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I provide comments and replies to the seven insightful contributions that discussed "The Democratic Challenge of Central Bank Credit Policies" and the proposal for a European Credit Council. I review how interdisciplinary scholarship on the political economy of central banking have shown the limits of simple principal-agent framework applied to central bank power and legitimacy. I emphasize why a change to central bank independence is not necessary for a fundamental change in the financial system and credit policies. I also argue that deliberations can have strong effects on decision-making and that the power of the people is not restricted to the legislative power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This discussion of Eric Monnet's idea of a European Credit Council evaluates the likely consequences of such a new institution. Based on a critical examination of the notion of economic expertise, it warns that such a council might legitimate an untenable status quo, while bringing little positive benefits. Such a council could however exercise a subversive role if its counterexpertise were to expose the limits to central bank independence in the context of the climate crisis, thus undermining the current set-up. Yet to play such a role would require a degree of confrontation which is unlikely to emerge from the council's envisioned setup. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eric Monnet's European Credit Council (ECC) is an innovative, historically-grounded institutional proposal for supporting the ECB in the design of its monetary policy operations. In this commentary, I seek to strengthen the case for the European Credit Council drawing on work in progress on the history of the ECB. I first discuss the tradition of moderate interventionism as it appears in Monnet's (Monnet, E. (2018). Controlling credit: Central banking and the planned economy in Postwar France, 1948–1973. Cambridge University Press) study Controlling Credit. I show that the model of moderate interventionism was well-known to the drafters of the ECB statutes and efforts to categorically rule such policies out were simply unsuccessful. I suggest that this fortuitous choice has left ample legal space in the EU treaties for an ECC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ekonomik Yaklaşim is the property of Ekonomik Yaklasim Dernegi (Ekonomik Yaklasim Association) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper investigates how the commitment to maintain an established inflation target as opposed to changing it depends on the extent to which institutional or economic preconditions improve in a country. For 19 inflation‐targeting countries, we show that stronger operational commitment to the preannounced target is pronounced in countries with a greater improvement in institutional or economic preconditions, such as central bank independence, inflation, government indebtedness, financial development and central bank credibility. Our results also highlight the heterogeneous contingencies for the discretionary behaviour of adjusting the target, including the gradual disinflation phase, fiscal dominance and the transition to flexible targeting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article brings back the debate on central bank independence from its historical origins and its relation to financialization. With financial dominance, States have less influence over central bank policies as they gain greater action capacity through monetary policy strengthening. Central bank independence is an expression of financialization as it makes the monetary authority more susceptible to financial market pressures and simultaneously limits the participation of the State and society in conducting monetary policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central bank independence (CBI) has been widely advocated as a means to address the time‐inconsistency problem of controlling inflation. Consequently, many countries have embraced central bank reforms since the 1990s. While extant research in political science has sought to unveil the consequences of CBI, there remains an unexplained variation in the response of countries with regard to capital account openness. Notably, a positive association exists between CBI and capital account openness due to the constraints CBI places on leaders' discretionary monetary and fiscal policies, thereby fostering reliance on financial policy to boost their economies. However, this relationship is contingent on the domestic political contexts of countries. CBI leads to capital account liberalization only when the rule of law is guaranteed, given that CBI is often stipulated by laws. Therefore, in countries where political leaders can easily override formal rules, CBI shows no discernible impact on capital account openness. Employing two‐way fixed‐effects and error‐correction models, the study reveals that CBI increases capital account openness only in democracies, in the presence of multiple veto players, and a high level of transparency. The findings underscore the pivotal role of the domestic political environment in analyzing how CBI constrains political leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 17-18th century, during the process of civil transformations, starting from the economic policy based on the era of absolutism, the first central bank regulations appeared in Europe. Mainly the disorganization and crisis of public finances and the need to finance various wars