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Stalnaker (Context, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) defends two ideas about common ground. The first is that the common ground of a conversation is definable in terms of an iterated propositional attitude of acceptance, so that p is common ground iff p is commonly accepted. The second is the idea that the "default setting" of conversational acceptance is belief, so that as a default, what is accepted in conversation coincides with what is (commonly) believed. In this paper, I argue that we should favor a pair of contrasting theses instead. First, I argue that we should identify the common ground with what is common knowledge about what is accepted, so that p is common ground iff it is common knowledge that p is accepted. Thus the attitude that is iterated in the definition of common ground is not acceptance but knowledge. Second, I argue that the "default setting" for conversational acceptance is not belief, but knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Principals are responsible for planning school improvement efforts at the school level to leverage increases in student achievement. Recent research underscores how principals engage in satisficing behaviors that result in low-quality school improvement plans (SIPs). To disrupt compliance-based planning practices and produce high-quality SIPs, some districts have shifted from yearlong planning to short-cycle planning. Districts need to establish a coherent understanding of improvement planning to motivate and sustain new principal planning practices. Through the coherence framework, this qualitative study explored one large urban district's shift from yearlong planning processes to short-cycle planning processes to understand principals' perspectives on improvement planning and the potential shift to short-cycle planning. Researchers examined eight principals' short-cycle plans. Principals who participated in a two-year partnership with a University System Leadership Program (USLP) for school-level support for school improvement were interviewed. Principal interviews, USLP site lead feedback, and principal supervisors' interview data to triangulate the short-cycle plans. Data analysis revealed the existence of a perverse coherence that impeded principals' shift to short-cycle planning. Findings suggest that districts examine their internal practices and processes influencing principals' improvement planning practices and attend to principals' understanding and practice of improvement planning by providing continuous professional learning and feedback. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children's religious education is vital for the formation of pupils in Dutch Orthodox Protestant schools. Therefore, it seems self-evident that parents and teachers cooperate. This article presents research on parents' and teachers' opinions about the helpfulness of cooperative practices in religious education. A total of 1346 parents and teachers completed questionnaires developed from a previous study. This article finds that parents and teachers cherish the ideal of 'coherence between school and family' although differences between the respondent groups and school types occurred. Moreover, the research shows that this ideal influences the valuing of cooperative practices of religious education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of participation in Christ has remained a distinctive area in Pauline scholarship throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Scholars have raised a pressing critique, however, that "participation" has become a vague concept such that its use for exegesis of Paul is limited. This recent critique resembles E. P. Sanders's earlier concern in the late 1970s that scholars appear to lack a category of "reality" that corresponds to Paul's experience of participating in Christ. In light of this problem, I argue that the interpretive category of participation can be expanded further without losing its coherence. To develop this argument, I first chart a history of scholarship by focusing on participatory motifs that scholars have recently identified. Then, in the following sections, I analyze two motifs that have not been sufficiently integrated into this research on participation: (1) reasoning in accordance with Christ in Rom 15:5; (2) the form of the body conformed to Christ's glorified body in Phil 3:21. Finally, I discuss the conceptual linkage between these two Pauline passages. In conclusion, these two motifs will allow scholarship to move toward more nuanced perspectives on how Paul envisions participation in Christ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that there is an incompatibility between the two basic principles of Molinism, i.e., God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and divine immutability. To this end, firstly, we set out the difference between strong and weak immutability: according to the latter only God's essential attributes remain unchanged, while the former affirms that God cannot change in any way. Our next step is to argue that Molinism ascribes strong immutability to God. However, according to Molinism, some counterfactuals of freedom need to be actualized by divine will. We argue that this claim does entail a change in God because it attributes a knowledge to God that involves moving from possibility to actuality through divine will. Therefore, claiming God knows counterfactuals