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Using a decomposition of US monetary policy shocks and inflation forecasts from Consensus Economics, we find that information and monetary policy shocks move inflation expectations in opposite directions. Better performing forecasters appear less reliant on the informational content of announcements.

We propose a simple model of expectation formation with three distinct deviations from fully rational expectations. In particular, forecasters’ expectations are sticky, extrapolate the most recent news about the current period, and depend on the lagged consensus forecast about the period being forecast. We find that all three biases are present in the Survey of Professional Forecaster as well as in the Livingston Survey, and that their magnitudes depend on the forecasting horizon. Moreover, in an over-identified econometric specification, we find that the restriction on coefficients implied by our model is always close to being satisfied and in most cases not rejected. We also stress the point that using the past consensus forecast to form expectations is a rather smart thing to do if cognitive limitations and biases cause any attempt to build an own rational forecast to fail.

This study updates and expands upon the existing work on the accuracy of the IPF’s Consensus Forecasts. The paper evaluates the extent to which the consensus forecasts were able to predict the relative performance. It also assesses the accuracy of implied yield forecasts and concludes that failure in yield forecasting is the main source of failure in forecasts of capital growth and total returns. A high level of agreement between the actual and forecasted sector rankings was found. Evidence of a pessimism bias was identified. Yield forecasts are consistently found to perform worst using a range of forecast performance metrics.

Credibility is elusive, but Blinder [(2000) American Economic Review 90, 1421–1431.] generated a consensus in the literature by arguing that “A central bank is credible if people believe it will do what it says.” To implement this idea, we first measure people’s beliefs by using survey data on inflation’s expectations. Second, we compare beliefs with explicit (or tacit) targets, taking into account the uncertainty in our estimate of beliefs (asymptotic 95% robust confidence intervals). Whenever the target falls into this interval we consider the central bank credible. We consider it not credible otherwise. We apply our approach to study the credibility of the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) by using a world-class database—the Focus Survey of forecasts. Using monthly data from January 2007 until April 2017, we estimate people’s beliefs of inflation 12 months ahead, coupled with a robust estimate of its asymptotic 95% confidence interval. Results show that the BCB was credible 65% of the time, with the exception of a few months in the beginning of 2007 and during the interval between mid-2013 throughout mid-2016.

We develop a vector autoregressive model with time variation in the mean and the variance. The unobserved time-varying mean is assumed to follow a random walk and we also link it to long-term Consensus forecasts, similar in spirit to so called democratic priors. The changes in variance are modelled via stochastic volatility. The proposed Gibbs sampler allows the researcher to use a large cross-sectional dimension in a feasible amount of computational time. The slowly changing mean can account for a number of secular developments such as changing inflation expectations, slowing productivity growth or demographics. We show the good forecasting performance of the model relative to popular alternatives, including standard Bayesian VARs with Minnesota priors, VARs with democratic priors and standard time-varying parameter VARs for the euro area, the United States and Japan. In particular, incorporating survey forecast information helps to reduce the uncertainty about the unconditional mean and along with the time variation improves the long-run forecasting performance of the VAR models.

Using a panel of 54 countries between 1980 and 2013, we find empirical support for the view that changes in the fiscal policy stance (year-on-year change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance) have a significant positive correlation with inflation volatility. An increase in the volatility of discretionary fiscal policies by one standard deviation raises inflation volatility between 5 and 6 percent. Moreover, results using alternatively different inflation volatility proxies confirm that an expansionary fiscal stance increases price volatility. Another relevant outcome is that in a context of economic expansions (recessions) the harmful impact of fiscal activism on price volatility is soften (heightened), while the negative impact of fiscal activism on price stability is higher when fiscal policy is expansionary. Finally, fiscal activism fuels inflation volatility much more pronouncedly in emerging market economies vis-a-vis advanced economies. info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The paper compares the information contents of two of the most widely used sets of macroeconomic forecasts, namely, the macroeconomic forecasts produced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). By testing whether the release of public sector forecasts had systematic impact on subsequent revisions in Consensus (private sector) forecasts, the paper finds that, for the period 1994?2003, private forecasters reacted to the information provided by the IMF on regions (such as non?G7 Europe and Latin America) for which the IMF’s forecasts are known to be more accurate or about which information is less available. What determines the information value of public sector forecasts, however, appears complex. The OECD’s impact was limited in influencing private sector forecasts for the G7 countries, though it had a superior forecast performance than the IMF. Some herding behavior was observed among private sector forecasters.