led governments to establish central banks and to provide central banking functions to privately owned banks. The most important issues included the regulation of banknote issuance and legal tender, the management of state funds, the financing of the state debt, as well as the relationship with the state, in other words, the content of central bank independence. Each country followed different paths, and accordingly, the classic and the Prussian models of central bank development can be described based on the different legislative steps. The study presents the main characteristics through the English, German, French, American and Hungarian examples, primarily by characterizing the legislative peculiarities and illuminating the political historical background by applying the methods of comparative law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 exacerbated two distinct concerns about the independence of central banks: a concern about legitimacy and a concern about economic justice. This paper explores the legitimacy of independent central banks from the perspective of these two concerns, by presenting two distinct models of central banking and their different claims to political legitimacy and distributive justice. I argue primarily that we should avoid construing central bank independence in binary terms, such that central banks either are, or are not, independent. I will argue that we should instead construe central bank independence in scalar terms, so that independence admits of degree, thus allowing us to develop an account of independence in which central banks can retain it to the extent necessary for economic efficiency, while meeting reasonable concerns regarding democratic legitimacy and economic justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we examine the relationship between Hofstede national cultures and de jure central bank independence. We propose theoretical hypotheses to explain how cultural dimensions determine central bank independence and test these hypotheses using an international dataset. We find that two cultural dimensions, namely, individualism and uncertainty avoidance, are significantly related to central bank independence. Central bank independence is higher in collectivistic and uncertainty avoidance countries. We further reveal that these cultural dimensions affect central bank independence in different ways. Individualism and uncertainty avoidance are related to independence in policy formulation and limitations on lending to governments. Although power distance and masculinity are insignificantly related to total central bank independence, they affect independence in objectives, policy formulation and limitation on lending to governments. Our results are robust through a series of checks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent financial crisis caused by corruption and opacity has led us to examine how the informal economy and other factors affect tax revenues using a three-pillar theoretical analysis. Empirical research has not thoroughly explored the shadow economy's impact on direct and indirect taxes, tax revenues, and the central bank's independence from the shadow economy and tax collection. This paper used 2010–2018 data from 129 countries. The shadow economy and tax revenues had a substantial negative relationship. The shadow economy also changed the fiscal authorities' policy mix by reducing direct taxes and increasing indirect taxes. Finally, the central bank's independence mitigated the shadow economy's negative effects on tax revenues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amid growing global concern over increasing income inequality, the role of monetary policy and the central bank have come under increased scrutiny. This study employed a dynamic panel data analysis, drawing upon data from the World Bank's PovcalNet and the World Development Indicators for 25 countries from 2000 to 2018. The research explored the effects of central bank independence on income distribution. The analysis revealed that central bank independence plays a crucial role in controlling inflation, which, in turn, contributes to lowering income inequality. However, the findings also highlighted that while central bank independence fosters financial stability and controls inflation, it tends to weaken the effectiveness of fiscal policy, potentially exacerbating income disparities. Additionally, it is observed that central bank independence is associated with greater financial openness, which can lead to increased asset prices and further widen the income inequality gap. This research offers a nuanced understanding of the trade-offs entailed in central bank policies and their extensive socioeconomic ramifications, thereby contributing a novel perspective to the discourse on monetary policy and income inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research considers a new dimension of the effects of the underground sector by examining the spillovers on cryptocurrency holdings. Cryptocurrencies offer a relatively greater ability to dodge taxes and ensure the anonymity of holders, providing attractive avenues for underground operators to stash their informal-sector earnings. Our results, based on data from more than 50 nations, show that a greater prevalence of the underground economy in a nation is indeed associated with greater cryptocurrency holdings. This result holds across an alternative measure of the shadow economy, and when the bi-directional causality between the shadow economy and cryptocurrency holdings