Search

In France during winter 2016-2017, 487 outbreaks of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 subtype high pathogenicity (HP) avian influenza A virus (AIV) infections were detected in poultry and captive birds. During this epizootic, HPAIV A/decoy duck/France/161105a/2016 (H5N8) was isolated and characterized in an experimental infection transmission model in conventional mule ducks. To investigate options to possibly protect such ducks against this HPAIV, three vaccines were evaluated in controlled conditions. The first experimental vaccine was derived from the hemagglutinin gene of another clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N8) HPAIV. It was injected at three weeks of age, either alone (Vac1) or after a primer injection at day-old (Vac1 + boost). The second vaccine (Vac2) was a commercial bivalent adjuvanted vaccine containing an expressed hemagglutinin modified from a clade 2.3.2 A(H5N1) HPAIV. Vac2 was administered as a single injection at two weeks of age. The third experimental vaccine (Vac3) also incorporated a homologous 2.3.4.4b H5 HA gene and was administered as a single injection at three weeks of age. Ducks were challenged with HPAIV A/decoy duck/France/161105a/2016 (H5N8) at six weeks of age. Post-challenge virus excretion was monitored in vaccinated and control birds every 2-3 days for two weeks using real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction and serological analyses (haemagglutination inhibition test against H5N8, H5 ELISA and AIV ELISA) were performed. Vac1 abolished oropharyngeal and cloacal shedding to almost undetectable levels, whereas Vac3 abolished cloacal shedding only (while partially reducing respiratory shedding) and Vac2 only partly reduced the respiratory and intestinal excretion of the challenge virus. These results provided relevant insights in the immunogenicity of recombinant H5 vaccines in mule ducks, a rarely investigated hybrid between Pekin and Muscovy duck species that has played a critical role in the recent H5 HPAI epizootics in France., Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

An H3N1 avian influenza virus was detected in a laying hens farm in May 2019 which had experienced 25% mortality in Northern France. The complete sequencing of this virus showed that all segment sequences belonged to the Eurasian lineage and were phylogenetically very close to many of the Belgian H3N1 viruses detected in 2019. The French virus presented two genetic particularities with NA and NS deletions that could be related to virus adaptation from wild to domestic birds and could increase virulence, respectively. Molecular data of H3N1 viruses suggest that these two deletions occurred at two different times., (Copyright © 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

In 2021, France faced large avian influenza outbreaks, like in 2016 and 2017. Controlling these outbreaks required the preventive depopulation of a large number of duck farms. A previous study in 2017 showed that the quality of decontamination of trucks and transport crates used for depopulation was often insufficient. A new study was then set up to evaluate cleaning and disinfection (C&D) of trucks and crates used for duck depopulation and whether practices had changed since 2017. Three methods were used to assess decontamination: 1) detection of avian influenza virus (AIV) genome, 2) visual inspection of cleanliness, and 3) microbial counts, considering that 2 and 3 are commonly used in abattoirs. Another objective of the study was to evaluate the correlation between results obtained with the 3 methods. In 5 abattoirs, 8 trucks and their crates were sampled by swabbing to detect AIV genome by rRT-PCR before and after decontamination. Visual cleanliness scores and coliform counts were also determined on crates after C&D. Trucks and crates were decontaminated according to the abattoirs' protocols. Before C&D, 3 quarters of crates (59/79) and 7 of 8 trucks were positive for AIV genome. C&D procedures were reinforced in 2021 compared to 2017; use of detergent solution and warm water were more common. Nevertheless, 28% of the crates were positive for AIV genome after C&D, despite the fact that cleaning scores and microbiological counts were satisfactory for 84% and 91% of the crates, respectively. No correlation was observed between results for AIV genome detection and results from visual control or from coliform counts. Abattoirs are encouraged to use environmental sampling coupled with AIV genome detection to monitor the quality of cleaning and disinfection of trucks and crates during AI outbreaks. Reinforcement of biosecurity measures at abattoirs is still needed to avoid residual contamination of the equipment and cross-contamination during the decontamination process., (Copyright © 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Several new highly pathogenic (HP) H5 avian influenza virus (AIV) have been detected in poultry farms from south-western France since November 2015, among which an HP H5N1. The zoonotic potential and origin of these AIVs immediately became matters of concern. One virus of each subtype H5N1 (150169a), H5N2 (150233) and H5N9 (150236) was characterised. All proved highly pathogenic for poultry as demonstrated molecularly by the presence of a polybasic cleavage site in their HA protein - with a sequence (HQRRKR/GLF) previously unknown among avian H5 HPAI viruses - or experimentally by the in vivo demonstration of an intravenous pathogenicity index of 2.9 for the H5N1 HP isolate. Phylogenetic analyses based on the full genomes obtained by NGS confirmed that the eight viral segments of the three isolates were all part of avian Eurasian phylogenetic lineage but differed from the Gs/Gd/1/96-like lineage. The study of the genetic characteristics at specific amino acid positions relevant for modulating the adaptation to and the virulence for mammals showed that presently, these viruses possess most molecular features characteristic of AIV and lack some major characteristics required for efficient respiratory transmission to or between humans. The three isolates are therefore predicted to have no significant pandemic potential., (This article is copyright of The Authors, 2017.)