Search

We investigated the time course of selective attention to face regions during judgment of dis/approval by low (LSA) and high (HSA) social anxiety undergraduates (with clinical levels on questionnaire measures). The viewers' gaze direction was assessed and the stimulus visual saliency of face regions was computed, for video-clips displaying dynamic facial expressions. Social anxiety was related to perception of disapproval from faces with an ambiguous smile (i.e. with non-happy eyes), but not those with congruent happy eyes and a smile. HSA observers selectively looked earlier at the eye region, whereas LSA ones preferentially looked at the smiling mouth. Consistently, gaze allocation was less related to visual saliency of the smile for HSA than for LSA viewers. The attentional bias towards the less salient eye region – thus opposing the automatic capture by the smile – suggests that it is strategically driven in HSA individuals, possibly aimed at detecting negative evaluators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A happy facial expression makes a person look (more) trustworthy. Do perceptions of happiness and trustworthiness rely on the same face regions and visual attention processes? In an eye-tracking study, eye movements and fixations were recorded while participants judged the un/happiness or the un/trustworthiness of dynamic facial expressions in which the eyes and/or the mouth unfolded from neutral to happy or vice versa. A smiling mouth and happy eyes enhanced perceived happiness and trustworthiness similarly, with a greater contribution of the smile relative to the eyes. This comparable judgement output for happiness and trustworthiness was reached through shared as well as distinct attentional mechanisms: (a) entry times and (b) initial fixation thresholds for each face region were equivalent for both judgements, thereby revealing the same attentional orienting in happiness and trustworthiness processing. However, (c) greater and (d) longer fixation density for the mouth region in the happiness task, and for the eye region in the trustworthiness task, demonstrated different selective attentional engagement. Relatedly, (e) mean fixation duration across face regions was longer in the trustworthiness task, thus showing increased attentional intensity or processing effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research has shown that the more (or less) attractive a face is judged, the more (or less) trustworthy the person is deemed and that some common neural networks are recruited during facial attractiveness and trustworthiness evaluation. To interpret the relationship between attractiveness and trustworthiness (e.g., whether perception of personal trustworthiness may depend on perception of facial attractiveness), we investigated their relative neural processing time course. An event-related potential (ERP) paradigm was used, with localization of brain sources of the scalp neural activity. Face stimuli with a neutral, angry, happy, or surprised expression were presented in an attractiveness judgment, a trustworthiness judgment, or a control (no explicit social judgment) task. Emotional facial expression processing occurred earlier (N170 and EPN, 150-290 ms post-stimulus onset) than attractiveness and trustworthiness processing (P3b, 400-700 ms). Importantly, right-central ERP (C2, C4, C6) differences reflecting discrimination between “yes” (attractive or trustworthy) and “no” (unattractive or untrustworthy) decisions occurred at least 400 ms earlier for attractiveness than for trustworthiness, in the absence of LRP motor preparation differences. Neural source analysis indicated that facial processing brain networks (e.g., LG, FG, and IPL—extending to pSTS), also right-lateralized, were involved in the discrimination time course differences. This suggests that attractiveness impressions precede and might prime trustworthiness inferences and that the neural time course differences reflect truly facial encoding processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated (a) how prototypical happy faces (with happy eyes and a smile) can be discriminated from blended expressions with a smile but non-happy eyes, depending on type and intensity of the eye expression; and (b) how smile discrimination differs for human perceivers versus automated face analysis, depending on affective valence and morphological facial features. Human observers categorized faces as happy or non-happy, or rated their valence. Automated analysis (FACET software) computed seven expressions (including joy/happiness) and 20 facial action units (AUs). Physical properties (low-level image statistics and visual saliency) of the face stimuli were controlled. Results revealed, first, that some blended expressions (especially, with angry eyes) had lower discrimination thresholds (i.e., they were identified as “non-happy” at lower non-happy eye intensities) than others (especially, with neutral eyes). Second, discrimination sensitivity was better for human perceivers than for automated FACET analysis. As an additional finding, affective valence predicted human discrimination performance, whereas morphological AUs predicted FACET discrimination. FACET can be a valid tool for categorizing prototypical expressions, but is currently more limited than human observers for discrimination of blended expressions. Configural processing facilitates detection of in/congruence(s) across regions, and thus detection of non-genuine smiling faces (due to non-happy eyes). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive models posit that social anxiety is associated with biased attention to and interpretation of ambiguous social cues as threatening. We investigated attentional bias (selective early fixation on the eye region) to account for the tendency to distrust ambiguous smiling faces with non-happy eyes (interpretative bias). Eye movements and fixations were recorded while observers viewed video-clips displaying dynamic facial expressions. Low (LSA) and high (HSA) socially anxious undergraduates with clinical levels of anxiety judged expressers’ trustworthiness. Social anxiety was unrelated to trustworthiness ratings for faces with congruent happy eyes and a smile, and for neutral expressions. However, social anxiety was associated with reduced trustworthiness rating for faces with an ambiguous smile, when the eyes slightly changed to neutrality, surprise, fear, or anger. Importantly, HSA observers looked earlier and longer at the eye region, whereas LSA observers preferentially looked at the smiling mouth region. This attentional bias in social anxiety generalizes to all the facial expressions, while the interpretative bias is specific for ambiguous faces. Such biases are adaptive, as they facilitate an early detection of expressive incongruences and the recognition of untrustworthy expressers (e.g., with fake smiles), with no false alarms when judging truly happy or neutral faces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated the relative contribution of (a) perceptual (eyes and mouth visual saliency), (b) conceptual or categorical (eye expression distinctiveness), and (c) affective (rated valence and arousal) factors, and (d) specific morphological facial features (Action Units; AUs), to the recognition of facial happiness. The face stimuli conveyed truly happy expressions with a smiling mouth and happy eyes, or blended expressions with a smile but non-happy eyes (neutral, sad, fearful, disgusted, surprised, or angry). Saliency, distinctiveness, affect, and AUs served as predictors; the probability of judging a face as happy was the criterion. Both for truly happy and for blended expressions, the probability of perceiving happiness increased mainly as a function of positive valence of the facial configuration. In addition, for blended expressions, the probability of being (wrongly) perceived as happy increased as a function of (a) delayed saliency and (b) reduced distinctiveness of the non-happy eyes, and (c) enhanced AU 6 (cheek raiser) or (d) reduced AUs 4, 5, and 9 (brow lowerer, upper lid raiser, and nose wrinkler, respectively). Importantly, the later the eyes become visually salient relative to the smiling mouth, the more likely it is that faces will look happy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facial expressions can convey disapproval or rejection, which is highly relevant information for socially anxious observers. We investigated how social anxiety biases the interpretation of ambiguous expressions towards threat. Undergraduates with clinical levels of social anxiety and non-anxious controls were presented with 1-s video-clips displaying facial happiness, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and surprise, at various levels of emotional intensity, or neutral expressions. Participants categorized the expressions. Social anxiety was associated with enhanced detection of anger and disgust at low intensity levels, relative to non-anxious controls. Also, social anxiety was related to a higher probability of interpreting emotionally “neutral” faces as angry. A ′ sensitivity was affected, with no effects on B ″ response criterion. Socially anxious individuals are likely to perceive hostility, disapproval, or dislike in ambiguous facial expressions (with low intensity signals of anger/disgust, or “neutrality”). The effect involves an interpretative bias that occurs during expression encoding and is not contaminated by response biases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In social environments the smile can be driven by different motives and convey different emotions. This makes a smiling face ambiguous and amenable to alternative interpretations. We investigated how social anxiety is related to trustworthiness evaluation of morphed dynamic smiling faces depending on changes in the eye expression. Socially anxious and non-anxious participants judged the un/trustworthiness of people with different smiles. Social anxiety was related to reduced trustworthiness of (a) faces with a neutral mouth unfolding to a smile when the eyes were neutral at the beginning or end of the dynamic sequence, and (b) faces with a smiling mouth when happy eyes slightly changed towards neutrality, surprise, fear, sadness, disgust, or anger. In contrast, social anxiety was not related to trustworthiness judgments for non-ambiguous expressions unfolding from neutral (eyes and mouth) to happy (eyes and mouth) or from happy to neutral. Socially anxious individuals are characterized by an interpretation bias towards mistrusting any ambiguous smile due to the presence of non-happy eyes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated the relative attentional capture by positive versus simultaneously presented negative images in extrafoveal vision for female observers. Pairs of task-irrelevant pleasant and unpleasant visual scenes were displayed peripherally (⩾5° away from fixation) during a task-relevant letter-discrimination task at fixation. Selective attentional orienting was assessed by the probability of first fixating each scene and the time until first fixation. Results revealed a higher first fixation probability and shorter entry times, followed by longer dwell times, for pleasant relative to unpleasant scenes. The attentional capture advantage by pleasant scenes occurred in the absence of differences in perceptual properties. Processing of affective scene significance automatically occurs through covert attention in peripheral vision early. At least in non-threatening conditions, the attentional system is tuned to initially orient to pleasant images when competing with unpleasant ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facial expressions of emotion involve a physical component of morphological changes in a face and an affective component conveying information about the expresser’s internal feelings. It remains unresolved how much recognition and discrimination of expressions rely on the perception of morphological patterns or the processing of affective content. This review of research on the role of visual and emotional factors in expression recognition reached three major conclusions. First, behavioral, neurophysiological, and computational measures indicate that basic expressions are reliably recognized and discriminated from one another, albeit the effect may be inflated by the use of prototypical expression stimuli and forced-choice responses. Second, affective content along the dimensions of valence and arousal is extracted early from facial expressions, although this coarse affective representation contributes minimally to categorical recognition of specific expressions. Third, the physical configuration and visual saliency of facial features contribute significantly to expression recognition, with “emotionless” computational models being able to reproduce some of the basic phenomena demonstrated in human observers. We conclude that facial expression recognition, as it has been investigated in conventional laboratory tasks, depends to a greater extent on perceptual than affective information and mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background and Objectives: Perception of trustworthiness in other people is essential for successful social interaction. Facial expressions-as conveyers of feelings and intentions-are an important source of this information. We investigated how social anxiety is related to biases in the judgment of faces towards un/trustworthiness depending on type of emotional expression and expressive intensity.Methods: Undergraduates with clinical levels of social anxiety and low-anxiety controls were presented with 1-s video-clips displaying facial happiness, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise, or neutrality, at various levels of emotional intensity. Participants judged how trustworthy the expressers looked like.Results: Social anxiety was associated with enhanced distrust towards angry and disgusted expressions, and this occurred at lower intensity thresholds, relative to non-anxious controls. There was no effect for other negative expressions (sadness and fear), basically ambiguous expressions (surprise and neutral), or happy faces.Limitations: The social anxiety and the control groups consisted of more females than males, although this gender disproportion was the same in both groups. Also, the expressive speed rate was different for the various intensity conditions, although such differences were equated for all the