is considered. In other noteworthy findings, greater FDI crowded out cryptocurrency holdings, while greater financial globalization and greater economic uncertainty, ceteris paribus, increased them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a comprehensive dataset, this paper estimates a hazard model to examine whether central bank independence matters for the sustainability of fixed exchange rate regimes. The findings suggest that fixed exchange rate regimes are more likely to have a longer duration under more independent central banks; a result that holds true whether an exit from such a regime is orderly or disorderly. Thus, a more independent central bank is more likely to facilitate a more durable fixed exchange rate regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In political discourse, it is common to claim that non-majoritarian institutions are legitimate because they are technical and value-free. Even though most analysts disagree, many arguments for non-majoritarian legitimacy rest on claims that work best if institutions are, in fact, value-free. This paper develops a novel standard for non-majoritarian legitimacy. It builds on the rich debate over the value-free ideal in philosophy of science, which has not, so far, been applied systematically to political theory literature on non-majoritarian institutions. This paper suggests that the argument from inductive risk, a strong argument against the value-free ideal, (1) shows why a naive claim to value freedom is a poor general foundation for non-majoritarian legitimacy; (2) provides a device to assess the degree of democratic value inputs required for an institution to be legitimate; which (3) shows the conditions under which a claim to technical legitimacy might still be normatively acceptable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Przegląd Europejski is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the fallout of the 2008 crisis, macroprudential policy has been installed as the policy remedy against future financial instability, a primary focus being developments in the real estate sector. With house prices consistently rising in the EU since 2014, causing alarm among macroprudential supervisory bodies, a core question of EU regulatory governance is how far macroprudential bodies have been capable of bringing about countercyclical actions against the build‐up of such vulnerabilities. This paper investigates this question using a novel dataset of macroprudential intensity coded for the 17 EU countries that experienced real estate vulnerabilities post‐euro crisis. Specifically, it asks which configuration of conditions account for the (in)capacity of countries to impose stringent countercyclical regulations against housing booms? Using fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis technics coupled with qualitative analysis of country cases using expert interviews, we find that the absence of political salience of homeownership and the political independence of macroprudential authorities to be crucial conditions that jointly explain countercyclical macroprudential activity. These findings, which show two pathways to action have implications for the capacity of the EU to prevent future crises and future reform of the EU prudential framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the effects of monetary integration on the synchronization of the business cycle within ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and contributes to the economic literature dealing with these aspects. First, the indicators of de facto and de jure central bank independence are considered to examine the role of central bank independence in the relationship between monetary integration and business cycle synchronization. Second, the ARDL error correction estimator is used to analyze both short- and long-run relationships and to address potential problems related to endogenous variables. Using panel data covering 105 country pairs from 1990 to 2020, the estimation results show a positive and statistically significant effect of monetary integration on the long-run synchronization of the business cycle. Regarding short-term synchronization, the conclusions are mixed. Overall, this study argues for the implementation of economic policy measures aimed, among other things, at complying with convergence criteria, strengthening trade agreements, and ensuring the independence of the central bank of the future monetary union.

The independence of the central bank is one of the most important factors for effective monetary policy. Central bank independence is closely related to monetary stability, which is an important part of monetary policy. In this study, the purpose of the analysis is to understand whether monetary stability functions effectively for central bank independence in Azerbaijan using the vector autoregression method. In addition, the Granger Causality test was conducted to empirically investigate how central bank independence affects the provision of monetary stability in the economy of Azerbaijan over the data period from 1996 to 2022. In this framework, indices or variables are the exchange rate stability index (ERS) in 1996–2022, the level of monetary independence index (MI) in 1996–2020, taken from the “trilemma indexes”, which are defined as the consumer price index (CPI) in 1996–2022, and the broad money supply (M2) in 1996–2022. The findings of the study show that the independence of the central bank has a positive effect on the monetary stability of the Azerbaijani economy.

