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The article explores the geopolitical rivalry unfolding in the Pacific, focusing on the contest between Western powers and China, emphasizing the entanglement of emerging actors like South Korea and the implications of this competition for Pacific Island nations. It also discusses the historical dominance of Western allies in the region, China's increasing presence, and the deployment of threat narratives by Western powers.

Nuclear and missile tests by North Korea, which directly threaten China's national interests, regional stability, and economic development, have consistently irritated China. Since the 1950s, China and North Korea have held high-level meetings aimed at discussing and improving their bilateral relationship. Using empirical analysis, this study attempts to examine the impact of these meetings on North Korea's missile and nuclear tests. The study argues that as the frequency of high-level meetings between China and North Korea increases, North Korea's provocative actions decrease. The high-level meetings serve to address the issue of incomplete information, create avenues for economic aid and cooperation, and reduce the likelihood of future nuclear and missile tests. The empirical findings indicate that while high-level meetings with or without the presence of top leaders can lead to a reduction in missile tests by North Korea, only summits between China and North Korea have a significant impact on the reduction of nuclear tests by North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do history wars shape international affairs? If so, how and for whom? Taking the historical dispute between China and South Korea over the ancient Gaogouli/Goguryeo Kingdom as a case study, this article explores the individual-level psychological micro-foundations of history wars. A 2020 survey experiment in South Korea pit "ours" vs "theirs" Goguryeo imitation Wikipedia entries to explore their downstream consequences. It revealed direct, indirect, and conditional effects. Exposure to China's claim to the Kingdom undermined Korean pride, increasing dislike of China, and lessening desires to cooperate with it. Pre-existing levels of nationalism divided South Koreans in how angry they became after exposure the Wikipedia primes. That anger, however, only shaped the China policy preferences of those South Koreans who viewed the balance of military power with China favorably. Implications for ownership disputes over kimchi and other national possessions are also discussed, as are the implications of history wars for war and peace in twenty-first-century East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to its crucial strategic position, over the course of history Korea has several times found itself subject to the consequences of great power rivalry, with very negative results. The cases of the conflict between the Chinese Empire and Japan at the end of the 19th century and between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War are two clear examples that led to tragic effects in Korea. This complicated historical legacy resonates in the current competition between the U.S. and China and the role that South Korea has been increasingly playing in this dynamic in recent years. Although significant differences exist compared to the previous examples, this new rivalry risks becoming a matter of major concern in the country's foreign policy. For South Korea, maintaining positive relations with both great powers is crucial for its stability, economic development and security. For this reason, in recent years different South Korean governments have tried and managed to pursue a «flexible» approach avoiding taking sides between the two great powers. While the rapidly growing tension between the U.S. and China poses challenges to this approach, it still represents a suitable solution to ensure that Seoul does not get caught in the middle of a new great power rivalry that would be detrimental for its strategic interests. Starting by introducing the dilemmas of Korea amid great power rivalry from a historical perspective, this paper argues that in the current competition South Korea has demonstrated a higher level of agency than in previous cases, thanks also to its greater autonomy and capabilities in the international system, and that its «flexible» approach has been successful in maintaining a middle ground between the U.S. and China. Considering the current increase in rivalry, this role has been more difficult to manage, especially with the recent push by the United States for its regional allies and partners to take a tougher stance against Beijing. However, adapting its foreign policy approach to the challenges that have emerged in recent years and avoiding taking a stance that might deteriorate relations with China, while reassuring Washington that the alliance is the main pillar in Seoul's security policy, can be considered as a possible and positive way forward for South Korea's role amid U.S.-China competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most consequential political event that took place on the peninsula in 2022 was the election of a new president in South Korea. The very narrow victory of the conservative candidate Yoon Suk-yeol marked a clear break with his predecessor Moon Jae-in and returned the image of a very divided country. The division continued throughout the year and contributed to a rapid and sharp decrease in the approval rating of the new president, together with a series of disasters and incidents that hit the country. The election of Yoon also influenced inter-Korean relations, with a return to a tougher position in Seoul. The resurgence of missile tests by North Korea, combined with this new attitude in the South, inevitably led to an exacerbation of tension that took the form of repeated military provocations and reactions, especially in the second half of the year. The spread of COVID-19 continued to be a relevant factor influencing social and political developments on the Korean peninsula. On one side, South Korea was able to adapt its strategy to the spread of the new and much more contagious «Omicron» variant; on the other side, North Korea experienced its first, officially recognized, wave of infections, that did not lead to the collapse of the country’s healthcare system and was managed with a relatively low number of deaths, according to government data. In terms of international relations, the attitude of both Koreas was a return towards traditional alliances and practices. North Korea openly supported Russia, and its invasion of Ukraine, and China, in order to weaken the position of the United States and to benefit from the split among the great powers within the UN Security Council. South Korea’s new president restored the pre-eminence of the alliance with the U.S. and of the country’s role within the liberal international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on China's foreign policy towards South Korea, North Korea and denuclearisation. Topics discussed include China's understanding of two power transitions underway on the Korean peninsula, the influence of the U.S.-China power transition on security affairs throughout Northeast Asia, the implications of the U.S.-China power transition for South Korean security policy, and the North Korea-South Korea power transition.

