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In this article, the author describes an upper-level, special topics English course she designed as a "workshop" in "wreading" contemporary women's innovative poetries. She was inspired to "wreading" by Charles Bernstein's essay "Creative Wreading: A Primer," in which he offers interactive and reactive responses to assigned texts as the grounds for subsequent critical interpretations and argues that "you can't interpret what you don't experience." "Wreading" thus implies not only a merging of the acts of reading and writing but also, and more importantly, an investment in experiential learning. The author's primary pedagogical goals for this course were twofold: (1) to unsettle students' reading habits and offer them strategies for approaching the poem as a process rather than a product, asking, "How is it made?" rather than "What does it mean?"; and (2) to illustrate to students their responsibility as university students and as, specifically, students in an English classroom, to intervene in the discursive practices that make such assumptions about women's writing possible, to, in effect, talk back to the white male heterosexual discourse that continues to dominate Culture-at-Large. Poetry is a particularly apt medium for this lesson because students are so unfamiliar with it and, for the most part, have very little notion of the wide range in contemporary poetic praxis. (Contains 5 notes.)

This essay examines four schools of thought about US strategy in Asia, particularly regarding China. These four viewpoints—here termed the responsible stakeholder, communist collapse, constructive cooperation, and managed competition schools—are determined largely by the answers to two questions. First, to what degree should US policies focus on integrating China into the international order, versus mitigating the consequences of China's rise? Second, should US policy makers seek a specified end state with China, or simply focus on achieving a stable steady state? Based on a detailed analysis of existing commentary, we assert that most debates about US objectives vis-à-vis China revolve around these questions. This essay concludes that US policies are likely to incorporate aspects of all four theories, which will make it difficult—if not impossible—for the United States to adopt any clear and sustained strategy across administrations. Barring a major breakthrough or breakdown in US–China relations, Washington is destined for a muddled debate on China that will make it difficult to achieve strategic consensus. And this strategic confusion on China will have substantial implications for US regional strategy more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]