expressions and for both groups.Conclusions: Individuals with high social anxiety overestimate perceived social danger even from subtle facial cues, thus exhibiting a threat-related interpretative bias in the form of untrustworthiness judgments. Such a bias is, nevertheless, limited to facial expressions conveying direct threat such as hostility and rejection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facial happiness is consistently recognized faster than other expressions of emotion. In this study, to determine when and where in the brain such a recognition advantage develops, EEG activity during an expression categorization task was subjected to temporospatial PCA analysis and LAURA source localizations. Happy, angry, and neutral faces were presented either in whole or bottom-half format (with the mouth region visible). The comparison of part- versus whole-face conditions served to examine the role of the smile. Two neural signatures underlying the happy face advantage emerged. One peaked around 140 ms (left N140) and was source-located at the left IT cortex (MTG), with greater activity for happy versus non-happy faces in both whole and bottom-half face format. This suggests an enhanced perceptual encoding mechanism for salient smiles. The other peaked around 370 ms (P3b and N3) and was located at the right IT (FG) and dorsal cingulate (CC) cortices, with greater activity specifically for bottom-half happy versus non-happy faces. This suggests an enhanced recruitment of face-specific information to categorize (or reconstruct) facial happiness from diagnostic smiling mouths. Additional differential brain responses revealed a specific 'anger effect,' with greater activity for angry versus non-angry expressions (right N170 and P230; right pSTS and IPL); and a coarse 'emotion effect,' with greater activity for happy and angry versus neutral expressions (anterior P2 and posterior N170; vmPFC and right IFG). Hum Brain Mapp 36:4287-4303, 2015. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pairs of emotional (pleasant or unpleasant) and neutral scenes were presented peripherally (≥5° away from fixation) during a central letter-discrimination task. Selective attentional capture was assessed by means of eye movement orienting, i.e., probability of first fixating a scene and the time until first fixation. Static and dynamic visual saliency values of the scenes were computationally modelled. Results revealed selective orienting to both pleasant and unpleasant relative to neutral scenes. Importantly, such effects remained in the absence of visual saliency differences, even though saliency influenced eye movements. This suggests that selective attention to emotional scenes is genuinely driven by the processing of affective significance in extrafoveal vision. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We investigated whether the emotional content of visual scenes depicting people is processed in peripheral vision. Emotional or neutral scene photographs were paired with a matched scrambled image for 150 ms in peripheral vision (≥ 5°). The pictures were immediately followed by a digit or letter in a discrimination task. Interference (i.e., slowed reaction times) with performance in this task indexed the processing resources drawn by the pictures. Twelve types of specific emotional scene contents (e.g., erotica or mutilation) were compared. Results showed, first, that emotional scenes caused greater interference than neutral scenes, in the absence of fixations. This suggests that emotional scenes are processed and draw covert attention outside the focus of overt attention. Second, interference was similar for female and male participants with pleasant scenes (except for erotica), but females were more affected by all types of unpleasant scenes than males. This reveals that sensitivity to peripheral vision is modulated by sex and affective valence. Third, low-level image properties, visual saliency, and size of bodies and faces, were generally equivalent for emotional and neutral scenes. This rules out the alternative hypothesis of a contribution of non-emotional, purely perceptual factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Genuine smiles convey enjoyment or positive affect, whereas fake smiles conceal or leak negative feelings or motives (e.g. arrogance, contempt, embarrassment), or merely show affiliation or politeness. We investigated the minimum display time (i.e. threshold; ranging from 50 to 1,000 ms) that is necessary to distinguish a fake from a genuine smile. Variants of fake smiles were created by varying the type of non-happy (e.g. neutral, angry, sad, etc.) eyes in blended expressions with a smiling mouth. Participants judged whether faces conveyed happiness or not. Results showed that thresholds vary as a function of type of eyes: blended expressions with angry eyes are discriminated early (100 ms), followed by those with disgusted eyes, fearful, and sad (from 250 to 500 ms), surprised (750 ms), and neutral (from 750 to 1,000 ms) eyes. An important issue for further research is the extent to which such discrimination threshold differences depend on physical or affective factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated the time course and processes in the recognition of facial expressions in peripheral vision (10.5°). Happy faces were categorized more accurately and faster than angry, fearful, sad, and neutral faces. Consistently, the N1 (90 to 130ms post-stimulus) and N2pc (200-300ms) ERP (event-related-potentials) components were more negative, and the SPWs (slow positive waves; 700-800ms) were smaller, for happy than for non-happy faces. Computational modeling revealed that the smiling mouth became visually salient earlier (95ms) than any other region, in temporal correspondence with the N1, thus showing an attentional capture by the smile. The N2pc presumably reflected the subsequent selective allocation of processing resources to happy faces. As a result, the reduced SPWs suggest that the decision process in expression categorization became less demanding for happy faces. We propose that facial expression recognition in peripheral vision is mainly driven by perceptual processing, without affective discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This study investigated the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the role of the eye and the mouth regions in the recognition of facial happiness, anger, and surprise. To this end, face stimuli were shown in three formats (whole face, upper half visible, and lower half visible) and behavioral categorization, computational modeling, and ERP (event-related potentials) measures were combined. N170 (150–180ms post-stimulus; right hemisphere) and EPN (early posterior negativity; 200–300ms; mainly, right hemisphere) were modulated by expression of whole faces, but not by separate halves. This suggests that expression encoding (N170) and emotional assessment (EPN) require holistic processing, mainly in the right hemisphere. In contrast, the mouth region of happy faces enhanced left temporo-occipital activity (150–180ms), and also the LPC (late positive complex; centro-parietal) activity (350–450ms) earlier than the angry eyes (450–600ms) or other face regions. Relatedly, computational modeling revealed that the mouth region of happy faces was also visually salient by 150ms following stimulus onset. This suggests that analytical or part-based processing of the salient smile occurs early (150–180ms) and lateralized (left), and is subsequently used as a shortcut to identify the expression of happiness (350–450ms). This would account for the happy face advantage in behavioral recognition tasks when the smile is visible. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This study investigated whether social anxiety facilitates the discrimination between genuine and ambiguous smiles. Socially anxious (N=20) and nonanxious (N=20) participants categorized as “happy” or “not happy” faces with either (1) a truly happy expression (i.e., happy eyes and a smile), (2) truly nonhappy expressions (e.g., angry eyes and an angry mouth), or (3) blended expressions with a smiling mouth and nonhappy (e.g., angry, sad, etc.) eyes. Results indicated that, relative to nonanxious participants, those high in social anxiety weremore likelyto judge as “not happy” any blended expression with nonhappy eyes, and they werefasterin judging as “not happy” the blended expressions with angry, fearful, or disgusted eyes (but not those with sad, surprised, or neutral eyes). These results suggest, respectively, that social anxiety inhibits a benign interpretation ofallthe ambiguous expressions with a smile, and speeds up the detection ofthreateningeyes in such expressions. Importantly, no differences appeared as a function of social anxiety for truly happy or nonhappy faces. This rules out a response-bias explanation, and also reveals that social anxiety does not affect sensitivity in the recognition of prototypical expressions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Abstract: The present study aimed to identify the brain processes—and their time course—underlying the typical behavioral recognition advantage of happy facial expressions. To this end, we recorded EEG activity during an expression categorization task for happy, angry, fearful, sad, and neutral faces, and the correlation between event-related-potential (ERP) patterns and recognition performance was assessed. N170 (150–180ms) was enhanced for angry, fearful and sad faces; N2 was reduced and early posterior negativity (EPN; both, 200–320ms) was enhanced for happy and angry faces; P3b (350–450ms) was reduced for happy and neutral faces; and slow positive wave (SPW; 700–800ms) was reduced for happy faces. This reveals (a) an early processing (N170) of negative affective valence (i.e., angry, fearful, and sad), (b) discrimination (N2 and EPN) of affective intensity or arousal (i.e., angry and happy), and (c) facilitated categorization (P3b) and decision (SPW) due to expressive distinctiveness (i.e., happy). In addition, N2, EPN, P3b, and SPW were related to categorization accuracy and speed. This suggests that conscious expression recognition and the typical happy face advantage depend on encoding of expressive intensity and, especially, on later response selection, rather than on the early processing of affective valence. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

A smile is visually highly salient and grabs attention automatically. We investigated how extrafoveally seen smiles influence the viewers' perception of non-happy eyes in a face. A smiling mouth appeared in composite faces with incongruent non-happy (fearful, neutral, etc.) eyes, thus producing blended expressions, or it appeared in intact faces with genuine expressions. Attention to the eye region was spatially cued while foveal vision of the mouth was blocked by gaze-contingent masking. Participants judged whether the eyes were happy or not. Results indicated that the smile biased the evaluation of the eye expression: The same non-happy eyes were more likely to be judged as happy and categorized more slowly as not happy in a face with a smiling mouth than in a face with a non-smiling mouth or with no mouth. This bias occurred when the mouth and the eyes appeared simultaneously and aligned, but also to some extent when they were misaligned and when the mouth appeared after the eyes. We conclude that the highly salient smile projects to other facial regions, thus influencing the perception of the eye expression. Projection serves spatial and temporal integration of face parts and changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded to assess the processing time course of ambiguous facial expressions with a smiling mouth but neutral, fearful, or angry eyes, in comparison with genuinely happy faces (a smile and happy eyes) and non-happy faces (neutral, fearful, or angry mouth and eyes). Participants judged whether the faces looked truly happy or not. Electroencephalographic recordings were made from 64 scalp electrodes to generate ERPs. The neural activation patterns showed early P200 sensitivity (differences between negative and positive or neutral expressions) and EPN sensitivity (differences between positive and neutral expressions) to emotional valence. In contrast, sensitivity to ambiguity (differences between genuine and ambiguous expressions) emerged only in later LPP components. Discrimination of emotional vs. neutral affect occurs between 180 and 430ms from stimulus onset, whereas the detection and resolution of ambiguity takes place between 470 and 720ms. In addition, while blended expressions involving a smile with angry eyes can be identified as not happy in the P200 (175–240ms) component, smiles with fearful or neutral eyes produce the same ERP pattern as genuinely happy faces, thus revealing poor discrimination. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Why is a face with a smile but non-happy eyes likely to be interpreted as happy? We used blended expressions in which a smiling mouth was incongruent with the eyes (e.g., angry eyes), as well as genuine expressions with congruent eyes and mouth (e.g., both happy or angry). Tasks involved detection of a smiling mouth (perceptual), categorization of the expression (semantic), and valence evaluation (affective). The face stimulus display duration and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) were varied to assess the time course of each process. Results indicated that (a) a smiling mouth was visually more salient than the eyes both in truly happy and blended expressions; (b) a smile led viewers to categorize blended expressions as happy similarly for upright and inverted faces; (c) truly happy, but not blended, expressions primed the affective evaluation of probe scenes 550ms following face onset; (d) both truly happy and blended expressions primed the detection of a smile in a probe scene by 170ms post-stimulus; and (e) smile detection and expression categorization had similar processing thresholds and preceded affective evaluation. We conclude that the saliency of single physical features such as the mouth shape makes the smile quickly accessible to the visual system, which initially speeds up expression categorization regardless of congruence with the eyes. Only when the eye expression is later configurally integrated with the mouth, will affective discrimination begin. The present research provides support for serial models of facial expression processing. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Saccadic and manual responses were used to investigate the speed of discrimination between happy and non-happy facial expressions in two-alternative-forced-choice tasks. The minimum latencies of correct saccadic responses indicated that the earliest time point at which discrimination occurred ranged between 200 and 280ms, depending on type of expression. Corresponding minimum latencies for manual responses ranged between 440 and 500ms. For both response modalities, visual saliency of the mouth region was a critical factor in facilitating discrimination: The more salient the mouth was in happy face targets in comparison with non-happy distracters, the faster discrimination was. Global image characteristics (e.g., luminance) and semantic factors (i.e., categorical similarity and affective valence of expression) made minor or no contribution to discrimination efficiency. This suggests that visual saliency of distinctive facial features, rather than the significance of expression, is used to make both early and later expression discrimination decisions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant pictures appeared for 150 ms in either peripheral or foveal vision, with or without a concurrent foveal load task. Participants indicated whether the visual scene in the picture was or was not pleasant, or was or was not unpleasant. The manipulation of picture location (foveal vs. peripheral) aimed to tap spatial attention, while the perceptual load task was used to manipulate the availability of attentional resources. Results showed that emotional valence was discriminated above the chance level even in the attentionally-constrained conditions (peripheral presentation combined with perceptual load). Nevertheless, valence encoding depended on both attentional mechanisms, as indicated by reductions in accuracy and by slowed reaction times in valence identification when attention was allocated elsewhere, relative to when the scene appeared at fixation and when there was no concurrent task. This indicates that emotional processing requires attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We compared the primacy of affective versus semantic categorization by using forced-choice saccadic and manual response tasks. Participants viewed paired emotional and neutral scenes involving humans or animals flashed rapidly in extrafoveal vision. Participants were instructed to categorize the targets by saccading toward the location occupied by a predefined target scene. The affective task involved saccading toward an unpleasant or pleasant scene, and the semantic task involved saccading toward a scene containing an animal. Both affective and semantic target scenes could be reliably categorized in less than 220 ms, but semantic categorization was always faster than affective categorization. This finding was replicated with singly, foveally presented scenes and manual responses. In comparison with foveal presentation, extrafoveal presentation slowed down the categorization of affective targets more than that of semantic targets. Exposure threshold for accurate categorization was lower for semantic information than for affective information. Superordinate-, basic-, and subordinate-level semantic categorizations were faster than affective evaluation. We conclude that affective analysis of scenes cannot bypass object recognition. Rather, semantic categorization precedes and is required for affective evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to extend the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) norms by obtaining reaction time (RT) normative data for 308 selected photographs. Pictures were presented one at a time for 33, 100, or 250 msec, or under free-time display, to 96 women and 48 men. The participants' task involved assessing the emotional valence of each picture and responding as quickly as possible as to whether it was unpleasant, neutral, or pleasant. RTs provided an index of processing efficiency. The manipulation of display time served to estimate the time course in the valence identification of each picture. Some categories of depicted scenes (e.g., erotica and mutilations) were classified more consistently and efficiently than were others as pleasant or unpleasant. There were minimal differences between men and women. Overall, the present data provide researchers investigating cognition/emotion relationships with an objective criterion to select pictorial stimuli on the basis of RTs. Data for all pictures may be downloaded from brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To investigate the processing of emotional words by covert attention, threat-related, positive, and neutral word primes were presented parafoveally (2.2° away from fixation) for 150 ms, under gaze-contingent foveal masking, to prevent eye fixations. The primes were followed by a probe word in a lexical-decision task. In Experiment 1, results showed a parafoveal threat-anxiety superiority: Parafoveal prime threat words facilitated responses to probe threat words for high-anxiety individuals, in comparison with neutral and positive words, and relative to low-anxiety individuals. This reveals an advantage in threat processing by covert attention, without differences in overt attention. However, anxiety was also associated with greater familiarity with threat words, and the parafoveal priming effects were significantly reduced when familiarity was covaried out. To further examine the role of word knowledge, in Experiment 2, vocabulary and word familiarity were equated for low- and high-anxiety groups. In these conditions, the parafoveal threat-anxiety advantage disappeared. This suggests that the enhanced covert-attention effect depends on familiarity with words. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, the authors investigated how salient visual features capture attention and facilitate detection of emotional facial expressions. In a visual search task, a target emotional face (happy, disgusted, fearful, angry, sad, or surprised) was presented in an array of neutral faces. Faster detection of happy and, to a lesser extent, surprised and disgusted faceS was found both under upright and inverted display conditions. Inversion slowed down the detection of these faces less than that of others (fearful, angry, and sad). Accordingly, the detection advantage involves processing of featural rather than configural information. The facial features responsible for the detection advantage are located in the mouth rather than the eye region. Computationally modeled visual saliency predicted both attentional orienting and detection. Saliency was greatest for the faces (happy) and regions (mouth) that were fixated earlier and detected faster, and there was close correspondence between the onset of the modeled saliency peak and the time at which observers initially fixated the faces. The authors conclude that visual saliency of specific facial features—especially the smiling mouth—is responsible for facilitated initial orienting, which thus shortens detection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Participants judged which of seven facial expressions (neutrality, happiness, anger, sadness, surprise, fear, and disgust) were displayed by a set of 280 faces corresponding to 20 female and 20 male models of the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). Each face was presented under free-viewing conditions (to 63 participants) and also for 25, 50, 100, 250, and 500 msec (to 160 participants), to examine identification thresholds. Measures of identification accuracy, types of errors, and reaction times were obtained for each expression. In general, happy faces were identified more accurately, earlier, and faster than other faces, whereas judgments of fearful faces were the least accurate, the latest, and the slowest. Norms for each face and expression regarding level of identification accuracy, errors, and reaction times may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive/. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To investigate preferential processing of emotional scenes competing for limited attentional resources with neutral scenes, prime pictures were presented briefly (450 ms), peripherally (5.2° away from fixation), and simultaneously (one emotional and one neutral scene) versus singly. Primes were followed by a mask and a probe for recognition. Hit rate was higher for emotional than for neutral scenes in the dual- but not in the single-prime condition, and A' sensitivity decreased for neutral but not for emotional scenes in the dual-prime condition. This preferential processing involved both selective orienting and efficient encoding, as revealed, respectively, by a higher probability of first fixation on - and shorter saccade latencies to - emotional scenes and by shorter fixation time needed to accurately identify emotional scenes, in comparison with neutral scenes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prime pictures of emotional scenes appeared in parafoveal vision, followed by probe pictures either congruent or incongruent in affective valence. Participants responded whether the probe was pleasant or unpleasant (or whether it portrayed people or animals). Shorter latencies for congruent than for incongruent prime-probe pairs revealed affective priming. This occurred even when visual attention was focused on a concurrent verbal task and when foveal gaze-contingent masking prevented overt attention to the primes but only if these had been preexposed and appeared in the left visual field. The preexposure and laterality patterns were different for affective priming and semantic category priming. Affective priming was independent of the nature of the task (i.e., affective or category judgment), whereas semantic priming was not. The authors conclude that affective processing occurs without overt attention--although it is dependent on resources available for covert attention--and that prior experience of the stimulus is required and right-hemisphere dominance is involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present study, we investigated how reading strategies affect the time course of online predictive inferences. Participants read sentences under instructions either to anticipate the outcomes of described events or to understand the sentences. These were followed by a target word to be named, with stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 500 or 1,000 msec (50- or 550-msec interstimulus interval, respectively). Sentences either were predictive of events or were lexically matched control sentences. There was facilitation in naming latencies for predictable target words in the strategic-anticipation condition at both SOAs, but not in the read-to-understand condition, with a significant improvement in the former condition in comparison with the latter. This suggests that predictive inferences, which are typically considered to be resource demanding, can be speeded up by specific goals in reading. Moreover, this can occur at no cost to comprehension of explicit information, as was revealed by a comprehension test. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors investigated whether emotional pictorial stimuli are especially likely to be processed in parafoveal vision. Pairs of emotional and neutral visual scenes were presented parafoveally (2. 1° or 2.5° of visual angle from a central fixation point) for 150-3,000 ms, followed by an immediate recognition test (500-ms delay). Results indicated that (a) the first fixation was more likely to be placed onto the emotional than the neutral scene; (b) recognition sensitivity (A') was generally higher for the emotional than for the neutral scene when the scenes were paired, but there were no differences when presented individually; and (c) the superior sensitivity for emotional scenes survived changes in size, color, and spatial orientation, but not in meaning. The data suggest that semantic analysis of emotional scenes can begin in parafoveal vision in advance of foveal fixation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pictures of emotionally neutral, positive, and negative (threat- or harm-related) scenes were presented for 3 seconds, paired with nonemotional control pictures. The eye fixations of high and low trait anxiety participants were monitored. Intensity of stimulus emotionality was varied, with two levels of perceptual salience for each picture (colour vs. greyscale). Regardless of perceptual salience, high anxiety was associated with preferential attention: (a) towards all types of emotional stimuli in initial orienting, as revealed by a higher probability of first fixation on the emotional picture than on the neutral picture of a pair; (b) towards positive and harm stimuli in a subsequent stage of early engagement, as shown by longer viewing times during the first 500 ms following onset of the pictures; and with (c) attention away from (i.e., avoidance) harm stimuli in a later phase, as indicated by shorter viewing times and lower frequency of fixation during the last 1000 ms of picture exposure. This suggests that the nature of the attentional bias varies as a function of the time course in the processing of emotional pictures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In two experiments, prime face stimuli with an emotional or a neutral expression were presented individually for 25 to 125 ms, either in foveal or parafoveal vision; following a mask, a probe face or a word label appeared for recognition. Accurate detection and sensitivity (A′) were higher for angry, happy, and sad faces than for nonemotional (neutral) or novel (scheming) faces at short exposure times (25-75 ms), in both the foveal and the parafoveal field, and with both the probe face and the probe word. These results indicate that there is a low perceptual threshold for unambiguous emotional faces, which are especially likely to be detected both within and outside the focus of attention; and that this facilitated detection involves processing of the affective meaning of faces, not only discrimination of formal visual features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eye fixations were assessed during the reading of continuation sentences confirming inferences suggested by a preceding context sentence. In multiple regression analysis, individual differences in available prior vocabulary knowledge, working memory span, and speed of access to prior word knowledge served as predictors of eye fixations. Accessibility speed was associated with first-fixation time and gaze duration across all sentence regions. Vocabulary knowledge was associated with reduced looks-back from the target word that represented the inference in the continuation sentence. Working memory span was associated with reduced gaze duration and looks-back from the final word of the continuation sentence. It is concluded that accessibility is a general reading efficiency factor. In contrast, both vocabulary knowledge and working memory make specific, although delayed, contributions to inferences: Vocabulary knowledge facilitates the selection of linguistic representations for the inference; working memory helps to integrate meanings in situation model construction of the inference. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Pictures of either emotionally neutral, pleasant (affectionate), or unpleasant (threat and injury) scenes were paired with nonemotional control pictures and presented for 3 s, while eye fixations were monitored. Preferential attention to the emotional picture of eah pair occurred at an early processing stage: The probability of placement of the first fixation and the proportion of viewing time during the first 500 ms were higher for both pleasant and unpleasant pictures than for neutral pictures, whereas later fixation location and time were not differentially affected. This suggests that, when emotional and nonemotional stimuli are presented simultaneously, emotional meaning captures initial overt orienting and engages attention early, as measured by gaze direction and duration. The possibility that this effect could be accounted for by perceptual differences—such as luminance and complexity—between emotional and neutral pictures was ruled out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elaborative inferences during reading were assessed by means of a naming task and eye-fixation monitoring in low- and high-vocabulary undergraduates. A context sentence was followed by a target word to be named or read. Evidence for inferences involved facilitation in naming latencies or reading times for the target word when this was predictable by the context. The results indicated that high-vocabulary readers were faster and more likely to make inferences on-line than low-vocabulary readers. Those low in vocabulary, generated inferences only after 1050 ms of the end of the inducing context sentence, whereas those high in vocabulary made inferences 500 ms earlier. Furthermore, when the stimuli involved reading of continuous text, rather than discrete naming of target words, only the high-vocabulary readers drew inferences, which suggests that low-vocabulary readers are unlikely to make inferences in natural reading conditions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Low and high trait anxiety undergraduates were presented with physical-threat, ego-threat, positive, and neutral words. Following an orienting task promoting lexical--but not semantic--processing, unexpected free recall or recognition tests were presented. High anxiety participants showed increased correct recall of both types of threat-related words, but also increased incorrect recall (intrusions) and incorrect recognition (false alarms) of these words. Furthermore, participants high in anxiety had reduced sensitivity ( d ′) for ego-threat words, and reduced cautiousness ( β ) for physical-threat words. This tendency to report threat-related information regardless of prior presentation suggests that there is a response bias rather than a memory bias in anxiety. In addition, this bias is likely to be mediated by depression insofar as physical-threat information is concerned, although the bias can be attributed to trait anxiety insofar as ego-threat information is concerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eye fixations were recorded to assess whether, how, and when readers draw inferences about predictable events. Predicting context sentences, or non-predicting control sentences, were presented, followed by continuation sentences in which a target word referred to a predictable event (inferential word) or an unlikely event (non-predictable word). There were no effects on initial target word processing measures, such as launch and landing sites, fixation probability, first-fixation duration, or first-pass reading time. However, relative to the control condition, the predicting context (1) speeded up reanalysis of the inferential word, as revealed by a reduction in second-pass reading time and regressions, and (2) interfered with processing of the non-predictable word, as shown by an increase in regressions. These results indicate that predictive inferences are active at late text integration processes, rather than at early lexical-access processes. The pattern of findings suggests that these inferences involve initial activation of rather general concepts following the inducing context, and that they are completed or refined with delay, after the inferential target word is read. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Six experiments examined a bias in the probability and the time course of predictive inferences as a function of individual differences in emotional proneness and the adaptive importance of stimuli. Participants high or low in trait anxiety read context sentences predictive of potentially threatening events or nonthreat events. The contexts were followed by a target word to be named, which represented the predicted event or an unlikely event. Context constraints, the context presentation rate, and the interval between the context and the target word were manipulated. Evidence for inferences involved facilitation (shorter latencies) in naming the inferential target words following the predicting context, relative to when these words followed a control context. Predictive inferences were activated when there was congruence between anxiety and the threat content of stimuli, regardless of context constraints. The time course of predictive inferences was constant across context presentation rate; they occurred with considerable delay (1,050 ms) after the context but not earlier (i.e., 50 or 550 ms). We discuss the relevance and the integration of these findings with current models and research on inference processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eye fixations during reading were monitored to examine the relationship between individual differences in working memory capacity—as assessed by the reading span task—and inferences about predictable events. Context sentences predicting likely events, or non-predicting control sentences, were presented. They were followed by continuation sentences in which a target word represented an event to be inferred (inferential word) or an unlikely event (non-predictable word). A main effect of reading span showed that high working memory capacity was related to shorter gaze durations across sentence regions. More specific findings involved an interaction between context, target, and reading span on late processing measures and regions. Thus, for high- but not for low-span readers, the predicting condition, relative to the control condition, facilitated reanalysis