The aim of this study is to examine the degree to which a country's institutional quality, such as the degree of central bank independence and the rule of law, matters for enhancing banking supervision. While numerous studies have examined the effects of central bank independence (CBI) on inflation and the quality of governance on economic growth and development, empirical studies exploring these institutional impacts on banking supervisory regimes remain scarce. Hence, this study analyzes the political economy of enhancing the supervision over the banking sector using the expanded indices of enhancement of banking supervision for 100 economies from 1973 to 2013, which accounts for both institutional and operational independence of banking supervisory agencies. The results demonstrate that institutions matter in enhancing a country's banking supervision; a higher degree of central bank independence and the rule of law leads to a higher degree of banking supervision. I also analyze the sectoral impact on banking supervision. While resource curse theory holds, the results of sectoral influence tend to differ depending on the estimation method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Economic Research & Business Administration is the property of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this study, it is analysed whether central bank independence or real effective exchange rate, international reserves, credits, and current account deficit are effective on financial stability in 9 developed countries between the period of 1996-2017. The Fourier procedure is applied for analysis. As a result of the analysis, it is concluded that central bank independence is not effective on financial stability. Also, it is determined that credit volume negatively affects financial stability while international reserves positively affect it.

The decisions of the central bank, as the most important monetary institution of any country, have an impact on the companies whose shares are bought and sold in the stock exchange, and this market is dependent on the policies of the central bank. Considering the importance of this issue, in the present study, the effect of central bank independence on the stock returns of active industries in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period of 1370 to 1399 will be investigated by using the ARDL Bounding Test. Results of the model indicate that increasing the degree of central bank independence increases the stock returns of active industries in the Tehran Stock Exchange. Also, the findings show that the impact of GDP growth, interest rate, oil price and turnover ratio on stock returns is positive and on the other hand, inflation rate and real exchange rate have a negative effect on stock returns.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether political pressure affects the conduct of monetary policy in Brazil. For the period between January 2010 and August 2020, we estimate a modified Taylor rule to empirically test whether the calls for lower interest rates by presidents induce Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) to lower the policy rate. We document that BCB is more likely to set the policy rate in line with the preferences of political leaders. We also show that the response of BCB to political pressure remained significant even though political pressure diminished in recent years.

Using a legal or de jure measure of central bank independence, the present study attempts to examine the impact of central bank independence (CBI) on the inflation in case of Indian economy over the period, 1991–1992 to 2018–2019. To ascertain the possible dependence of association on the institutional quality proxied by level of financial development, we incorporated a non-linear logistic smooth transition framework with ratio of private credit to GDP as an appropriate transition variable. We found a statistically significant regime dependency with respect to the impact of CBI on inflation. In both the short-run and long run, increase in value of CBI is found to increase inflation when the level of financial development is below threshold value, however, beyond this threshold, any increase in CBI would decrease it. The impact of other control variables like GDP growth, oil price inflation & lagged inflation is found to be positive and statistically significant. However, currency appreciation is found to lower inflation. Our findings signify an appreciable role for the degree of financial development in the transmission of central bank's monetary policy stances to maintain low inflation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bank trading is basically observed in their traditional agreements of bargaining products and services. However, in terms of meeting and complying with global economic standards set by WTO to promote sustainable development, known as the doctrine of good governance, it is certain that corporate practices will be lacking explanatory tools for achieving corporate ethics as their culmination of bank independence and accountability to civil society. This paper aims to map the importance of bank independence and its accountability using the Kano model assessment in addressing issues of concern in trade-environmental problems under WTO economic standards. Soil environmental quality is a quantitative measurement of the Kano developmental framework using a positivistic paradigm towards legal scholarship defiance of corporate ethics for culmination reflection and plotting the behavior of corporate institutions to eradicate