Search

Climate change, primarily driven by human activities such as burning fossil fuels, is causing significant long-term changes in temperature and weather patterns. To mitigate these impacts, there is an increased focus on renewable energy sources. However, optimizing power consumption through effective usage control and waste recycling also offers substantial potential for reducing energy demands. This study explores non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM) to estimate disaggregated energy consumption from a single household meter, leveraging advancements in deep learning such as convolutional neural networks. The study uses the UK-DALE dataset to extract and plot power consumption data from the main meter and identify five household appliances. Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are trained with transfer learning using VGG16 and MobileNet. The models are validated, tested on split datasets, and combined using ensemble methods for improved performance. A new voting scheme for ensembles is proposed, named weighted average confidence voting (WeCV), and it is used to create combinations of the best 3 and 5 models and applied to NILM. The base models achieve up to 97% accuracy. The ensemble methods applying WeCV show an increased accuracy of 98%, surpassing previous state-of-the-art results. This study shows that CNNs with transfer learning effectively disaggregate household energy use, achieving high accuracy. Ensemble methods further improve performance, offering a promising approach for optimizing energy use and mitigating climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does online misinformation affect citizen's likelihood to vote? The risk of fake news on social media does not only lie in the false narratives spread by manipulated content but also in the misplaced confidence cultivated by the way fake news is consumed. Both should be considered when evaluating the impact of fake news on political behavior. We examine a non-probability sample comprising 23,996 college students across the Philippines a year before the 2022 national elections to see the individual effects of misinformation susceptibility and confidence on voting. Contrary to previous empirical work, ordered logistic regression analyses reveal that both confidence and information accuracy are crucial predictors in voting likelihood. We also find empirical evidence for dissatisfaction with the President and the third person effect being significant factors in one's choice to vote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Crawford v. Marion County (2008), the Supreme Court ruled that voter identification requirements are lawful on the grounds that, even if they do not prevent fraud, they can instill confidence in voting. However, this reasoning ignores the historical and contemporary racial biases in the enactment and administration of restrictive voting policies in the United States. This legacy likely colors the extent to which Black and white voters see reforms as deterring fraud versus increasing suppression, and as such, how confident they are in election outcomes. We examine how increasing voter restrictions affects voter fraud beliefs and voter confidence among Black and white voters. We find that the enactment of restrictive policies decreases fraud beliefs among white voters but has no effect on fraud beliefs for Black voters; however, Black voters are less confident in elections when conducted with more restrictive policies while white voters are not. Finally, we find suggestive evidence that the racial gap in the effects of restrictive voting policies on voter confidence is partially undergirded by racial elite signaling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of research indicates that voters' perceptions of the electoral system change when the means of administering elections change. As some electoral jurisdictions have moved to systems designed to increase voter convenience, little is known about whether convenience is achieved at the expense of confidence. Utah's rollout of Vote by Mail (VBM) occurred county by county across five federal elections, and the three most populous counties adopted all VBM elections successively in 2014, 2016, and 2018. This meaningful variance in voter experience with VBM allows us to model the relationship between experience with VBM and voter confidence. We find that the switch to a more convenient system of voting came at the expense of diminished confidence in the voting process. However, experience with VBM is positively related to confidence such that the loss in confidence can be recouped over time. To capture this dynamic relative to other factors, we also estimate the effects of partisanship and the messages of political elites. In the aftermath of the 2020 election, the effect of partisanship on voter confidence changed compared to just two years earlier. Elite messages appear to be especially negative for Trump voters after 2020. More experience with VBM acts as a bulwark against those negative messages, almost completely attenuating the negative effects of Trump's fraud claims among his voters with the highest levels of VBM experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classification, the task of discerning the class of an unlabeled data point using information from a set of labeled data points, is a well-studied area of machine learning with a variety of approaches. Many of these approaches are closely linked to the selection of metrics or the generalizing of similarities defined by kernels. These metrics or similarity measures often require their parameters to be tuned in order to achieve the highest accuracy for each dataset. For example, an extensive search is required to determine the value of K or the choice of distance metric in K-NN classification. This paper explores a method of kernel construction that when used in classification performs consistently over a variety of datasets and does not require the parameters to be tuned. Inspired by dimensionality reduction techniques (DRT), we construct a kernel-based similarity measure that captures the topological structure of the data. This work compares the accuracy of K-NN classifiers, computed with specific operating parameters that obtain the highest accuracy per dataset, to a single trial of the here-proposed kernel classifier with no specialized parameters on standard benchmark sets. The here-proposed kernel used with simple classifiers has comparable accuracy to the 'best-case' K-NN classifiers without requiring the tuning of operating parameters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