of freedom leads us to reject the strong sense of divine immutability. Further, we argue that assuming God's knowledge encompasses counterfactuals of freedom cannot be consistent even with weak immutability because, according to Molinism, a change in God's knowledge requires a change in His essence. We conclude that Molinism is incoherent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: Many strategy studies implicitly rely upon inference to the best explanation (IBE) or modern abduction. We leverage recent work in the philosophy of science to consider how we arrive at "best" explanations, explanations that are lovely, in the sense that they are useful, general, and provide meaning, and likely, in the sense that they are close to the truth. Interpretation of observational results requires an understanding of context that statistical analysis alone cannot provide. At that point of encounter, historical methods—hermeneutics, contextualization and source criticism—can improve IBE by helping scholars (1) generate new candidate explanations and (2) systematically judge, privilege, and balance the explanatory virtues that constitute the loveliness and likeliness of explanations. Managerial Summary: Many strategy studies iteratively use data and theory to inference to the best explanation of observed phenomena. We leverage recent work in the philosophy of science to consider how we arrive at best explanations that are useful, general, provide meaning, and, at the same time, are close to the truth. Interpreting observational results requires an understanding of the context that statistical analysis alone cannot provide. At that point of encounter, methodological tools from the field of history can improve the process of determining the best explanation by helping scholars (1) generate new candidate explanations and (2) systematically judge and privilege explanations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A passage from Ps.-Basil of Caesarea's ep. 366 contains verbatim parallels with a quotation of Valentinus given in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 3.7.59.3. These parallels have rarely been recognized by scholars. Völker and Markschies have argued that Ps.-Basil was excerpting from Clement, but this paper argues that Ps.-Basil was independent of Clement and was likely Clement's source. Overlooked evidence includes (i) the coherence of the parallel passages in the context of ep. 366 and their relative incoherence in the context of Strom. 3.7.59.3; (ii) Valentinian theology that is found throughout ep. 366, including the notions of spiritual bodies and Charis as God's protological consort; (iii) grammatical errors in Clement that are not present in Ps.-Basil; and (iv) further textual evidence suggesting that ep. 366 has the original version of the passage. A plausible explanation of the evidence, this paper will argue, is that ep. 366 comes from the pen of Valentinus himself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is it good for us if the different parts of our lives are connected to each other like the parts of a good story? Some philosophers have thought so, while others have firmly rejected it. In this paper, I focus on the state-of-the-art anti-narrativist arguments Amy Berg has recently presented in this journal. I argue that while she makes a good case that the best kind of lives for us do not revolve around a single project or theme, the best kind of narrativist views actually encourage us to pursue a variety of different projects, as long as they are mutually supportive. I claim that when interpreted in the most plausible way, prudentially good-making narrative coherence arises precisely out of this kind of unity in diversity. Well-roundedness and narrative coherence are thus not inherently in tension, but are both good-making holistic features of our lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some descriptions of learning represent the process as the development of organisations of elements. Various organisations have been proposed, for example, schemata and conceptual structures. Such representations assume that mental entities, such as concepts, are sufficiently stable and differentiated to be treated as units. We discuss these assumptions and propose a new term, assemblages, to refer to a person's activation of two or more conceptual resources in a context. Methodological challenges have resulted in a lack of research that examines how assemblages are formed. This study presents data from a microgenetic, multiple case study of four 16-17-year-old students. The participants were interviewed weekly, using various probes related to forces and motion over six months. We focus on two aspects of the assembly process in our analysis. First, we report data that indicate that participants perceived the units they assembled differently from expert conceptualisations and reflect on the stability of their assemblages. Second, we discuss how participants' expectations about the coherence of knowledge impact their assembly. We propose that future research investigates the stability and boundaries of conceptual resources and suggest teachers and researchers are cautious in assuming that data indicate a conceptual resource is stable or unitary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to consider Bergson's theory of language as a resource of his intuitive method. Although he never explicitly elaborated a philosophy of language, his reflections on how