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When do smaller states defer to and when do they defy stronger powers? How and why? This article traces and explains the changing patterns of deference and defiance in Malaysia's China policy. There are three findings. First, deference and defiance are essential elements in all inter-state relations, especially asymmetric ones. The greater the power asymmetry, the greater the inclination to defer and defy. Second, states often pursue defiance and deference concurrently and selectively, with approaches adapted in accordance with changing external and internal conditions. The concurrent adoption of the two behaviors often manifest in hedging, an insurance-seeking policy aimed at offsetting multiple risks by counteracting the effects of the other behavior: deference without defiance risks subservience and dependency; defiance without deference invites hostility and confrontation. Third, the specific patterns and proportions of the deference–defiance mix are attributable more to domestic than external determinants, i.e., the needs to balance security, prosperity, and autonomy, as necessitated by the prevailing pathways of elite legitimation. This explains why Malaysia's open deference vis-à-vis China has been accompanied by an indirect and quiet defiance especially in recent years, as best evidenced by the second Mahathir administration's dualistic approaches toward the Belt and Road, South China Sea, and Xinjiang.

Although much has been written on hedging in traditional security, few studies have focused on hedging in the non-traditional security (NTS) domains. This essay examines NTS hedging through the case of Vietnam’s disaster response cooperation with the USA and with China. “Hedging” is insurance-seeking behaviour, characterised by avoidance of irrevocable commitment, adoption of impartial and inclusive diversification, and the pursuit of prudent contradictions—all aimed at offsetting risks and cultivating a fallback position. We argue that it is Vietnam’s elite-defined strategic considerations and functional needs amid uncertainty that both drive and constrain its hedging approach to disaster management cooperation with the competing powers—China and the USA. While not fully aligning with either power, Vietnam has sought closer cooperation with both, with different objectives in mind: engaging China to maintain a good relationship, while engaging the USA to enhance its capabilities. The net result is cooperation that is symbolic in posture and selective in practice, which serves the substantive purposes of mitigating risks while acquiring concrete gains. In the world of hedging, symbolism is substance.

Hedging is one of the more commonly used but least studied concepts in international relations. This essay conceptualizes hedging and operationalizes it to the alignment choices of Southeast Asian smaller states. I define hedging as insurance-seeking behavior under situations of high uncertainty and high stakes, where a rational state avoids taking sides and pursues opposite measures vis-a-vis competing powers to have a fallback position. I argue that while Washington and Beijing understandably dislike small-state hedging, they both overlook that it is the uncertainties stemming from their actions that push the weak to hedge. As uncertainties deepen, the non-great powers in Southeast Asia—as elsewhere—are compelled to hedge one way or another, even as the space to hedge is shrinking. Hedging is not a panacea and it entails its own problems. But acting out of their survival instincts, smaller states opt to hedge for as long as conditions compel. Unless US–China rivalry escalates into a direct conflict, or unless strategic certainty prevails, e.g., if Washington retreats or reduces its long-term commitment to Asia—raising certainty about the absence of a reliable aligned support—then states will stop hedging and start bandwagoning with China; or if Beijing’s actions directly threaten most actors on all major fronts—heightening certainty about an imminent, across-the-board danger—then hedging will be replaced by balancing against China. Short of that, hedging is likely to persist, making ambiguities a defining theme of our time.

This interlude pulls together themes of agency and hedging that run throughout many of the chapters in this volume. In it, Kuik develops a typology of host-country agency and addresses key questions: What explains variations of host-state agency? Why do some countries welcome foreign-backed infrastructure cooperation more than others? How do some smaller states hedge more effectively in infrastructure cooperation? It concludes, first, that infrastructure and connectivity cooperation – an increasingly salient aspect of international politics due chiefly to the growing US–China competition – are not just about big-power activism, but also about small-state agency. Second, hedging is increasingly prevalent in international cooperation, though remains understudied. And third, it reveals that while power competition at global and regional levels provides the space and leverage for smaller states to hedge, exactly how individual states engage is conditioned by domestic attributes, most notably elite legitimation and internal resilience, thus pointing to the importance of analysis at multiple scales.