British parties have pioneered the use of 'one-member, one-vote' ballots to select their leaders. However, the elections of Jeremy Corbyn (Labour) and Liz Truss (Conservative) prompted calls to return leadership selection to parliamentarians. Critics claim that party members are non-centrist and liable to impose unsuitable leaders on MPs. This weakens the cohesion of parliamentary parties, undermining the functioning of Britain's majoritarian democracy. This article assesses the major parties' leader-selection systems. It goes beyond existing research by identifying and applying four evaluative criteria for selection institutions : legitimacy, parliamentary acceptability, leader-eviction and timeliness. It shows that most criticisms of one-member, one-vote are overstated because the latter is heavily mediated by ex-ante and/or ex-post parliamentary controls, for example, nomination thresholds and confidence votes. One-member, one-vote generally produces leaders acceptable to MPs; 'unsuitable' ones typically arise when the parliamentary controls fail. However, key institutional weaknesses are identified: legitimacy in the Conservatives' system and leader-eviction in Labour's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the consequences of violence and insecurity on democracy through an analysis of electoral participation in presidential elections in Mexico. The aim is to discover whether violence and insecurity influence whether citizens vote or abstain. Several hypotheses are put forward stating that both objective and subjective indicators of security affect intention to vote. In order to test them, a quantitative methodology and the 2019 Americas Barometer are used. After empirically testing the hypotheses, it is found that the objective indicator, occurrence of homicides in the neighbourhood, does influence the decision to vote or to abstain in future presidential elections. This shows that voting on security issues is sociotropic in nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ouster of Imran Khan as prime minister in Pakistan sparked a significant academic and public interest, thereby requiring an in-depth investigation into the law and practice of vote of no-confidence. Therefore, this comparative study critically examines the utilization and implementation of this constitutional mechanism and instrument in the parliamentary democracies of the United Kingdom and her former colonies India, and Pakistan. While infrequently employed in the recent historical journey of the democracies in the UK and India, this motion has gained center stage in Pakistan, mostly due to the historic overthrow of the government of Pakistan Justice Movement party called The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf or PTI in 2022. The PTI was founded and led by the cricketer-turned politician Imran Khan. Another dramatic motion of no confidence happened in Punjab provincial assembly of Pakistan. The use of no confidence motion was relatively infrequent in the early history of Pakistan compared to the relatively frequent use in early Anglo-Indian parliamentary history. The study found that in Pakistan, no confidence motion was a recent option where governments went packing through martial law or presidential powers. The study also found that philosophically the notion of collective responsibility inherent in the vote of no-confidence strengthens party politics and the opposition. Moreover, it was established that emerging parliamentary democracies lacking a robust democratic culture require comprehensive and stringent anti-defection laws to combat corrupt practices such as horse-trading. Thus, the motion is more of a boon than a bane in the Indo-Pak political context. It may also trigger instability in developing countries like Pakistan and India. The study acknowledged the pivotal role played by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the landmark Suo Moto Case No. 1 of 2022. This judgment successfully averted a constitutional crisis and marked a significant milestone in the country's democratic development. Furthermore, a comparative analysis reveals that initiating a vote of no-confidence is comparatively more challenging in Pakistan than in India and the United Kingdom. This research further sheds light on the complexities and variations surrounding the parliamentary mechanism of vote of no-confidence, offering insights for scholars and policymakers alike especially taking the British and Indo-Pak parliamentary context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) experienced a reputational crisis after a number of allegations of sexual harassment. Leading members of the organisation resigned and its resources were depleted. The British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) attempted to fill the void. The organisation survived a confidence vote, but the result may be a permanently weakened organisation. Apart from the 2023 crisis, there are deeper structural problems in business representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article studies the impact that the end of the two-party system since 2015 has had on the relationship of trust between the Spanish Congress of Deputies and the Government, marked by the difficulties in reaching the investiture with the consequent prolongation of the Government in office, on the one hand, and on the other, the first successful vote of no confidence. It analyzes the unprecedented circumstances of the different legislatures: failed investitures, repetition of elections, coalition government, testimonial no confidence motions without possibility of success, adoption of a constructive vote of no confidence without a result of political stability. The conclusion is that the intensive and novel application of the Constitution and parliamentary law in recent years in Spain does not seem to have led to political agreement, but to confrontation and parliamentary deadlock. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The confidence convention is a fundamental characteristic of parliamentary government, yet its definition is vague and general. Disappointment in its utility to hold a government to account, its misuse purely for political gain, and the absence of a fair playing field for its use have led to calls for reforms. In this article, the author explores the nature of the vote of confidence, outlines some reasons warranting its reform, reviews some past proposals for reform in Canada and the United Kingdom, and finally proposes his own idea for how to address criticism of its historic and current use in the House of Commons. The author suggests parliamentarians create a standing order which carves out a specific role for the Speaker to rule on the appropriateness of considering an upcoming vote as a matter of confidence. Given that the Speaker’s rulings on the vote of confidence could be challenged, they would be advisory in nature and would not interfere with other confidence conventions such as the Crown’s power of dissolution. However, its use for pure political gain would be weakened; public guidelines developed by the Speaker could better textualize the meaning of the vote of confidence and contribute to civic literacy; order and decorum would be restored when confidence issues arise, and there would be no danger of possible justiciability of the courts. He concludes by suggesting this reform would go a long way in strengthening the Commons over the Executive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the concept of a no-confidence vote and its significance in various contexts, such as parliamentary procedure, government leadership, corporate boards, and university governance. It highlights recent examples of world leaders facing no-confidence votes and the potential consequences of such votes. The article also explores the lack of clear guidelines for conducting no-confidence votes in parliamentary procedure authorities, emphasizing the importance of understanding their purpose and role in democratic organizations and societies. The author, James J. Connors, is a professor of agricultural education, leadership, and communications at the University of Idaho. [Extracted from the article]

We revisit the effect of ballot access laws on voter confidence in the outcome of elections. Previous research found weak or no relationship between voter confidence and election laws regulating ballot access. We argue this non-finding is conditioned by partisanship. Democrats and Republicans view election laws through a partisan lens, which is especially triggered when coalitions lose. Republican voters see ballot restrictions as a means of securing the vote against fraud; Democratic voters see ballot restrictions as voter suppression. We maintain that the conditional partisan effect that election laws have on voter confidence is triggered or attenuated when partisans’ candidates lose elections. We find that in states where ballot access is costly, voter confidence among partisans and supporters of the losing Presidential candidate is significantly higher for Republicans and significantly lower for Democrats than their counterparts in states with less costly ballot access laws. These effects are greater for Republican than Democrats. We discuss the implications of our findings on election ecosystems and voter confidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many machine‐learning‐based intrusion detection methods have been proposed, however there is a lack of collaboration among these methods. Faced with a cascade of malicious behaviors and various running environments, coupled with the endless emergence of new malicious activities, it is difficult for us to choose an algorithm manually that is suitable for all scenarios. In addition, usually the binary detection models are applied that only "normal" or "abnormal" decision is made, and it is difficult for us to know how much confidence we have in the prediction model. In this study, we propose an intrusion collaborative detection framework (ICDF), an ICDF that allows heterogeneous detection models to effectively work together which have complementary expertise. A multialgorithm model ensemble learning method with confidence interval is adopted. In this process, each algorithm model only makes prediction judgments on its own credible probability interval and refuses to predict outside the interval. The final result is generated by voting based on the confidence of multiple models. Ten detection algorithms were tested on three different data sets. Compared with different single algorithms, ICDF could achieve high precision and recall rate, and the best F1 scores. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A landmark is a familiar target in terms of the echoes that it can produce and is important for echolocation-based navigation by bats, robots, and blind humans. A brain-inspired system (BIS) achieves confident recognition, defined as classification to an arbitrarily small error probability (PE), by employing a voting process with an echo sequence. The BIS contains sensory neurons implemented with binary single-layer perceptrons trained to classify echo spectrograms with PE and generate excitatory and inhibitory votes in face neurons until a landmark-specific face neuron achieves recognition by reaching a confidence vote level (CVL). A discrete random step process models the vote count to show the recognition probability can achieve any desired accuracy by decreasing PE or increasing CVL. A hierarchical approach first classifies surface reflector and volume scatterer target categories and then uses that result to classify two subcategories that form four landmarks. The BIS models blind human echolocation to recognize four human-made and foliage landmarks by acquiring suitably sized and dense audible echo sequences. The sensorimotor BIS employs