words intertwine with our thoughts and the way we know reality permeate various moments of his work, to the point where he defines the task of Metaphysics (i.e. Philosophy) as an attempt to go beyond symbols. Despite the exegetical effort to be developed here to present Bergson's conception of language and its centrality to the coherence of his philosophy, the pretension is above all systematic in its counterpoint with the theses of the so-called linguistic turn. Thus, by asking what Bergson's theory of language tells us about knowledge of reality and, consequently, about the nature of philosophy itself, I will also be questioning the status of the critique of language in contemporary philosophy. My aim is finally to show that the discussion about philosophy and the boundaries of language is less a theoretical question than a fundamental decision about the search for wisdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Western jurists have spent the last centuries trying to escape the ill effects of will theories of contract law. For pre-nineteenth-century continental jurists, the enforceability and effects of a contract depended on the reason or causa for which the contract was made. For the will theorists, what mattered was what the parties willed, not why they had chosen to do so. Nineteenth-century positivists took a similar approach to law. The "business" of jurists, Sir Frederck Pollock said, is to "learn and know, so far as needful for their affairs, what rules the State does undertake to enforce and administer, whatever the real or professed reasons for those rules may be." We now recognize that the effects of laws and contracts should depend on the reasons for which they are made, although we are often unsure how to take these reasons into account. This Article describes and evaluates how jurists once took account of the causa for which a contract is made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the highest good actually good for in Kant's third Critique? While there are well-worked out answers to this question in the literature that focus on the highest good's practical importance, this paper argues that there is an important function for the highest good that has to do exclusively with contemplation. This important function becomes clear once one notices that coherent [konsequent] thinking, for Kant, was synonymous with 'bündiges' thinking, and that both are connected with the highest good in the third Critique's moral proof for God's existence. I show that the original meaning of 'bündig', which is a forgotten term from the carpentry trade, illuminates the stakes of the highest good in Kant's system. For us, as proverbial carpenters of reason, coherence is essential for the intellectual activity of constructing a philosophical worldview in his transcendental idealism. I motivate the reading further by showing how this function can neatly reconstruct Kant's proof for God's existence in the third Critique. I conclude by sketching Kant's reasons for why the project of creating a coherent worldview grounded in the highest good is worth the labour costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The normativity of so-called 'coherence' or 'structural' requirements of rationality has been hotly debated in recent years. However, relatively little has been said about the nature of structural rationality, or what makes a set of attitudes structurally irrational, if structural rationality is not ultimately a matter of responding correctly to reasons. This paper develops a novel account of incoherence (or structural irrationality), critically examining Alex Worsnip's recent account. It first argues that Worsnip's account both over-generates and under-generates incoherent patterns of attitudes, and then proposes an alternative that both avoids these problems and captures a crucial insight behind Worsnip's account. According to this account, a set of attitudes is incoherent just in case having all of the attitudes in that set is incompatible with reacting to a question in a way that one is, in virtue of having the attitudes, committed to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the need for a cohesive economic narrative in the Great Britain to guide policymaking and address public uncertainty, particularly in light of Labour leaders Starmer and Reeves' recent proposals. Topics include the dual role of economic narratives in coordination and communication, the historical context of Great Britain economic narratives since 1979, and the implications of these narratives on policy decisions and public perception.

The article focuses on establishing a coherent legal framework, termed the Child Wellbeing framework, within the domain of children and the law. It addresses skepticism regarding the coherence of this field and highlights the interconnectedness of various legal doctrines affecting children. It is reported that the framework, based on contemporary research on child development and social welfare benefits, aims to promote the wellbeing of children across different legal contexts.

The article discusses the challenges faced by Conservative Judaism in grappling with halakhah, particularly regarding its approach to marriage ceremonies. It argues that a historical approach to halakhah must confront the realities of contemporary society and ensure consistency in its application, highlighting the need for clarity and coherence in halakhic decision-making within the Conservative movement.

