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人性非惡？惡從何來？如何去惡？自宋明儒學到當代新儒學，主流儒者無不推崇孟子的「性善說」：人性本然內具為善的能力與傾向，不善的出現只能訴諸後天環境的影響。針對於此，學界內外都不乏質疑儒家人性論過份樂觀天真的聲音。尤其後來晚明時期心學學者將「心」的內部結構撐開，認為不僅人「性」是善，甚至「心」內部的「意」、「知」、「物」、「情」、「念」等環節亦全皆是善；在這種理解下，惡從何而生更是儒學理論中亟待澄清的問題。本文撰寫的目的，即是旨在從哲學史發展的角度清理晚明王學──自王陽明以降，下轄陽明後學，直到劉蕺山為止──對於「惡」的問題方方面面的思考。並希望通過這工作整理出儒學傳統中一套「惡」的系統理論，以見儒學處理「惡」這個普遍哲學問題的基本態度。扼要言之，王陽明認為「意」念發動處是惡之出現的樞紐；「意」的本然狀態原來是「心」與「理」應事接物的表現，其淪落為惡只能從其「偏」、「滯」、「著」等流弊狀態中了解。通過唐君毅先生的相關洞見，本文接著探討了「主流」陽明學者對「惡」的思考：浙中王龍溪與泰州羅近溪緊接師說，認為當下一「念」便是本心發用的端倪，唯其陷溺與留滯才會轉而為惡。當中尤需強調的是，心知能力與知識活動赫然竟是助成心念陷溺的幫兇！雖然江右羅念菴思想在當前學界的討論中往往被視為偏離「主流」的歧出，但筆者認為在過惡的議題上念菴與龍溪近溪的相關思考實能相輔相成。若說龍溪近溪更關心常人如何在「知識」的幫助下犯過，則念菴更關注的即是心知功能如何進一步助成了修道者「空言」之過。最後，筆者將會指出，劉蕺山在理論表述上將心知功能的誤用更為明確地為說明為「妄」的毛病，並以之為惡之所以出現的最根本起源；這是儒學惡論的一大推進，由此徹底廓清了儒學惡乃無根的傳統。筆者並會考察晚明儒者對過惡問題的種種思考，如何結穴在儒學論惡的高峰文獻《人譜》之中。通過本文種種的討論，希望能夠豐富學界對儒學傳統中「惡」的理論的了解。, Human nature is evil? Where does evil come from? How to get rid of evil? From Song Ming Neo-Confucianism to Contemporary New Confucianism, the main line of Confucian thought follows Mencius in stressing the goodness of human nature. According to Mencius, human nature has an innate faculty and tendency towards goodness, and that immorality could only be attributed to society’s influence. Accordingly, some scholars criticize Confucianism for being too optimistic and naive about human nature. That is especially a difficult question for the Wang Yangming’s scholars, who assert that not only xing性, but all yi意, zhi知, wu物, qing情, nian念 within the inner structure of xin心 are originally good and without evil. If this is the case, how come there is evil in reality? The aims of this paper are to elucidate the ideas of evil in late Ming school of Wang Yangming’s philosophy, and to articulate a systematic theory of evil in Confucianism. In brief, in Yangming’s view, evil arises from the part of yi意. The original activation of yi意 is nothing but the manifestation of xin心 and li理, it is the deviation, stagnation and attachment of yi意 that leads it to immorality. Wang Longxi and Luo Jinxi, the followers of Yangming, carry on Yangming’s view and hold that it is the stagnation and attachment of nian念 that make it an evil one. What is more interesting is that the cognitive part of xin心 would assist in the formation of evil. Furthermore, Luo Nianan’s ideas on evil are complementary to Longxi and Jinxi’ related theories. Nianan focuses on empty words as the result of the misused cognitive part of xin心, and regards it as a major wrongdoing of Confucian practitioners. Finally, Liu Jishan describes the misuse of the cognitive part of xin心as the problem of wang, and regards it as the deepest origin of evil. By doing so, Jishan clarifies the Confucian tradition that evil is rootless to its greatest extent. How Jishan’s masterpiece the schemata of humanity concludes different discussion of e, Detailed summary in vernacular field only., 陳志強., Parallel title from added title page., Thesis (Ph.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 212-219)., s also in Chinese., Chen Zhiqiang., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6116419, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

本文研究的主題是後期印度佛教哲學中關於外部對象是否實在的爭論。主要依據妙護（Śubhagupta）的《成立外部對象論》（Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā)和寂護（Śāntarakita）及其弟子蓮華戒（Kamalaśīla）《攝真實論疏》第23品〈考察外部對象〉兩本文獻。, 原子論和直接知覺論是妙護素樸實在論的兩大基石。原子是外部對象存在的實體要素，而直接知覺論則為如何認識外部對象提供知識論上的依據。原子是構成外部對象的不可見、不可再分的最小實體，當眾多同種類原子聚集在一起時，它們由於實體性的能力而凝聚成為可認知的「粗大」對象。另一方面，認識的本性是「識別」，就是主體（識）直接認知外部對象。認識本身並不具有對象的形象，只是當認識發生時，它就獲得了與外部對象一致的形象。妙護的知覺論蘊含了外部對象與認識之間確定的因果關係。他以為，對象（原因）與識（結果）必須是兩個不同的東西，結果不能以自身為原因而產生。所以，認識活動一定是以自己之外的其他對象作為原因，後者既是令識生起的條件，同時也給予了識自己的形象。妙護認為「效果作用的一致性」是判斷真知覺與幻覺的標準。所謂「一致性」是指認識通過形象獲得外部對象以及認識對象具有與外部對象一致的特定功能。, 寂護從觀念論和懷疑論的角度批判妙護的理論並不能證成外部對象的存在。他說，妙護也同意感官體驗直接知覺到的不是原子，而是「粗大」的對象；但他又不能從理論上自洽地解釋單個、無部分的原子是如何過渡到成爲有部分（即空間性）的知覺對象。其次，妙護的直接知覺論也無法證明外部對象與認識之間具有必然的因果聯係。因爲，假如認識的形象原來就不存在，那麽外部對象其實是與認識完全分離的東西，形象既不是令識生起的實體，也不能夠對認識產生實際的作用。換句話說，對象與認識之間不曾發生實質性的關聯。寂護以為認識的本質就是自我意識，如同光的明照性一般，它不是主體（識）去認知對象的二元模式，也不依賴任何外部對象而存在；認識活動中效果作用的一致性則可以通過認識的自我相續來解釋。, In the present thesis, I discuss a debate on the reality of external objects in late Indian Buddhist philosophy. I focus on two texts, one is "The Establishment of External Objects (Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā)" written by Śubhagupta, the other is a chapter named as "The Examination of The External Objects (Bahirarthaparīkā)" in "Commentary on The Summary of Truth (Tattvasagrahapañjikā)" written by Śāntarakita and his disciple Kamalaśīla., Śubhagupta’s point of view can be regarded as the naive realism. He thinks that external objects are constituted by the aggregation of atoms which are the ontological substances. An individual atom is invisible and without parts. Thus, atoms cannot become the cognitive objects until they are aggregated together as a gross because of the power of substance. The gross arouses the form of blue etc. in cognition which is formless in nature. Although the form of blue is not real, it is based on the real substance and consistent with external objects. The characteristic of cognition is to grasp external objects directly. According to Śubhagupta, cognition cannot be produced by itself; it must be aroused by other things, just like sprouts cannot be produced by themselves but by the seeds in reality. External object served as a cause should be satisfied with two conditions: it is a real substance which has real capacity and a real perceivable object. Based on this theory, Śubhagupta believes that the existence of the external objects is a standard to distinguish the perception from the hallucination such as a dream, because the object of perception must be consistent with the external object. The consistency means that external object is acquired by the cognition and the cognitive object has the definite function according to a real object., On the stand point of idealism and skepticism, Śāntarakita argues that the gross of atoms should not have shape as well, because the atoms are without parts in nature. Moreover, if the cognitive forms only come from external objects which are material substances, then cognition cannot recognize anything; because the matter and the cognition are totally different entities and cognition itself is formless in nature. Śāntarakita argues that if a form in cognition is not real at all, it will neither be a substance to arouse the cognition nor have the power to make effects on cognition. That is to say, the external objects cannot be the causes of cognition, because there is not causal relationship between them. Thus, the cognitive objects should not coincide with external objects which have not been established yet. The consistency of definite function of objects will be explained by the continuity of our own consciousness. Śāntarakita believes that the cognition in nature is self-cognizing, just like a light illuminates itself. The cognitive form and the cognition are definitely perceived together as one entity. They are not separated from each other. Thus, the cognition itself does not rely on any causality such as the relationship between the grasping and grasped aspects., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., 茅宇凡., Parallel title from added title page., Thesis (Ph.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 143-157)., s in English and Chinese., Mao Yufan., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6116508, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

本研究旨在以模態語義論之角度分析隱喻的語言特性，並探討其在語言演化中的作用。作者認為，隱喻言語的發生通常預含有命名行為，即以現有之舊詞指命新的事物範疇，且這類以喻名事乃是自然類詞彙的基本命名方式。為探討自然類詞彙的語義特性，本研究首先藉回顧Kripke 及Putnam 有關經典論述，論述自然類詞彙的外延在其命名之初具有不可確定性，因而其本身就便於以譬喻的方式改變外延。其次作者批評兩家以語用角度研究隱喻的經典理論即Grice 即Davidson，指出其理論未能解決隱喻命題的真值問題。關於認知角度方面的理論，本研究亦批評Black 及Lakoff 等人的成果。作者論述，這類理論誇大隱喻的超語言功能，混淆了語義與一般認知的界限。最後，作者以模態語義理論中的二維語義框架界定隱喻的語義特性。, This study approaches metaphor from the perspective of modal semantics, and aims at defending, clarifying, and constraining an intuitive idea of this linguistic phenomenon based on its instrumental function in language evolution. The central claim is that a metaphorical utterance characteristically presumes a naming ceremony under a conventional word for a new category. To understand the potential of metaphorical re-dubbing of conventional terms, I will firstly appeal to Kripke’s classic modal argument, and examine the semantic plasticity of natural kind terms, which are typically used as vehicles for metaphorical expressions. The work will proceed to defend the naming function of metaphor by criticizing the classic stance against semantic understanding of metaphor, namely the Pragmatist approach. Restricting the possibility of semantic discussion only to conventionalized vocabulary, the Pragmatists treat the extra message in metaphor either as a sort of conversational implicature (Grice) or speaker meaning (Searle), which is still expressible in conventional vocabulary, or as some kind of extra-linguistic force (Davidson). I will argue that the treatment of Grice and Searle fails to appreciate the categorical incompatibility lying behind metaphors, and thus fails to see that the meaning of metaphorical expressions is irreducible to conventional vocabulary. Moreover, all of the Pragmatists fail also to account for an apparent semantic behavior of metaphors, namely, their possible truth assumed by participants in conversations. I will then try to constrain the proper semantic understanding of metaphor by distinguishing it from the Cognitivist view represented by Black and Lakoff, which identifies the meaning of metaphors with the content resulted from various sorts of analogical cognition. I will argue that, theoretically speaking, analogical cognition is neither necessary nor sufficient in order for a metaphorical expression to be uttered. The final portion of this, Detailed summary in vernacular field only., Deng, Yangzhou., Thesis (Ph.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-98)., s also in Chinese., Deng, Yangzhou., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6115913, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

漢字的「觀」指的不僅是一種身體的知覺能力，其為視覺活動背後包涵了豐富的心靈活動，讓事物呈現更深邃的面向。「觀物」在北宋以前一直潛伏於儒家的語脈當中，尚未成為一個突出的概念，直到邵康節始點化出來作顯題處理， 直指一種窮理體道的活動。與邵康節並世的周濂溪、張橫渠和二程兄弟都分別有觀窗前草、觀驢鳴、觀雞雛、觀魚游等的雅事為人所樂道。觀物不僅是理學家的休閒活動，更和他們的道德修養息息相關，悠然帶著成德工夫的意味。有見及此，一、我們可以探討北宋理學中的觀物在什麼意義下是一種修道的工夫；二、以觀物工夫切入北宋五子，可以提供一個新的角度審視理學的發展 。, The Chinese character Gun (Cantonese) or Guan (Mandarin) entails not only our physical sensibility, the visual activity itself also unfolds a rich exercising of the mind, revealing a dimension lying in the depth of objects. Before Northern Song, the concept of Guan Wu (Deep Viewing of Things) has been latent in the Confucius linguistic context. It has not been a significant concept until highlighted by Master Shao Yong, who argued that this is an activity of articulating and embodying the truth. Other four contemporaries of Master Shao Yong, namely Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi, were acclaimed for the engagements in the deep viewing of different entities: the deep viewing of the grass before window, the deep viewing of a donkey braying, the deep viewing of the chicks and the deep viewing of the swimming fish. Guan Wu is not only a pastime to the Neo-Confucianists, it is also closely related to their own self-cultivation with a hint of manifesting Dao aplomb. In view of this, this thesis aims to, firstly, examine to what understanding is Guan Wu (Deep Viewing of Things) a way of self-cultivation in Northern Song Neo-Confucianism. Secondly, it shall argue that understanding the five masters of Northern Song through the self-cultivation of Guan Wu can provide a new perspective in examining the development of Neo-Confucianism., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., 鄧康宏., Thesis (M.Phil.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 162-163)., s in Chinese and English., Deng Kanghong., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6116479, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

本文處理的問題是「先秦儒家哲學中的情感」，具體的內容涉及「情感與詩、歌、禮、樂」、「情感與家庭」、「情感與生死」和「情感與道德」四個主題。其中，重要的主題是「情感與生死」，最核心的主題是「情感與道德」。在對先秦儒家經典中的情感語詞及其所關聯的情感現象進行細緻分析的基礎上，筆者重點考察相關的情感現象如何關聯於先秦儒家對「情感」與「道」、「德」的理解和經驗，進而深入考察其中可能的關聯是什麼。基於研究所得的結論，筆者提出：「先秦儒家重『情』，認為『哀、樂』或『喜、怒、哀、悲』是人生而具有的基本情感，是人性本有的內涵，其終極來源是天」這一基本看法。就具體的情感現象來看，孔子在面對「顏回之死」這一事件發生的當時，其直接的情感反應是「哭之慟」。筆者的問題是：「顏回死時，孔子已知天命，既已知天命，為何還會因『顏回之死』而『哭之慟』？」基於圍繞此問題展開的分析和研究筆者發現：孔子是以「情感」的方式理解和經驗「我與天」、「我與道」、「我與己」、「己與人」這兩個維度、四個面向的關係和「他人之死」的情感現象，他對天實有的情感是「敬畏」、「畏懼」，對縱向維度的未聞之道實有的情感是「期盼」。, 筆者認為，自孔子開始的以「情感」的方式理解、經驗「生命」、「生死」、「道」與「德」影響其後學、孟子、荀子和《禮記》的作者，筆者在各主題中結合文本分析孔子為何會有這樣的理解和經驗，及其如何影響後世的思想家。筆者提出，應當結合以《詩經》為代表的文學傳統和以《論語》為代表的哲學傳統來考察先秦儒家對情感的理解和經驗；孔子的「哭之慟」之情感現象反映出孔子的心靈在當時真實感受到的悲傷之情。在本文各章研究所得結論的基礎上，筆者發現：先秦儒家承認「情感與人」、「情感與生死」之間存在著固有的關聯。簡單總結：在先秦儒家的理解和信念中，「人是有情的活物。」孔子生命中所有的對「天命」的畏懼及其對能「聞道」的期盼之情正是人之「有情」的真實體現。, This thesis focuses on the question of "Emotions in Pre-Qin Confucian Philosophy", which mainly relates to four topics including "Emotion and Poem, Song, Rites, Music", "Emotion and Family", "Emotion and Life, Death", "Emotion and Dao, De". The important topic is "Emotion and Life, Death", the most core topic is "Emotion and Dao, De". I will discuss them based on this internal relationship among the four topics. Have made in-depth research into classical texts in Pre-Qin Confucian Philosophy, my point in this essay is that "The Pre-Qin Confucians were highly valued the role of Emotions, they took ‘grief and joy’ or ‘happiness, anger, sadness, grief’ as basic type of Emotions, which originate from Heaven, as well as is inborn content of human nature." When Confucian faced "the death of Yan Hui", his direct emotional reaction was "bitterly cried out". This emotional phenomenon poses a question to me: If Confucian have already known what "Heaven" wanted him to do, why he still cried so bitterly for "the death of Yan Hui"? I find that Confucian understood and experienced "Heaven and I", "Dao and I", "Myself and I", "You and I" which exhibited two dimensions and four aspects formations, as well as the phenomenon of "the Death of the Other" in emotional way. Confucian’s true feeling toward "Heaven" is "awe" or "fear", and his actual feeling to "the Unknown Dao" is "Hope"., My view is that Confucian opened a tradition focuses on understanding and experiencing "Life", "Life and Death" , "Dao" and "De" by the way of emotions connected to emotional phenomena which influenced his disciples, Mencius, Hsun Tzu, etc. It is needed to study "emotional phenomena" in the literature tradition which The Book of Songs started and philosophy tradition which originated from Analects. In the end, I come to the conclusion how Confucian’s viewed "Emotion and Life and Death": "People are inborn with Emotions." And Confucian’s emotional feeling toward "Tian Ming" was fear, his life had a specific hope to hear from "Dao"., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., 劉妮., Thesis submitted: October 2013., Thesis (Ph.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 254-263)., s also in English., Liu Ni., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6115842, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

