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Many arguments for and against functionalism have revolved around logical and methodological issues, discouraging attempts to develop testable functionalist theories. This paper takes a different approach, arguing that the problem with sociological functionalism is not its logic of explanation but the absence of appropriate techniques for formalizing functionalist theories. The solution presented – agent-based simulation – is illustrated by a case study: a functionalist account of church survival. The case study suggests that there is nothing wrong with the logic of functionalism properly formalized, illustrates how simulation can enable testing of functionalist explanations and suggests why existing sociological methods have not proved fruitful for this task. In the light of new techniques like simulation, the current neglect of functionalism may no longer be justified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper raises two difficulties with an earlier contribution to this Journal (Coles 2001) and proposes solutions. While we strongly support his suggestion that neglect of Social Network Analysis (SNA) has hampered criminology, and welcome his opening up of the debate, we argue that Coles has failed to make an important distinction between types of SNA data collection and presented a flawed 'theoretical framework'. In the first section of this article, we highlight the difference between egocentric and non-egocentric network data collection. In the former, respondents are asked about their own network ties, while in the latter, they are also asked what they know about the ties of others. It transpires that egocentric data suit quantitative surveys while non-egocentric data harmonize with ethnography. While Coles endorses 'qualitative' SNA, his failure to make a clear distinction between egocentric and non-egocentric data means that he confuses criticisms appropriate to two different data collection techniques. Many problems with quantitative data collection do not apply to qualitative techniques. In the second section of the article, we argue that the 'theoretical framework' which Coles resents is problematic. He discusses a number of extant findings about the structure of non-criminal networks but fails to support the claim that they can be applied to criminal networks. Such support could either be empirical-showing that the two types of networks were alike—or model based—showing that relevant social interaction mechanisms actually produce similar structural properties in networks. In the absence of either kind of evidence, however, there are ethnographic reasons to expect that criminal networks will have both distinctive generative mechanisms and structural properties. These reasons are discussed in the context of examples provided by Coles. The final section of the paper uses computer simulation to address the two problems raised. The first model shows the conditions under which collection of qualitative (non-egocentric) and quantitative (egocentric) data will produce a more accurate picture of the underlying network. The second (outline) model shows how simulation might link ethnographic data on social interaction to the aggregate properties of networks. The conclusion discusses the consequences of this approach for novel research and criminal intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper clarifies and develops some of the arguments put forward by W.G. Runciman in his 1998 Sociology article 'The Selectionist Paradigm and its Implications for Sociology'. It intends to support his basic claim that mechanisms analogous to (but not synonymous with) natural selection are an important way of understanding both continuity and change in social systems. Nonetheless, it questions the emphasis of his discussion and extends his analysis of two substantive points. The argument proceeds in two stages, The paper begins by examining the many objections that Runciman rebuts and showing that many of them do not need rebuttal but are simply irrelevant to the selectionist paradigm. By irrelevant, I mean that the objections are logically flawed or simply do not apply to the selectionist paradigm as Runciman defines it. The purpose of this part of the paper is to sharpen the debate, so that attention can subsequently be focused on a smaller number of relevant objections that remain. The remainder of the paper attempts to open that debate by discussing the two relevant objections that appear most forceful. It attempts to show that. on closer examination, both objections are mistaken. The first objection is that human deliberation makes any analogy with random mutation in biology untenable. The paper argues that in fact selection and deliberation are complementary. Selection will continue to act on social practices to the extent that our models of the world are imperfect and our practices have unintended consequences. The second objection is that while selectionism is interesting, it may be irrelevant to sociological practice. The last part of the paper provides a more detailed analysis of an example used by Runciman, the task of explaining differing levels of male lethal violence across societies. This analysis suggests that while Runciman's 'discursive' selectionist analysis (like functionalism) can generate suggestive hypotheses, appropriate techniques wi... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports findings from twenty-six interviews conducted with retired households about the way they make budgeting decisions. The data are presented with three objectives. First, to describe the way that households carry out the process of budgeting. Secondly, to consider the implications for economic and sociological theories of consumption. Thirdly, to construct a framework for understanding budgetary decision making which organises the data usefully and places current theories in a clearer relationship to each other. It is found that personal budgeting has several characteristics which are poorly represented in existing theories of consumption: the strong relation between time and money in decision making, the importance of durable goods, the social rather than rational nature of household decision making and the need for budgeting strategies to deal with uncertainty. A five-level framework is presented which shows how different resources and methods are used by decision makers to manage their money. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]