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• We present evidence on short and long-term impact of the COVID-19 crisis on India's rural youth. • A third of those in salaried job lost their jobs, and half of those who worked out of state returned home after the lockdown. • While many male workers took up informal employment, most female workers dropped out of the labor force. • Using RCT, we find that a government-supported digital platform had no effect on job search intensity or employment. This paper presents evidence on the short and long-term impact of the COVID-19 crisis on India's rural youth. We interviewed about 2,000 vocational trainees from Bihar and Jharkhand three times after the first national lockdown in 2020, between June 2020 and December 2021. We find that a third of respondents who were in salaried jobs pre-lockdown lost their jobs, and half of those who worked out of state returned home shortly after the lockdown. We report a stark difference between men and women: while many male workers took up informal employment, most female workers dropped out of the labour force. In the second part of the paper, we use a randomised experiment to document the effects of a government-supported digital platform designed to provide jobs to low-skilled workers. The platform turned out to be difficult to use and publicised only few job ads. We find no effect on job search intensity or employment. Our findings suggest that bridging the gap between rural young workers and urban formal labour markets requires more active and targeted policy interventions, especially for female workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The theory of implementation abounds with mechanisms with intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it is not in the designer''s best interest to go through with the reward/punishment in the “subgame” arising from some disequilibrium play. This would make the mechanism''s outcome function non-credible. We define a notion of credible implementation and, in the domain of exchange economies, we show that (a) the non-dictatorial Pareto correspondence can be credibly implemented (b) there is no credibly implementable Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice rule (SCR) and (c) there is no credibly implementable Pareto-efficient and envy-free SCR. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for credible implementability of SCR. The main implication is that it is sub-optimal for the designer to be endowed with “too much” information about the economy. Finally, we show that the negative results persist under weaker credibility requirements. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]