西方哲學中的知識論就著知識的本質、知識之範圍、知識成立的條件等等問題有著深入而又精微的討論，然而反觀中國古代的先秦儒者，他們所關懷往往是內聖外王之事，且拙於運用抽象的概念進行思考，因此他們從不曾顯題化地對知識之構造、本質等等進行嚴謹而有系統的思考。然而，人一旦廁身於世，就無可避免地面對認識的問題，而無論是甚麼人，都有運用自己的感官和理性思維去認識、理解世界的經驗，因此假使我們仔細閱讀先秦儒者對於「知」的零碎文本，未嘗不可建立一套先秦儒者的「知」「識」論。, 因此，本文將以孔子、孟子、荀子的文本為主要探討對象，分析他們所言之「知」「識」的各種意涵，具體的論述將主要分為四章：第一章「耳目之知」，闡述先秦儒者對於運用各種身體感官以認識外物的討論；第二章則為「知慮之知」，以理性思維能力為探討核心；第三章則為「知義之知」，探討在孟荀理解中，道德是如何被認識；而最後一章是「知天之知」，研究「天」、「命」這兩個觀念在孟荀文本中，是如何被理解和掌握的。本研究希望通過重新梳理「知」之不同層次之意涵，重構先秦儒者對於知識的討論，雖然當中或沒有令人耳目一新之創見，但望能為日後進一步討論作基石。, Western epistemology has flourish, thorough discussion on the nature, scope, necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. For Pre-Qin Confucians, as what they concerned about were how to be a sage and true king and they were weak in conceptual thinking, thus they did not have any thematic and systematic discussion on the issue of the nature and structure of knowledge. However, everyone encounters the problem of how to get to know the outside world when they are living. Besides this, everyone has the experience of using their sense organs and rationality to perceive and understand the world. As a result, although Pre-Qin Confucians has only some piecemeal texts on knowing, we can still re-construct their views on knowing through detailed, deep analysis of their words., As a result, this research will focus on Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi, analyzing different meanings of "Zhi" "Shi" (knowledge) in their texts. It will divide into four main parts, chapter one will concentrate on the discussion of sensible knowing, while chapter two will reveal the kind of knowing by rational deliberation and inference. As for chapter three, it will study how morality is being acquired in Mencius and Xunzi’s thought. Then the last chapter will examine some transcendental objects, such as "tian" and "ming", are how to be perceived. After all, despite this research might not contain much insightful, new opinions, its clarification and division on the meaning of "Zhi" might serve as a helpful ground for further discussion on the thought of knowing in Chinese Philosophy., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., 葉德莉., Thesis (M.Phil.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 143-146)., s in Chinese and English., Ye Deli., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6116481, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

後果論（Consequentialism）和義務論（Deontology）是規範倫理學裏兩個基本理論。兩個理論之間的差異，經常成為討論基本倫理問題的框架。一方面，義務論認為後果論道德上容許任何能達到最好結果的行為，這是過於寬鬆。另一方面，後果論認為義務論是自相矛盾的；因為它既禁止某些行為，視之為不道德，但又不容許人們以違反義務為手段，整體減少這類行為發生的次數。, 這篇論文的旨趣是研究用後果論的理論框架，來表達義務論的可能性。這將提供一個新的視角，以了解後果論和義務論的基本理論差異。, 全文共分四個部分。第一章，我會檢視兩個理論的一些基本特徵。第二章，我第一次嘗試用後果論的理論框架來表達義務論。方法是給違反義務的行為分配一個負面道德價值。然而，這方法不能成功把義務論表達為一種後果論。因為它引申了一些義務論不接受的道德判斷。第三章，我會檢視義務論和道德價值之間的關係；並順著 Louise (2004) 提出的理論，論證後果論的理論框架可以用來表達義務論。方法是把遵從義務的行為視為把時間和行動者相對 (time-relative and agent-relative) 的道德價值最大化。第四章，我將嘗試回應對這理論可能提出的反駁。, Discussions in basic ethical problems are often framed by the essential differences between consequentialism and deontology - two fundamental theories in normative ethics. Most arguments in those ethical problems are basically reiteration of how the two theories differs from each other: Deontology holds that consequentialism is too lax as it allows all actions that leads to the best outcome, while consequentialism holds that deontology is essentially paradoxical because it forbids agents to act against a constraint even when doing so can avoid more violations., My interest in this thesis is to examine a possible alternative in characterizing the differences between consequentialism and deontology, namely the doctrine of "consequentializing deontology". This doctrine holds that all deontological theories can be given a representation in consequentialist form., This thesis consists of four parts. In Chapter 1, I will first examine three essential features of consequentialism, namely it is structurally axiological, teleological and maximizing. Then I will examine various formulations of deontological constraints and argue that they are best formulated as agent-relative reasons for action. In Chapter 2, I will explicate the first attempt to consequentialize deontological constraints by assigning a negative weighing to any violation. I will show that this attempt is not satisfactory because it entails a number of implausible claims. In Chapter 3, I proceed to examine various accounts that explain the normative power of deontological constraints in terms of values. Following Louise (2004), I argue that deontology can be consequentialized by giving a consequentialist representation to deontology, so that when an agent acts upon a deontological constraint, he is maximizing values that are both agent-relative and temporal-relative in nature. In Chapter 4, I will examine possible challenges to consequentializing deontology and respond to them., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., Chan, Pui Yee June., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013., Includes bibliographical references., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s also in Chinese., Chapter Chapter 1. --- Delineating Consequentialism and Deontology --- p.1, Chapter 1.1 --- Consequentializing Deontology: A Possible Alternative to Characterizing the Differences between Consequentialism and Deontology --- p.1, Chapter 1.2 --- Thesis Overview --- p.4, Chapter 1.3 --- What Makes a Theory in Normative Ethics Consequentialist? --- p.11, Chapter 1.3.1 --- Conception of Outcome: Future-Oriented is Not a Necessary Principle for Consequentialism --- p.13, Chapter 1.3.2 --- Maximizing is a Necessary Principle for Consequentialism --- p.17, Chapter 1.3.3 --- Consequentialism Essentials Summarized --- p.25, Chapter 1.4 --- Deontological Constraints --- p.25, Chapter 1.4.1 --- Absolute and Threshold Deontological Constraints --- p.26, Chapter 1.4.2 --- Agent-Relative & Agent-Neutral Reasons for Action: Two Approaches --- p.27, Chapter 1.4.3 --- Deontological Constraints & Reasons for Action --- p.31, Chapter Chapter 2. --- Attempt of Consequentializing Deontology without Agent-Relativity --- p.36, Chapter 2.1 --- The Consequentialism/Deontology Distinction & the Agent-relative/Agent-neutral Distinction --- p.36, Chapter 2.2 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Threshold Constraints --- p.39, Chapter 2.3 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Absolute Constraints --- p.42, Chapter 2.4 --- Limits and Problems with Consequentializing Deontology --- p.44, Chapter 2.4.1 --- Perfect calculus leads to implausible implications --- p.44, Chapter 2.4.2 --- Agent-relativity in Deontological Constraints --- p.46, Chapter 2.5 --- Responding to Challenges --- p.48, Chapter 2.5.1 --- Perfect calculus leads to implausible implications --- p.48, Chapter 2.5.2 --- Agent-relativity in Deontological Constraints --- p.50, Chapter 2.6 --- Summary: Consequentializing Deontology Fails --- p.52, Chapter Chapter 3. --- Deontology and Agent-Relative Values --- p.54, Chapter 3.1 --- Consequentializing Deontology and Agent-Relativity in Values --- p.54, Chapter 3.1.1 --- The Deontology/Consequentialism Distinction and The Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction in Values --- p.55, Chapter 3.1.2 --- Consequentializing Deontology with Agent-Relative & Temporal-Relative Values --- p.58, Chapter 3.2 --- Nagel: Agent-Relative Reasons and Agent-Relative Values --- p.59, Chapter 3.2.1 --- Reasons of Autonomy --- p.61, Chapter 3.2.2 --- Reasons of Deontology --- p.63, Chapter 3.3 --- Korsgaard: Deontology and Inter-subjectivity --- p.70, Chapter 3.4 --- Pettit: The Honoring/Promoting Distinction as the Deontology/Consequentialism Distinction --- p.78, Chapter 3.4.1 --- Values that cannot be honored --- p.80, Chapter 3.4.2 --- It is not always clear what counts as "honoring" a value --- p.82, Chapter 3.4.3 --- Honoring is promoting agent-relative value --- p.83, Chapter Chapter 4. --- Consequentializing Deontology - Its Limits and Implications --- p.88, Chapter 4.1 --- Thesis Project Recap --- p.88, Chapter 4.2 --- Consequentializing deontology and agent-relativity --- p.94, Chapter 4.3 --- Extended application of consequentializing to other ethical theories --- p.99, Chapter 4.4 --- Fragmentation of values and consequentializing --- p.101, Chapter 4.5 --- Conclusion: How successful consequentializing contributes to moral discussions --- p.104, Bibliography --- p.107, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5549273, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

本論文旨在闡釋費希特之超驗哲學的知識論面向。處理這問題的過程除了闡釋部份外還會涉及兩個觀點。第一個觀點是透過歷史的角度來揭露費氏的早期知識學(Wissenschaftslehre)所處置的理論哲學脈絡，而第二個觀點則是從一個當代角度去考察費氏的早期知識學作為一知識論策略的本質並檢討當代對其哲學以基礎論(foundationalism)及反基礎論(anti-foundationalism)作評斷的考察方式。對費氏理論集中闡釋的部份則成為樞紐把兩觀點貫穿起來。第一個觀點的作用在於透過把費氏的理論放置於其獨特的、特殊的背景下理解來防止時代錯置的判斷(anachronism)，而這樣也為我們提供理解費氏哲學的恰當途徑。這對闡釋費氏的理論有關鍵的理解作用而不只具有歷史意義。而第二個觀點雖然較易傾向時代錯置，但可以透過當代的資源和方法來為問題作翻新的處理。這做法有助突顯闡釋中隱藏的、未被充份處理的問題，而透過處理這些問題可側面地補充闡釋。因此本論文主要有三大部份。第一部份著重解釋在甚麼意義下費氏知識學趨生於三個哲學家雅各比（而從他關聯到斯賓洛沙）、康德 和 萊茵霍爾德(K. L. Reinhold)的理論脈絡並試圖作出回應。明白這點則不難理解第二部份之主張費氏所提出的三個基本原則其用意其實是要把人類知識基礎建於人類自發性之上。第三部份（即上述所指的對當代觀點的處理）則會指出把費氏理論詮釋成反基礎論是不準確和誤導的，他的理論反而指向一抗拒這種二分法的統一性。, This thesis aims at explicating the epistemological aspects of Fichte's transcendental philosophy from a historical perspective that exposes the theoretical philosophical context in which Fichte's early philosophical project Wissenschaftslehre is embedded, as well as from a contemporary perspective that examines the nature of Fichte’s epistemological strategy and reviews the examination of it in foundationalist and anti-foundationalist terms. The first perspective prevents anachronism by situating the theory within the unique particular background, which also gives us a proper access to the philosophy of Fichte. The latter perspective, though could be prone to anachronism, gives the problematic a refreshment by bringing in contemporary resources and devices to review the theory. An explication of Fichte's three fundamental principles and an analysis of the third as the culmination of foundation make up the hinge that connects both perspectives. The first perspective is an essential prologue to the explication, its significance lies not in merely giving out information of the historical development, but in making the theory itself intelligible; the second perspective considers an issue that is hidden in the explication but not yet sufficiently addressed, and in addressing this perspective I provide a review of the review, through which the explication can be supplemented., Hence it should be obvious that the thesis consists of three parts and how they are connected. The first part sets up the historical background through which the epistemological relevance of Fichte is to be appreciated. Three philosophers are given extra weight for this purpose Jacobi (and through him Spinoza as well), Kant, and Reinhold. It is in the face of a particular set of issues resulting from their interaction that Fichte's theory of knowledge emerges to resolve. With this in mind, we will find that Fichte's proposal of the fundamental principles is a strategy to ground the foundation of knowledge on human spontaneity, as spontaneity is found to be the necessary condition for the third principle and the third principle the necessary condition for the coordination of the first two principles which Fichte takes as hardly disputable. Based on this understanding, we shall see that Rockmore’s suggestion to understand Fichte's theory of knowledge as a kind of anti-foundationalism is inaccurate and misleading, instead it rather points to a theoretical tendency that resists such dichotomy., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., Tse, Chiu Yui Plato., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 108-112)., s also in Chinese., Acknowledgement --- p.1, Introduction --- p.2, Chapter One: --- p.6, The Relevance of the Absolute to the Foundation of Knowledge, The Epistemological Relevance of the Absolute --- p.7, Jacobi’s Spinozakritik: The Skeptic Consequence of “Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit“ --- p.12, Jacobi’s Kantkritik --- p.16, Reinhold’s Principle of Consciousness and Beyond --- p.29, Chapter Two: --- p.35, Part I, The Three Fundamental Principles: With an Explanation of a Common Phenomenon of Consciousness, The I-Talk --- p.38, The First Principle --- p.42, The Second Principle --- p.44, The Third Principle --- p.46, The Absolute I and the Forgotten --- p.49, Part II, An Analysis through a Dialectics of Contradictions --- p.52, Step A --- p.53, Step B --- p.55, Step C --- p.58, Step D --- p.60, Step E --- p.65, Chapter Three: --- p.74, The Conflict between Foundationalist and Anti-foundationalist Interpretation, The Problem --- p.75, Tom Rockmore’s Anti-foundationalist Interpretation --- p.79, Problem of Daniel Breazeale’s Response --- p.87, Klaus Hammacher a Leap towards Certainty --- p.92, Conclusion --- p.101, Bibliography --- p.108, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5549302, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Zhu, Xinqu., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013., Includes bibliographical references., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s also in Chinese., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5884277, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Yuan Ai., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 45-48)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., in Chinese and English., Yuan Ai., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5884247, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