the poverty line and promote the economic prosperity of their territory or jurisdiction by answering issues on environmental problems such as soil quality for advocacy of environmental protection under trade-environment conflicts of WTO as accountability to human society for achieving sustainable development following good governance doctrine. Business law has a dynamic performance of both the behavior of the corporate and its environment through interactions of human society in their competition market. Innovation of products and corporate services must be integrated with good governance principles using the insufficiency of their code of conduct explanatory authority to enforce trade-environment agreements in achieving human rights of sustainable development in international and global economic standards. The realization of civil rights to sustainable development is reflected in the good governance principle. The legal scholarship defiance of doctrinal research using a positivistic paradigm of objective knowledge can be recommended to other corporate practices to advocate financial intelligence through active participation in environmental calls as political agendas as intended to lessen poverty towards integration to economic transparency and ecological protection. The plotting over time can be predicted towards a comparison of constitutional rights of public welfare and safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores the relationship between Central bank independence (CBI) and fiscal deficit in India. Moreover, the study tries to assess the impact of CBI on the levels of fiscal deficit. The study incorporates other variables like Gross Domestic Product, financial development, and trade openness to analyze their impact on the fiscal deficit. The study employed Auto-regressive distributed lag model (ARDL) Bounds test developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) to examine the long-run relationship between CBI and fiscal deficit. The study also employs a legal index for measuring CBI developed by Jasmine et al (2019) as well as an actual measure of independence developed by Cukierman (1992) to measure CBI in India. The study confirms the long-run relationship between the CBI and fiscal deficit as well as among other variables. An increase in the levels of CBI leads to falling in the levels of fiscal deficit. The other explanatory variables used in the study also confirm the long-run relationship and impact fiscal deficit negatively except for trade openness, which positively impacts the fiscal deficit.

The rise of central bank independence (CBI) raises questions regarding the importance of CBI for economic growth. Where conventional theory focuses on the link between CBI and inflation as the common primary objective of any central bank is price stability, this paper explores the theoretical framework of CBI while making the connections to the potential impact it could have on economic growth especially in the context of the ASEAN region. Hence, the aim of this paper is to investigate the relevance of the CBI in the ASEAN region in comparison to the existing literature. Observing nine countries in the ASEAN region across 1996 to 2017, and using the Feasible Generalized Least Squares Method, the study found that the legal CBI has positive impact on economic growth, while the de facto CBI is not significant. The finding raises questions regarding how the economic agents perceive aspects of the CBI.

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to the diversionary use of force literature, unemployment as an indicator of poor economy should increase the likelihood of diversionary conflict. I argue, however, leaders do not engage in such conflict unconditionally simply when unemployment is rising. Whether worsening unemployment leads to diversionary conflict depends on the availability of policies that can alleviate the condition. Only when such policy availability is low, will diversionary conflict become more likely as unemployment deteriorates. When ameliorating policies are available, unemployment should reduce the likelihood of diversionary conflict. Focusing on central bank independence (CBI) as a primary institution that shapes the availability of policies that tackle unemployment, I expect that high CBI encourages the use of diversionary conflict as unemployment surges. An augmented zero-inflated negative binomial analysis of an updated militarized dispute dataset for the period 1975-2013 lends strong and robust support to this theoretical postulate. The causal mechanism is also empirically validated. De acuerdo con la bibliografía con relación al uso de la fuerza como maniobra de distracción, el desempleo, en su calidad de indicador de una economía deficiente, debería aumentar la probabilidad del uso de conflictos como maniobra de distracción. Sin embargo, argumentamos que los gobernantes no se involucran en un conflicto de este tipo de manera incondicional por el mero hecho de que el desempleo esté aumentando. Lo posibilidad de que el empeoramiento del desempleo conduzca a un conflicto como maniobra distracción depende de la disponibilidad de políticas que puedan aliviar esta situación. Solo cuando se dé caso de que la disponibilidad de estas políticas sea baja, resultará más probable que se produzcan conflictos como maniobra de distracción a medida que se vaya deteriorando la situación del desempleo. Cuando se dispone de políticas de mejora, el desempleo debería reducir la probabilidad del uso de conflictos como maniobra de distracción. Centrándonos en la