landmark-specific CVL values and a 2.7° view increment to acquire echo sequences that achieve zero-error recognition of each landmark independent of the initial view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Government formation in multiparty systems requires election winners to strike deals to form a coalition government. Do voters respond and how do they respond to coalition government deals? This paper examines the short-term consequences of coalition government formation on voters in European democracies relying on survey panel data and original content analysis of coalition agreements. It tests theoretical expectations that deal with both the actual and perceived ideological shifts parties make when joining coalition deals as well as the effect of a much simpler heuristic cue based on preferences. The findings indicate that coalition deals have consequences on party preferences, but voter perceptions play a much stronger effect than the actual content of coalition deals. These results have important implications for our understanding of public opinion and provide important insights into the current difficulties and challenges of government formation and representative democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Congress should enact a law requiring a candidate for a seat in Congress to receive a majority of votes in order to win tbe election. Congress sbould let states determine what particular procedure to use to determine whether a candidate wins a majority, as there are significantly different methods of identibing a majority winner. While this simple piece of legislation might seem inconsequential-many Americans assume, enoneously, that elections already require majority winners-it in fact would cause states to undertake a form of experimentation in the details of electoral system design tbat would have tbe e#ect of counteracting tbe threat tbat anti-democracy extremism currently poses in America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Aotearoa, the survival of a government depends on it gaining and retaining the "confidence of the House". Despite the fact that this confidence convention is essential to our constitutional system, until now it has remained unclear in what circumstances that confidence can be lost. There are two viable conceptions of confidence: the formal conception (which holds that confidence is lost only through defeat on a formal confidence vote) and the organic conception (which holds that confidence can be lost through clear and public indications by a majority of Parliament that they do not wish the government to continue in office). I examine the normative arguments for both conceptions and argue the organic conception best channels democratic reality and constrains the illegitimate use of power. I assess which conception better reflects historical practice, constitutional materials and scholarly opinion. I conclude that the organic conception of confidence best fits these sources. Accordingly, I find that the organic conception should guide our understanding of when a government has lost confidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Controlling capital costs and cost overruns due to construction field change orders (FCOs) is essential for the electric power industry to provide affordable energy services. Conversion from overhead to underground systems due to security and climate change factors will increase the risk of FCOs due to site conditions. The failure in collaboration by front-end planning (FEP) teams can increase risk of FCOs due to missing scopes, errors in design, lack of existing field condition evaluation, constraints on the project schedule, or unexpected field conditions, among other causes. This study involved development of a quality control process that enables members of the FEP team to vote their confidence levels about risk control of FCOs before proceeding to final design. The proposed process utilized Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) methodologies to distribute the weights of stakeholder votes based on responsibilities for each category of FCOs to obtain an integrated metric of FEP team confidence. Data from an operational electric power utility was used to provide a case scenario approach and to illustrate the method. Three actual projects were analyzed to assess how well the process would have worked for them. The novelty of the proposed model is to enhance the effectiveness of collaborative working relationships across teams during the FEP process and to provide a quality control metric to capture risk of FCOs in the early phase to minimize cost overruns in the project execution phase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Federated learning, as a new security exchange paradigm, is widely used in medical care, driverless cars, finance, and other fields. However, federated learning still faces the problem of sybil attacks common in distributed frameworks. The existing schemes mainly defend against malicious model attacks with distance comparison, neural network, and confidence vote. But they are significantly limited in dealing with collusive sybil attacks. Therefore, we propose a federated learning malicious model detection method based on feature importance (Fed-Fi). Firstly, we screen important features by feature importance reasoning method based on LRP and compare the similarity based on Hamming distance between important features. Then, we adjust model learning rate adaptively to reduce the effect of collusive sybil attacks on the global model. The experimental results indicate that it can effectively resist the attack of collusive sybils in federated learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the institution of a vote of confidence for the commune head (mayor, city president). The paper is divided into four parts: introduction; the mode of adoption of a resolution on a vote of confidence for a commune head (mayor, city president); selected judgments of administrative courts in the context of the institution of a vote of confidence for a commune head (mayor, city president); and conclusion. In the introduction, I made an attempt to