This paper adopts a two-level model to explain Malaysia’s forward diplomacy toward the Northeast Asian states, the larger economies beyond its immediate neighborhood of Southeast Asia. We contend that while such structural conditions as power dynamics drive and constrain the smaller state’s agency toward the Northeast Asian nations, their effects are filtered by domestic politics, specifically the ruling elite’s pathways of legitimation. The findings highlight that while diplomacy is almost always motivated by the imperatives of immediate reality and identity, there is a different genre of driver, that of nurtured necessity. This paper illustrates how Malaysia’s outlook toward the Northeast Asian states—and its resulting active and anticipatory diplomacy—has been more “discovered” than determined and why such diplomacy has been driven more by the elite’s domestic political needs than the idiosyncrasies of its leaders.

As an innovative mode of China’s foreign direct investment, China’s overseas industrial parks are not only the main content of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but also the practical carrier of policy transfer. However, most of the academic literature on the policy transfer of overseas industrial parks has regarded the host country as a passive learner and seldom considers the two-way interactions between the host country and the home country. Using the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP) and the “Two Countries, Twin Parks” model as case studies, we discuss the applicability and innovative development of the policy transfer theory of China’s overseas industrial parks under the background of BRI. This article systematically analyzes the developmental background of the MCKIP and the cooperative framework between the governments. We consider the problems encountered in the policy transfer process and the solutions, as well as the two-way interactions between China and Malaysia in terms of the flow of people, logistics, capital, information, and technology. The study sheds light on the construction of the “Two Countries, Twin Parks” overseas industrial park.

This essay traces the structural sources of Malaysia's South China Sea policy. It argues that Malaysia's ‘light-hedging’ approach is primarily a smaller-state's response to growing systemic pressur...

The year 2013 saw the launch of the largest, most influential investment initiative in recent memory: China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This globe-spanning strategy has reshaped local economies and regional networks, and it has become a contested subject for scholars and practitioners alike. How should we make sense of the complex interactions that the BRI has enabled? Understanding these processes requires truly global perspectives alongside careful attention to the role that local actors play in giving shape to individual BRI projects. The contributions in Global Perspectives on China's Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency through Regional Connectivity provide both 'big picture' assessments of China's role in regional and global interactions and detailed case studies that home in on the role agency plays in BRI dynamics. Written by leading area studies scholars with diverse disciplinary expertise, this book reveals how Chinese efforts to recalibrate the world are taken up, challenged, revamped, and reworked in diverse contexts around the world.

This chapter offers a small-state perspective on the presence of China’s connectivity-based Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia, a prioritized region of the rising power’s economic statecraft, especially since President Xi Jinping announced the initiative in late 2013. Viewing “connectivity†and “gaps†as two sides of the same coin, the chapter focuses on the role of the BRI in bridging key gaps in the host countries. Among the key findings is that the effects of China’s BRI push – taking place alongside the pulls of several host countries – have been mixed: bridging links are being developed, but missed links persist. Specifically, while the growing BRI presence is showing early signs of narrowing the physical and developmental gaps in several Southeast Asian countries, the process has also highlighted the enduring – and in some cases deepening – perceptual and political gaps between China and host countries. This chapter argues that the persistent gaps and missed links are a product of power asymmetries, bilateral complexities, and divergent domestic political imperatives across the countries. Significantly, while the gaps have constrained and challenged China’s BRI agenda, they have also motivated Beijing to devote more capital, diplomatic resources, and political will to the cross-border negotiation treadmills with the smaller countries, especially as competing powers enter the Asian connectivity game one after another. Further strengthening the bridging links and addressing the missed links is central to the prospects of the BRI in shaping global governance in the twenty-first century.