Research on the relationship between international economic and political relations has produced no consensus on the pacifying effects of trade. Rapid trade growth and enduring tensions characterize post–Cold War Asia’s paradox. This study assesses the political effects of China-centered interdependence based on the China–South Korea case since 1992. Although trade may inhibit conflict in line with liberal expectations, its coercive potential limits its pacifying effects. When disputes arise, asymmetric interdependence generates strategic leverage and vulnerability, and amplifies the identity dimensions of conflict that shape societal preferences. China’s combination of economic pressure and nationalist discourse induces accommodation primarily through coercion. By blending state-led and society-led retaliation, economic and accountability costs are minimized. China–South Korea political interactions have increased in quantity but not quality. The Asian case underscores qualitative changes in political relations (rather than just instances of conflict), the material and nonmaterial repercussions of asymmetric trade, and the regional security implications of China-led interdependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea President Moon Jae-in's meeting with Joe Biden and his participation in the G7 summit during May and June focused attention on Seoul's strategy of balancing relations with China and the United States. While Beijing disapproved of the US-ROK joint statement released after the May summit, Chinese state media praised the Moon administration's relative restraint in joining US-led coalition building against China. Official remarks on core political and security issues, however, raised mutual accusations of interference in internal affairs. US-China competition and South Korean domestic political debates amplify Seoul's dilemma regarding its strategic alignment ahead of the country's 2022 presidential elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors have driven South Korea’s and Japan’s strategic approaches toward China? In contrast to scholarly claims that the Sino-Korean and Sino-Japanese relationships have generally been exacerbated since 2010, we argue that the relationships have shown a consistent pattern of resilience and moderate development over the last two decades. An examination of the security and diplomatic relations from 2008 to 2019 shows that bilateral relationships remained at a manageable level, barring episodic stagnations. The findings indicate that converging factors—economic interdependence and the presence of the United States (US)—have consistently motivated Japan and Korea to accommodate China. Major economic entities in South Korea and Japan have prevented their countries from applying irreversible pressure on China. Further, the strong security commitment of the US toward Japan and South Korea has served as a bulwark preventing security dilemmas by reducing fears of Chinese military threat in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's relations with North and South Korea gained momentum in the first four months of 2021. China-North Korea relations were propelled by an exchange of messages between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Chinese President Xi Jinping around North Korea's successful convening of the Worker's Party of Korea's (WPK) Eighth Party Congress, the appointment of former North Korean Trade Minister Ri Ryong Nam as North Korea's new ambassador to China, and another round of messages in March that emphasized the importance of close relations. In a Jan. 21 Cabinet meeting, South Korean President Moon Jae-in pledged to develop relations with China to new heights, and in a Jan. 26 telephone call with Moon, Xi expressed support for Korean denuclearization and joint development of China-South Korea relations. China and South Korea held consultations on maritime enforcement cooperation, defense lines of communication, health security, and free trade negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on the relationship between international economic and political relations has produced no consensus on the pacifying effects of trade. Rapid trade growth and enduring tensions characterize post--Cold War Asia's paradox. This study assesses the political effects of China-centered interdependence based on the China-South Korea case since 1992. Although trade may inhibit conflict in line with liberal expectations, its coercive potential limits its pacifying effects. When disputes arise, asymmetric interdependence generates strategic leverage and vulnerability, and amplifies the identity dimensions of conflict that shape societal preferences. China's combination of economic pressure and nationalist discourse induces accommodation primarily through coercion. By blending state-led and society-led retaliation, economic and accountability costs are minimized. China-South Korea political interactions have increased in quantity but not quality. The Asian case underscores qualitative changes in political relations (rather than just instances of conflict), the material and nonmaterial repercussions of asymmetric trade, and the regional security implications of China-led interdependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's policy of restraint (avoidance of crippling economic sanctions) towards North Korean provocation is typically explained in terms of geopolitical concern with North Korean regime stability. The strategic and diplomatic costs