本文考察佛教瑜伽中觀派系統內之刹那滅。此考察主要以寂護（Śāntarakita）之《攝真實》(Tattvasagraha)第八章「恆常的存在物之考察」（sthirabhāva-parikā）為文本根據，並以花戒（Kamalaśīla）之《疏》(Tattvasagraha-pañjikā)為輔助。刹那滅主張存在物只在一刹那中存在，能持續存在至下刹那。實在者（realist）如正派（Nyāya）、勝派（Vaiśeika）等以共相、本體等恆常的存在物，視為其他事物存在背後的基礎。他們認為本體能持續存在至下刹那，能關係於下刹那的存在物，把其產生或滅。按此，存在物必須透過被原因「產生」的形式生起，其滅也必須由其自身以外的原因造成，否則它能一直存在。如取實在者對存在物的解，刹那滅被推翻。筆者認為刹那滅之所以成有三點（1）被產生的存在物皆以「滅」為本性、（2）存在物是以即時產生結果的形式存在、（3）前刹那與後刹那的存在物以必然伴隨的（necessary concomitant）關係互相依待，後刹那的果並非由前刹那的因「生出」。本文旨在分析及探討上述的證。筆者以支持寂護的場闡釋，嘗試以回應反對者的批評，證存在者只有「被產生的」和「刹那的」存在物，所謂能持續存在的存在物，實際上並存在。筆者並進一步澄清，瑜伽中觀派系統內的刹那的存在物並非獨存在，其必然伴隨的關係也違反佛教的緣起觀。此以因果關係為概建構的主張，也能與中觀的世俗諦同時成。, The present study is an examination of the Buddhist Yogācāra-Madhyamaka argument for momentariness in the sthirabhāvaparīkā chapter of Śāntarakita’s Tattvasagraha with reference to Kamalaśīla’s Tattvasagraha-pañjikā. The theory of momentariness holds that produced things only exist within one moment; they do not exist before or after. Realists such as Nyāya and Vaiśeika, on the other hand, regard universal, substance, and permanent existents alike as the basis of the existence of things. Since these existents can persist in the next moment, things in the next moment are considered to be produced or destroyed by them through the means of relation. For this reason, the realists hold that things must exist through production. The destruction of these things must also be produced. As the cause of destruction exists apart from these things, the latter will persist if the former is not present. The theory of momentariness will be refuted if this realist conception of existence is accepted., The present study seeks to argue for the theory of momentariness with the following: (1) whatever is produced takes “destruction as its nature; (2) whatever exists produces its effect immediately in the same moment; (3) existents in the former moment and those in the latter moment are related to each other through a relation of necessary concomitance; they are not related through a causal relation in which the effect is produced out from the cause. The conclusion of the argument of this study is that whatever exists must be produced and momentary; the non-produced or the non-momentary things, which are considered to be persistent by the opponents, in fact have no existence. This study also points out that momentary existents under the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka system do not exist independently. Their necessary concomitant relation does not violate the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination. And as the theory of momentariness considers causal relation conceptually constructed, this theory is also compatible with Madhyamika’s conventional truth., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., 方麗欣., "2012年10月"., "2012 nian 10 yue"., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 94-99)., in Chinese and English., Fang Lixin., Chapter 第一章 --- 引言 --- p.7, Chapter 第一部份 --- 基本問題 --- p.7, Chapter 第二部份 --- 存在物與刹那 --- p.9, Chapter 第三部份 --- 本文重點 --- p.13, Chapter 第四部份 --- 研究方法 --- p.17, Chapter 第二章 --- 「被產生的」存在物以「滅」為本性 --- p.18, Chapter 第一部份 --- 正理派對「滅」的理解 --- p.19, Chapter 第二部份 --- 以「滅」為本性 --- p.21, Chapter 第三部份 --- 「被產生的」存在物之必然滅 --- p.23, Chapter 第四部份 --- 「他因」不能產生「被產生的」存在物之滅 --- p.25, Chapter 第一節 --- 滅為「非實非不實」, Chapter 第二節 --- 滅的時間性, Chapter 第三章 --- 「存在」即有「即時的因果效力」 --- p.39, Chapter 第一部份 --- 反對者之存在的標準及其理論困難 --- p.41, Chapter 第二部份 --- 以因果效力作為存在的標準 --- p.46, Chapter 第一節 --- 因果效力之雙重意義, Chapter 第二節 --- 因果效力與現量的關係, Chapter 第三部份 --- 「不是被產生的」存在物沒有因果效力 --- p.55, Chapter 第四章 --- 存在物間的關係 --- p.64, Chapter 第一部份 --- 刹那的存在物與「變化」 --- p.66, Chapter 第二部份 --- Yogasena的批評從中觀立場出發 --- p.70, Chapter 第一節 --- 《中論》對刹那滅學說的批評, Chapter 第二節 --- Yogasena的批評, Chapter 第三節 --- Yogasena之批評的影響, Chapter 第三部份 --- 回應 --- p.78, Chapter 第一節 --- Yogasena對《攝》中刹那滅理論的誤解, Chapter 第二節 --- 中觀並不否定存在物為刹那滅, Chapter 第五章 --- 結論 --- p.89, 略號及參考書目 --- p.94, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5549248, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

牟宗三的哲學系統建基於康德哲學，可謂眾所周知。不論批評抑或支持，論者均以牟宗三與康德表面上的親和關係而立論。本文嘗試擴闊相關課題的論域，論證牟宗三反覆申述的康德哲學，其實源於海德格的康德詮釋。他閱讀的康德，他建立的系統，均以「有限」與「超越」概念為焦點，這都是海德格影響下的結果。因此，本文的目標是雙重的：其一，重新評估牟宗三的哲學系統，我們應該重視他與海德格之間的對話，不應該只側重他與康德的關係；其二，顯示「有限」與「超越」概念如何有助我們重構中國哲學。, 本文共分五章。第一章檢討學界現況，說明牟宗三與海德格之間關係的研究素被忽略，本文將論證海德格在牟宗三的哲學中扮演了關鍵的角色。第二、三章探討兩者哲學歷程上的相似性，點出兩人如何從生命哲學轉到存在論的研究。接下來的兩章，本文重點剖析牟宗三與海德格的兩個基本概念，一個是「有限」，另一個是「超越」。本文會研究牟宗三如何繼承海德格的概念，又如何使用這些概念來闡述他的存在論。牟宗三強調「智的直覺」並非出於誤解，那是他回應海德格基礎存在論的策略。, It is well-known that Mou’s system of philosophy is constructed through a transformation of Kant’s philosophy. Both critics and followers of Mou make their stance based on the apparently intimate relation of his thought to Kant’s philosophy. My own inquiry will broaden this scope by trying to demonstrate how Mou’s much-discussed Kantianism is rooted in his close reading of Heidegger’s Kant interpretation. Under Heidegger’s influence, Mou’s own reading of Kant and his system of philosophy focus on the concepts of “finitude and “transcendence. Now the purpose of my thesis is twofold: first, the system of Mou’s philosophy should be reassessed through a dialogue with Heidegger, not merely with Kant; second, it will be shown how the reconstruction of the Chinese philosophy through concepts like “finitude and “transcendence is possible., This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter reviews the state of current scholarship on Mou’s relation to Heidegger. This issue is largely neglected. I will argue that it is Heidegger who plays a crucial role in Mou’s philosophical development. The second and the third chapters are concerned with the similarity of their approaches to philosophy, i.e. the transformation from a philosophy of life to ontology. The following two chapters focus on the two fundamental concepts of both Mou and Heidegger -- finitude and transcendence. I will investigate how Mou inherits Heideggerian concepts and uses them to articulate his own ontology. Taking this backdrop into consideration, the purpose of Mou’s emphasis on intellectual intuition comes to the foreground, which I understand not as the result of a misunderstanding of Kant’s, but as his strategy in response to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., 劉保禧., Thesis submitted in 2012., Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 265-272)., s in Chinese and English., Liu Baoxi., 摘要 --- p.i, 鳴謝 --- p.iii, 目錄 --- p.iv, 引用與縮寫 --- p.viii, Chapter 第一章 --- 導論：隱匿的對話 --- p.1, Chapter 1.1 --- 前言：海德格籠罩下的陰影 --- p.1, Chapter 1.2 --- 文本根據：牟宗三筆下的海德格 --- p.5, Chapter 1.2.1 --- 主題式的理解：牟宗三論西方哲人 --- p.6, Chapter 1.2.2 --- 理論勁敵：牟宗三論海德格 --- p.10, Chapter 1.2.2.1 --- 起點：上帝隱退與神聖之感 --- p.10, Chapter 1.2.2.2 --- 誤讀：海德格與主體性 --- p.12, Chapter 1.2.2.3 --- 轉折：海德格的康德詮釋 --- p.16, Chapter 1.3 --- 理論根據：有限與超越 --- p.23, Chapter 1.3.1 --- 柏拉圖的兩個世界 --- p.24, Chapter 1.3.2 --- 牟宗三：兩個世界的圓融無礙 --- p.25, Chapter 1.3.3 --- 海德格：時間、有限與超越 --- p.27, Chapter 1.3.4 --- 有限與無限之爭 --- p.31, Chapter 1.4 --- 本文定位 --- p.33, Chapter 1.4.1 --- 學界現況：牟宗三與漢語哲學 --- p.33, Chapter 1.4.1.1 --- 牟宗三與康德 --- p.36, Chapter 1.4.1.2 --- 牟宗三與黑格爾 --- p.37, Chapter 1.4.1.3 --- 牟宗三與海德格 --- p.40, Chapter 1.4.2 --- 隱匿的對話 --- p.44, Chapter 1.4.2.1 --- 「隱匿」 --- p.46, Chapter 1.4.2.2 --- 「對話」 --- p.48, Chapter 1.4.3 --- 研究範圍 --- p.50, Chapter 1.4.4 --- 論文佈局 --- p.53, Chapter 第二章 --- 生命：實況性與氣質 --- p.55, Chapter 2.1 --- 前言：同一的思想軌跡 --- p.55, Chapter 2.2 --- 海德格：生命、實況性與詮釋 --- p.56, Chapter 2.2.1 --- 實況性的詮釋 --- p.59, Chapter 2.2.1.1 --- 生命與實況性 --- p.60, Chapter 2.2.1.2 --- 詮釋 --- p.65, Chapter 2.2.2 --- 小結 --- p.72, Chapter 2.3 --- 牟宗三：生命的學問 --- p.74, Chapter 2.3.1 --- 建構理論的純學院式人物？ --- p.74, Chapter 2.3.2 --- 生命的學問 --- p.76, Chapter 2.3.2.1 --- 「生命」 --- p.77, Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- 「學問」 --- p.80, Chapter 2.3.3 --- 小結 --- p.84, Chapter 2.4 --- 生命哲學的交鋒 --- p.85, Chapter 2.4.1 --- 「英雄式的勇敢哲學」：牟宗三論海德格的生命哲學 --- p.85, Chapter 2.4.2 --- 海德格的可能辯護 --- p.89, Chapter 2.5 --- 結語：真正的分歧 --- p.94, Chapter 第三章 --- 存在論：一個世界抑或兩個世界？ --- p.97, Chapter 3.1 --- 康德的遺稿 --- p.97, Chapter 3.2 --- 牟宗三：兩層存有論 --- p.99, Chapter 3.2.1 --- 存在論的轉向 --- p.100, Chapter 3.2.2 --- 現象與物自身 --- p.105, Chapter 3.2.2.1 --- 「現象」所以可能的根據 --- p.108, Chapter 3.2.2.2 --- 「物自身」所以可能的根據 --- p.111, Chapter 3.2.2.3 --- 「現象與物自身」所以可能的根據 --- p.114, Chapter 3.2.3 --- 基本存有論 --- p.116, Chapter 3.3 --- 海德格：基礎存在論 --- p.122, Chapter 3.3.1 --- 「兩個觀點」的閱讀方式 --- p.122, Chapter 3.3.2 --- 存在論的差異 --- p.126, Chapter 3.3.3 --- 哥白尼式革命 --- p.128, Chapter 3.3.4 --- 範疇論與存活論 --- p.131, Chapter 3.3.5 --- 存在論的「基礎」 --- p.136, Chapter 3.4 --- 結語：無本之論 --- p.138, Chapter 第四章 --- 有限：智的直覺與想像力 --- p.139, Chapter 4.1 --- 前言：有限抑或無限？--牟宗三與海德格的正面衝突 --- p.139, Chapter 4.2 --- 「有限性」的哲學意涵 --- p.141, Chapter 4.2.1 --- 康德：人是甚麼？ --- p.142, Chapter 4.2.2 --- 海德格：人的有限性 --- p.143, Chapter 4.2.3 --- 牟宗三：人雖有限而可無限 --- p.144, Chapter 4.3 --- 「有限」的界線 --- p.145, Chapter 4.3.1 --- 康德 --- p.145, Chapter 4.3.2 --- 海德格 --- p.149, Chapter 4.4 --- 越界：牟宗三論「智的直覺」 --- p.152, Chapter 4.4.1 --- 「智的直覺」為何可能？ --- p.154, Chapter 4.4.2 --- 「無限」為何可能？ --- p.160, Chapter 4.4.2.1 --- 「命」之限制 --- p.163, Chapter 4.4.2.2 --- 無限的歷程？. --- p.168, Chapter 4.5 --- 化無限為有限：海德格論「想像力」 --- p.173, Chapter 4.5.1 --- 質疑：想像力不是「共根」 --- p.174, Chapter 4.5.2 --- 回應：想像力、圖式論與共根 --- p.175, Chapter 4.5.2.1 --- 想像力 --- p.177, Chapter 4.5.2.2 --- 圖式論 --- p.179, Chapter 4.5.2.3 --- 共根？ --- p.185, Chapter 4.6 --- 處境與可能性：海德格對牟宗三的可能批判 --- p.190, Chapter 4.6.1 --- 處境 --- p.191, Chapter 4.6.2 --- 可能性 --- p.194, Chapter 4.7 --- 結語：哲學家之間的思想對話 --- p.197, Chapter 第五章 --- 超越：天道與界域 --- p.199, Chapter 5.1 --- 前言：關於「超越」的爭議 --- p.199, Chapter 5.2 --- 牟宗三：超越而內在 --- p.200, Chapter 5.2.1 --- 上帝隱退與神聖之感 --- p.201, Chapter 5.2.2 --- 作為宗教的儒學 --- p.202, Chapter 5.2.3 --- 爭議：「無本之論」--牟宗三論海德格的超越 --- p.205, Chapter 5.2.3.1 --- 超越論的對象 = x --- p.207, Chapter 5.2.3.2 --- 真正的「超越」 --- p.211, Chapter 5.2.4 --- 正名：transcendent 與transcendental --- p.212, Chapter 5.2.4.1 --- 康德 --- p.213, Chapter 5.2.4.2 --- 牟宗三 --- p.214, Chapter 5.2.5 --- 質疑：「超越而內在」是否可能？ --- p.216, Chapter 5.3 --- 海德格：此在的超越 --- p.224, Chapter 5.3.1 --- 為形而上學奠基 --- p.225, Chapter 5.3.2 --- 此在、世界與超越 --- p.228, Chapter 5.3.2.1 --- 此在 --- p.230, Chapter 5.3.2.2 --- 世界 --- p.232, Chapter 5.3.2.3 --- 超越 --- p.234, Chapter 5.3.2.4 --- 小結 --- p.235, Chapter 5.3.3 --- 根據的本質 --- p.237, Chapter 5.3.3.1 --- 界域 --- p.237, Chapter 5.3.3.2 --- 無 --- p.239, Chapter 5.3.3.3 --- 根據 --- p.240, Chapter 5.3.3.4 --- 小結 --- p.243, Chapter 5.4 --- 道德與歷史：兩條取代宗教的道路 --- p.244, Chapter 5.4.1 --- 牟宗三：以道德代宗教 --- p.244, Chapter 5.4.2 --- 海德格：以歷史代宗教 --- p.246, Chapter 5.5 --- 結語：同一與差異 --- p.248, Chapter 第六章 --- 結論：有限者的超越 --- p.251, Chapter 附錄一： --- 詞彙表 --- p.257, Chapter 附錄二： --- 外文著作學者姓名對照表 --- p.263, 參考書目 --- p.265, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5549709, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Law, Ki Fung., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013., Includes bibliographical references., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s also in Chinese., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5884426, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Law, Ki Fung., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013., Includes bibliographical references., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s also in Chinese., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5884426, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

