionism ,PRODUCTION FUNCTION ,TARIFF FORMATION ,CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS ,DOMESTIC PRICES ,CETERIS PARIBUS ,TARIFF RATES ,Finance ,EXPENDITURE ,EXPORT TAXES ,MARGINAL UTILITY ,SOCIAL SAFETY NET - Abstract
A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing, whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with observed patterns of protection.
- Published
- 2004
10. Limited Government in Nondemocracies (The Role of Capital Owners).
- Author
-
Altinoglu, Ebru
- Subjects
- Accountability in Nondemocratic Regimes, Limited Government, Democratization, Policy-making, Capital Owners, Structural Dependence of the State on Capital
- Abstract
Nondemocratic regimes are marked by the absence of a formal (or effectively functioning) mechanism of political accountability. The present study, however, investigates the seeds of some kind of an informal mechanism of accountability which may ‘restrict’ the policymaking power of autocratic rulers. In that regard, it focuses on the business-state relations in nondemocratic countries. Autocratic rulers may make policies favoring the interests of the capital owners. The main argument of the study is that if that policymaking springs from the bargaining-power of the private sector, then it can be regarded as a form of accountability—indirect accountability. It is indirect, because, the capital owners cannot directly remove the rulers off the office. Nevertheless, by ceasing to invest or produce (exit), they can halt or shrink the size of the economic activities from which the rulers extract their revenue (tax revenue). As a result, by exiting or simply by (credibly) threatening to exit, capital owners can indirectly hold the autocratic rulers accountable for the policies they make. The present study, thus, quantitatively tests whether we indeed observe a policymaking favoring capitalist interests in general, or at least the interests of the capital owners in the leading economic sector of a country, when (1) the incumbents are financially dependent on tax revenue, and (2) the private-sector credibly threatens to exit or actually exits. Credible exit-threat is conceptualized as a function of (a) investment strength and independence of the private sector and (2) existence of sectorally determined viable exit-opportunities. The results of a series of time-series-cross-sectional regression analyses indicate that, controlling for other factors, the joint presence of the conditions of indirect accountability is positively correlated with the level of certain pro-leading-sector policies. The importance of the findings hinges on a possible link to unlimited government, and democratization, in the long run, through transfer of economic power to the private sector due to policy concession made, and also through formalization and spread of habits of interaction between the government and citizens.
- Published
- 2009
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