define the concept of a vote of confidence for a commune head, pointing out that this concept has not (so far) been the object of in-depth analysis by scholars. I then traced the process of adoption of this resolution, which is very important (for the executive body of the commune). I have characterized the legal consequences that arise from the failure to pass the act in question. The most relevant part of the paper is the third part entitled "selected judgments of administrative courts in the context of the institution of a vote of confidence for a commune head (mayor, city president)". It is in that section (based on the rulings of administrative courts) that I presented the most important interpretation problems faced not only by councilors, lawyers providing legal services to the commune, and supervisory authorities (mainly the province governor), but also by administrative courts. These controversial issues (which have been interpreted in different ways by administrative courts) are: a. the requirement to draft the grounds for the resolution on granting a vote of confidence to the executive body; b. the possibility or impossibility of drafting and voting on a resolution not to pass a vote of confidence; c. the obligatory nature of the debate on the report on the state of the commune with a requirement for the legality of the resolution on granting a vote of confidence to the commune head; d. the legal interest or absence of legal interest of the commune head to challenge the resolution on not granting him a vote of confidence. The section ends with a brief summary and presentation of bibliographic items as well as selected judgments of administrative courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The resurgence of radical and populist parties has stimulated renewed discussions about the resilience of parliamentary democracy in Europe. This work contributes to this debate by analysing the extent to which positive parliamentarism, the prime minister's parliamentary dissolution powers, the government's power to table votes of confidence and the majority requirements for votes of no confidence serve as 'shock absorbers' moderating the effect of ideological polarisation in European parliaments. Fitting several Cox Proportional Hazards models to data for 752 cabinets from 28 European democracies between 1945 and 2019, the well-established finding that the restrictiveness of the constructive vote of no confidence mitigates the destabilising effect of strong extreme parties on non-electoral cabinet replacements is confirmed. More counter-intuitively, the absence of positive parliamentarism reduces the risk of non-electoral cabinet replacements when ideologically extreme parties are strong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When coalition leaders have powers to call a vote of confidence, they can invoke the threat of government resignation or early elections, and raise other actors' costs of voting down the government. In this paper, this insight is applied to coalition replacements. The procedure, argued here, allows leaders to reduce their risk of losing office between elections by (i) managing the coalition's cohesion and (ii) denying parliament the option of replacing the government without intervening elections. Premiers, moreover, can be expected to use these powers for partisan benefit, protecting primarily their own rather than their coalition partners' incumbency status. To test this expectation, a novel measure of vote of confidence powers is applied to the analysis of coalition replacement risks in 20 European democracies. The results show that premiers with extensive confidence powers significantly reduce their risk of replacement between elections while their coalition partners do not benefit equally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Veto players hold the capacity to decline a choice being made, making them powerful actors within legislative systems. During 2016–2020, Ireland was governed by a minority government, reliant on confidence and supply votes from other parliamentarians, thus it did not hold a veto during parliamentary votes. However, if the independent Bills Office and Ceann Comhairle deemed a 'Money Message' would be necessary for a Private Members' Bill (PMB), even if it had achieved majority support in the Dáil, then the government could refuse to grant one, returning veto status to the minority government. To date, research has not provided a comprehensive overview of the PMBs blocked, nor examined in detail the cases that were high-profile. Via a nested analysis, we code 79 PMBs and complement our analysis through interviews with parliamentarians whose bills were blocked. We identify eleven policy themes in the PMBs that were blocked, demonstrating that vetoing via the Money Message was a widespread phenomenon. Next, we conduct a small-n analysis of the application of Money Messages across a variety of bills. Our analysis provides the first comprehensive examination of a procedure that holds lasting implications for the legislative process, perceptions of democracy, and executive dominance over minor parties in Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Government formation in multi‐party systems often requires coalition negotiations and finding common ground among coalition partners. Supporters of parties involved in the government formation process face a trade‐off when evaluating such bargaining processes: on the one hand, voters usually prefer seeing their party being in government rather than in opposition; on the other hand, negotiations require coalition compromises that they might dislike. In this paper, we study voters' willingness to accept policy compromises during government formation processes. We argue that voters' acceptance of policy compromises depends on both the strength of their party attachment and the importance they assign to the issue at stake during the coalition negotiations. Not giving in on important issues is key, especially for supporters of challenger parties, who hold strong policy preferences on a selected number of issues. To test these expectations, we collected original survey data