of restraint would suggest the presence of non-geopolitical influences behind China's approach. Ideational explanations emphasise the persistence of shared socialist identity as well as the traditional Sino-centric worldview as shaping influences. There is much less detailed analysis of how China views North Korea's political economic evolution and how this view has changed over time to produce fluctuations in the bilateral relationship. In order to capture China's motivations more fully, I introduce two additional variables, namely China's view of the state of its own reform path (which provides the domestic context shaping policy towards North Korea), and the extent of North Korea's readiness to prioritise economic reform. I will then use these variables to explain two contrasting phases which represented the worst (1992–1999) and best (2009–2012) of times in the bilateral relationship in the post-Cold War era. These variables also help us to understand the potentials and limitations of the upturn in bilateral relations which has occurred since 2018. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains China's abortive attempt to stop North Korean nuclear development between 1993 and 2016. It attributes this failure to two international conditions. The first is geographical contiguity. As an adjacent great power, China had limited leverage over North Korea. Beijing's threats of sanctions lacked credibility, as sanctions could trigger dangerous local instabilities. Its security inducements implied a risk of subordination, which Pyongyang was unwilling to accept. The second is the unipolar international system. Unipolarity curbed Beijing's ability to protect Pyongyang from the United States, while simultaneously inducing China to pass the buck of restraining North Korea to the American unipole. This article corroborates these main arguments by drawing upon primary and secondary sources in Korean, Chinese, and English. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What has driven China's policy toward United Nations (UN) sanctions on North Korea? While insisting on a peaceful settlement of North Korean nuclear issues via diplomatic dialogues, China has gradually loosened its protective stance regarding UN sanctions on North Korea. This article examines the factors that have pushed China to take a tougher position toward North Korea: North Korea's increasingly aggressive nuclear policy, the influence of the United States on Chinese foreign policy, and the changing perception of North Korea in China. Through close examination of China's domestic discussions on North Korea, this article concludes that, besides the external factors, a growing negative perception of North Korea has played an increasingly important role in changing China's official stance. The findings suggest that closer attention should be paid to the changes in the domestic political environment of China to understand its current and future approach toward North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains a patron's decision to publicly condone, condemn, or forgo commenting on its client's unilateral provocations? We present a new theoretical framework that identifies a patron's two strategic considerations – maximizing its sphere of influence and avoiding entanglement – and factors that affect them. We claim that whenever a patron faces a great power rivalry or a vulnerable client, it is more likely to condone its client's provocations in order to safeguard its sphere of influence. On the other hand, when the risk of escalation looms large, the patron is more likely to condemn its client's provocations in order to avoid entanglement. Focusing on the Sino-North Korean patron–client relationship, we test our theory on an original dataset that tracks China's official reactions to provocations initiated by North Korea. We find that China tends to condone North Korea's provocations when the USA criticizes them, and refrains from condemning when North Korea is domestically fragile. We also find that China is more likely to condemn its client's provocations in the period after North Korea became a nuclear state. In addition, we draw on examples from the USA–Pakistan and the USA–Israel patron–client relationships to illustrate our causal logic. This article offers new insights on how a patron manages its client's unruly behavior, and provides the first large-N evidence on China's responses to North Korean provocations from 1981 to 2016. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The outbreak of COVID-19, first in China and then in South Korea, placed plans for a highly anticipated summit between Xi Jinping and Moon Jae-in on hold. Beijing and Seoul's priorities focused on fighting the virus together through aid exchanges, a new inter-agency mechanism led by their foreign ministries, and multilateral cooperation with Japan and ASEAN. As cases spread across borders, political frictions emerged over entry bans and relief supplies. The public health crisis triggered efforts to mitigate socioeconomic repercussions, raising questions over long-term US influence. The virus also dramatically interrupted the normal diplomatic and economic interactions between China and North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains Botswana's non-aligned stance at the United Nations in the 1970s. It focuses on two diplomatic wars between China and Taiwan, and between North Korea and South Korea. Botswana's position was challenged by intimidation from South Africa