If we want to retain classical logic and standard syntax in light of the liar, we are forced to restrict the T‐schema. The traditional philosophical justification for this is sentential – liar sentences somehow malfunction. But the standard formal way of implementing this is conditional, our T‐sentences tell us that if "p" does not malfunction, then "p" is true if and only if p. Recently Bacon and others have pointed out that conditional T‐restrictions like this flirt with incoherence. If we want to keep the "malfunction" motivation, our only other option is to non‐conditionally restrict the T‐schema, but Field and others have given powerful philosophical and technical arguments against this kind of approach. Here I argue that if we really take the philosophical motivation for restricting T‐sentences seriously, we can explain why conditional restrictions fail, answer Field's argument, and reason in a coherent way about truth using a non‐conditional restriction strategy. This cracks the door open for a fully classical response to the liar and related paradoxes. In closing, I argue that, when properly understood, this kind of "restriction" is not really a restriction at all. If this is right, then the holy grail of liar studies (classical logic, naïve truth, and standard syntax) may yet be attainable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a popular account, rationality is a kind of coherence of an agent's mental states and, more specifically, a matter of fulfilling norms of coherence. For example, in order to be rational, an agent is required to intend to do what they judge they ought to and can do. This norm has been called 'Enkrasia'. Another norm requires that, ceteris paribus, an agent retain their intention over time. This has been called 'Persistence of Intention'. This paper argues that thus understood norms of rationality may at times conflict. More specifically, Enkrasia and Persistence of Intention may place demands on the agent that are impossible to fulfil. In these cases, the framework of requirements does not provide us with norms that make us rational. A rival account, according to which rationality is a kind of responsiveness to one's available reasons, can overcome the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We answer the long-standing question whether it is consistent to have simple P-points of two different characters. For a filter F over w Guzmán and Kalajdzievski introduced a parametrised version of Miller forcing called PT(F). By combining iterands of the type PT(F)with others we establish: It is consistent relative to ZFC that there is a simple P%1 -point and a simple P%2 -point. A main technical point is the use of properness and descriptive complexity in the limit steps of uncountable cofinality [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to advance a very natural and very simple glut-theoretic response to the problem of evil – or at least the target, 'logical' problem of evil. At the very least, the given account rebuts the frequent claim – even by glut theorists (including me until recently) – that gluts are entirely irrelevant to the problem of evil even if otherwise involved in the true theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Subjectivists think that our well-being is grounded in our subjective attitudes. Many such views are vulnerable to variations on the 'paradox of desire', where theories cannot make determinate judgements about the well-being of agents who take a positive valuing attitude towards their life going badly. However, this paradox does not affect all subjectivist theories; theories grounded on agents' prudential values can avoid it. This paper suggests a new paradox for subjectivist theories which has a wider scope, and includes such prudential judgement theories. I outline the new paradox and show how two plausible idealisztions (coherence and consideration) will not help. Subjectivists about well-being must either add an additional idealization that can solve the paradox of judgement or explain why such paradoxes do not constitute serious objections to a theory of well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coherence between theory and practice, and transition between education and the profession are central challenges in social work and social worker education. This article analyzes how students and professional social workers within a Norwegian social work education establish such connections and how this changes in the transition between education and the profession. The study is inspired by Aaron Antonovsky's concept, sense of coherence, and is based on qualitative data from focus group interviews with students, and with social workers after one year, and after five years in the profession. The analysis shows three different patterns for establishing meaningful connections. For students, notions of competence requirements in the profession create practice anxiety and an instrumental approach to coherence. For newly graduated social workers, this changes radically to understanding theory as a source for reflection on practice, and that the more instrumental connections can be developed within various occupational positions. The more experienced social workers describe the sense of coherence more as an individual development of personal competence. Finally, these empirical results are used to discuss challenges for social work as an 'practice-based profession and an academic discipline', and implications for social work education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Oscar Brenifier's approach to Philosophical Practice is contested. In this text I analyze his "Phenomenology of Lying" in a deconstructionist manner. I try to strengthen its strengths and make suggestions as to how to mend some important shortcomings that I find. First, I summarize and structure the 13 reasons for lying that Brenifier lists, and second the 21 patterns of lying that he identifies. Third, I discuss his notions of reality and truth, which are too much "correspondence-minded", hence the belligerence. Fourth, I explore coherence and consistency as valuable alternatives. Fifth, I follow the trace of the "dead philosopher", which is a very interesting concept of Brenifier's. It leads to confirming the coherence approach from within. Finally, I draw conclusions for the philosophical dialogue. I claim that Brenifiers' enlightening intentions can be implemented better with a peaceful and patient attitude towards the people coming for advice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philip K. Dick’s novels Ubik and The Man in the High Castle explore the idea of the multiplicity of realities, which can be understood better if interpreted from a cosmological point of view. The scientific principles of decoherence, as formulated by H. Dieter Zeh and Hugh Everett III, shed light on the nature of these fictional worlds, their creation and dissolution and their perception by both the protagonists and the reader. Ontological puzzles of the quantum world, based on the rejection of the special status of an observer in physical reality and fractal branching of the universe, offer insights into the mechanisms at work in these two novels. Decoherence may be the key to understanding the disintegrating borders between realities in both novels, which are manifested as worlds in superposition. However, the rules of this scientific principle are radically challenged by the emergence of what could be termed the agents of re-coherence. These agents reveal the existence of alternate realities in the novels, as well as the process of the violation of the decoherence principle. Not only are these occurrences interesting from both a scientific and artistic point of view, they also reveal the realities in the novels as being far more coherent than they seem on the surface and interpretable as literary parallels to thought experiments conceived as possible explanations of the quantum world theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the experience of the Afro-Colombian movement over the course of two peace processes, investigating the relationship between opportunities for participation and effective inclusion. The 1991 Constituent Assembly that emerged from the peace processes of the late 1980s presented a particularly open opportunity for civil society participation, and yet the AfroColombian movement was unable to gain representation in negotiations for a new constitution. In the 2016 peace process with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC, despite insistence from the government that its negotiations with FARC were exclusively bilateral, the Afro movement was able to gain a seat at the table along with its Indigenous counterparts and generate a commitment from both parties to protect ethnic rights, known as the Capítulo Étnico (Ethnic Chapter). In contrast to existing literature that focuses on international actors as drivers of inclusion, we argue that effective inclusion reflects in large part the internal capacity, coherence, and unity of the movements themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: This study investigates the relations of resilience with coping, personality traits, emotional intelligence, sense of coherence and maladaptive personality traits. Method: The study employs network analysis techniques to the study of resilience, showcasing how these methods can estimate a model that is simple to interpret while still retaining the most important relations and that can even suggest the direction of causality despite using a cross‐sectional design (N = 305). Results: The results highlight several important variables that should be considered for fostering resilience, foremost among them the use of positive reappraisal coping, sense of coherence, and the social management aspect of emotional intelligence. Conclusions: The results successfully replicated known associations between resilience and other psychological constructs (emotional intelligence, personality, sense of coherence, coping) and shed light on relations between resilience and maladaptive personality traits. Network analysis considered all these constructs together, so as to take into account the complex pattern of relations between them and offer a bird's eye view of the whole network of associations centred on resilience. The resulting model is parsimonious and easy to interpret while still striving to preserve the complexity of the variables' interrelations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When we talk about the coherence of a story, we seem to think of how well its individual pieces fit together—how to explicate this notion formally, though? We develop a Bayesian network based coherence measure with implementation in R, which performs better than its purely probabilistic predecessors. The novelty is that by paying attention to the network structure, we avoid simply taking mean confirmation scores between all possible pairs of subsets of a narration. Moreover, we assign special importance to the weakest links in a narration, to improve on the other measures' results for logically inconsistent scenarios. We illustrate and investigate the performance of the measures in relation to a few philosophically motivated examples, and (more extensively) using the