Pengkritik biasanya menggambarkan ‘ASEAN Way’ sebagai proses yang lembap dalam mempromosi integrasi serantau. Kritikan tersebut telah membawa kepada persoalan berhubung dengan peranan ASEAN dalam prospek kesalinghubungan fizikal serantau. Setakat ini memang terdapat kekurangan kajian ekonomi politik berkenaan dengan peranan ASEAN dalam perkembangan kesalinghubungan rel serantau di Asia. Oleh itu, kajian ini bertujuan memenuhi lompang penyelidikan tersebut. Artikel ini bermula dengan penyingkapan sejarah asal-usul perkembangan jaringan keretapi merentasi Asia sejak zaman imperialisme bagi mengkaji evolusi dan pelbagai faktor yang mempengaruhi perkembangan kesalinghubungan pengangkutan rel di rantau tersebut. Berdasarkan data sekunder berkenaan perkembangan rangkaian keretapi di Asia, analisis menunjukkan bahawa faktor ekonomi merupakan pendorong utama bagi setiap fasa perkembangan jaringan rel di rantau tersebut. Faktor tersebut bertambah penting berikutan dengan peningkatan penglibatan Asia dalam rangkaian pengeluaran global serta peningkatan perdagangan intra-ASEAN dan perdagangan dengan rantau lain sejak 1990-an. Hasil kajian mendapati bahawa kesalinghubungan pengangkutan rel di Asia berkembang mengikut konteks ekonomi politik rantau tersebut tanpa mengikut acuan institusi Kesatuan Eropah. Pelaksanaan polisi adalah terikat dengan perundangan Kesatuan Eropah. Pendekatan ASEAN yang berasaskan persefahaman dan autonomi nasional memberi fleksibiliti kepada negara-negara anggota ASEAN dalam pelaksanaan kesalinghubungan. Namun demikian, potensi ekonomi yang tinggi telah meningkatkan kehendak politik dan komitmen pemimpin-pemimpin ASEAN bagi memastikan kelancaran pelaksanaan jaringan rel Trans-Asian walaupun terdapat beberapa halangan dan masalah daripada segi politik dan geografi/teknikal. Justeru, prospek perkembangan jaringan TAR adalah cerah dengan gabungan peranan ASEAN, initiatif China dan Jepun melalui Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, Belt and Road Initiative dan Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, di samping bantuan teknikal dan kewangan daripada organisasi antarabangsa lain.

If “militarisation” is defined as an act of deploying military assets to pursue wider strategic ends, then all players of the South China Sea disputes have engaged in some forms of militarisation. China’s militarisation reflect three layers of target audiences: the United States (the main target), regional countries (the secondary target) and its domestic audience. Beijing’s growing anxieties over US rebalancing and the arbitration ruling have paradoxically pushed it to accelerate its “militarisation” activities.

The extant literature on alignment behavior has focused primarily on the macro dimensions, i.e. the typology, manifestations and implications of states’ alignment choices vis-a-vis the great power(s). Relatively few studies have examined the micro aspects of alignment choices. This article attempts to fill in the gap by unpacking the constituent component of weaker states’ alignment decisions, with a focus on ASEAN states’ hedging behavior in the face of a rising China in the post-Cold War era. It contends that the enduring uncertainty at the systemic level has compelled the states to hedge by pursuing contradictory, mutually counteracting transactions of ‘returns-maximizing’ and ‘risk-contingency’ options, which seek to offset the potential drawbacks of one another, as a way to project a non-taking-sides stance while keeping their own fallback position at a time when the prospect of power structure is far from clear.

This article analyzes Malaysia's alignment behavior vis-a-vis America and China, with a focus on explaining how the weaker state's insistence on hedging has both motivated and limited its defense links with the competing powers. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that regional states choose to align militarily with the rebalancing America to hedge against China, the article argues that this characterization is only partially true; a more accurate account is that weaker states do not hedge against any single actor per se; rather, they seek to hedge against a range of risks associated with uncertain power relations. In the case of Malaysia, while Putrajaya aims to mitigate the challenges of an assertive Beijing, its alignment behavior is more a function of a desire to offset several systemic and domestic risks, namely, the shadow of entrapment, abandonment, and alienation, alongside the fear of authority erosion at home.