In this paper, we derive a modification of a forward-looking Taylor rule, which integrates two variables measuring the uncertainty of inflation and GDP growth forecasts into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model. We show that certainty-equivalence in New Keynesian models is a consequence of log-linearization and that a second-order Taylor approximation leads to a reaction function which includes the uncertainty of macroeconomic expectations. To test the model empirically, we use the standard deviation of individual forecasts around the median Consensus Forecast as proxy for forecast uncertainty. Our sample covers the euro area, Sweden, and the United Kingdom and the period 1992Q4-2014Q2. We find that while all three central banks react significantly to inflation forecast uncertainty by reducing their policy rates in times of higher inflation expectation uncertainty with an average effect of more than 25 basis points, they do not have significant reactions to GDP growth forecast uncertainty. We conclude with some implications for optimal monetary policy rules and central bank watchers.

This article sheds light on the interaction of media, economic actors, and economic experts. Based on a unique data set of 86,000 news items rated by professional analysts of Media Tenor International and survey data, we first analyze the overall tone of the media, consumers', firms', and economic experts' opinions on the state and outlook of the economy. Second, we assess the protagonist's ability at correctly predicting GDP. Third, we use Granger causality tests to uncover who is influencing whom when it comes to the formation of opinions on the economy. We find that media reports have a significant negative bias. The economic sentiment of the media, consumers and firms does not reflect the actual situation. Finally, we find that media sentiment is not influenced by any other actor. In contrast, media appear to affect all other actors.

This article sheds light on the interaction of media, economic actors, and economic experts. Based on a unique data set of 86,000 news items rated by professional analysts of Media Tenor International and survey data, we first analyze the overall tone of the media, consumers', firms', and economic experts' opinions on the state and outlook of the economy. Second, we assess the protagonist's ability at correctly predicting GDP. Third, we use Granger causality tests to uncover who is influencing whom when it comes to the formation of opinions on the economy. We find that media reports have a significant negative bias. The economic sentiment of the media, consumers and firms does not reflect the actual situation. Finally, we find that media sentiment is not influenced by any other actor. In contrast, media appear to affect all other actors.

We assess the contribution of macroeconomic uncertainty

This semiannual report, a product of the Office of the Chief Economist for the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region of the World Bank, examines the nature of the very good overall performance of the LAC region in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisis and presents a comparative analysis of the post-crisis recovery patterns in the region vis-a-vis other regions. The first part of this report provides an overview of recent economic developments, an in depth look at the drivers of the post-crisis performance in the region, analyzes the external and domestic risks that could drag down growth performance in LAC, and discusses policy response options. The second part of the report documents the adverse impact of the crisis on the Caribbean region as well as its slow recovery. It distinguishes the poorer performance of English speaking Caribbean nations vis-a-vis non-English speaking ones, and highlights the dependence of the region on countries in the epicenter of the crisis, especially the United States, and the limited fiscal space that disabled a counter-cyclical policy response. The report concludes by emphasizing that skillful cycle management is necessary although far from sufficient to be able to turn what has to date been a cyclical recovery into a higher rate of trend growth. Moreover, countries experiencing a formidable windfall from the high commodity prices are in a unique position to seize the opportunity by judiciously saving and investing out of the windfall, they could relax the structural speed limits that have so far kept economic activity from rising to a higher long-run growth path.

