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This pap er develops a theory of revealed preferences over oneís own and othersímonetary payo§s. We intro duce ìmore altruistic thanî(MAT), a partial ordering over preferences, and interpret it with known parametric mo dels. We also intro duce and illustrate ìmore generous thanî (MGT), a partial ordering over opp ortunity sets. Several recent discussions of altruism fo cus on two player extensive form games of complete information in which the Örst mover (FM) cho oses a more or less generous opp ortunity set for the second mover (SM). Here recipro city can b e formalized as the assertion that an MGT choice by the FM will elicit MAT preferences in the SM and, fur- thermore, that the e§ect on preferences is stronger for acts of commision than acts of ommision by FM. We state and prove prop ositions on the observable consequences of these assertions. Then we test those prop ositions using exist- ing data from investment games with dictator controls and Stackelb erg games and new data from Stackelb erg mini-games. The test results provide supp ort for the theory of revealed altruism.

This paper develops a nonparametric theory of preferences over one's own and others' monetary payoffs. We introduce "more altruistic than" (MAT), a partial ordering over such preferences, and interpret it with known parametric models. We also introduce and illustrate "more generous than" (MGT), a partial ordering over opportunity sets. Several recent studies focus on two-player extensive form games of complete information in which the first mover (FM) chooses a more or less generous opportunity set for the second mover (SM). Here reciprocity can be formalized as the assertion that an MGT choice by the FM will elicit MAT preferences in the SM. A further assertion is that the effect on preferences is stronger for acts of commission by FM than for acts of omission. We state and prove propositions on the observable consequences of these assertions. Finally, empirical support for the propositions is found in existing data from investment and dictator games, the carrot and stick game, and the Stackelberg duopoly game and in new data from Stackelberg mini-games.

Prior to 2003, virtual universities were being created at a rate that would question the usual perception that higher education rarely changed, or changed (if at all) at a glacial speed. No comprehensive study of what was actually being created had been done; nor had anyone tapped the experiences of the developers in the states to see what was working and what was not. To begin to understand what happened in the rush to create virtual organizations, the State Higher Education Executive Officers and the Western Cooperative for Educational Telecommunications undertook a study in 2002 that would identify the types of organizational and financial models in use; the statewide goals that virtual colleges or universities (VCUs) were created to meet (and how they may have changed); the policies, programs, and student participation for VCUs; and implications for policymakers. This article provides a summary of the Epper and Garn (2003) final report for this nationwide study of virtual universities in the United States. Epper and Garn (2003) found that most VCUs began by placing their general education or core curriculum online. Once the VCUs became efficient with the general curriculum, they tackled more complicated courses and issues. This could prove beneficial to higher education institutions across the nation to decrease the cost associated with general education or core curricula. By learning how to do online learning well on core courses, the lessons can be easily transferred to other courses or taught to faculty interested in teaching online in an effective manner.