本研究有兩個面向。首先，梳理胡塞爾1893-1917 時期的時間觀，把握其對兩個疑難的思考，分別是時間客體如何被感知和內時間意識流如何被建構。其次，藉胡塞爾的內時間意識現象學示範兩種現象學還原的動機──實事的豐富性和認識的嚴謹性──之張力，從而揭示出「諸原則的原則」與第一身觀點的有效界域，此有效界域逼使胡塞爾在1917 後提出「靜態現象學」和「生成現象學」兩種研究方向。這兩種研究方向意味著胡塞爾在1983-1917 的時間意識分析只是他思考時間問題的中途站。然而，這卻是西方哲學史上對時間思考的承先啟後的里程碑。胡塞爾的內時間意識現象學有三個貢獻：(1). 現象學還原方法的準備。(2). 從認識論上追問時間的本原。(3). 對內時間意識流的仔細分析消解了一些哲學疑難。然而，胡塞爾這一研究遺留了兩個疑難：(1). 胡塞爾的內在時間分析難以說明「壓抑」(repression)這一心靈現象。(2). 在追問意識流如何被建構時，所得出的「匿名」主體性之答案，應該如何被理解？不過，這正正顯示著，胡塞爾忠於還原方法及事實的描述，不止息地回應疑難的態度促使現象學成為一門「無窮」的運動。, This research has a double objective. Firstly, it relocates Husserl’s internal time analysis from 1893 to 1917 in order to understand his two fundamental inquiries, namely how temporal object appears towards consciousness and how consciousness of internal time is constituted. Secondly, it pinpoints the challenge of striking a balance between two motivations of transcendental reduction, that is, attending to the richness of things and securing the evidence of understanding. The study of different ways to transcendental reduction shows the limitation of “Principle of all Principles and the first person perspective. Through the analysis of consciousness of internal time, Husserl came to the awareness that the perspective of static phenomenology he was hitherto pursuing needs to be complemented by the perspective of “genetic phenomenology after 1917. These two perspectives prove that Husserl’s restless analysis of internal time consciousness is a stepping stone which is not only the middle stage throughout his entire philosophical career in his thought, but also a landmark in the history of western philosophy. Husserl’s phenomenology of internal time consciousness has important contribution in the following three issues: (1). The introduction of phenomenological reduction. (2). The question of time origin from a strictly epistemological perspective. (3). Solve some philosophical difficulties in his detailed analysis of the stream of consciousness of internal time. However, Husserl’s analyses leave behind two major puzzles: (1).His doctrine of the spontaneous continuing of internal time consciousness renders difficult comprehension of the psychic phenomenon of repression. (2). The difficulties of understanding the status of the “anonymous subjectivity as the ultimate constitutive origin or the stream of internal time consciousness. Yet, Husserl’s faithfulness to the method of reduction and the description of the things underlines his relentless effort to face every diffi, Detailed summary in vernacular field only., 鄧文韜., "2012年9月"., "2012 nian 9 yue"., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-139)., in Chinese and English., Deng Wentao., 導論, 第一章, Chapter 1. --- 時間客體如何被感知或向意識呈現? --- p.2, Chapter 1.1 --- 對客觀時間的懸擱－－回到時間經驗本身 --- p.3, Chapter 1.2 --- 邁農的「絶對現在論」時間觀及胡塞爾對其批判 --- p.5, Chapter 1.3 --- 布倫塔諾的「過去想像論」時間觀及胡塞爾對其批判 --- p.9, Chapter 2. --- 時間客體與其呈現模態 --- p.14, Chapter 2.1 --- 「立義內容－立義」的圖式詮釋 --- p.15, Chapter 2.1.1 --- 「呈現」的兩個面向──呈現活動和被呈現物 --- p.15, Chapter 2.1.2 --- 三種「時段」 --- p.17, Chapter 2.1.3 --- 三種「時段」和「立義模式」 --- p.19, Chapter 2.2 --- 「現在」作為所有時間位置的「來源點」(source-point) --- p.21, Chapter 2.3 --- 流動或連續的直觀──新鮮/原初與派生的回憶和顯在與再現的感知 --- p.22, 小結 --- p.25, 第二章, Chapter 1. --- 內時間意識的時間流/意識流(stream of consciousness)結構如何被建構 --- p.27, Chapter 1.1 --- 連續的意識流與時間的同一性 --- p.28, Chapter 1.1.1 --- 「立義模式」和意識的流動性 --- p.28, Chapter 1.1.2 --- 「立義模式」說明意識流的基礎──意識的三種模態 --- p.30, Chapter 1.1.3 --- 意識的三層層次立義模式」 --- p.35, Chapter 2.2 --- 立義模式所導致的無限後退理論困難 --- p.36, Chapter 2.3 --- 無限後退的補救－絶對意識(the absolute consciousness)的引入 --- p.38, Chapter 2.3.1 --- 絶對意識所衍生的弔詭(1)－「個體」與「流」 --- p.40, Chapter 2.3.2 --- 絶對意識所衍生的弔詭(2)－「匿名性」 --- p.44, 小結 --- p.45, 第三章, Chapter 1. --- 時間意識與意向性 --- p.48, Chapter 1.1 --- 新的時間意識建構(1)──三個「意識」的概念 --- p.48, Chapter 1.2 --- 新的時間意識建構(2)──意向性與「內在的」、「超越的」的三重意義 --- p.55, Chapter 1.3 --- 新的時間意識建構(3)──內時間意識的「內」 --- p.60, Chapter 1.4 --- 新的時間意識建構(4)──縱向和橫向意向性 --- p.61, Chapter 2. --- 時間意識與意向性「對象化的內在反思」的把握與「非對象化的內時間意識」的把握 --- p.64, 小結 --- p.70, 第四章, Chapter 1. --- 現象學還原在1893-1917 時期的擴充和作用 --- p.73, Chapter 1.1 --- 前《邏輯研究》時期 --- p.75, Chapter 1.2 --- 《邏輯研究》A 版時期 --- p.76, Chapter 1.3 --- 《現象學的觀念》時期 --- p.76, Chapter 1.4 --- 《現象學的基本問題》時期 --- p.79, Chapter 1.5 --- 《觀念I》時期和《邏輯研究》B版 --- p.81, Chapter 1.6 --- 《文章與講演》 --- p.85, Chapter 2. --- 《內時間意識現象學》所顯現的現象學還原 --- p.85, Chapter 2.1 --- 從《第一哲學》看成熟時期的現象學還原 --- p.86, Chapter 2.2 --- 從成熟時期的現象學還原看現象學還原在1893-1917 時期的擴充 --- p.89, Chapter 3. --- 還原的動機問題與道路 --- p.90, 小結 --- p.97, 第五章, Chapter 1. --- 對海德格和德里達批判的回應 --- p.100, Chapter 1.1 --- 對海德格的回應－－庸俗的時間概念 --- p.100, Chapter 1.1.1 --- 黑格爾的時間概念，及其與精神的關係 --- p.101, Chapter 1.1.2 --- 本原的原初現象和本己時態性 --- p.103, Chapter 1.1.3 --- 黑格爾對時間的理解是庸俗的時間概念 --- p.104, Chapter 1.1.4 --- 《存在與時間》中對黑格爾的批判－－對胡塞爾的批判 --- p.105, Chapter 1.2 --- 胡塞爾的時間理解是否庸俗的時間概念? --- p.107, Chapter 2.1 --- 對德里達的回應－現在/顯在形上學 --- p.110, Chapter 2.1.1 --- 「真正的形上學」和「習慣意義上的形上學」的區分 --- p.110, Chapter 2.1.2 --- 德里達所理解的現象學作為「真正的形上學」──「諸原則的原則」要求 --- p.111, Chapter 2.1.3 --- 現象學作為「真正的形上學」的困難(1)──溝通與獨白 --- p.115, Chapter 2.1.4 --- 現象學作為「真正的形上學」的困難(2)──顯在不是本原 --- p.116, Chapter 2.1.5 --- 「延異」作為本原的補充 --- p.118, Chapter 2.2 --- 胡塞爾是否「現在/顯在形上學」? --- p.121, Chapter 3. --- 胡塞爾現象學的界限──諸原則的原則與第一身觀點的有效界域 --- p.124, 小結 --- p.126, 總結 --- p.128, 參考書目 --- p.134, 詞彙表 --- p.140, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5549009, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

康德在《單純理性範圍內的宗教》一書中非常重視「思慮品格」(Gesinnung)這個概念，並把它視為所有行動的「終極基本格準」。首先，他認為一個人或道德行動者為善或是惡取決於這種「傾向」。再者，「思慮品格」在康德的行動理論中亦扮演非常重要的角色，它解釋了理性行動者作惡的可能條件。故此，「思慮品格」是評價康德關於「根本惡」以及理性行動理論的重要概念。進一步說，「道德完整」的可能性以及「道德歷程」的可理解性也都建基於此概念。因此，「思慮品格」對於康德道德哲學的整體計劃而言也甚為關鍵。儘管康德在《道德底形上學之基礎》及《實踐理性批判》兩本書中曾數度提及「思慮品格」，但這概念在康德《單純理性範圍內的宗教》之前的著作中卻似未受到充分的重視。本文將要指出，康德並非在其後期作品中才突然提出「思慮品格」這概念，事實上，在許多較早的著作中，這個關鍵的概念早已留下重要的理論線索。, 本文嘗試指出，康德在討論《實踐理性之批判》裡的「自由範疇」理論，特別是論及「道德人格」範疇時，早已舖排有關「思慮品格」的理論。「道德人格」範疇與「思慮品格」分別為道德罪責提供智性及心理根據，而後者正是以前者作為根據。對康德而言，「道德人格」並非一個心理概念，而是實踐判斷的先驗形式，正如「實體/屬性」這個在時間中連結不同直覺之基礎的「自然範疇」一般，作為它的同位範疇 (isomorphic category)，「道德人格」是關聯個別實踐判斷的基礎。然而，我們仍然需要解釋，行動的證成理由如何推動我們的意志，因為對「有限理性行動者」而言，純粹理性並不一定具有實踐性，或者說，一個行動的證成理由並不一定是我們的動力。康德正是以「思慮品格」這個概念來闡明採納「格準」的心理基礎。當我們釐清了採納「格準」的心理基礎後，便能明白人在甚麼意義下要為自己的行動負責。本文希望能夠清楚闡明「思慮品格」與「道德人格」的關係，更希望由此說明這兩個概念以及「自由範疇表」的理論關係，並對有關問題引起更多關注和討論。, In religion within the limit of reason alone Kant deliberately proposes the concept Gesinnung and regards it as the “ultimate underlying maxim“ of all actions. Firstly, whether a certain person or a moral agent should be regarded as good or evil depends on this ‘disposition’. Moreover, Gesinnung assumes an important role in Kant's theory of action, namely to explain how it is possible for a rational agent to act evil. It is thus an important aspect of evaluating Kant's account of radical evil and rational agency. Furthermore, the possibility of moral integrity and the intelligibility of moral progress also lie in this concept, rendering it important also in Kant's whole project of moral philosophy. Although Gesinnung appears in Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason for a few times, very little had been said about the use of the term until Religion was written. It would be strange to for Kant to propose this important concept all of a sudden without any previous clues. I shall argue that the clues can already be found in the discussion of Categories of Freedom (the category of Personality) in the Critique of Practical Reason. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the category “personality“ and Gesinnung serve to provide the rational and psychological grounds of moral imputation respectively, and that the latter arises from the foundation built from the former. The category “personality“ is not a psychological concept but an a priori form of practical judgment: as isomorphic to the categories, “personality“ serves as the ground of relating discrete practical judgments just as “subsistence and inherence“ in categories of nature serves as the ground of relating intuitions in time. But we also need a psychological ground for moral imputation to explain how the justifying reason motivates our will, as for a finite rational agent pure reason may not always be practical, i.e. the justifying reasons for certain actions may not always be our motivation for the action, Detailed summary in vernacular field only., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., Ng, Yat Kan., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-121)., s also in Chinese., p.i, Table of contents --- p.v, Chapter 0.1 --- Prelude: structure of the essay --- p.1, Chapter 1.01 --- Searching for the unchanged in the midst of changes- legacy of western philosophy --- p.3, Chapter 1.1 --- Kant and the category of Subsistence and Inherence --- p.5, Chapter 1.11 --- The ‘placement problem’ in the Categories of the Understanding --- p.5, Chapter 1.111 --- Mathematical categories as a priori conditions of intuition --- p.10, Chapter 1.2 --- “Substance and its transcendental time-determination --- p.15, Chapter 1.3 --- Kant’s critique of the a-temporal treatment of Substance --- p.20, Chapter 2 --- Kant’s on the problem of the personal identity: Transcendental “I“, Refutation of Idealism and brief remarks on “personality“ in the Critique of Pure Reason --- p.26, Chapter 2.1 --- Transcendental apperception --- p.26, Chapter 2.11 --- Kant’s refutation of idealism --- p.30, Chapter 2.2 --- Preliminary remark: “Person and its genealogy --- p.38, Chapter 2.21 --- Personality: Remarks from Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason --- p.41, Chapter 3 --- Interlude: Brief accounts on the Moral Law and Autonomy --- p.45, Chapter 3.1 --- The Moral Law 45, Chapter 3.2 --- On autonomy: an explication on the role of “self“ in “self-legislation“ --- p.51, Chapter 3.2.1 --- Wood’s etymological mistake --- p.52, Chapter 3.2.2 --- Kant’s distinction on the “author and the “legislator“ of the law --- p.53, Chapter 3.2.3 --- Typic as a “procedure and the significance of “autos --- p.57, Chapter 3.3 --- Intelligible noumenal character and the Empirical phenomenal character --- p.61, Chapter 4 --- “Personality“ in Kant’s moral philosophy --- p.69, Chapter 4.1 --- Overview of the problem --- p.69, Chapter 4.2 --- The Categories of Freedom: a complete failure? --- p.71, Chapter 4.3 --- “Personality as the “substratum of moral actions 85, Chapter 5 --- The Analysis of the Will and Radical Evil --- p.94, Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction: The Good Will and the Absolutely Good Will --- p.94, Chapter 5.11 --- The Good and the Evil --- p.95, Chapter 5.2 --- Autonomy part two: Wille and Willkür --- p.101, Chapter 5.3 --- The Gesinnung --- p.104, Chapter 5.31 --- Gesinnung and Personality: the psychological and rational grounds of moral imputation --- p.105, Chapter 5.32 --- Gesinnung and Radical Evil --- p.110, Chapter 6 --- Concluding remarks --- p.118, Chapter 7 --- Bibliography --- p.120, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5549134, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

哲學家多認為日常關于語意的陳述 (如:「單身漢」意即未婚男性)乃事實陳述，陳述語義事實。這些哲學家大都還認為語義事實有物理基礎。對此本文提出兩重反駁。首先，語義事實並無物理基礎，因此 (物理主義認為)根本不存在語義事實。其次，日常語義話語既不陳述語義事實，也不要求語義事實存在，而應理解為一種虛構。第一章論證第一點 (基于Kripke的論證，但据本文目的作了適當裁剪):任何具備表徵能力的物理系統皆等價於擁有某一獨特、確定功能的機器;若語義事實有物理基礎，則功能事實當有物理基礎，但功能事實並無物理基礎。第二章首先論證日常語義話語不要求語義事實存在 (因我們對其存在與否實無所謂)，其次論證虛構話語 (如「Crotone在意大利的足弓上」)乃理解日常語義話語的最佳模型。將語義話語理解為虛構，非但合理可信，且多有啟發。本文結論認為，自然主義本身雖毋庸置疑，尋求自然主義的意義/表徵理論卻是緣木求魚。, Many philosophers believe that the folk talk of meaning (e.g. “ ‘Bachelor’ means unmarried man“) states facts about meaning, or semantic facts. Most of them further believe that these facts are grounded in the physical reality. I argue against both views: (1) there are no semantic facts, insofar as they must be physically grounded; (2) meaning-talk does not state semantic facts, is not committed to them, and should instead be understood as a kind of make-believe. Chapter 1 presents an argument for (1), rst expounded (I think) by Kripke and here modied for my purpose. The argument is that any physical system with any representational capacity at all can be regarded as having a unique, determinate function; thus if representation--hence meaning--is physically grounded, so must be the function; but no such function can be physically grounded. Chapter 2 argues, rst, that meaning-talk does not commit us to semantic facts because we are indifferent to their existence. Second, that make-believe utterances (e.g. “Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot“) more than any other discourse provide a good model for meaning-talk. Construing meaning-talk as make-believe is plausible and illuminating. I conclude that, while naturalism (I believe) is true, the attempt to naturalise meaning and representation is misguided., Detailed summary in vernacular field only., Shen, Jian., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-85)., s also in Chinese., p.i, Acknowledgements --- p.iii, Table of Contents --- p.iv, Introduction --- p.1, The First Thesis --- p.1, The Second Thesis --- p.6, Chapter 1 --- To Repudiate an Ontology --- p.9, Chapter 1.1 --- Argument for Semantic Anti-Realism --- p.9, Chapter 1.1.1 --- Premise One --- p.12, Chapter 1.1.2 --- Premise Two --- p.14, Chapter 1.2 --- Naturalisers’ Program --- p.19, Chapter 1.2.1 --- Against Dretske --- p.24, Chapter 1.2.2 --- Against Millikan --- p.28, Chapter 1.2.3 --- Against Fodor --- p.35, Chapter 1.3 --- An Exegetical Appendix --- p.39, Chapter 2 --- While Enjoying Its Benefit --- p.43, Chapter 2.1 --- Argument for Non-Commitment --- p.43, Chapter 2.2 --- Another Argument for Non-Commitment --- p.44, Chapter 2.2.1 --- Objections and Replies --- p.46, Chapter 2.3 --- The Fictionalist Hypothesis --- p.60, Chapter 2.3.1 --- Searching for a Model --- p.60, Chapter 2.3.2 --- Why the Model Is Good --- p.65, Chapter 2.3.3 --- Other Models --- p.71, Chapter 2.3.4 --- Objections and Replies --- p.73, Conclusion --- p.82, Bibliography --- p.83, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5549141, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

