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At this writing, a tropical storm floods south Texas. A major hurricane churns west across the Caribbean with a potential landfall along the Texas coast. Wildfires in the Western United States consume nearly 75,000 acres. U.S. Navy divers assist in the recovery of victims of a bridge collapse in Minneapolis. The space shuttle is aloft with a worrisome gouge in its protective tiles. Russian long-range bombers have resumed patrols that in the past have probed American and Canadian air defense identification zones. Vessels of interest approach American ports with suspicious persons on board. Each of these events could require the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) or U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to respond to defend the homeland or support U.S. civil authorities in their response to various threats. These are the mission essential tasks of the dual commands at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs. Many organizations see themselves as unique, and we are no different. Our claim to that status flows from our area of responsibility for USNORTHCOM and our area of operations for NORAD: the North American continent., Published in Joint Force Quarterly, issue 48 p44-50, 1st Quarter 2008.

When US military forces are performing public security functions during complex contingency operations, what conditions must they establish in order to transfer those functions successfully back to the host nation? In several recent complex contingency operations the intervening military force had to maintain minimum essential public order because the host nation capabilities were either overwhelmed by the magnitude of disorder, or because corrupt, repressive military and police were removed by the intervention. As the host nation public security capability is reinforced or rebuilt, military and political leaders must determine when conditions permit the transfer of public security functions from combat forces to military or international police and finally to the host nation public security forces. Indeed, the possible requirement to restructure the host nation public security forces may become an essential element of the intervention strategy, and would involve both military and civilian agencies. This paper proposes objective conditions to guide joint task force commanders, country teams, and interagency planners in making those transfer decisions.

As modern battlefields have become increasingly dispersed and nonlinear, intermingling of opposing forces in encounter battles jeopardizes the sustainment of maneuver forces along fixed lines of communication. During the mid-nineteenth century, French and American armies developed the flying column. This formation was a self-sustained, combined arms force that was able to operate independently of fixed lines of communication for predetermined periods of time. The purpose of this monograph was to assess the utility of the flying column concept for tactical sustainment of the modern nonlinear battlefield in a mid- to high intensity environment.

In the monograph, I define pivots of operations in the context of Jomini's theoretical writings and relate the concept to Carl von Clausewitz's concept of culmination. I analyze two historical illustrations used by Jomini from Napoleon's campaigns and two twentieth century campaigns to see how the concept has evolved. Based on the historical examples, I summarize the characteristics of pivots of operations and suggest desirable features of modern pivots. Using a hypothetical theater, I demonstrate how pivots may be used today to design the operational sustainment structures for a theater of operations. Then, I compare this model to current and emerging U. S. Army and joint sustainment doctrine to assess their sufficiency. The criteria for analysis throughout are the elements of operational sustainment design enumerated in FM 100-5, Operations: lines of support, staging, altering lines of communication, sustainment priorities, and force expansion. I conclude that the pivots of operations concept provides a common, unifying link between the doctrinal elements of operational sustainment design. Furthermore, it ties sustainment design closely to the theater concept of operations. Finally, pivots of operations offer significant benefits for sustaining the emerging warfighting concept for the future.

As modern battlefields have become increasingly dispersed and nonlinear, intermingling of opposing forces in encounter battles jeopardizes the sustainment of maneuver forces along fixed lines of communication. During the mid-nineteenth century, French and American armies developed the "flying column." This formation was a self-sustained, combined arms force that was able to operate independently of fixed lines of communication for predetermined periods of time. The purpose of this monograph was to assess the utility of the flying column concept for tactical sustainment on the modern nonlinear battlefield in a mid- to high-intensity environment. In this study, I trace the evolution of modern warfare to define nonlinearity and describe its effects on tactical sustainment. I describe the development of the flying column concept in the nineteenth century, and examine contemporary uses of a similar sustainment concept in mid- to high-intensity conflicts. I assess the characteristics and effectiveness of the flying column based upon the historical examples using the sustainment imperatives of AirLand Battle (anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation). Finally, I examine current and emerging U.S. Army sustainment doctrine to determine their sufficiency for nonlinear sustainment, and compare them to the flying column concept. I conclude in the monograph that current and emerging U.S. Army doctrine for tactical sustainment is still largely linear in concept and is highly dependent upon secure lines of communication. By contrast, the accompanying sustainment of the flying column concept could provide the independence and endurance required of tactical units on the modern nonlinear battlefield. I briefly discuss some adaptations to organizations, equipment, and doctrine that adoption of a flying column concept of tactical sustainment will require.

Current U.S. Army and joint sustainment doctrine offers several considerations for the design of operational sustainment in a theater of operations. However, doctrine does not elaborate on how these considerations are interrelated, how they are integrated with the theater concept of operations, or how the operational planner should assess a theater of operations in order to apply them. Military theory may suggest a possible solution to these doctrinal shortcomings. In the mid-nineteenth century, Baron Antoine Henri Jomini proposed the concept of pivots of operations. These were critical geographic nodes that Napoleon used to design his campaigns, and which facilitated both his maneuver and sustainment. The purpose of this monograph was to examine pivots of operations to determine what utility the concept may have for unifying modern operational sustainment design. In the monograph, I define pivots of operations in the context of Jomini's theoretical writings and relate the concept to Carl von Clausewitz's concept of culmination. I analyze two historical illustrations used by Jomini from Napoleon's campaigns and two twentieth century campaigns to see how the concept has evolved. Based on the historical examples, I summarize the characteristics of pivots of operations and suggest desirable features of modern pivots. Using a hypothetical theater, I demonstrate how pivots may be used today to design the operational sustainment structure for a theater of operations. Then, I compare this model to current and emerging U.S. Army and joint sustainment doctrine to assess their sufficiency. The criteria for analysis throughout are the elements of operational sustainment design enumerated in FM 100-5, Operations: lines of support, staging, altering lines of communication, sustainment priorities, and force expansion. I conclude that the pivots of operations concept provides a common, unifying link between the doctrinal elements of operational sustainment design. Furthermore, it