real-life example of the Sally Clark case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I challenge the standard view that clarity and coherence in moral philosophy and ethics are always good and obscurity necessarily bad. The appraisal of clarity, I argue, entails a risk of reducing and misrepresenting the complex and multifaceted nature of good, productive and true thinking and communication. Uncertainty and obscurity do not necessarily lead to vagueness, imprecision or meaning-obstruction. There are productive forms of uncertainty and there are unproductive forms. Indeed, to be precise, lucid and truthful sometimes requires respecting and linguistically and conceptually reproducing the incoherence, obscurity and uncertainty of reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a growing body of literature on categorization in organization theory, researchers are exploring the stabilizing role of categories and the processes by which they emerge. Because the literature focuses mainly on categories that emerge successfully or are already established, we know much less about why categories fall out of use or fail to emerge. Rather than viewing declining usage or failed emergence as different processes, we argue that they are two aspects of the single problem of understanding what makes a category viable. Focusing on the coherence of the items included in a category and how distinct they are compared to items in other categories, we develop the concept of category viability and argue that viable categories are those found useful for sensemaking, analysis, and coordination because they balance both coherence and distinctiveness to fall within what we call a zone of viability. To illustrate how category viability helps explain both change and continuity of categories, we also offer a framework to describe the process by which categories move in or out of the zone of viability with deliberate actions or with shifting circumstances that change their members or positions relative to other categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: We examined changes in value interrelations during middle childhood. In line with the Personal Values Theory, we expected a value system, with individuals similarly valuing related motivations, and setting priorities between conflicting motivations. We hypothesized this system to develop dynamically during middle childhood as children deepen their understanding of their own values. Method: Using unfolding analysis, we estimated intraindividual value structure coherence, that is, the extent to which the interrelations among a child's values are similar to the hypothesized interrelations. Cross‐Cultural Study 1 (N = 4615, 6–12‐year‐old children) included children from 12 countries. Cross‐Sequential Study 2 (N = 629, 6–10‐year‐old children at Time 1) included three annual measurements. Results: In Study 1, we found a curvilinear association between age and intraindividual value structure coherence: Children's values were more coherent at ages 9–10 than before or after. Study 2 confirmed this pattern of within‐individual development. Conclusions: We propose that development in coherence with the theoretical value structure offers insight into children's understanding of values as well as changes in value priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What grounds the truth of modal statements? And how do we get to know about what is possible or necessary? One of the most prominent anti-realist perspectives on the nature of modality, due to Peter Menzies, is the response-dependent account of modal concepts. Typically, offering a response-dependent account of a concept means defining it in terms of dispositions to elicit certain mental states from suitable agents under suitable circumstances. Menzies grounded possibility and necessity in the conceivability-response of ideal conceivers: P is possible iff an ideal conceiver could conceive that P. I will draw attention to three major objections that can be identified in the modal metaphysics and epistemology literature: Chalmers' Incoherency Objection, Sherratt's Transparency Objection and Geirsson's Irrelevancy Objection. Each of these objections raises a different worry regarding Menzies' account: that the notion of an ideal conceiver is incoherent, that the account implies a controversial thesis, and that it fails to offer an explanation of our knowledge of modality. The aim of this paper is to defend the response-dependent account of modality against these three objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper it is shown that interpretive canons are either constitutionally invalid because of the principles of interpretation it establishes, or a theory of interpretation can be made to be inconsistent: where a theory of interpretation says do p , then a new canon can say do not- p. This is called the Canon Dilemma. Whichever horn of the dilemma is taken as acceptable (accept invalidity or possible inconsistency), this shows that canons cause more problems for theorising about interpretation than currently realised. Some might interpret the Canon Dilemma as a process of theory change (p is replaced with not- p rather than being contradicted by it), but even then problems of incoherence still persist. This paper also shows a connection between debates on the constitutionality of interpretive canons and the descriptive accuracy of linguistic theories of interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Integrating horizontal perspectives in sectoral policies is an increasingly popular way to address complex, societal problems like climate change and gender inequality. Policy