In this dissertation I discuss Zhu Xi's inquiry into the Confucian way of self-cultivation, and his moral psychology that explains why and how one should practice such a way., The Confucian notion of xin as a seed that grows on proper nourishment makes it necessary to practice "preserving and nourishing". According to Cheng Yi, this practice requires jing (seriousness/reverence). Zhu treats jing as a way of maintaining the mind as a whole. It can be practiced without objects, therefore must be practiced anywhere and anytime. It runs through all the other moral efforts. Without jing, the ideal xin falls apart; therefore jing is essential to the xin. Jing serves as a key to the identity of xin. Only through jing can all other moral efforts act on the xin., While jing is to maintain the ideal xin itself, extending knowledge is the way to deal with things. Zhu Xi analyzes two elements of action, knowing and doing, and concludes that knowing should precede doing, just as we should know the way before we walk. He believes that the xin is endowed with myriads of li (principles/patterns) and motivational strength to act accordingly. One would be settled in doing what he should do, if one attains a genuine knowledge of the li. However, we should investigate things, because the xin tends to be covered by self-centered desires, lose sight of li, and become unaware of its non-ideal state. To see li in things is to perceive the good. The immediacy of value-perception proves that li is not attained from the external., Why and how should we substantiate yi (thoughts) after we attain genuine knowledge? Such is the problem Zhu Xi had to puzzle out during the last years of his life. He solved the problem by reaffirming that genuine knowledge necessarily leads to action, but not to the purification of thoughts. The key to substantiate thoughts is to constantly aim at and concentrate on the target which the genuine knowledge has shown us. Extending knowledge is still considered as the pre-condition of substantiating yi, since the latter requires a clear representation of the good., Zhu concludes his inquiry into the relationship between xin (heart/mind) and xing (nature) with the idea that heart/mind commands/comprises (tong) nature and qing (emotions). There are three connotations of "tong" and correspondingly three perspectives from which we understand xin, namely, as moral agency, as a functional unity, and as the totality of psychological states. The main idea is that xin is the moral agency, xing is xin's unity of functions, and qing is its particular functioning already realized. Unlike Cheng Yi, Zhu distinguishes xin and xing by emphasizing that xin is the moral agent to which good and evil are ultimately attributable. Xin is the master in its activated and calm states. This distinction between xin and the states in which it is situated enables him to describe different activities of xin and how they are integrated into the Confucian way of self-cultivation. To hold that xin is nothing but qi is to commit genetic fallacy and category mistake., 鄭澤綿., Adviser: Kwong-loi Shun., Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-08(E), Section: A., Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011., Includes bibliographical references (p. 290-302)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s in Chinese and English., Zheng Zemian., isbn: 9781267267207, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

仲輝., Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 155-164), Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s in Chinese and English., Zhong Hui., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6075438, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

The Confucian thoughts in the transition period from Ming to Qing Dynasty indicate the trend to pull down the transcendent world to the real world. This means the "immanent monism tendency", which is to internalize the transcendent li within the experiential qi. The "immanent monism tendency" is the most obvious feature in the Jishan School. This thesis focuses on Huang Zongxi's thoughts and takes the "immanent monism tendency" as the clue to expose the inner logic in the Ming-Qing academic transformation. The thoughts of "immanent monism tendency" emerge in Mid-Ming period. There are two reasons behind it: one is anti-Buddhism and the other comes from the pursuit of the most fundamental moral self-cultivation in the School of Mind. The two converge upon Liu Zongzhou's thoughts, which are inherited by Huang Zongxi, who then develops the "immanent monism tendency" to an extreme form. Huang Zongxi emphasizes qi as the first order concept and completely internalizes the transcendent li within qi. Both his xin-xing and moral self-cultivation are based upon the li-qi theory. Through the Principle with Many Manifestation, Huang Zongxi combines traditional mind-reason thought with his ultimate concern on administration and practical usage. In conclusion, Huang Zongxi's philosophical thoughts are the transition form In the phase of the Ming-Qing academic transformation, in which the "immanent monism tendency" plays a key role., 秦峰., Submitted: 2010年11月., Submitted: 2010 nian 11 yue., Adviser: Cheng Chungxi., Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-04, Section: A, page: ., Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011., Includes bibliographical references (p. 269-279)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s in Chinese and English., Qin Feng., isbn: 9781267099228, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

李康廷., "2011年8月"., "2011 nian 8 yue"., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 99-103)., in Chinese and English., Li Kangting., 引用與縮寫 --- p.5, 導論 --- p.6, Chapter 1 --- 康德論人的立場 --- p.10, Chapter 1.1 --- 人類的認知活動 --- p.11, Chapter 1.2 --- 人類的創造活動 --- p.14, 想像力於創造活動的功能 --- p.17, Chapter 1.3 --- 有限理性者的使命 --- p.19, Chapter 1.4 --- 有限理性者的他律傾向 --- p.22, 實踐理性的他律 --- p.22, 理論理性的他律 --- p.24, Chapter 2 --- 反省性判斷與美感判斷 --- p.30, Chapter 2.1 --- 反省性判斷 --- p.30, 決定性判斷與反省性判斷 --- p.30, 感性反省判斷 --- p.32, 想像力於反省性判斷的角色 --- p.33, 自然合目的性 --- p.34, Chapter 2.2 --- 美感判斷 --- p.37, 美感判斷與自由遊戲 --- p.37, 美感判斷是純粹的判斷 --- p.38, 無利害關係的滿足感 --- p.40, 主觀普遍性 --- p.42, 無目的的合目的性 --- p.43, 示範的必然性 --- p.44, Chapter 2.3 --- 美感經驗的功能 --- p.46, 美感經驗於認知上的功能 --- p.48, 美感經驗於道德上的功能 --- p.51, Chapter 3 --- 崇高判斷一般 --- p.54, Chapter 3.1 --- 崇高經驗 --- p.54, 反目的性：痛苦 --- p.55, 合目的性：歡愉 --- p.58, 反目的的合目的性：否定的歡愉 --- p.60, Chapter 3.2 --- 數學崇高與力學崇高的區分 --- p.63, 數學與力學的區分 --- p.63, 數學崇高與力學崇高 --- p.65, Chapter 4 --- 數學崇高 --- p.68, 理論理性的要求 --- p.68, 數學綜合的失敗 --- p.70, 思想能力的自覺 --- p.73, 數學崇高的功能 --- p.74, 數學崇高的對象 --- p.77, Chapter 5 --- 力學崇高 --- p.80, 實踐理性的要求 --- p.80, 格律的製造 --- p.82, 力學綜合的失敗 --- p.85, 自由意志的自覺 --- p.86, 力學崇高與道德感的分別 --- p.88, 力學崇高的功能 --- p.89, 總結 --- p.94, 參考書目 --- p.99, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5894873, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

陳志強., "2011年8月"., "2011 nian 8 yue"., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-95)., in Chinese and English., Chen Zhiqiang., 中文摘要, 英文摘要, 緒論 --- p.7, Chapter 第一節 --- 本文的工作 --- p.7, Chapter 第二節 --- 範圍的勘定 --- p.12, Chapter 第三節 --- 方法的說明 --- p.17, Chapter 第一章 --- 基本槪念的字義分析 --- p.20, Chapter 第一節 --- 「過」的分析 --- p.20, Chapter I. --- 「過」在《論語》中的基本用法 --- p.20, Chapter II. --- 過失之「過」的一般理解 --- p.21, Chapter III. --- 超過之「過」的一般理解 --- p.22, Chapter IV. --- 從超過之「過」到過失之「過」-以子路爲例的分析 --- p.25, Chapter A. --- 子路的性格 --- p.25, Chapter B. --- 孔子對子路性格的評價 --- p.27, Chapter C. --- 子路的障蔽 --- p.34, Chapter V. --- 「過」與人底有限性 --- p.37, Chapter VI. --- 「過」與「惡」的關係 --- p.43, Chapter 第二節 --- 「惡」的分析 --- p.46, Chapter I. --- 「惡」在《論語》中的基本用法 --- p.46, Chapter II. --- 日常用法中「惡」的槪念的分析 --- p.47, Chapter III. --- 《論語》中「惡」的槪念的分析 --- p.48, Chapter 第三節 --- 「罪」的分析 --- p.50, Chapter I. --- 「罪」在《論語》中的基本用法 --- p.50, Chapter II. --- 「過」、「惡」、「罪」的關係 --- p.54, Chapter 第二章 --- 轉化之道與改過工夫 --- p.57, Chapter 第一節 --- 預防工夫 --- p.57, Chapter 第二節 --- 改正工夫 --- p.62, Chapter 第三章 --- 《論語》中的過惡類型 --- p.71, Chapter 第一節 --- 自身的過惡 --- p.71, Chapter I. --- 一般的理解 --- p.72, Chapter II. --- 《論語》對自身過惡的論述 --- p.75, Chapter A. --- 德之不修-「朽木」、「糞土之牆」 --- p.76, Chapter B. --- 學之不講-「過」、「不及」 --- p.78, Chapter C. --- 聞義不能徙-「惑」 --- p.79, Chapter D. --- 不善不能改-「惡」 --- p.81, Chapter 第二節 --- 社會脈絡中的過惡 --- p.82, Chapter I. --- 父子之間 --- p.82, Chapter II. --- 君臣之間 --- p.84, Chapter III. --- 朋友之間 --- p.86, Chapter 第三節 --- 集體的過惡 --- p.88, Chapter 結論- --- 回顧與展望 --- p.89, 參考書目 --- p.93, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5894875, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

郭柏年., Thesis (doctoral)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (p. 159-167)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s in Chinese and English., Guo Bonian., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6074832, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Chapter Five discusses the methodological theory of Liu Xiaogan's "Two Orientations", and addresses a new "non-objectified" approach of interpreting the Laozi., Chapter Four examines Tao in a new perspective and discloses the value of Tao based on the analysis of "simplicity". First, Tao in the Laozi mainly has three interconnected meanings, namely "origin", "law", and "vision", which are not objects of a clear, fixed, or external nature. Second, the active, indescribable and intuitive nature of Tao cannot be fully clarified by the meanings of "General principle", "subjective vision", or "horizon". Third, "simplicity" is not only an expression of Tao, but also the presupposition of human nature and value orientation; in this sense, Tao can be defined as the understanding of the significance of life in the world when people return to the nature of "simplicity"., Chapter One focuses on Feng Youlan's approach, which interprets Tao as "General principle" and "Universals". However, Feng Youlan did not solve the problem of how the "General principle" itself could produce things, nor did he deal with the problem of the relationship between Tao and human beings. In his later works, he claimed Tao as the intuitive understanding of the cosmos and life. Accordingly, Taoism is one of the manifestations of Tiandi Jingjie. However, he did not clarify the relationship between the intuitive understanding and "General principle" as well as the "Universals"., Chapter Three explores the case of Zhang Xianglong, who interprets Tao as a "non-objectified horizon" which is constitutive and self-sufficient as a structure that generates meaning, or a real experience of life in the world. It matches with the obscure, active and creating nature of Tao in the Laozi. However, his phenomenological perspective can only lead to a further disclosure of the vivid, rich, and fundamental meanings of Tao, it fails to deal with the value of Tao., Chapter Two examines the case of Mou Zongsan, who interpreted Taoism as the "Metaphysics in the line of vision" and viewed Tao as a disclosing vision under certain subjective state of mind. The ultimate vision is established on the unity of the objective Tao as a foundation and the subjective Tao as a subjective vision. However, Mou Zongsan did not clarify how to achieve the ultimate vision by Gongfu of subject without distinguishing subject and object from each other. He recommended Heidegger's concept of "non-objectification", attempting to acquire the understanding of horizon as the hidden background of the distinction of object and subject. However, he could not fully understand the phenomenological approach of Heidegger and failed to overcome the dichotomy in interpreting Tao., This dissertation aims at studying how to interpret Tao in the Laozi beyond the dichotomy of object and subject. There are three contemporary typical approaches to explore Tao: First, Tao is interpreted as an object with external and objective features, such as principle or universals; the representative figure of this approach is Feng Youlan. Second, Tao is interpreted as a subjective state of mind; the representative figure of this approach is Mou Zongsan. Third, Tao is interpreted as the horizon that exists before object and subject are distinguished from each other; the representative figure of this approach is Zhang Xianglong. This dissertation gives a new interpretation of Tao based on a clear exploration and critique of the theories of Feng Youlan, Mou Zongsan, and Zhang Xianglong. The methodology of different approaches will also be reviewed. The dissertation consists of five chapters, 林光華., Adviser: Xiaogan Lin., Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-04, Section: A, page: ., Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (p. 190-202)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s in Chinese and English., Lin Guanghua., isbn: 9781267063540, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

According to Humboldt, language is a typical cultural activity which involves the act of creation (Erzeugung). It is also an important activity which reveals the nature of man. In the first part of this research, we try to sum up Humboldt's analysis on creation into four main theses: (1) the true definition of language must be based on speaking, rather than dead products such as words and rules. As a result, the definition of language can only be a genetic one and must be related to a certain idea of "activity;" (2) speaking is an act through which the speaker expresses his thought by using different sounds. In other words, man uses speech sounds as tools of expression. Thus, language is an act of producing tools rather than the tools produced; (3) only articulated sounds are capable of expressing thoughts. If we want to use them to express our ideas, we must compel our vocal organs and produce sounds with patiicular sound-forms. In Humboldt's words, this involves a process of Bildung in which we combine matter and form to produce tools with particular forms. (4) To express a certain thought, we have to put words together. These grammatically formed words, all as elements, enter into the sentence and form a new unity. A closer look at this operation shows that words acquire their grammatical functions through a special mental act: the mind creates a sentence to express the thought, but by the same act opposes itself to the created. From this point of view, language is a synthesis which brings elements together to create novelties., At the very first glance, Humboldt's philosophy of language is just a series of tedious, laborious examination of linguistic facts. In addition, the idealistic terminologies he employed set up a barrier for those who want to understand his theory. Through our investigations, we show that his philosophy of language can be seen as the foundation of a full-fledged philosophy of culture with the analysis on creation providing all the building blocks. Humboldt reminds us of the freedom of the individual, and stresses on the importance of the self-consciousness of any human activity. As an educational reform is currently undergoing in Hong Kong, the philosophy of Humboldt can act as a timely reminder for all of us., In the second part of this research, we follow the example of Humboldt and start a series of investigations to show how Cantonese-speaking community uses different sound-forms to form words and sentences. Our investigations will focus on the activity of the listener. We try to prove that there is a change of role of the listener whenever he understands a certain chain of words. A listener always plays a double-role. He must speak in order to understand. The active role of the listener is evidence that Humboldt's analysis on creation can be applied to all aspects of language and is still meaningful to us despite its idealistic traits., 趙子明., Adviser: Tze Wan Kwan., Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-03, Section: A, page: ., Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (p. 178-186)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s in Chinese and English., Zhao Ziming., isbn: 9781267063533, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Lam, Sin Yee Calista., "November 2009.", Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (p. 119-122)., s in English and Chinese., p.i, Acknowledgements --- p.iv, Table of Contents --- p.V, Introduction --- p.1, Chapter Chapter 1: --- Russell´ةs Argument Against Ontological Vagueness: Motivations “vagueness-in-the-world´ح --- p.9, Chapter Chapter 2: --- A Modal Framework of Ontological Indeterminacy --- p.30, Chapter Chapter 3: --- Explaining Away Ontological Vagueness via Supervenience --- p.43, Chapter Chapter 4: --- Evans´ةs Argument Against Vague Identity --- p.66, Chapter Chapter 5: --- The Challenge for Accounting for Vague Existence --- p.91, Conclusion --- p.111, Bibliography --- p.118, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896630, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