Malaysia and China have seen one of the most cordial and productive relationships in the Asia-Pacific throughout the post–Cold War era, one with implications beyond their bilateral ties. However, relations were tested through a series of unprecedented events in 2013–14. This article analyzes how the Beting Serupai incidents have impacted Malaysia’s evolving South China Sea policy, and then assesses the impact of the MH370 and Sabah kidnapping incidents on bilateral relations. Finally, it makes an overall assessment of the implications of these events, focusing on the developments after Najib Razak’s visit to Beijing in May–June 2014.

This article explains Malaysia's US policy under Prime Minister Najib. It argues that to the extent that there is a “shift” in Malaysia's policy, its substance has been shaped by structural and domestic considerations. Structurally, in the face of a fast rising China, Malaysia is compelled to keep a more balanced relationship with all the major powers. This structural push, reinforced by Obama's “pivot,” has been nonetheless limited by a concern about the risks of entrapment, abandonment, and antagonism. Domestically, there are economic and political motivations to develop closer ties with Washington. These, however, have been counteracted by a calculation of not wanting to align too closely with America. These structural and domestic determinants together explain the smaller state's strategy towards the superpower at a time of systemic change.

Using Malaysia’s China policy as a case study of a smaller state’s response to a rising power, this article challenges the mainstream neorealist notion that the growing capability and geographical proximity of a rising power tend to induce fear among its weaker neighbours. By tracing the transformation of Malaysia’s China policy, the article’s findings indicate that power asymmetry and geographical proximity have no inherent logic of their own; rather, whether and to what extent the two variables will prompt smaller states to become fearful and/or attracted to a rising power is often a function of intervening factors at the domestic level, i.e. the imperative of ruling elite’s domestic legitimation. In the case of Malaysia’s China policy, it is the ruling Barisan Nasional elite’s desire to capitalize on the big power’s rise—for the ultimate goal of enhancing and justifying its political authority at home—that has driven the smaller state to adopt a hedging approach characterized by an inclination to prioritize immediate economic and diplomatic benefits over potential security concerns, while simultaneously attempting to keep its strategic options open for as long as the systemic conditions allow.

Part 1: Evolution of Inter-state Cooperation 1. Institutionalization of Southeast Asian: ASEAN and ASEAN Centrality Alice D. Ba 2. The Institutionalization of 'East Asian' Regionalism: The Critical Cases of ASEAN Plus Three amd East Asia Summit Md Nasrudin Md Akhir and Sueo Sudo Part 2: Domains of East Asian Cooperation 3. Institutionalization of Economic Cooperation in East Asia Sueo Sudo and Tham Siew Yean 4. Institutionalization of Security Cooperation in East Asia Kuik Cheng-Chwee 5. Institutionalization of Disaster Management in Southeast Asia Tavida Kamolvej 6. ASEAN's (Non-) Role in Managing Ehtnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Obstacles to Institutionalization Chanintira na Thalang and Pinn Siraprapasiri Part 3: Levels of Cooperation 7. Institutionalization of Sub-Regional Cooperation: The Case of the Greater Mekong Sub-region Nguyen Quoc Viet 8. Institutionalization of Inter-Regional Cooperation: The Case of ASEM and FEALAC Yulius P. Hermawan 9. Conclusion: Themes and Prospects Alice D. Ba, Kuik Cheng-Chwee and Sueo Sudo

This article argues that the U.S.–Southeast Asia relations under Obama have been driven and limited by a “partially converged hedging” process between the two sides. On the one hand, the United States has sought to push back and hedge against the longer-term risks of a rising challenger by mobilizing its alignment and diplomatic assets in Asia. The structural imperative, however, has been conditioned by a calculation of not wanting to be rigidly locked in any regional problems. On the other hand, the ASEAN states have correspondingly hedged against the uncertainty surrounding China's rise by leveraging on the United States' enhanced engagement. This driver, nonetheless, has also been conditioned by a fundamental concern of not wanting to confront the rising power in an outright manner. Unless China's actions have posed an immediate threat that leaves the states no choice but balancing, such a partially converged hedging process is likely to endure in the years to come.