The pace of economic activity is gradually returning to pre-crisis levels. After a roller-coaster of sharp drops, vigorous rebounds and mild contractions, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was up 4.8 percent in the last quarter of 2010 on a seasonally-adjusted annualized (SAAR) basis, closer to pre-crisis, normal levels. For 2010 as a whole, GDP expanded by 7.8 percent from 2009. Growth was broad-based, with significant contributions from external and domestic demands. Thailand's economy is one of the most energy intensive in the region because of the large (and growing) share of energy-intensive manufacturing in the economy and high proportion of cargo transported by trucks. Thailand can reduce its vulnerability to oil price shocks by raising fuel standards, improving tax incentives for conservation and relying more on rail for cargo transport.

Growth has slowed down since the second quarter, but exceeded expectations. Considering the 1) political turmoil; 2) robust growth during the rebound; and 3) slowdown in advanced economies, the Thai economy was expected to contract by more than it did in the second and third quarters. The output of the manufacturing sector expanded in the second quarter, led by still-growing exports and robust private consumption. Demand indeed appears to have been higher than production, as some orders had to be filled by drawing down on inventories. However, a sharp contraction in tourism led Gross Domestic product (GDP) overall to contract in the quarter. The FY10 fiscal deficit was much smaller than initially feared when the budget was proposed. The budget for FY10 was prepared at the trough of the global financial crisis in February 2009 and anticipated only 1.35 trillion baht in revenues. Inflation levels have been low and stable but persistent increases in food prices could pose risks. Overall, slower growth in advanced economies will translate into lower GDP growth Thailand for the next two to three years. Notwithstanding a deceleration in the second half because of the waning global inventory cycle, year-on-year growth in 2010 is expected at 7.5 percent due to the low base of 2009 and the strong first half. Quarter-to-quarter growth will pick up modestly in 2011 to average over 4 percent, but the relatively high base in 2010 results in a year-on-year growth rate of 3.2 percent for 2011.

The global crisis is now in the rear view mirror and world growth is being restored. In sharp contrast with past episodes of global turmoil, this time the recovery is led by the periphery, specifically by the larger and more dynamic emerging markets (Brazil, China, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand). For this group of emerging markets (EMs), the contraction in economic activity was much smaller than that of rich countries, the recovery started earlier, and the rebound has been much steeper. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are second among emerging regions, after Asia, in the strength of the recovery. The first part of the report focuses on macroeconomic and financial aspects, emphasizing the outlook going forward. Finally, the second part examines some aspects of the adjustment in labor markets during this crisis in comparison to previous ones.

In this paper we analyze the macroeconomic forecasts of the Consensus Forecasts for 12 countries over the period from 1996 to 2006 regarding bias and information efficiency. A pooled approach is employed which permits the evaluation of all forecasts for each target variable over 24 horizons simultaneously. It is shown how the pooled approach needs to be adjusted in order to accommodate the forecasting scheme of the Consensus Forecasts. Furthermore, the pooled approach is extended by a sequential test with the purpose of detecting the critical horizon after which the forecast should be regarded as biased. Moreover, heteroscedasticity in the form of year-specific variances of macroeconomic shocks is taken into account. The results show that in the analyzed period which was characterized by pronounced macroeconomic shocks, several countries show biased forecasts, especially with forecasts covering more than 12 months. In addition, information efficiency has to be rejected in almost all cases.

We find evidence that adopting an explicit inflation objective plays a role in anchoring long-run inflation expectations and in reducing the intrinsic persistence of inflation. For the period 1994-2003, private-sector long-run inflation forecasts exhibit significant correlation with lagged inflation for a number of industrial economies, including the United States. In contrast, this correlation is largely absent for the five countries that maintained explicit inflation objectives over this period, indicating that these central banks have been reasonably successful in delinking expectations from realized inflation. We also show that the null hypothesis of a random walk in core CPI inflation can be clearly rejected for four of these five countries, but not for most of the other industrial countries. Finally, we provide some evidence concerning the initial effects of the adoption of explicit inflation objectives in a number of emerging-market economies.