evaluation can contribute to policy integration by shedding light on the coherence between sectoral goals and the mitigation or solution of the problem in question – including possible synergies and/or conflicts. To denote this evaluation modality, we introduce the concept of "integrated evaluation" – i.e. integrating horizontal perspectives in evaluations of sectoral policies. A Swedish case study helps identify salient factors affecting the implementation of this type of evaluation. We find that the prospect for integrated evaluation is significantly affected by the perceived inappropriateness in asking independent evaluators to contribute to political agendas, the lack of requisite knowledge to produce credible integrated evaluations, and a disinterest in the integrated perspective among policymakers. In light of our case study, we discuss the outlook for this kind of evaluation and provide ideas on how to support its future implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is it good to be less, rather than more incoherent? Julia Staffel, in her excellent book "Unsettled Thoughts," answers this question by showing that if your credences are incoherent, then there is some way of nudging them toward coherence that is guaranteed to make them more accurate and reduce the extent to which they are Dutch-bookable. This seems to show that such a nudge toward coherence makes them better fit to play their key epistemic and practical roles: representing the world and guiding action. In this paper, I argue that Staffel's strategy needs a small tweak. While she identifies appropriate measures of epistemic value, she does not identify appropriate measures of practical value. Staffel measures practical value using Dutchbookability scores. But credences have practical value in virtue of recommending actions that produce as much utility as possible. And while susceptibility to a Dutch book is a surefire sign that one's credences are needlessly bad at this task, one's degree of Dutch-bookability is not itself a good measure of how well they recommend practically valuable actions. Strictly proper scoring rules, I argue, are the right tools for measuring both epistemic and practical value. I show that we can rerun Staffel's strategy swapping in strictly proper scoring rules for Dutch-bookability measures. So long as one's epistemic scoring rule and practical scoring rule are "sufficiently similar," there is some way of nudging incoherent credences toward coherence that is guaranteed to yield more of both types of value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This autoethnography explores one woman's international move from Colorado to Switzerland in the role of trailing spouse. Trailing spouse describes a person who moves abroad to support his or her spouse's career. This term conjures an experience defined by a lack of agency and often intense identity struggle and can foreshadow some of the challenges trailing spouses face upon arrival in their new country. The author critically calls her identity, privilege, and gender roles into question as she navigates what it means to be a new mother, wife, academic, and expat in the role of trailing spouse. She exposes the invisible work of reorienting her identity to the new culture and roles, something she was too overwhelmed to do while living abroad. By examining how the role of trailing spouse is conceptualized and lived, it becomes clear that supporting spouses in an international move must make space for identity struggle instead of consistency or coherence. This piece argues that trailing spouses need to find space to embrace the identity struggle, in a world that values identity coherence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The harshness objection is the most important challenge to luck egalitarianism. Very recently, Andreas Albertsen and Lasse Nielsen provided a scrupulous analysis of the harshness objection and claim that only the inconsistency objection—the objection that luck egalitarianism is incompatible with the ideal of basic moral equality—has real bite. I argue that the relevantly construed incoherence objection is not as strong as Albertsen and Nielsen believe. In doing so, first, I show that the deontological luck egalitarian conception of equal treatment does not endorse harsh policies such as excessive responsibility-sensitive healthcare that would be disrespectful to the imprudent. Second, I demonstrate that deontological luck egalitarianism is not troubled by the case that involves a lack of respect for the prudent, which vexes Anderson's relational egalitarianism that Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen's argument highlights. I thus claim that the harshness objection is not a truly decisive objection against the luck egalitarian project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism is presented in which the author challenges the interpretation of William Golding's novel, The Spire, which was criticized for its crude symbolism and incoherence. The author suggests that the spire's resemblance to a living organism implies that it was not made but grown, possessing a life of its own independent from its creator. Although it is uncertain whether Golding was exposed to such theories during the novel's composition.

The article examines the alleged incoherence, documentary aesthetics and use of direct address in the book "The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine" by Michael Lewis. Also cited are the book's topics like the mortgage crisis of 2007-2008, the global economic recession, and the book's film adaptation "The Big Short, " directed by Adam McKay.