陳孝龍., Thesis submitted in: December 2009., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57)., s in Chinese and English., Chen Xiaolong., 摘要 --- p.i, 目錄 --- p.iii, 前言 --- p.1, Chapter 一、 --- 槪念分析-性、分、性分 --- p.2, Chapter (一） --- 性 --- p.2, Chapter (二） --- 分 --- p.8, Chapter (三） --- 性分 --- p.14, Chapter 二、 --- 性分的理論意含 --- p.19, Chapter (一） --- 自生、自然、獨化 --- p.19, Chapter (二） --- 適性逍遙 --- p.29, Chapter (三） --- 率性無爲 --- p.34, Chapter 三、 --- 性分與變化 --- p.37, Chapter (一） --- 性分可否被改變？ --- p.37, Chapter (二） --- 性分是否會變化？ --- p.43, Chapter (三） --- 性分不變論與事物變化是否矛盾？ --- p.49, 結論 --- p.52, 參考資料 --- p.53, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5894322, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

黃頌文., "2010年2月"., "2010 nian 2 yue"., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-111)., s in Chinese and English., Huang Songwen., 全文摘要 --- p.i, p.ii, 目錄 --- p.iii, 導言：對「死亡」的重思 --- p.1, Chapter 第一章： --- 死亡一存在論的詮釋方法 --- p.5, Chapter 1.1 --- 死亡的描述在《存在與時間》的位置 --- p.6, Chapter 1.2 --- 存在論的本源層面 --- p.15, Chapter 第二章： --- 死亡作爲現象基點 --- p.23, Chapter 2.1 --- 死亡與「在死之中」 --- p.23, Chapter 2.2 --- 「在死之中」與「存在於世」的關連 --- p.31, Chapter 第三章： --- 死亡與「在家」 --- p.42, Chapter 3.1 --- 本源的基點 --- p.42, Chapter 3.2 --- 存活的「無」與死亡的「可能性」 iii --- p.51, Chapter 第四章： --- 探究死亡的意義 --- p.59, Chapter 4.1 --- 自我的覺醒 --- p.60, Chapter 4.2 --- 倫理關注的痕跡 --- p.69, Chapter 4.3 --- 詮釋層面的序列 --- p.78, 總論：對「存活本源」的領悟 --- p.88, 《存在與時間》引文(原文/譯文：)對照 --- p.92, 參考書目 --- p.106, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5894326, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

甘子勤., Thesis submitted in: November 2009., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 122-123)., in Chinese and English., Gan Ziqin., 引言 --- p.6, Chapter 第一章 --- 樂的基本義理-孔孟對樂的規定 --- p.10, Chapter 第一節 --- 音樂和樂的異同 --- p.10, Chapter I. --- 樂的出處 --- p.10, Chapter II. --- 禮別異、樂和同 --- p.11, Chapter III. --- 音樂與樂的關聯 --- p.16, Chapter 第二節 --- 孔子論仁與樂 --- p.17, Chapter I. --- 禮樂與仁 --- p.17, Chapter II. --- 仁與樂 --- p.25, Chapter 第三節 --- 論孟子思想中的樂與命 --- p.32, Chapter I. --- 君子之所欲、所樂與所性 --- p.33, Chapter II. --- 君子有三樂 --- p.36, Chapter III. --- 反身而誠，樂莫大焉 --- p.40, Chapter 第二章 --- 論王陽明思想中本體層的樂 --- p.42, Chapter 第一節 --- 陽明思想的中心-致良知 --- p.42, Chapter I. --- 良知與致良知 --- p.45, Chapter A. --- 心即理 --- p.46, Chapter B. --- 良知 --- p.50, Chapter C. --- 致良知 --- p.55, Chapter 第二節 --- 本體層的樂-樂是心之本體 --- p.60, Chapter I. --- 心之本體 --- p.60, Chapter II. --- 樂與心之本體的關聯 --- p.62, Chapter A. --- 心悦理義 --- p.65, Chapter B. --- 樂與天地萬物一體 --- p.69, Chapter C. --- 樂與良知之生生不息 --- p.77, Chapter 第三章 --- 論王陽明思想中作用層的樂 --- p.82, Chapter 第一節 --- 作用層上的樂 --- p.82, Chapter I. --- 真樂 --- p.82, Chapter II. --- 情的轉化 --- p.91, Chapter 第二節 --- 真樂工夫 --- p.101, Chapter I. --- 常快活 --- p.101, Chapter II. --- 自快吾心與自慊 --- p.102, Chapter III. --- 謹獨與瀟落 --- p.104, 結論 --- p.106, 參考書目 --- p.112, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5894315, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

植永強., "2010年9月"., "2010 nian 9 yue"., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 147-152), in Chinese and English., Zhi Yongqiang., 導論 --- p.13, Chapter 第一章: --- 回顧與評論, Chapter 一） --- 海德格哲學並不關連作為德意志種族主義的國家社會主義:朱利安̐£揚(Julian Young) --- p.21, Chapter 二） --- 海德格哲學和國家社會主義之間有聯繫, Chapter 甲、） --- 政治事件(支持國家社會主義)作為失誤:鄂蘭(Arendt)與高達美(Gadamar) --- p.25, Chapter 乙、） --- 從哲學性質上看海德格政治事件, Chapter 1) --- 《存在與時間》概念的政治性分析:洛維特(Loewith) --- p.30, Chapter 2) --- 政治事件與海德格哲學關懷:哈貝馬斯(Habermas)與德希達(Derrida), Chapter i) --- 哈貝馬斯(Habermas) --- p.37, Chapter ii) --- 德希達(Derrida) --- p.42, Chapter 第二章: --- 費希特、海德格與形而上學, Chapter 一、） --- 費希特《告德意志國民書》, Chapter 1) --- 危機 --- p.49, Chapter 2) --- 德國民族的理解, Chapter A) --- 恆常語言、德國民族與精神世界 --- p.49, Chapter B) --- 費希特與知識學 --- p.52, Chapter C) --- 學問與德國民族 --- p.56, Chapter 3) --- 領導方向:國家作為精神世界的維護 --- p.57, Chapter 4) --- 政策方向:教育 --- p.59, Chapter 二、） --- 海德格、<德國大學的自身持守>與形而上民族, Chapter 1) --- 危機:形而上的威脅 --- p.61, Chapter 2) --- 民族:德國民族作為發生形而上學的民族, Chapter A、） --- 發問作為最高形式的學問 --- p.67, Chapter B、） --- <形而上學是什麼>與作為學問激情的「此在」 --- p.69, Chapter C、） --- 《形而上學導論》與作為形而上學根源的此在 --- p.72, Chapter 3) --- 領導:國家社會主義作為希望 --- p.79, Chapter A) --- 亞道夫̐£希特勒(Adolf Hitler)與國家社會主義 --- p.81, Chapter 4) --- 政策方向:勞動與學問 --- p.87, Chapter 第三章: --- 《存在與時間》、形而上學與國家社會主義, Chapter I、） --- 本己性與國家社會主義, Chapter 1) --- 《存在與時間》工作和此在分析 --- p.92, Chapter 2) --- 日常性(everydayness) --- p.97, Chapter 3) --- 本己性和《存在與時間》, Chapter 甲、） --- 本己性與可能存在 --- p.100, Chapter 乙、） --- 死亡與本己性 --- p.105, Chapter 丙、） --- 本己性與存在論基礎 --- p.107, Chapter 4) --- 本己性、形而上學根源與國家社會主義 --- p.109, Chapter II、） --- 歷史性與國家社會主義, Chapter 1) --- 歷史性和《存在與時間》, Chapter 甲、） --- 本己的時間性意義 --- p.111, Chapter 乙、） --- 歷史性和《存在與時間》 --- p.113, Chapter 2) --- 歷史性、作為形而上學根源與國家社會主義 --- p.115, Chapter III、） --- 《存在與時間》和作為政治權力主張的國家社會主義, Chapter 1) --- 本己性、歷史性與作為極權主義的國家社會主義 --- p.118, Chapter 2) --- 〈存在與時間〉、民族與文化 --- p.118, Chapter 3) --- 〈存在與時間〉與「英雄」 --- p.121, Chapter 第四章: --- 鄂蘭、海德格與批判國家社會主義, Chapter 一、） --- 國家社會主義的科學性意識形態:漢娜̐£鄂蘭(Hannah Arendt) --- p.122, Chapter 三、） --- 海德格對現代性特徵－－－－科學技術主義的批判, Chapter 1) --- 國家社會主義與科學技術主義 --- p.128, Chapter 2) --- 科學技術主義的形而上學基礎 --- p.129, Chapter 3) --- 費希特、歐洲與科學技術主義 --- p.136, Chapter 4) --- 技術、戰爭及種族主義 --- p.137, 結論 --- p.144, 參考文獻 --- p.147, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896635, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Aristotle's own solution is treated as a series of responses to his predecessors. His dialectical character and his subtle understanding of the complexity of human condition enable him to reach a dialectical and dynamic mean between these two extremes solutions. Aristotle objects Plato's attack of rhetoric, acknowledges its value, and secures its legitimate status in political life. But he also realizes the innate limitations of rhetoric. His theoretical solution to the tension lies in his theory of virtue and happiness. According to his ethics, virtue bridges these two series of goods, and in a virtuous person the tension does not exist. But this theory also has the same limitation of rhetoric in general, i.e., the lack of compulsory power. Therefore Aristotle, like Plato, tries to establish an ideal city, habituating the people to be truly virtuous through a series of legislative efforts. Good as it is, legislation cannot solve the tension permanently either, due to the universality of law. Therefore, when facing new situations or in critical moments, the system of law needs the supplement of decent and prudent politicians and through rhetoric. Thus, Aristotle establishes a virtuous circle between rhetoric and legislation, and such a dynamic system will give enough flexibility to deal with the complexity of human political life, and enables him to solve this tension successfully., The first part presents two solutions given by Aristotle's predecessors. On the one hand, Gorgias, the representative rhetorician of that time began to reflect and champion the power of rhetoric. Such a theoretical reflection brought huge impact on Athenian political life. I treat Pericles and Alcibiades under Thucydides' depiction as spiritual heirs of Gorgias. They both try to solve the tension through rhetoric. On the other hand, Plato, fully realizing the limitation of rhetoric, attacks it in his Gorgias, and further in his Republic tries to solve this tension through legislation., The tension between private and cornmon good is a problem for any human political society, and a central question for any political philosophy. This thesis tries to examine some attempts of solving this tension in ancient Greek context, and focuses on Aristotle's practical philosophy., Liu, Wei., Adviser: Qingjie Wang., Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-03, Section: A, page: ., Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 254-266)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., also in Chinese., isbn: 9781267063557, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Liu, Pengbo., "September 2010.", Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (p. 94-96)., s in English and Chinese., Chapter Chapter 1 --- Physicalism and its Discontents --- p.1, Chapter 1.1 --- Physicalism --- p.2, Chapter 1.1.1 --- "Two Problems in Characterizing ""Physicalism""" --- p.2, Chapter 1.2 --- The Explanatory Gap --- p.6, Chapter 1.2.1 --- The First Manifestation of the Explanatory Gap: Mary's New Knowledge --- p.7, Chapter 1.2.3 --- The Epistemic (Explanatory) Gap and the Ontological Gap --- p.10, Chapter 1.2.4 --- Levine on the Explanatory Gap --- p.11, Chapter 1.3 --- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS): The Basics --- p.16, Chapter Chapter 2 --- Two Accounts of Phenomenal Concepts --- p.18, Chapter 2.1 --- The Quotational Account of Phenomenal Concepts --- p.18, Chapter 2.1.1 --- The Quotation Analogy --- p.18, Chapter 2.1.2 --- The Fundamental Use and Derived Use --- p.20, Chapter 2.1.3 --- Why Mental Quotation? --- p.22, Chapter 2.1.4 --- Problems of the Quotational Account --- p.25, Chapter 2.2 --- The Recognitional/Demonstrative Account of Phenomenal Concepts --- p.30, Chapter 2.2.1 --- Type Demonstratives and Token Demonstratives --- p.31, Chapter 2.2.3 --- "Recognition, Memory, and Imagination" --- p.37, Chapter 2.2.4 --- The Possession Condition of Recognitional Concepts --- p.40, Chapter 2.2.5 --- PRC and PC --- p.41, Chapter 2.2.6 --- Compare the Quotational Account and the Loarian Recognitional Account --- p.45, Chapter 2.2.7 --- Reply to Balog's Complaint --- p.47, Chapter 2.3 --- Objections and Replies --- p.49, Chapter 2.3.1 --- Chalmers' Objection --- p.49, Chapter 2.3.2 --- Raffman's Objection: --- p.52, Chapter Chapter 3 --- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy Examined --- p.55, Chapter 3.1 --- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy: A Brief Review --- p.55, Chapter 3.2 --- Stoljar's Objections --- p.57, Chapter 3.2.1 --- Experience Thesis and the A priori/ A priori Synthesizable --- p.58, Chapter 3.2.3 --- The Immediacy Thesis and Phenomenal Acquaintance --- p.60, Chapter 3.2.4 --- Conceptual Difference and Conceptual Gap --- p.66, Chapter 3.2.5 --- Conclusion --- p.72, Chapter 3.3 --- Chalmers' Objection to PCS --- p.72, Chapter 3.3.1 --- Chalmers' Master Argument --- p.73, Chapter 3.3.2 --- Balog's Reply --- p.78, Chapter 3.3.3 --- A Worry about Balog's Reply --- p.82, Chapter 3.3.4 --- Epistemic Situation and the Explanatory Gap --- p.84, Chapter 3.3.5 --- An Alternative Reply: Some Speculations --- p.87, Chapter 3.3.6 --- Conclusion --- p.92, Bibliography --- p.94, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5894453, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Yeung, Wang Chun., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-117)., s in English and Chinese., Declarations, Acknowledgements, Table of Contents, Introduction --- p.1, PART I FROM MIXED TRUTHS TO TWO-DIMENSIONALISM, Chapter Chapter One: --- "Rigidity, Descriptivism, and Direct Reference", Chapter 1.1. --- Meaning and Reference --- p.7, Chapter 1.2. --- Rigidity and the Dusk of Descriptivism --- p.13, Chapter 1.3. --- Different Theories of Reference --- p.22, Chapter 1.4. --- Apriority and Necessity --- p.32, Chapter Chapter Two: --- Two-Dimensionalism, Chapter 2.1. --- Possible-World Semantics --- p.38, Chapter 2.2. --- Two-Dimensional Semantics --- p.43, Chapter 2.3. --- Variety of Two-Dimensionalism --- p.48, PART II TWO-DIMENSIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS, Chapter Chapter Three: --- The Argument from Ignorance and Error, Chapter 3.1. --- A-Intension and Associated Properties --- p.59, Chapter 3.2. --- The Argument from Ignorance and Error --- p.65, Chapter 3.3. --- The a Priori Argument --- p.73, Chapter Chapter Four: --- The Argument from Variability, Chapter 4.1. --- Associated Properties and Meanings --- p.88, Chapter 4.2. --- A-Intension and Understanding --- p.90, Chapter 4.3. --- A-Intension and Communication --- p.97, CONCLUDING REMARKS --- p.109, BIBLOGRAPHY --- p.112, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5894286, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Liu, Pengbo., "September 2010.", Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (p. 94-96)., s in English and Chinese., Chapter Chapter 1 --- Physicalism and its Discontents --- p.1, Chapter 1.1 --- Physicalism --- p.2, Chapter 1.1.1 --- "Two Problems in Characterizing ""Physicalism""" --- p.2, Chapter 1.2 --- The Explanatory Gap --- p.6, Chapter 1.2.1 --- The First Manifestation of the Explanatory Gap: Mary's New Knowledge --- p.7, Chapter 1.2.3 --- The Epistemic (Explanatory) Gap and the Ontological Gap --- p.10, Chapter 1.2.4 --- Levine on the Explanatory Gap --- p.11, Chapter 1.3 --- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS): The Basics --- p.16, Chapter Chapter 2 --- Two Accounts of Phenomenal Concepts --- p.18, Chapter 2.1 --- The Quotational Account of Phenomenal Concepts --- p.18, Chapter 2.1.1 --- The Quotation Analogy --- p.18, Chapter 2.1.2 --- The Fundamental Use and Derived Use --- p.20, Chapter 2.1.3 --- Why Mental Quotation? --- p.22, Chapter 2.1.4 --- Problems of the Quotational Account --- p.25, Chapter 2.2 --- The Recognitional/Demonstrative Account of Phenomenal Concepts --- p.30, Chapter 2.2.1 --- Type Demonstratives and Token Demonstratives --- p.31, Chapter 2.2.3 --- "Recognition, Memory, and Imagination" --- p.37, Chapter 2.2.4 --- The Possession Condition of Recognitional Concepts --- p.40, Chapter 2.2.5 --- PRC and PC --- p.41, Chapter 2.2.6 --- Compare the Quotational Account and the Loarian Recognitional Account --- p.45, Chapter 2.2.7 --- Reply to Balog's Complaint --- p.47, Chapter 2.3 --- Objections and Replies --- p.49, Chapter 2.3.1 --- Chalmers' Objection --- p.49, Chapter 2.3.2 --- Raffman's Objection: --- p.52, Chapter Chapter 3 --- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy Examined --- p.55, Chapter 3.1 --- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy: A Brief Review --- p.55, Chapter 3.2 --- Stoljar's Objections --- p.57, Chapter 3.2.1 --- Experience Thesis and the A priori/ A priori Synthesizable --- p.58, Chapter 3.2.3 --- The Immediacy Thesis and Phenomenal Acquaintance --- p.60, Chapter 3.2.4 --- Conceptual Difference and Conceptual Gap --- p.66, Chapter 3.2.5 --- Conclusion --- p.72, Chapter 3.3 --- Chalmers' Objection to PCS --- p.72, Chapter 3.3.1 --- Chalmers' Master Argument --- p.73, Chapter 3.3.2 --- Balog's Reply --- p.78, Chapter 3.3.3 --- A Worry about Balog's Reply --- p.82, Chapter 3.3.4 --- Epistemic Situation and the Explanatory Gap --- p.84, Chapter 3.3.5 --- An Alternative Reply: Some Speculations --- p.87, Chapter 3.3.6 --- Conclusion --- p.92, Bibliography --- p.94, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5894453, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Aristotle's own solution is treated as a series of responses to his predecessors. His dialectical character and his subtle understanding of the complexity of human condition enable him to reach a dialectical and dynamic mean between these two extremes solutions. Aristotle objects Plato's attack of rhetoric, acknowledges its value, and secures its legitimate status in political life. But he also realizes the innate limitations of rhetoric. His theoretical solution to the tension lies in his theory of virtue and happiness. According to his ethics, virtue bridges these two series of goods, and in a virtuous person the tension does not exist. But this theory also has the same limitation of rhetoric in general, i.e., the lack of compulsory power. Therefore Aristotle, like Plato, tries to establish an ideal city, habituating the people to be truly virtuous through a series of legislative efforts. Good as it is, legislation cannot solve the tension permanently either, due to the universality of law. Therefore, when facing new situations or in critical moments, the system of law needs the supplement of decent and prudent politicians and through rhetoric. Thus, Aristotle establishes a virtuous circle between rhetoric and legislation, and such a dynamic system will give enough flexibility to deal with the complexity of human political life, and enables him to solve this tension successfully., The first part presents two solutions given by Aristotle's predecessors. On the one hand, Gorgias, the representative rhetorician of that time began to reflect and champion the power of rhetoric. Such a theoretical reflection brought huge impact on Athenian political life. I treat Pericles and Alcibiades under Thucydides' depiction as spiritual heirs of Gorgias. They both try to solve the tension through rhetoric. On the other hand, Plato, fully realizing the limitation of rhetoric, attacks it in his Gorgias, and further in his Republic tries to solve this tension through legislation., The tension between private and cornmon good is a problem for any human political society, and a central question for any political philosophy. This thesis tries to examine some attempts of solving this tension in ancient Greek context, and focuses on Aristotle's practical philosophy., Liu, Wei., Adviser: Qingjie Wang., Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-03, Section: A, page: ., Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 254-266)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., also in Chinese., isbn: 9781267063557, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Yeung, Wang Chun., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-117)., s in English and Chinese., Declarations, Acknowledgements, Table of Contents, Introduction --- p.1, PART I FROM MIXED TRUTHS TO TWO-DIMENSIONALISM, Chapter Chapter One: --- "Rigidity, Descriptivism, and Direct Reference", Chapter 1.1. --- Meaning and Reference --- p.7, Chapter 1.2. --- Rigidity and the Dusk of Descriptivism --- p.13, Chapter 1.3. --- Different Theories of Reference --- p.22, Chapter 1.4. --- Apriority and Necessity --- p.32, Chapter Chapter Two: --- Two-Dimensionalism, Chapter 2.1. --- Possible-World Semantics --- p.38, Chapter 2.2. --- Two-Dimensional Semantics --- p.43, Chapter 2.3. --- Variety of Two-Dimensionalism --- p.48, PART II TWO-DIMENSIONALISM AND ITS CRITICS, Chapter Chapter Three: --- The Argument from Ignorance and Error, Chapter 3.1. --- A-Intension and Associated Properties --- p.59, Chapter 3.2. --- The Argument from Ignorance and Error --- p.65, Chapter 3.3. --- The a Priori Argument --- p.73, Chapter Chapter Four: --- The Argument from Variability, Chapter 4.1. --- Associated Properties and Meanings --- p.88, Chapter 4.2. --- A-Intension and Understanding --- p.90, Chapter 4.3. --- A-Intension and Communication --- p.97, CONCLUDING REMARKS --- p.109, BIBLOGRAPHY --- p.112, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5894286, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

