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I INTRODUCTION Amid concerns that New Zealand's grocery duopoly is charging unfairly high retail prices, (1) the Commerce Commission (NZCC) released a critical report, illuminating the anti-competitive practices within the [...], New Zealand's retail grocery sector is dominated by a duopoly that impedes opportunities for new entry by lodging restrictive covenants on strategic sites and exclusive covenants in lease agreements. This enables the duopoly to limit competition and artificially raise grocery prices, harming consumers and society as a whole. In response, the Government has recently passed legislation prohibiting the duopoly's covenants. This article applauds action against anti-competitive grocery covenants. However, it argues that enforcement action, rather than legislation, would have been the more appropriate avenue forfour reasons. First, under the new legislation, grocery retailers can apply for an exemption so that certain covenants remain in force, the outcome of which can be appealed. This means cases concerning grocery covenants will likely appear before the courts anyway. Secondly, enforcement action under existing legislation would have captured a key distinction that the new legislation overlooks. That is, while the duopoly's restrictive covenants are overwhelmingly anticompetitive and should all be unenforceable, in limited circumstances exclusive covenants are arguably net pro-competitive and should remain in force. Thirdly, and flowing from this, establishing via the courts that grocery covenants are in fact anti-competitive would have provided a more legitimate basis for prohibiting them. Finally, the Government's position that litigation is inefficient as each covenant must be individually analysed overlooks both the ANZCO Foods Waitara Ltd v AFFCO New Zealand Ltd collective covenants approach under s 28 and the s 30 cartel provisions in the existing Commerce Act 1986. To this end, this article argues that all of the duopoly's restrictive covenants and the great majority of their exclusive covenants breach existing competition laws, namely ss 28 and 30 of the Commerce Act.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. GETTING UP TO SPEED ON F1 859 A. The World's Best-Funded Science Fair 859 B. Hitting the Brakes on Innovation 862 C. You Can Race, But [...], Formula 1 is in the midst of a copycat scandal: technology has made it possible for teams to reverse engineer clones of competitors' race cars. This is a less than ideal state of affairs for the championship series, which prides itself on being the pinnacle of motorsport and automotive innovation, thanks in large part to the cars' rapid rate of technological advancement. In order to address this problem, the Federation Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA), Formula 1's governing body, must increase independent innovation efforts by amending the technical regulations to restrict the extent of presently allowed inter-team collaboration. Worried that the sport was becoming a "copying championship," the FIA adopted new measures that ban extreme reverse engineering methods. Because these new FIA regulations do not limit the degree of coordinated conduct between teams, this approach will likely fail to remedy the sport's copying problem because team plagiarism is an anticompetitive side effect of this collusive behavior. The FIA addresses the copying problem as one of trade secret misappropriation. By contrast, this Note approaches the issue as one of unregulated anticompetitive conduct. Analyzing the technical partnerships in Formula 1 under antitrust law elucidates their harmful effects on the racing series. This Note urges the FIA to adopt measures that limit Formula 1 teams' ability to collaborate, before the "A-B team" phenomenon further diminishes the sport's innovation efforts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 717 II. CURRENT LEGAL TREATMENT OF SHARING ECONOMY DRIVERS 724 A. Current Legal Treatment of Agreements Among Sharing Economy Suppliers 724 1. Agreements Among Sharing [...], The sharing economy brings together the constituent parts of a business enterprise into a structure that, on its surface, resembles a business firm, but in crucial ways is nothing like the traditional firm. This includes the ownership of the primary capital assets used in the business, as well as one of the most fundamental features of a firm--the relationship with its labor force. Sharing economy workers are formally contractors, running small businesses as sole entrepreneurs, with the effect that they are excluded from many of the protections made available to workers across the economy. The result is a seeming disparity across the market, with consumers realizing benefits of choice and price that did not exist before and platforms possibly poised to turn profits as the hubs of massive enterprises with few of the burdens of a dependent workforce. This Article explains how existing antitrust law would not allow labor organization by sharing economy workers. Even under a possible Rule of Reason approach, the worker protection goals that underlie collective bargaining are not cognizable efficiency justifications for collective bargaining. However, this Article also shows that existing law ignores the well-developed economic theory that supports labor organization as a response to monopsony, and how that theory supports the idea of labor organization as having pro-consumer effects. This Article identifies two primary market structures--the fallow-assets model and the locked-in model--and shows how in the first structure the effect of organization would be to increase output in the labor market, leading to increased output and lower price in the consumer market, while in the second structure the effect of organization is likely to lead to harm in the consumer market. Outcome ambiguity and the novel enterprise structure militate for a Rule of Reason treatment of labor organization in ride-sharing. In operation, this produces the uncomfortable result that the workers least in need of labor protections are most likely to succeed in avoiding liability, while those most in need of protections are most likely to be subjected to damages and injunctions. As a result, non-antitrust labor protections remain essential.

I INTRODUCTION It was a challenging period for real estate agencies operating in the Hamilton market in 2013. Prior to that time, it was common practice among real estate agencies [...], An arrangement to fix, control or maintain prices is the classic competition law per se offence, and is deemed to substantially lessen competition under s 30 of the Commerce Act 1986. However, it is currently unclear when arrangements that do not explicitly concern price fall within the ambit of s 30. This article examines the recent Court of Appeal decision in Commerce Commission v Lodge Real Estate Ltd which found that the defendants were liable under the per se offence provisions. (1) It contends that the Court of Appeal took the overseas case law out of context, misunderstood key factual findings made by the High Court at first instance and overlooked important legal and policy considerations. As a result it is argued that Lodge sets an unfortunate precedent that should be overruled or strictly confined to its own facts.

INTRODUCTION Global supply chains are prolific throughout modern business, provide unique business advantages in a globalized economy, and should be protected to some degree by American antitrust law. A supply [...]

Antitrust law is the primary legal obstacle to price fixing, which is condemned by Section One of the Sherman Act. Section One condemns only concerted action between separate entities, not [...]

More than a century elapsed between Australia's first legislative attempts to modify anticompetitive behaviour (the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906) and its most recent efforts to criminalise price fixing (Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Act 2009). After a burst of activity in the first decade of Federation, the intervening years saw only sporadic interest by governments to promote competitive markets, with limited impact until the late 1960s. This paper assesses the first period of Australia's attempts to promote competition. It traces the political, economic and social environments of anticompetitive business behaviour in Australia from 1901 up to World War I. We suggest that Australia's initial forays into regulating cartels were motivated more by protectionist aims than by efforts to increase competition, which in part also explains the next half-century of legislative apathy towards anti-competitive legislation.