Why should we avoid incoherence? An influential view tells us that incoherent combinations of attitudes are such that it is impossible for all of those attitudes to be simultaneously vindicated by the evidence. But it is not clear whether this view explains what is wrong with certain akratic doxastic states. In this paper, I flesh out an alternative response to that question, one according to which the problem with incoherent combinations of attitudes is that it is impossible for all of those attitudes to be simultaneously knowledgeable. This alternative response explains what is wrong with akratic combinations of attitudes using commonly accepted epistemological theses. The paper still shows how this proposal is able to explain the badness of incoherent combinations involving the absence of attitudes, suspended judgment, and credence. Finally, it is suggested that this picture can be generalized to the realm of practical rationality as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author presents replies to critics that reviewed her book "Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality." Topics discussed include the association between outright beliefs and credences, the possible impact of the implementation of pseudo-conditionalization on reasoning with beliefs, and the dualist view on the source of incoherence.

Classical Indian thought contains a number of arguments for monism that reject the cogency of metaphysical pluralism's account of change, development, and causation in the world. They do this on the basis of (a) the coherence of changes that we see in the world, (b) the difficulty of limning absolute distinctions between individuals, and (c) the prerequisite need for some medium explaining causal interactions. This article provides some background to Indian philosophical thought about a basic fabric of reality that grounds changing forms, containing the telos of their evolution in potentia. It then sets out Coherence, Complexity, and Connection Arguments for monism as employed by the Vedāntic scholastic philosopher Śaṃkara. Along the way, we clarify the Vedāntic conception of a single material, efficient, and formal cause that provides a medium for connection and combination, is naturally replete with generative order and impetus, and in which the teloi of all forms are embedded. We will briefly consider what the argument shows, if it succeeds – comparing with current philosophical approaches to monism. Finally, we observe that this rich monism, describing a single vertiginous reality of many levels and powers, is central to classical Hindu conceptions of what makes something 'divine'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we ask: how should an agent who has incoherent credences update when they learn new evidence? The standard Bayesian answer for coherent agents is that they should conditionalize; however, this updating rule is not defined for incoherent starting credences. We show how one of the main arguments for conditionalization, the Dutch strategy argument, can be extended to devise a target property for updating plans that can apply to them regardless of whether the agent starts out with coherent or incoherent credences. The main idea behind this extension is that the agent should avoid updating plans that increase the possible sure loss from Dutch strategies. This happens to be equivalent to avoiding updating plans that increase incoherence according to a distance‐based incoherence measure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Innovation breakthroughs prompt sensemaking discourses that promote community learning and socially construct the innovation. Through this discourse, interested actors advance diverse frames, appealing to consumers with disparate preferences but raising concerns for the coherence of that discourse. We unpack this diversity-coherence paradox by recasting coherence as the relatedness of innovation frames and spotlighting the role of discursive fields that circumscribe meaning. Our empirical context is the first six years of blockchain discourse across seven discursive fields. Our research offers three insights in furtherance of an ecological perspective on innovation discourse. First, framing diversity emanates from discursive fields rather than from actors. Second, fields play differentiated roles in the framing process. Enactment fields comprised of actors with direct experience with the technology limit diversity. They do so by erecting walls that circumscribe discourse through imprinting on their original frame and retracting from or abandoning frames learned from other fields. In contrast, mediated fields, in which actors lack direct experience with the technology, enhance diversity. They do so by imitating or learning from other fields and foreshadowing or anticipating the frames used by other fields, thereby building bridges. Third, rather than opposing each other, diversity and coherence coevolve as the diversity induced by mediated fields increases framing redundancies, synthesizing frames into a coherent community understanding of the innovation. Our research signals to the actors who serve as innovation ambassadors and gatekeepers that diverse views of an innovation are not only inevitable, given the many discourse fields in which those views are formulated, but can also be coherent and desirable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on the disability justice paradigm of care work (Piepzna-Samarasinha), this article moves to shift the labor of resilience from students to our course design, noting how models of student resilience are often tied to ableist expectations of performance and coherence. The authors share their ongoing experiments in creating disability-centric, care-centered course designs, which are meant to offer students more flexibility while respecting the required labor asked of instructors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]