This thesis aims at investigating the two main elements of "intellect" and "tradition" in Zhu Xi's methodology of self-cultivation. About "intellect", chapter 1 and 3 argue that the core idea of Zhu's methodology is "to discriminate between right and wrong according to reasons". Therefore, the most important in "probing principle" is not "getting information", but "reflecting and examining the reasons of all things we face". Chapter 2 argues that "to discriminate between right and wrong" should be the starting point of Confucian self-cultivation. The only question is how it can motivate the actual moral practice, to complete the actual transformation of one's personality. To answer this question, chapter 3 clarifies the meaning of "being totally convinced by a reason": a moral belief which is confirmed as reasonable by the intellect, will necessarily originate an intention to act accordingly, the moral motivation is inside this intention. However, we should not ignore the importance of "tradition" in self-cultivation. Chapter 4 explains that for Zhu Xi, "to discriminate between right and wrong" needs reliable standards; they cannot come from any personal assertion, but only from the studying of tradition. Personal intellect does not operate in a closed space, but the space in which it can enter into dialogue with the traditional wisdom. The interaction between intellect and tradition is the ideal learning way in Zhu Xi's mind., 吳啓超., Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-09, Section: A, page: ., Thesis (doctoral)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009., Includes bibliographical references (p. 216-220)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s in Chinese and English., School code: 1307., Wu Qichao., isbn: 9781109401776, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