and Rhodesia, and threats to cut aid from the United States. Gaborone was concerned with building its legitimacy among African states who questioned Botswana's anti-colonial and anti-apartheid credentials. President Seretse Khama, when managing Cold War and southern African geopolitics, used the China and Korea questions to assert Botswana's agency and sovereignty as a non-aligned state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the impact of air pollution spillover from China to South Korea. To isolate the effects of cross-border pollution spillover from that of locally generated pollution, we exploit within-South Korea and over-time variation in the incidence of Asian dust—a meteorological phenomenon exogenous to district–time cells in South Korea—together with temporal variations in China's air quality. We find that conditional on being exposed to Asian dust, increased pollution in China leads to increased mortality from respiratory and cardiovascular diseases in South Korean districts, with the most vulnerable being the elderly and children under five. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines an underexplored area of communication studies to date, the relationship between news translation and national identity construction in China. By analysing the translation into Chinese of Korean language news that takes place on the Chinese volunteer news translation website Ltaaa.com, this article shows how the translation of news reports, and the discussions which these translations engender within the Ltaaa.com community, help to foster an aggressive form of Chinese national identity among community members. By constantly emphasising difference and promoting hostility, through attempts to control historical discussion and by asserting a superordinate status and position for China in its relations with Korea, the translation activities that take place within the Ltaaa.com community encourage the growth of a xenophobic, belligerent and condescending nationalism that is likely to hinder the development of more productive Sino-South Korean ties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the challenges due to developing of nuclear weapons by North Korea. Topics discussed include nuclear nonproliferation policy between nuclear weapon nations; belief of North Korean government to build nuclear weapons to prevent foreign invasion and foreign support for an internal rebellion; and support of China with other nations on denuclearization in North Korea.

In 2018, the situation on the Korean peninsula eased after 17 years of tension. Chinese political circles and academic circles began to discuss how to deal with the change in the situation on the Peninsula. Many notable experts on North Korea in China have expressed their views, but there are great differences among them. The government's decision-making is opaque. How do Chinese scholars interact with the government and how does the détente on the Korean Peninsula influence the opinion market of the academic community of China? How should South Korea handle the relationship with Chinese scholars in order to meet its own interests? In this article, I analyze the interaction between Chinese academics and politics on the basis of information available to the public and the changes in China's policy toward the Peninsula during and after the Sino-US trade conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines China's approach to integrating Korea into Chinese territory in history and its significant influence on the construction of the Chinese Empire and state. It discusses major instances of Chinese integration of Korea before and under the Mongol Empire and reveals that the tributary relationship with Korea that the Ming and Qing dynasties cultivated in the post-Mongol period allowed Korea to maintain a significant degree of independence from China. It points out that the Qing imperial discourse described Korea as a province by combining the Manchu ruling house's and European Jesuits' understandings of the Chinese empire. Qing China refrained from colonizing Korea in the nineteenth century primarily because of the post-Mongol shift in its policy toward the country and because of its Confucian ethos. The article further argues that China did not become a modern state until the 1950s, when the Chinese option of provincializing Korea permanently disappeared. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the second stage of the East Asian War, Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豐臣秀吉 hopefully sought to make an honorable exit, but the Choson 朝鮮 formulated a unique diplomatic strategy that brought the Ming to the battlefield, and there was no way for Toyotomi Hideyoshi's retreat and attempts at peace talks to be successful. In the end, the war concluded with Toyotomi Hideyoshi's death from illness and the retreat of the Japanese army in defeat, and the international order established between China and Korea was maintained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