immediately after the Spanish general election in November 2019. The results show support for the hypothesized effects, shed light on the pressure potential coalition partners face during government formation and help explain the failures of government formation attempts in increasingly polarized societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can voters in multi‐party systems predict which coalition will form the government with any degree of accuracy? To date, studies which explore voter expectations of coalition formation have emphasized individual level attributes, such as education, but the complexity of the environment at the time the coalitions are forming should also be consequential in enabling (or handicapping) voters in forming expectations. We examine the relative effects of individual level attributes (e.g., education, cognitive mobilization) versus contextual factors (e.g., information availability) in 19 German state elections and 3 German general elections between 2009 and 2017. We find that the ease of identifiability of alternative future governments varies significantly across multi‐party systems. We find that respondents are more likely to predict governments that they would like to see in office, that have a higher probability of receiving a majority of seats, and that consist of ideologically proximate parties. Combining survey data with a novel indicator of coalition signals, measured through a quantitative text analysis of newspaper coverage, we also find that voters consider positive pre‐election coalition signals when predicting the government. Finally, we find that the information environment is much more relevant for correct coalition predictions than individual‐level characteristics of respondents. Although individual attributes do influence predictive ability, these factors are strongly dominated by the context in which the prediction is taking place. The information environment has by far the largest effect on predicting coalition outcomes. Our results have implications for the literature on strategic voting in multi‐party settings, as well as the literature on accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines one arena of decision-making in cabinet government: cabinet committees. It assesses the relationship between the composition of cabinets – their party make-up – and the structure of cabinet committees. Cabinet committees are groups of ministers tasked with specific policy or coordination responsibilities and can be important mechanisms of policymaking and cabinet management. Thus, the structure of committees informs our understanding of how cabinets differ in their distributions of policy influence among ministers and parties, a central concern in parliamentary government. We investigate two such dimensions: collegiality – interaction among ministers – and collectivity, the (de)centralization of influence. We find that cabinet committees in coalitions are significantly more collegial, on average, than single-party cabinets, though this is driven by minority coalitions. At the same time, influence within cabinet committees is less collectively distributed in most types of coalitions than in single-party cabinets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not all portfolios are equally important. But despite recognizing that the relative value of portfolios is central to government formation, the criteria that determine why certain portfolios are more important than others is rarely made explicit and justified. The lack of transparency about the criteria that determines the value of portfolios is particularly important where party institutionalization is low, where single-party governments are the norm and where non-partisan groups participate in government formation. In this article we develop a framework that proposes measuring portfolio salience based on four dimensions: the opportunities the portfolio offers its occupant to influence relevant public policies, to influence the governments political agenda, to distribute discretional resources, and to intervene in the functioning of other portfolios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior to the 2020 general election, some commentators suggested that President Donald Trump and his allies would attempt to undermine the election's result by inducing Republican-controlled state legislatures to directly appoint pro-Trump electors to the Electoral College. As predicted, after losing his re-election bid to President Joe Biden, President Trump pressured some leaders in Republican-dominated state legislatures to ignore the election's result and to appoint electors who would vote for him in the Electoral College. Although these efforts were unsuccessful, the volatility of the current political landscape suggests that this issue might emerge again in a future election. In discussing possible safeguards against such an attempt, many commentators have focused on the Electoral Count Act and other legal measures. Most, however, have not addressed the possibility of a constitutional safeguard. This Note uses the 2020 presidential election as a case study and argues that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a constitutional safeguard that can restrain states from overturning election results through direct appointment of presidential electors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I develop a model to study the effects of political uncertainty on a prime minister's ability to use a vote‐of‐confidence procedure to determine policy outcomes. In contrast to previous studies, I model political uncertainty as an area in policy space in which the probability of the prime minister's proposal being accepted varies continuously and find that under certain circumstances the presence of political uncertainty can increase the ability of the prime min‐ ister to extract policy rents. This novel result corresponds to an interpretation of political uncertainty as a result of an intraparty bargaining problem within the legislature and allows the model to explain certain cases that sit oddly with previous work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]