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Collaboration between firms and product users has been widely practiced to enhance the efficiency and quality of product development. We consider a collaborative product improvement setting where a sponsoring firm and product users jointly create or promote product design ideas through firm-sponsored online user innovation communities (FOUICs). Using a differential-game framework, we study a benchmark case in which product users involved in FOUICs are homogeneous in their innovative contribution capacities and propensities. We then incorporate users' heterogeneity such that product users are distinguished into lead users and common users. Our analytical result shows that the equilibrium effort levels and utilities of both the sponsoring firm and product users may increase or decrease with a change in the output elasticities of product design ideas or in the cost elasticities of the effort levels. Moreover, lead users' equilibrium effort level and utility are more sensitive to the elasticity parameters of product users' effort than those of common users, and lead users obtain a higher total incentive reward than that of common users. Last, we compare the benchmark model and the extended model to identify the condition under which one model outperforms the other one for both the sponsoring firm and product users. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Large volumes of online product reviews generated by customers have important strategic values for new product development. We consider a duopoly setting where two manufacturers aim to develop their own new products and services. Applying a differential game framework, we examine how online customer reviews can be leveraged as external knowledge for manufacturers to develop new products. In our base models, we assume that the products supplied by the manufacturers are homogenous. First, we consider a closed innovation setting as a benchmark case in which both manufacturers develop new products by their internal R&D without leveraging online customer reviews. Second, we propose a model in which one manufacturer leverages online customer reviews as external knowledge, while the other manufacturer only relies on internal R&D effort. We derive analytical equilibrium solutions to both models. We find that when one manufacturer uses online customer reviews, if the manufacturer's R&D process becomes more effective in improving its new product performance or reducing its cost, it certainly hurts the other manufacturer, but it may sometimes hurt this particular manufacturer as well. Furthermore, we demonstrate that when the manufacturer utilizes online customer reviews more in R&D, both manufacturers' profits can either increase or decrease. In an extended model, we relax the product homogeneity assumption and obtain the equilibrium solution analytically. We show that main managerial insights still hold in the extend model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The irrational emotion of the parties concerned can cause the deviation of decision-making and behavior during the emergency management of unexpected mass incidents. Many experiments show that when the occurrence probability is lower, player is inclined to the pessimistic emotion. However, when the occurrence probability becomes very higher, player begins to turn the optimistic emotion. Considering the above logistic emotional utility of both players, we build a simultaneous-move game model of unexpected mass incidents with the logistic emotional utility, where the two players are the dominant group and the vulnerable group, respectively. Lastly, we make the numerical analysis based on the case of Dalian PX incident. The results show that when only the social strong group has logistic emotion, its pessimistic emotion leads to the occurrence of mass incidents. The unilateral logistic emotion of the vulnerable group is conducive to the reconciliation of the situation, especially its optimistic emotion makes the situation reach a harmonious bilateral cooperation. However, both sides having obvious emotional fluctuation aggrade the uncertainty of the situation. Therefore, local government strengthens information collection, situation assessment and emergency drills increasing the handling experience prompting the situation to converge to a stable equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]