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The classic win-win has a key flaw in that it cannot offer the parties the right amounts of winning because each party believes they are winners. In reality, one party may win more than the other. This strategy is not limited to a single product or negotiation; it may be applied to a variety of situations in life. We present a novel way to measure the win-win situation in this paper. The proposed method employs Fuzzy logic to create a mathematical model that aids negotiators in quantifying their winning percentages. The model is put to the test on real-life negotiations scenarios such as the Iraqi-Jordanian oil deal, and the iron ore negotiation (2005-2009). The presented model has shown to be a useful tool in practice and can be easily generalized to be utilized in other domains as well., Comment: 25 pages, 5 figures

In this paper we show how the study of asymmetric R&D alliances, that are those between young and small firms and large and MNEs firms for knowledge exploration and/or exploitation, requires the adoption of a coopetitive framework which consider both collaboration and competition. We draw upon the literature on asymmetric R&D collaboration and coopetition to propose a mathematical model for the coopetitive games which is particularly suitable for exploring asymmetric R&D alliances., Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1106.3543

This paper provides a coopetitive model for a global green economy, taking into account the environmental sustainability. In particular, we propose a differentiable coopetitive game G (in the sense recently introduced by D. Carf`{\i}) to represent a global green economy interaction, among a country c and the rest of the world w. Our game G is a linear parametric (Euclidean) perturbation of the classic Cournot duopoly. In the paper we offer the complete study of the proposed model and in particular a deep examination of its possible coopetitive solutions.

In the present work we propose an original analytical model of coopetitive game. We try to apply this analytical model of coopetition - based on game theory and conceived at a macro level - to the Greek crisis, suggesting feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic policies in the euro area.

In this paper we shall prove that the plane of financial events, introduced and applied to financial problems by the author himself (see [2], [3] and [4]) can be considered as a fibration in two different ways. The first one, the natural one, reveals itself to be isomorphic to the tangent- bundle of the real line, when the last one is considered as a differentiable manifold in the natural way; the second one is a fibration induced by the status of compound interest capitalization at a given rate i in the interval ] - 1, \rightarrow [. Moreover, in the paper we define on the first fibration an affine connection, also in this case induced by the status of compound interest at a given rate i. The final goal of this paper is the awareness that all the effects determined by the status of compound interest are nothing but the consequences of the fact that the space of financial events is a fibration endowed with a particular affine connection, so they are consequences of purely geometric properties, at last, depending upon the curvature determined by the connection upon the fibration. A natural preorder upon the set of fibers of the second fibration is considered. Some remarks about the applicability to economics and finance of the theories presented in the paper and about the possible developments are made in the directions followed in papers [1], [5], [6], [7], [8] of the author.

In this paper we see the evolution of a capitalized financial event e, with respect to a capitalization factor f, as the exponential map of a suitably defined Lie group G(f,e), supported by the half-space of capitalized financial events having the same capital sign of e. The Lie group G(f,e) depends upon the capitalization factor f and on the event e itself. After the extension of the definition of exponential map of a Lie group, we shall eliminate the dependence on the financial event e, recognizing the presence of essentially one unique financial Lie semigroup, supported by the entire space of capitalized financial events, determined by the capitalization factor f.

In this note we define summable families in tempered distribution spaces and we state some their properties and characterizations. Summable families are the analogous of summable sequences in separable Hilbert spaces, but in tempered distribution spaces, having elements (functional) realizable as generalized vectors indexed by real Euclidean spaces (not pointwise defined ordered families of scalars indexed by real Euclidean spaces in the sense of distributions). Any family we introduce here is summable with respect to every tempered system of coefficients belonging to a certain normal space of distributions, in the sense of superpositions. The summable families we present in this note are one possible rigorous and simply manageable mathematical model for the infinite families of vector-states appearing in the formulation of the continuous version of the celebrated Principle of Superpositions in Quantum Mechanics.

In this paper we introduce and study the multiplication among smooth functions and Schwartz families. This multiplication is fundamental in the formulation and development of a spectral theory for Schwartz linear operators in distribution spaces, to introduce efficiently the Schwartz eigenfamilies of such operators and to build up a good functional calculus for them. The definition of eigenfamily is absolutely natural and this new operation allows us to develop a rigorous and manageable spectral theory for Quantum Mechanics, since it appears in a form extremely similar to the current use in Physics.

In this paper we prove and apply a theorem of spectral expansion for Schwartz linear operators which have an S-linearly independent Schwartz eigenfamily. This type of spectral expansion is the analogous of the spectral expansion for self-adjoint operators of separable Hilbert spaces, but in the case of eigenfamilies of vectors indexed by the real Euclidean spaces. The theorem appears formally identical to the spectral expansion in the finite dimensional case, but for the presence of continuous superpositions instead of finite sums. The Schwartz expansion we present is one possible rigorous and simply manageable mathematical model for the spectral expansions used frequently in Quantum Mechanics, since it appears in a form extremely similar to the current formulations in Physics.

In this paper we define the Schwartz linear operators among spaces of tempered distributions. These operators are the analogous of linear continuous operators among separable Hilbert spaces, but in the case of spaces endowed with Schwartz bases having a continuous index set. The Schwartz linear operators enjoy properties very similar to those enjoyed by linear operators in the finite dimensional case. The Schwartz operators are one possible rigorous mathematical model for the operators and observables used in Quantum Mechanics.

In this paper we define the S-bases for the spaces of tempered distributions. These new bases are the analogous of Hilbert bases of separable Hilbert spaces for the continuous case (they are indexed by m-dimensional Euclidean spaces) and enjoy properties similar to those shown by algebraic bases in the finite dimensional case. The S-bases are one possible rigorous and extremely manageable mathematical model for the "physical" bases used in Quantum Mechanics.

In this paper we introduce the reactivity in decision-form games. The concept of reactivity allows us to give a natural concept of rationalizable solution for decision-form games: the solubility by elimination of sub-reactive strategies. This concept of solubility is less demanding than the concept of solubility by elimination of non-reactive strategies (introduced by the author and already studied and applied to economic games). In the work we define the concept of super-reactivity, the preorder of re-activity and, after a characterization of super-reactivity, we are induced to give the concepts of maximal-reactivity and sub-reactivity; the latter definition permits to introduce the iterated elimination of sub-reactive strategies and the solubility of a decision-form game by iterated elimination of sub-reactive strategies. In the paper several examples are developed. Moreover, in the case of normal-form games, the relation between reactivity, with respect to the pair of best reply decision rules, and dominance (with respect to the payoff functions of the game) is completely revealed., Comment: 20 pages

In this paper we define the canonical mixed extension of a decision form game. We motivate the necessity to introduce this concept and we show several examples about the new concept. In particular we focus our study upon the mixed equilibria of a finite decision form game. Many developments appear possible for applications to economics, physics, medicine and biology in those cases for which the systems involved do not have natural utility functions but are only capable to react versus the external actions., Comment: 12 pages