independencia del banco central (IBC) como un mecanismo primario que da forma a la disponibilidad de políticas que abordan el desempleo, pronosticamos que una IBC alta fomentará el uso del conflicto como maniobra de distracción a medida que aumenta el desempleo. Un análisis binomial negativo aumentado inflado a cero llevado a cabo sobre un conjunto de datos de disputas militarizadas actualizado para el período entre 1975 y 2013 brinda un apoyo fuerte y robusto a este postulado teórico. El mecanismo causal también está validado empíricamente. D'après la littérature sur l'emploi de la force pour détourner l'attention, le chômage en tant qu'indicateur de la faiblesse d'une économie devrait augmenter la probabilité d'un conflit visant à faire diversion. Néanmoins, j'affirme que les dirigeants ne s'engagent pas de façon inconditionnelle dans de tels conflits en se fondant simplement sur une montée du chômage. La relation entre aggravation du chômage et conflit visant à faire diversion dépend de la disponibilité des politiques qui peuvent remédier à cette situation. Quand cette disponibilité est faible, et seulement à cette condition, la probabilité des conflits pour détourner l'attention se renforce quand le chômage s'intensifie. Quand des politiques bénéfiques sont présentes, le chômage devrait réduire la probabilité d'un conflit visant à faire diversion. En me focalisant sur l'indépendance des banques centrales (IBC) en tant que mécanisme qui façonne principalement la disponibilité des politiques relatives au chômage, je prédis qu'une IBC élevée encourage l'utilisation d'un conflit pour détourner l'attention en cas de pic de chômage. En complétant une analyse binomiale négative à inflation de zéro d'un ensemble de données mis à jour sur les conflits militarisés pour la période 1975-2013, nous trouvons maints éléments pour fortement étayer ce postulat théorique. Le mécanisme causal a également fait l'objet d'une validation empirique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates whether political pressure affects the conduct of monetary policy in Brazil. For the period between January 2010 and August 2020, we estimate a modified Taylor rule to empirically test whether the calls for lower interest rates by presidents induce Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) to lower the policy rate. We document that BCB is more likely to set the policy rate in line with the preferences of political leaders. We also show that the response of BCB to political pressure remained significant even though political pressure diminished in recent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although central bank independence is a core tenet of monetary policy-making, it remains politically contested: In many emerging markets, populist governments are in frequent public conflict with the central bank. At other times, the same governments profess to respect the monetary authority's independence. We model this conflict drawing on the crisis bargaining literature. Our model predicts that populist politicians will often bring a nominally independent central bank to heel without having to change its legal status. To provide evidence, we build a new data set of public pressure on central banks by classifying over 9000 analyst reports using machine learning. We find that populist politicians are more likely than non-populists to exert public pressure on the central bank, unless checked by financial markets, and also more likely to obtain interest rate concessions. Our findings underscore that de jure does not equal de facto central bank independence in the face of populist pressures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central bank independence (CBI) implies that elected governments delegate monetary policy to technocrats in central banks. I argue that given the substantial influence of monetary policy on consumption, investments, exchange rates, capital flows and government spending, all of which critically determine the performance of the economy, CBI can blur the lines of responsibility for economic performance between elected governments and central banks. It can thereby weaken voters' ability and willingness to electorally punish (or reward) governments on the basis of economic outcomes. Utilizing data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, I test how CBI conditions the effects of macroeconomic performance on electoral support for incumbents in 38 countries from 1996 to 2016. The results show that CBI significantly attenuates the reward and punishment mechanism of elections based on economic records. The finding of this article sheds new lights on how the problem of democratic accountability caused by the rise of CBI actually materializes in elections, the most important sanctioning mechanism of democracy. Further, it identifies CBI as another crucial condition that can explain variations in the magnitude of economic voting across countries, as yet unexplored in the election literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the backdrop of an inflationary surge due to war, sanctions and pandemic disruptions, the article argues against dogmatic responses to inflation. Using extant theoretical and empirical literature as well as time-series data, it examines the scope for 'moderate inflation rates', above what is currently targeted. Specifically, it seeks to ascertain the potential developmental gains from moderate inflation (say, 10–15%), the risk of inflation accelerating to harm growth, and the implications of central bank independence during the recent inflation