2018 was a diplomatic breakthrough year for Kim Jong Un, including three summits each with Presidents Xi Jinping and Moon Jae-in and a historic meeting with President Trump. After years of frustration over North Korea's nuclear and missile development, the 70th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK in September was an occasion for consolidating the China-DPRK friendship. Prospects for regional coordination on North Korea, however, have been hindered due to challenges of implementation of international sanctions and deadlocked US-DPRK denuclearization negotiations. The focus on inter-Korean progress both overshadowed and enabled the gradual recovery of China-South Korea economic and political relations, but progress on North Korea's broader regional integration remains murky, and the regional dimension of the Korean puzzle remains unclear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are diverging assessments of China's role in resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. China's role has been characterised variously as a bystander, arbiter, catalyst and mediator over the years. This paper aims to clarify where China stands on North Korea and assesses the different phases of the Chinese approach to conflict resolution during the North Korean nuclear crisis. The main argument is that China wishes to maintain the regional status quo while appearing to adjust its position in line with the international community. China's current duplicity stems from its different priorities and concerns to the remainder of the world, and can best be explained using a role theory analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the timeline of the China-Korea relations as of September-December 2022 including Xi Jinping sending a message to Kim Jong Un on North Korea's 74 founding anniversary; and resumption of Dandong-Sinuiju railroad freight operations after a five-month suspension due to Covid-19.

By using Lowell Dittmer's game-theoretical analysis as a method, this article examines how North Korea's room to maneuver has been affected by Chinese-South Korean, Japan-ROK, and Sino-Japanese interactions, and how the DPRK sought to exploit the various conflicts between Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul. Placing the period of 2012-2016 into historical context, it emphasizes that North Korea has consistently tried to hinder cooperation between South Korea and the other two Northeast Asian states by creating "romantic triangles." North Korean propaganda frequently highlighted local territorial disputes, Japanese historical revisionism, and the deployment of US missile defense batteries in South Korea, but it could also abruptly remove these issues from its agenda if Pyongyang's foreign policy underwent a shift. Still, the DPRK was not necessarily able to benefit from these disagreements, because a Japan-ROK conflict could reinforce China-ROK cooperation (or vice versa). In periods of inter-Korean confrontation, Pyongyang had less chance to take advantage of Sino-Japanese and Japan-ROK friction than in periods of North-South rapprochement. If China or Japan decided to confront Seoul, they could easily have found alternative partners that were more powerful and attractive than the DPRK (like Russia or the United States), which limited their readiness to engage a confrontational North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Koreans pursuing business opportunities in China have routinely sought assistance from Chinese-born Koreans who possess the linguistic and cultural skills to help make ventures in China successful. While shared ethnicity is a proven resource for furthering transnational business, emphasis on common identity can quickly deteriorate into an emphasis on separate identities. This article examines how shared ethnicity has facilitated business between China and South Korea and how ethnic solidarity has been questioned. The study contributes to discussions about the interplay between cultural identities and transnational business. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It does not seem likely that the South Korean-Chinese relationship would return to its heyday in 2015. Owing to the urgency of the North Korean nuclear issue, both parties tacitly agreed to bury the THAAD dispute and to no longer deal with it publicly, in order to prevent additional damage to the relationship. But it means nothing more than that. The smooth progress of China's economic retaliations for THAAD demonstrates that it will be a long time before China's grievances can be mitigated. Beijing seems determined that there cannot be a full restoration of relations without a complete withdrawal of THAAD. As can be inferred from the three Chinese-North Korean summits alone this year, China seems to regard a return to a two Koreas policy as the best way to secure its interests. Regardless of whether Seoul wants it or not, China will continue to play a part on the Peninsula, either directly or indirectly. Given this situation, China should be encouraged to make constructive and positive contributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the North Korean government view China? This study examines North Korea's foreign policy on China by analyzing the strategic options of North Korean leaders and applying sentiment analysis to Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reports about China. It is found that North Korea's generally positive attitude toward China contains nuanced types of sentiments and that North Korean leaders have managed the expression of these sentiments in the media to achieve political goals at domestic and international levels. Our findings also suggest that, first, China may not be the key to the solution of the Korean nuclear issue. Second, Kim Jong Un was not a weak leader from the beginning of his rule. Rather he had acquired a substantial amount of authority before Kim Jong Il passed away. Based on our findings, an analysis of the