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Summary: Self‐incompatibility (SI) is a widespread prezygotic mechanism for flowering plants to avoid inbreeding depression and promote genetic diversity. Citrus has an S‐RNase‐based SI system, which was frequently lost during evolution. We previously identified a single nucleotide mutation in Sm‐RNase, which is responsible for the loss of SI in mandarin and its hybrids. However, little is known about other mechanisms responsible for conversion of SI to self‐compatibility (SC) and we identify a completely different mechanism widely utilized by citrus. Here, we found a 786‐bp miniature inverted‐repeat transposable element (MITE) insertion in the promoter region of the FhiS2‐RNase in Fortunella hindsii Swingle (a model plant for citrus gene function), which does not contain the Sm‐RNase allele but are still SC. We demonstrate that this MITE plays a pivotal role in the loss of SI in citrus, providing evidence that this MITE insertion prevents expression of the S‐RNase; moreover, transgenic experiments show that deletion of this 786‐bp MITE insertion recovers the expression of FhiS2‐RNase and restores SI. This study identifies the first evidence for a role for MITEs at the S‐locus affecting the SI phenotype. A family‐wide survey of the S‐locus revealed that MITE insertions occur frequently adjacent to S‐RNase alleles in different citrus genera, but only certain MITEs appear to be responsible for the loss of SI. Our study provides evidence that insertion of MITEs into a promoter region can alter a breeding strategy and suggests that this phenomenon may be broadly responsible for SC in species with the S‐RNase system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Software developers usually adopt free trial strategies to promote their products in the software industry. Limited-time, limited-function, and hybrid have been becoming prevalent free trial strategies in reducing consumers' uncertainty about software quality. How to choose the optimal free trial strategy is a core issue facing software developers. This paper discusses the optimal software free trial strategy, as well as optimal pricing, optimal free quality, and optimal free time length based on network effects in a platform supply chain. The results show that hybrid is always optimal and the intensity of network effects plays a key role between limited-time and limited-function. Limited-time is superior to limited-function for a medium intensity of network effects, whereas limited-time is inefficient and limited-function is optimal for a weak/strong intensity of network effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Combined with the background of the rapid development of e-commerce platform, this paper constructs a twoechelon e-commerce supply chain game model dominated by e-commerce platform and followed by a manufacturer. This paper considers the pricing of products, service level and promotion level under centralized decision and decentralized decision, analyzes the influence of commission rate on optimal decision and supply chain members'profit, and designs "promotion cost allocation coordination" strategy. The results show that: When the commission rate is low, the optimal decision under centralized decision is higher than that under decentralized decision; when the commission rate is high, the result is opposite. Under decentralized decision, the supply chain profit is always lower than that under centralized decision, and the strategy of "promotion cost allocation coordination"can achieve Pareto improvement of both sides'profits. Under decentralized and centralized decision-making, the manufacturer's product price and e-commerce platform service level increase with the promotion efficiency. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the validity of the conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consider a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer may open direct channels through ex-ante or ex-post encroachment, and the retailer can provide consumers with ex-ante or ex-post service. We investigates the effects of encroachment and services on the optimal strategy for two members in three decision modes: MR mode (ex-ante encroachment), MRM mode (ex-post encroachment and ex-post service), and MRMR mode (ex-post encroachment and ex-ante service). The results show that in the MRM mode, both the wholesale and retail prices may become higher with encroachment. Improving the service efficiency may hurt the retailer, and increasing the operating cost for direct channels harms the retailer, while benefits the manufacturer. In addition, only in the MRM mode, the retailer maybe benefits from encroachment under certain conditions. We further study the equilibrium mode and the result shows as follows. The MR mode, widely adopted by the literature on manufacturer encroachment, always is worst for the manufacturer. Only when both the operating cost for direct channels and the service efficiency are low, the equilibrium decision mode is the MRMR mode, otherwise the MRM mode is the equilibrium decision mode. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]