episode and for supporting sustainable development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the effects of legal central bank independence (CBI) on inflation volatility in developing countries. We discuss why CBI should curb inflation volatility, independently from its effect via lowering inflation levels. Empirical analyses in a sample of 96 developing countries between 1980 and 2014 show that CBI is directly and unconditionally associated with lower volatility. The magnitude of this effect is larger in more democratic countries even after accounting for the endogeneity of CBI and inflation. Our results are robust to alternative measurements of the main variables, different model specifications, and methodologies. • We discuss why central bank independence (CBI) should curb inflation volatility, independently from its effect via lowering inflation levels • With a sample of 96 developing countries (1980-2014) we find that CBI is directly and unconditionally associated with lower volatility • The magnitude of this effect is larger in more democratic countries even after accounting for the endogeneity of CBI and inflation [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Economic Researcher Review is the property of Association of Arab Universities and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Two major economic crises in the early twenty-first century have had a serious impact on monetary policy and CB independence. Disruption in financial intermediation and associated deflationary pressures caused by the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 and European financial crisis of 2010–2015 pushed central banks (CBs) in major currency areas towards adoption of unconventional monetary policy measures, including large-scale purchase of government bonds (quantitative easing). The same approach has been taken by CBs in response to the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 even if the characteristics of this crisis differ from the previous one. As a result of both crises, CBs have become major holders of government bonds and de facto – main creditors of governments. Against rapidly deteriorating fiscal balances, CBs have become hostages of fiscal policies, which compromises their independence. Risks to the CB independence also come from their additional mandates (beyond price stability) and populist political pressures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In July 2021, the European Central Bank (ECB) published a new monetary policy strategy, the first time in 17 years that it had undertaken a review of its monetary policy. In the intervening time, the world – and the economic challenges facing the ECB – have changed immensely but partly as a result of the ECB's own maneuvering. In particular, monetary policy has been relied upon for every single malaise facing the global economy, including and up to the coronavirus pandemic. This paper argues that a review of central banks as an institutional mechanism in general, and in particular the ECB, was overdue but should not have been limited to policies; instead, an opportunity was missed to have an institutional review to examine whether or not it has been performing as intended. In particular, the vast experiment of unconventional monetary policy/issuance should have been more scrutinized from an institutional level as it appears to have contributed to the current problems the European economy faces. Europe and the ECB would be well served by taking stock of its actions over the past two decades and especially during the era of unconventional monetary policy to find a sustainable route forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last years, independent central banks were often criticized. Many critics felt that the fatal flaw of the current system lied in its independent nature. Some critics argued that the remedy to such problems was to replace independence with interdependence. Such a drastic measure is completely unnecessary. No more time should be lost discussing further the merits or the weaknesses of central bank independence. But taking central bank independence as a given, one should simply try to equip central bankers with the mandates, the tools, and the values best fitted to help them face future shocks. Deeper checks and balances with other institutions and the fair financing of investment by all economic agents, including startups and SMEs, are urgently necessary to head off financial crises that will inevitably arise in this era of growing wealth inequality, disruptive technologies and climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of central bank independence (CBI) raises questions regarding the importance of CBI for economic growth. Where conventional theory focuses on the link between CBI and inflation as the common primary objective of any central bank is price stability, this paper explores the theoretical framework of CBI while making the connections to the potential impact it could have on economic growth especially in the context of the ASEAN region. Hence, the aim of this paper is to investigate the relevance of the CBI in the ASEAN region in comparison to the existing literature. Observing nine countries in the ASEAN region across 1996 to 2017, and using the Feasible Generalized Least Squares Method, the study found that the legal CBI has positive impact on economic growth, while the de facto CBI is not significant. The finding raises questions regarding how the economic agents perceive aspects of the CBI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]