future development of the North Korea-China relationship is also provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper seeks to find an answer to the question of why China's effort to curb North Korea's nuclear development has failed to produce expected outcomes. Since the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002, China, as the most, if not sole, influential country to North Korea, has been attempting to restrain the North's nuclear armament. Nevertheless, Beijing has always failed to sustain its pressure on Pyongyang long enough to restrain Pyongyang's nuclear ambition; instead, it has often ended up with China's appeasement policy. Witnessing such failure, some scholars assert that Beijing is able, but not willing, to curb Pyongyang's nuclear armament, while others claim that Beijing's leverage over Pyongyang is a lot more limited than widely thought. Yet, both schools of thought, focusing narrowly on China's capability or willingness to restrain North Korea, has failed to depict a full picture. By contrast, this study, employing a game theory approach, views Sino--DPRK relations as a strategic interaction between restrainer and restrainee. It argues that North Korea's tactical deception and military adventurism shuffle China's political priorities on the Korean peninsula, thereby preventing China from pressuring North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In tackling the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, President Donald Trump has invested - especially before the dramatic turn of events since early 2018 - a great deal of political capital in President Xi Jinping in the hopes that he might rein in North Korea, China's traditional ally. However, expecting Beijing to 'solve' the problem is unrealistic. Chinese thinking on North Korea - as reflected in policy positions and domestic debates - has been marred by inconsistencies and overcaution and it is now further complicated by the intensifying geopolitical competition with the United States, which also embroils, to a varying degree, South Korea and Taiwan. Beijing has been strenuously walking a fine line between pressing Pyongyang and averting a war, all the while watching its back, particularly with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea. Beijing's risk aversion over North Korea and its security competition with the US has led it into a geopolitical conundrum from which there is no clear exit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Beijing has repeatedly signed up to multilateral sanctions against North Korea, it is widely regarded as having failed to enforce them. Indeed, China's deepening economic engagement with the country has led observers to debate the causes of this seemingly duplicitous approach. Constructivist and realist approaches have relied on state-centric frameworks that serve to reduce Sino-North Korean relations to the high politics of Beijing-Pyongyang diplomacy in the context of broader geopolitical dynamics. This article argues that such approaches pay insufficient attention to the profound rescaling of the Chinese state in recent years and the implications this process has for bilateral relations. This article sheds light on how Sino-North Korean relations are being driven by actors at multiple scales and by a multitude of objectives as a result of decentralisation and marketisation alongside increasing geographical unevenness within China and new challenges to continued capital accumulation. North Korea has come to play an increasingly important role in efforts to facilitate economic recovery in the northeastern border regions through serving as spatial fix for Chinese manufacturing capital. These new cross-border flows of capital and labour suggest an emerging pattern of Sino-North Korean relations that is by no means static but in considerable flux. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this special section, the present article reviews South Korean perspectives on China's ‘periphery diplomacy’ with a focus on Chinese behaviour with respect to the East China Sea maritime territory and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). By analysing research papers published by various Korean research institutions and academic journals, this article demonstrates that most Korean scholars hold that as long as China's growth goes on, the tensions between the US and China are likely to intensify. The article also shows that one of the primary concerns of South Korean scholars lies in the question of how South Korea should respond to changing regional orders and a rising China. The article argues that South Korea's strategic dilemma is reflected in a regional structure in which competition between two great powers has recently forced the periphery to impose bilateral ties on. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The view that China would not "abandon" North Korea, despite repeated provocations by North Korea, has been strengthened in the context of the US pivot to Asia, which is generally regarded by Chinese strategists as Washington's ploy to contain China. As the rivalry and competition between Washington and Beijing deepen, North Korea's strategic value to China increases. However, history shows that Beijing regarded Pyongyang as "expendable" even during the Korean War. Based on Sino- North Korean historical relations, in this article we argue that China's policy toward North Korea is not fixed but fluid, and that Washington and Seoul could inspire changes within China's policy toward North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early twentieth century, the sovereignty of a territory north of the China-Korea Tumen River border was under severe dispute between China, Korea, and Japan. Based on a Jesuit memoir and map of Korea published in eighteenth-century Europe, a Japanese colonial bureaucrat and international law expert, Shinoda Jisaku, asserted that a vast region north of the China-Korea border should be regarded as a “no man’s land.” Employing Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and European materials, this article traces the origin and evolution of such a definition. It demonstrates that the Jesuit map and description were based on false geographic information, which the Korean court deliberately provided to a Manchu official in 1713 in order to safeguard its interests. During prolonged intercommunication between diverse areas of the globe during the past three centuries, spatial and legal knowledge has been produced, reproduced, and transformed within imperial and colonial contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Toward the end of the book, Westad suggests that realpolitik is the reason why China is intent on protecting the North Korean regime, and he assails it for producing negative foreign perceptions of Chinese policy. A history of Choson Korea's relations with Ming and Qing China quickly follows the conceptual discussion. Odd Arne Westad's I Empire and Righteous Nation i elucidates the history of the relationship between China and Korea over the past six hundred years. [Extracted from the article]

Purpose--This article highlights relations between the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and North Korea, explains why ASEAN adheres to the principle of Nuclear Arms Non- Proliferations and posits that this regional bloc can make a positive contribution towards encouraging the DPRK's military denuclearization. Design/methodology/approach--The author analyses current affairs, examines official ASEAN communiques and consults ASEAN Treaty documents in order to substantiate his argument. Findings: While ASEAN-North Korea relations were and are for the most part friendly and economic links stable, Pyongyang cannot depend on the former as a counterweight to nuclear and missile non- proliferation pressure exerted by the U.S.-Northeast Asia alliance, as ASEAN steadfastly promotes non- proliferation ideals to serve the national interests of the bloc's member states. Instead of siding with the DPRK, it is proposed that ASEAN exerts economic and political influence to coax the Kim regime towards nuclear munitions and missile abnegation. The author argues for the efficacy of such pressure. Practical Implications--This article points out that there is little room for the North to maneuver itself out of its current international isolation. Also, contrary to ASEAN skeptics or naysayers, the regional bloc can, if it adopts a cohesive and actionable policy stance against the DPRK's nuclear and missile proliferation, help to promote the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Originality, Value--While articles urging pressure on North Korea are not new, detailed analysis concerning ASEAN, its policy on nuclear arms and the constructive role it might play are few and far between. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016, China's response was stern enough for certain China analysts to posit that the Middle Kingdom's approach to its Cold War ally was changing. In reality, however, China's imports from North Korea, especially coal, a crucial mineral for the North's income but banned by United Nations (UN) Resolution 2270, did not decrease. Politically, China also strived to maintain mutual relations with North Korea. Based on its strategic and other cost-benefit calculations, Beijing needs to maintain economic and political ties with Pyongyang and thus has no incentive to seriously observe the U.N. resolution. In this context, China is expected to virtually repeat the gestures it made in the past in dealing with the North. Under these circumstances, sanctioning North Korea through China is not considered a viable option in tackling the nuclear issue; rather, the USA and South Korea should change their policy approach toward this problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines recent reversals and divergences in Japan's and Korea's free-trade agreement (FTA) patterns and strategies through the cases of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, the Japan-Australia FTA, and the Korea-China FTA. Throughout the 2000s, South Korea was much more proactive in pursuing FTAs with major trade partners and agricultural exporters compared to Japan. Departing from its past FTA practices, however, Japan recently concluded the Japan-Australia FTA and the TPP negotiations, which include substantial liberalization of Japan's politically sensitive and heavily protected agricultural sector. In contrast, Korea has increasingly been taking a more protective stance in its recent FTAs and has been hesitant to join the TPP negotiations. This paper argues that changes in Japan's and Korea's domestic trade governance - in other words the institutions of trade policy-making that encompass the authority structure, decision-making processes, and coordinating mechanisms among various societal and political actors - explain Japan's and Korea's shifting FTA patterns and strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]