of the continuation sentence that represented the inference concept. This effect was revealed by a reduction in regression-path reading time in the last region of the sentence, involving less time reading that region and fewer regressions from it. These results indicate that working memory facilitates elaborative inferences during reading, but that this occurs at late text-integration processes, rather than at early lexical-access processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of event uncertainty on inferences predictive of threat was investigated in high and low trait anxious individuals. Participants read context sentences predicting threat or nonthreat outcomes. They subsequently named target words that were consistent with or unrelated to prediction. In Experiment 1, with predictability relatively low, anxious participants showed clear threat bias in their inferences: Although nonthreat targets were unaffected by context, shorter naming latencies were found for threat target words that followed a threat predicting context. A low anxiety group showed an opposite effect, that is, facilitation only for nonthreat words, suggesting an avoidance (of threat) bias. In Experiment 2, under higher predictability, this bias disappeared, as both high and low anxious groups performed similarly. The relevance of these data for different models of selective processing in anxiety is discussed. Of particular pertinence is the finding that, with increasing stimulus threat, low anxious participants no longer show avoidance; instead, they infer threat in a way similar to the high anxious. This suggests that the difference between the high and the low anxious persons resides in the threshold at which stimulus threat input is processed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The time course of a bias in predicting danger as a function of a repressive coping style was examined. The participants belonged to repressor, low - anxious, or high - anxious groups. They read context sentences predictive of threat or nonthreat event outcomes, followed by target words for rapid naming representing the outcomes. The interval between context and target word was 50 ms (Experiment 1), 550 ms (Experiment 2), or 1050 ms (Experiments 3 and 4). There was bias for naming words confirming threatening outcomes: (a) for repressors in the 550-ms delay condition; and (b) for high - anxiety participants in the 1050-ms delay condition. Repressive coping facilitated early processing of threat, but inhibited late processing, whereas high anxiety was characterised by sustained vigilance for threat. There were clear differences in threat processing by repressors and the low - anxious participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of context constraints on the time course of predictive inferences during reading was investigated. Constraints (low vs. medium vs. high) were determined by manipulations of a context sentence that affected the extent to which an event was predictable. The time course was assessed by variations in the delay (50 vs. 550 vs. 1050 ms) between the context to be read and a target word to be named. This word represented either the predicted event (inferential target) or an unlikely event (non-predictable target). With a 1050-ms delay, there was facilitation in naming the inferential target word following the predicting context, relative to a control context, regardless of the degree of constraints. With a 550-ms delay, facilitation did not occur unless there were high constraints, even if the context presentation rate was slowed down. With a 50-ms delay, facilitation was not observed even under high constraints. It is concluded that enhanced context constraints speed the time course of predictive inferencing to some extent: under enhanced constraints, predictive inferences are made earlier, but do not become automatic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents information on a study which examined discrepancies between subjective and objective measures of state anxiety as a function of test anxiety in undergraduate students. Description of test anxiety; Response systems of state anxiety; Methodology; Results and discussion.

A naming task assessed activation of inference concepts during reading. Apredicting, or a control, context sentence was followed by a target word to be named, which represented the predicted event or an inconsistent event. The interval between the end of the context and the onset of the target word varied between 50 and 1050-msec. Individual differences in working memory capacity were assessed by the reading span task. As reflected by facilitation in naming latencies in the predicting condition, relative to the control condition, (a) inferences were not made within the first 50-msec after the context, regardless of reading span; (b) only the high-span participants drew inferences within a 550-msec interval; and, (c) both the high-and the low-span participants generated them within a 1050-msec interval. These results indicate that high working memory capacity accelerates the time course of predictive inferences, although they do not become automatic. We propose that this effect occurs because these inferences involve time-consuming elaborations that place demands on the effortful and limited resources of working memory. Deficiencies in word knowledge, speed of lexical access, or comprehension of explicit information do not account for low-span readers' difficulties in generating predictive inferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract In order to determine the time course of inferences about predictable events, predicting or control contexts were presented, followed by a target word (Exps. 1A, B, and C) or a continuation sentence (Exp. 2) that confirmed or disconfirmed the predicted event. Relative to the control condition, under the predicting condition there was facilitation in naming the confirming target words 1500 ms after the onset of the last word in the context (Exp. 1C), but not after 500 ms (Exp. 1A), [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under social-evaluative stress, self-reported distress (cognitive and somatic symptoms), behavioral anxiety (motor, facial, verbal, and social), physiological arousal (heart rate and skin resistance), and task performance (cognitive and motor) were recorded. Concordance was selective and consistent across response systems. There were significant relationships among measures of cognitive aspects, and among those concerned with somatic aspects, but not between these two areas. Furthermore, concordance was much higher in high-than in low-trait/test-anxiety participants, who even exhibited reversed concordance. These differences are explained in terms of stronger physiological signals in high trait/test anxiety. Alternative interpretations involving perceiving and/or reporting internal threat-related information in low trait/test anxiety are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Investigates the relative contribution of processing time during and after reading an inducing context. Indication that increasing the time available during reading of the context improves comprehension; No effect of the time increase to the construction of inferences.