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'Feminist logic' may sound like an impossible, incoherent, or irrelevant project, but it is none of these. We begin by delineating three categories into which projects in feminist logic might fall: philosophical logic, philosophy of logic, and pedagogy. We then defuse two distinct objections to the very idea of feminist logic: the irrelevance argument and the independence argument. Having done so, we turn to a particular kind of project in feminist philosophy of logic: Valerie Plumwood's feminist argument for a relevance logic $ (\textsf{L}_{\textsf{Plum}}) $ (L Plum ). Plumwood's work serves as our primary case study as we turn to the project of considering three different ways we might understand her argument and revisionist arguments like it: as a priori theorizing, as ameliorative conceptual engineering, or as instances of anti-exceptionalist approaches to logic. After arguing that the anti-exceptionalist approach seems to provide the most promising means of understanding the kind of project undertaken in a feminist challenge to classical logic, we briefly address the consequences that this might have for logic instruction. Here, we argue for the perhaps unexpected conclusion that feminist programs ought to offer more, not less, instruction in logic for those who take interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In I Taking Frege at his Word i , Joan Weiner proposes a wide-ranging re-thinking of Frege's philosophical and mathematical projects. First, much of the discussion of Frege's semantic arguments (or, according to Weiner, lack thereof) in Chapters 4 and 5 (and elsewhere) focuses on whether or not Frege gave I metatheoretical i arguments in I Begriffsschrift i , I Grundgesetze i , and elsewhere. The book concludes with two chapters which focus on fruitful applications of Frege's ideas (on Weiner's understanding of them). [Extracted from the article]