區凱琳., "2009年7月"., "2009 nian 7 yue"., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 168-172)., s in Chinese and English., Ou Kailin., 引言 --- p.1, Chapter 一 --- 導論 --- p.2, Chapter 1.1 --- 傅柯的倫理學之預備¨®Ơ明 --- p.4, Chapter 1.1.1 --- 傅柯學¨®Ơ的三條軸線, Chapter 1.1.2 --- 傅柯對道德觀的三種區分, Chapter 1.1.3 --- 傅柯研究的道德觀及其研究方法 ´ؤ´ؤ「實行手法之道德觀」與「道德過程之個性化條件」, Chapter 1.1.4 --- 傅柯研究的道德觀之歷史 ´ؤ´ؤ「道德主體化的方式」及「自身實踐的方式」之歷史, Chapter 1.1.5 --- 傅柯研究的道德觀及其研究方法之特殊意義, Chapter 1.2 --- 傅柯的《主體解釋學》之預備¨®Ơ明 --- p.16, Chapter 1.2.1 --- 傅柯對古代研究之態度, Chapter 1.2.2 --- 傅柯對古代倫理之基本分析, Chapter 1.2.3 --- 《主體解釋學》的工作及其目的, Chapter 1.3 --- 本文的旨趣 --- p.22, Chapter 二 --- 關懷自身原則中的主體與真理關係 --- p.24, Chapter 2.1 --- 概¨®Ơ「關懷自身」與「認識你自己」 --- p.27, Chapter 2.2 --- 「關懷自身」之理論化與邊緣化 --- p.32, Chapter 2.3 --- 兩種哲學區分與主體與真理的弔詭關係 --- p.42, Chapter 2.4 --- 修省之理由 --- p.48, Chapter 三 --- 知識探索與自身轉化 --- p.53, Chapter 3.1 --- 關懷自身之「自身的『自身目的化』」 --- p.57, Chapter 3.2 --- 轉向自身´ؤ´ؤ知識與真理的基點 --- p.62, Chapter 3.2.1 --- 目光之轉向, Chapter 3.2.2 --- 實在的轉移及回歸自身, Chapter 3.3 --- 知識之精神性模態化´إ´إ主體與世界關係之安頓 --- p.67, Chapter 3.3.1 --- 德米特里厄斯的知識之關係性模式 ´ؤ´ؤ自身與世界連繫在一起的知識觀, Chapter 3.3.2 --- 伊比鳩魯的自然研究 ´ؤ世界知識成為轉化自身之催化媒介, Chapter 3.3.3 --- 塞內加的世界頂峰 ´ؤ´ؤ此岸世界之解放, Chapter 3.3.4 --- 奧列里烏斯之無限小的剖析 ´ؤ魔力與誘惑之消解, Chapter 3.4 --- 兩種知識之區分´ؤ´ؤ「精神性知識」與「智力知識的知識」 --- p.95, Chapter 四 --- 修省與拯救 --- p.100, Chapter 4.1 --- 概¨®Ơ修省 --- p.103, Chapter 4.1.1 --- 哲學的修省與基督宗教的苦行, Chapter 4.1.2 --- 修省與預備, Chapter 4.1.3 --- 修省之兩層, Chapter 4.2 --- 真言之主體化´ؤ´ؤ哲學之修習方式 --- p.108, Chapter 4.2.1 --- 聆聽與沉默, Chapter 4.2.2 --- ˇئø讀與書寫之關係, Chapter 4.2.3 --- 言¨®Ơ與真理, Chapter 4.3 --- 主體之修行´ؤ´ؤ知行一致的主體 --- p.118, Chapter 4.3.1 --- 鍛鍊與考驗, Chapter 4.3.1 a --- 節制之養生法, Chapter 4.3.1 b --- 試煉之實踐, Chapter 4.3.2 --- 主體的沉思, Chapter 4.3.2 a --- 邪惡之預想, Chapter 4.3.2 b --- 死亡之修鍊, Chapter 4.3.2 c --- 良知的檢測, Chapter 4.4 --- 拯救自身´ؤ´ؤ此生此世的拯救 --- p.134, Chapter 4.4.1 --- 基督宗教的拯救概念, Chapter 4.4.2 --- 「自身目的化」與拯救, Chapter 4.4.3 --- 古代的拯救概念, Chapter 五 --- 結論´ؤ´ؤ哲學與自我拯救 --- p.142, Chapter 5.1 --- 回顧及小結 --- p.143, Chapter 5.2 --- ´ؤ己與超越 --- p.147, Chapter 5.3 --- 精神性及關懷自身的回歸 --- p.151, Chapter 5.4 --- 總結 --- p.157, Chapter 5.3.1 --- 保存個體存在風格的倫理觀, Chapter 5.3.2 --- 哲學之用, 後記 --- p.162, 附錄一 縮寫 --- p.163, 附錄二 詞彙表 --- p.164, 附錄三參考書目 --- p.168, 回顧 --- p.173, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896551, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Hu, Jing., Thesis (M.Mus.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009., Includes bibliographical references (p. 52-55)., also in Chinese., Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1, Chapter 2. --- Shame and Its Structure --- p.5, Chapter 2.1 --- Shame: General Description --- p.5, Chapter 2.2 --- Shame and Self-evaluations --- p.7, Chapter 2.3 --- Self-image --- p.14, Chapter 2.4 --- Parallels in Early Confucian Tradition --- p.16, Chapter 2.5 --- Knowledge of Self-evaluations and Articulation of Self-evaluations --- p.20, Chapter 3. --- Shame in Relation to Other People --- p.24, Chapter 3.1 --- Observers and Imaginary Observers --- p.24, Chapter 3.2 --- Shame Brought About by Other Parties --- p.28, Chapter 3.3 --- Exposing Shameful Affairs to the Public --- p.30, Chapter 3.4 --- Self-evaluations in Relation to Other People --- p.31, Chapter > 3.4.1. --- Other People in the Formulation and Revision of Self-evaluaitions --- p.31, Chapter > 3.4.2 --- Impacts from the Community --- p.33, Chapter > 3.4.3 --- Chi and Social Standards in Early Chinese Thought --- p.34, Chapter 4. --- The Role of Shame --- p.36, Chapter 4.1 --- Shame Serves to Alert One to One´ةs Deficiencies --- p.37, Chapter 4.2 --- Positive Responses to Shame --- p.38, Chapter 4.2.1 --- Direct Improvement --- p.38, Chapter 4.2.2 --- Positive Responses Involving a Third Party --- p.39, Chapter 4.2.3 --- Passive Changing of Self-evaluations --- p.41, Chapter 4.2.4 --- Revising Self-evaluations --- p.42, Chapter 4.3 --- Responses to Chi in the Early Confucian tradition --- p.44, Chapter 4.4 --- Scars Left by Shame --- p.46, Chapter 4.5 --- The Destructive Effects of Shame --- p.48, Chapter 5. --- Conclusion --- p.49, Reference: --- p.52, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896577, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Ma, Chun Fai., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 210-221)., also in Chinese., p.5, 摘要 --- p.6, Acknowledgements --- p.7, Introduction A phenomenological study of Being and Nothingness --- p.8, Chapter §1 --- Explanation of the title of thesis --- p.8, Chapter §2 --- The historical background: Sartre the existentialist and phenomenologist --- p.9, Chapter §3 --- Structure of the present research --- p.12, Chapter (i) --- Scope of research: Being and Nothingness --- p.12, Chapter (ii) --- Methodology --- p.14, Chapter (iii) --- Themes and structure of the research --- p.15, Chapter Chapter 1 --- Sartre´ةs phenomenological method --- p.18, Chapter §1.1 --- Sartre's project: a “phenomenological ontology'' --- p.18, Chapter 1.1.1 --- The difficulties for a phenomenological re-interpretation of BN --- p.18, Chapter 1.1.2 --- Sartre´ةs concept of phenomenon --- p.21, Chapter § 1.2 --- The Husserlian moment: intentional and eidetic analysis --- p.26, Chapter 1.2.1 --- Abschattung and essence --- p.27, Chapter 1.2.2 --- The percipere: consciousness as the directedness of intentions --- p.31, Chapter § 1.3 --- The Heideggerian moment: the question of the meaning of Being --- p.34, Chapter 1.3.1 --- The question of the meaning of Being: Heidegger´ةs ontological difference --- p.34, Chapter 1.3.2 --- Phenomenon of being and being of phenomenon --- p.37, Chapter Chapter 2 --- A phenomenological anthropology --- p.42, Chapter §2.1 --- A new motive for phenomenological research --- p.42, Chapter 2.1.1 --- A follower of the old path? --- p.42, Chapter 2.1.2 --- Husserl and his quest for foundational science --- p.44, Chapter 2.1.3 --- Heidegger and his pursuit of fundamental ontology --- p.47, Chapter § 2.2 --- A project of phenomenological anthropology --- p.51, Chapter 2.2.1 --- Sartre and his anthropological concern --- p.51, Chapter 2.2.2 --- The ontology of human reality and its ethical implication --- p.54, Chapter 2.2.3 --- Existential psychoanalysis as a moral description --- p.56, Chapter 2.2.4 --- Human reality versus Dasein? --- p.59, Chapter Chapter 3 --- Being-for-itself and being-in-itself --- p.66, Chapter §3.1 --- A preliminary sketch of being-for-itself and being-in-itself --- p.66, Chapter 3.1.1 --- The wrestling between the Husserlian and Heideggerian elements in BN --- p.66, Chapter 3.1.2 --- Two regions of being: their eidetic and ontological implications --- p.69, Chapter §3.2 --- Being-for-itself as the origin of nothingness (I 'origine du neant) --- p.74, Chapter 3.2.1 --- The meaning of nothingness (neant) --- p.74, Chapter 3.2.2 --- Consciousness as nihilation (neantis ation) --- p.81, Chapter 3.2.3 --- Consciousness (of) self and pre-reflective cogito --- p.84, Chapter §3.3 --- Being-in-itself as transcendent object --- p.90, Chapter 3.3.1 --- The transcendent object and its transphenomenality --- p.91, Chapter 3.3.2 --- World and instrumentality --- p.94, Chapter Chapter 4 --- "Human ekstasis: Facticity, Transcendence and Temporality" --- p.100, Chapter §4.1 --- From nihilation to human ekstasis --- p.100, Chapter 4.1.1 --- The under-thematized aspects of the For-itself --- p.100, Chapter 4.1.2 --- The inadequacy of our preceding analysis --- p.102, Chapter 4.1.3 --- The phenomenological concept of human ekstasis --- p.104, Chapter §4.2 --- The human ekstasis (1): Facticity --- p.106, Chapter 4.2.1 --- The For-itself and its pre-destined situation --- p.106, Chapter 4.2.2 --- "The engagement in projects, tasks and instruments" --- p.108, Chapter 4.2.3 --- Facticity and reality --- p.111, Chapter §4.3 --- Human ekstasis (2): Transcendence --- p.114, Chapter 4.3.1 --- Transcendence as the ekstasis of the For-itself --- p.114, Chapter 4.3.2 --- Transcendence as projection and surpassing --- p.116, Chapter 4.3.3 --- The self of For-itself --- p.119, Chapter 4.3.4 --- The radical undeterminedness of the For-itself --- p.123, Chapter 4.3.5 --- Possibles and the possibility of being --- p.127, Chapter 4.3.6 --- Choice and reality: the Transcendence in Facticity --- p.130, Chapter 4.3.7 --- Value as the being of For-itself --- p.133, Chapter §4.4 --- Human ekstasis (3): Temporality --- p.138, Chapter 4.4.1 --- "A naturalistic conception of time, and time as a holistic structure" --- p.138, Chapter 4.4.2 --- The concreteness of time --- p.141, Chapter 4.4.3 --- Time as the mode of being of For-itself --- p.143, Chapter 4.4.4 --- The presence of the For-itself: the temporal dimension of Present --- p.145, Chapter 4.4.5 --- The possibilities of the For-itself: the temporal dimensions of Past and Future --- p.148, Chapter 4.4.6 --- The primary structure of time --- p.157, Chapter Chapter 5 --- The phenomenon of bad faith (mauvaise foi) --- p.160, Chapter §5.1 --- The existential psychoanalysis --- p.160, Chapter 5.1.1 --- The necessity of an existential psychoanalysis --- p.160, Chapter 5.1.2 --- A lie to oneself and a lie to the other --- p.162, Chapter 5.1.3 --- The “anti-ethical´ح character of bad faith --- p.166, Chapter §5.2 --- The descriptive examination on concrete instances of bad faith --- p.168, Chapter 5.2.1 --- The dating woman (1): the confinement of human Transcendence and Temporality --- p.169, Chapter 5.2.2 --- The dating woman (2): the disintegration of human Transcendence and Facticity --- p.176, Chapter 5.2.3 --- The homosexual: the manipulation and disintegration of human Temporality --- p.181, Chapter §5.3 --- The “ideal´ح mode of being: on sincerity and authenticity --- p.188, Chapter 5.3.1 --- Sincerity as the opposite of bad faith? --- p.188, Chapter 5.3.2 --- Descriptive analysis on concrete instances of sincerity --- p.190, Chapter 5.3.3 --- An examination unfinished: authenticity as the “ideal´ح mode of being --- p.196, Conclusion --- p.202, Chapter §1 --- The phenomenological and anthropological-ethical contribution of Being and Nothingness --- p.202, Chapter §2 --- "The limitation of this thesis, and possible directions for further investigation" --- p.205, Bibliography --- p.210, Chapter 1 --- Works by Sartre --- p.210, Chapter 2 --- English/ French materials --- p.210, Chapter 3 --- Chinese materials --- p.221, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896578, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Art is the final product of the system and the ground can gain a complete intuition of itself through works of art. Art therefore becomes the final destination of the system. Schelling thinks that only the works of art can completely unify thinking and reality, the infinite and the finite, the universal and the particular, the subjective and the objective, give equal respect to each opposing pole, completely reflect the original identity and fulfill the primordial demand. What Schelling in his philosophy of art reveals is that philosophizing or reflection is not sufficient to solve the ultimate questions asked by itself. Thinking or rationality is not the foundation of world and reality. In fact, thinking and reality are equally the products of the ground. Hence, it is unreasonable and one-sided to make any one product the dominant factor and even the first principle of the unification and the whole system., Before Schelling, Kant has already placed aesthetics in a system of philosophy, but he is not genuinely concerned about the question of art. Schelling is the first philosopher who places art within a system of philosophy and endows art a paramount role in the system. For Schelling, at least in his early thinking, art is not only a necessary question in philosophy, but is also its very origin and final destination. This position is quite extraordinary to for philosopher. Why does Schelling, as a philosopher, make such claim? How can art become the origin and destination of philosophy and sciences? What is the true essence and significance of art? These are the major questions of this dissertation. Schelling's discourse on art in his System of Transcendental Idealism and Philosophy of Art will be explicated. In order to make Schelling's contention more apparent, the discussions on art in Hegel and the early German romantic such as Friedrich Schlegel, Holderlin and Novalis will be included as well., From the discourse on art, we see that Schelling, who is known as a German idealist, pays much attention to the question of existence and gives much respect to reality as such. Hence, Schelling's intellectual identity is quite ambivalent and should be re-examined. The second major task of this dissertation is to deliberate whether Schelling is an early German romantic or a German idealist, and whether there is a transition from romanticism to idealism in Schelling's philosophy. In order to answer these questions, the general positions of early German romanticism and German idealism should be first articulated. Then, the consistency of Schelling's thought will be verified. This dissertation argues for consistency of Schelling's system throughout his life and for Schelling's reconciliation of romanticism and idealism. Instead of being a preparation to Hegel's system, this dissertation will show that Schelling's fundamental concern and position are incompatible with that of Hegel. Despite his affinity with the romantic thought, the position of the demand of the ground and the final anticipation of future development are different in Schelling and the romantics., The ground is for Schelling nothing else but the original One and the primordial demand. In order to explain and attain the unity of everything, the ground is posited as original identity; in order to explain the origin of existence and thinking, the ground is posited as a primordial demand. This demand is the demand for intuiting or knowing itself. Since the first principle is a demand, the system therefore becomes a dynamic and dialectical one. The whole system of Schelling is thus constructed according to two basic activities originated from the primordial demand: separation and unification., Unlike contemporary aesthetic discussions, Schelling's discourse on art is never detached from the context of philosophy or metaphysics. For Schelling, what philosophy or metaphysics ultimately questions about are the unity and the ground of existence and thinking. Following Kant, Schelling, like his romantic and idealistic contemporaries, recognizes that the problem of unity is the fundamental question of philosophy. But diverging from Kant, Schelling thinks that there is no way to attain and explain the unity unless the ground is first investigated., Wong, Wing Yuen., Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-01, Section: A, page: 0210., Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 309-322)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s in English and Chinese., isbn: 9781109576641, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Art is the final product of the system and the ground can gain a complete intuition of itself through works of art. Art therefore becomes the final destination of the system. Schelling thinks that only the works of art can completely unify thinking and reality, the infinite and the finite, the universal and the particular, the subjective and the objective, give equal respect to each opposing pole, completely reflect the original identity and fulfill the primordial demand. What Schelling in his philosophy of art reveals is that philosophizing or reflection is not sufficient to solve the ultimate questions asked by itself. Thinking or rationality is not the foundation of world and reality. In fact, thinking and reality are equally the products of the ground. Hence, it is unreasonable and one-sided to make any one product the dominant factor and even the first principle of the unification and the whole system., Before Schelling, Kant has already placed aesthetics in a system of philosophy, but he is not genuinely concerned about the question of art. Schelling is the first philosopher who places art within a system of philosophy and endows art a paramount role in the system. For Schelling, at least in his early thinking, art is not only a necessary question in philosophy, but is also its very origin and final destination. This position is quite extraordinary to for philosopher. Why does Schelling, as a philosopher, make such claim? How can art become the origin and destination of philosophy and sciences? What is the true essence and significance of art? These are the major questions of this dissertation. Schelling's discourse on art in his System of Transcendental Idealism and Philosophy of Art will be explicated. In order to make Schelling's contention more apparent, the discussions on art in Hegel and the early German romantic such as Friedrich Schlegel, Holderlin and Novalis will be included as well., From the discourse on art, we see that Schelling, who is known as a German idealist, pays much attention to the question of existence and gives much respect to reality as such. Hence, Schelling's intellectual identity is quite ambivalent and should be re-examined. The second major task of this dissertation is to deliberate whether Schelling is an early German romantic or a German idealist, and whether there is a transition from romanticism to idealism in Schelling's philosophy. In order to answer these questions, the general positions of early German romanticism and German idealism should be first articulated. Then, the consistency of Schelling's thought will be verified. This dissertation argues for consistency of Schelling's system throughout his life and for Schelling's reconciliation of romanticism and idealism. Instead of being a preparation to Hegel's system, this dissertation will show that Schelling's fundamental concern and position are incompatible with that of Hegel. Despite his affinity with the romantic thought, the position of the demand of the ground and the final anticipation of future development are different in Schelling and the romantics., The ground is for Schelling nothing else but the original One and the primordial demand. In order to explain and attain the unity of everything, the ground is posited as original identity; in order to explain the origin of existence and thinking, the ground is posited as a primordial demand. This demand is the demand for intuiting or knowing itself. Since the first principle is a demand, the system therefore becomes a dynamic and dialectical one. The whole system of Schelling is thus constructed according to two basic activities originated from the primordial demand: separation and unification., Unlike contemporary aesthetic discussions, Schelling's discourse on art is never detached from the context of philosophy or metaphysics. For Schelling, what philosophy or metaphysics ultimately questions about are the unity and the ground of existence and thinking. Following Kant, Schelling, like his romantic and idealistic contemporaries, recognizes that the problem of unity is the fundamental question of philosophy. But diverging from Kant, Schelling thinks that there is no way to attain and explain the unity unless the ground is first investigated., Wong, Wing Yuen., Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-01, Section: A, page: 0210., Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 309-322)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s in English and Chinese., isbn: 9781109576641, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Lowe, Chun Yip., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009., Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-95)., also in Chinese., Notes on sources and translations, Intorduction --- p.1, Chapter 1. --- From Subjectivity of Individuals to Inter-Subjectivity: Moral Law and Social Contract in Kant's Theory of Perpetual Peace --- p.8, Chapter I. --- "Right as ""mine and yours"" and the level of inter-subjectivity" --- p.10, Chapter II. --- Moral law as the universal principle of right --- p.12, Chapter III. --- Freedom in public sphere: the distinction between Wille and Willkur --- p.22, Chapter IV. --- Original Contract and a transcendental principle of public right --- p.27, Chapter 2. --- Nature's guarantee of perpetual peace and the notion of purposiveness p --- p.36, Chapter I. --- The preliminary argument of the guarantee: war as a means of nature --- p.37, Chapter II. --- The objection against the guarantee --- p.40, Chapter III. --- "The technique of nature, purposiveness and the final end" --- p.44, Chapter IV. --- Reflective judgment as a directive force --- p.58, Chapter 3. --- Appraising the project of perpetual peace --- p.61, Chapter I. --- The definition of perpetual peace and the six preliminary articles --- p.61, Chapter II. --- The division of public right and the three definitive articles --- p.66, Chapter III. --- Remark --- p.82, Conclusion --- p.85, Bibliography --- p.93, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5894159, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

寧晓萌., Thesis (doctoral)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008., Includes bibliographical references (p. 211-231)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s in Chinese and English., Ning xiaomeng., http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b6074562, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

馬嘉域., "2008年2月"., 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2008., 參考文獻(leaves 116-118)., "2008 nian 2 yue"., also in English., Ma Jiayu., Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2008., Can kao wen xian (leaves 116-118)., 緒論 --- p.5, Chapter 第一章 --- 規則式道德爲道德建立基礎的嘗試及其失敗 --- p.10, Chapter 1.1 --- 啓蒙運動的努力一一休謨的嘗試 --- p.10, Chapter 1.2 --- 啓蒙運動的努力一一康德的嘗試 --- p.14, Chapter 1.3 --- 爲何啓蒙運動以來的道德哲學必定失敗 --- p.19, Chapter 1.4 --- 啓蒙運動後的努力一一效益主義及其他 --- p.21, Chapter 1.5 --- 直覺主義與情感主義一一道德根據的徹底喪失 --- p.23, Chapter 1.6 --- 小結道德衰退的三階段 --- p.26, Chapter 第二章 --- 麥肯泰爾論德性的根據和基礎 --- p.28, Chapter 2.1 --- 德性與實踐活動的關係 --- p.29, Chapter 2.1.1 --- 內在價値與外在價値 --- p.30, Chapter 2.1.2 --- 卓越標準 --- p.33, Chapter 2.1.3 --- 必須依靠他人的協作性活動 --- p.36, Chapter 2.1.4 --- 對德性初步理解的不足 --- p.39, Chapter 2.2 --- 個人生活的敘述性整體 --- p.40, Chapter 2.2.1 --- 個人主義式自我與整體性自我 --- p.41, Chapter 2.2.2 --- 個別行爲的可理解性 --- p.43, Chapter 2.3.3 --- 敘述、對話與個人身份 --- p.47, Chapter 2.3.4 --- 個人生活的敘述式整體 --- p.50, Chapter 2.3 --- 傳統的槪念 --- p.51, Chapter 2.4 --- 小結德性論三階段的聯繫 --- p.55, Chapter 第三章 --- 道德相對主義問題的消解及其困難 --- p.57, Chapter 3.1 --- 傳統的合理性 --- p.57, Chapter 3.2 --- 知識論危機 --- p.59, Chapter 3.3 --- 不同傳統之間的互相了解及相對主義的超越 --- p.60, Chapter 3.3.1 --- 真理的槪念 --- p.62, Chapter 3.3.2 --- 可理解性的問題 --- p.64, Chapter 3.4 --- 小結 --- p.68, Chapter 第四章 --- 後期麥肯泰爾一一德性倫理學的社會生物學基礎 --- p.69, Chapter 4.1 --- 人與動物相同的地方 --- p.70, Chapter 4.1.1 --- 意圖的前語言認識 --- p.72, Chapter 4.1.2 --- 行爲的理由 --- p.73, Chapter 4.2 --- 我們如何由動物成長爲人類? --- p.75, Chapter 4.2.1 --- 價値與成長的關係 --- p.75, Chapter 4.2.2 --- 人類成長的三個階段 --- p.77, Chapter 4.2.3 --- 成長三階段的關係 --- p.79, Chapter 4.3 --- 個人成長的依賴性 --- p.80, Chapter 4.4 --- 施予及受惠的社群關係 --- p.84, Chapter 4.4.1 --- 施予及受惠的社群關係與權力分配 --- p.85, Chapter 4.4.2 --- 施予受惠關係的具體運作 --- p.86, Chapter 4.5 --- 維持社群關係的德性 --- p.88, Chapter 4.5.1 --- 正直地慷慨的特徵 --- p.89, Chapter 4.5.2 --- 德性根據的改變 --- p.90, Chapter 4.6 --- 小結一一德性與成長的整體圖像 --- p.91, Chapter 第五章 --- 麥肯泰爾德性論的一些問題 --- p.93, Chapter 5.1 --- 對待有缺陷人士的應有態度 --- p.94, Chapter 5.2 --- 德性根據轉變一一社群內親疏關係的問題 --- p.98, Chapter 5.3 --- 價値衝突的處境 --- p.101, Chapter 5.4 --- 社群建立的可能性 --- p.105, 結語 --- p.109, 參考書目 --- p.116, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5893403, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Chapter 3 further investigates the role of intuition in the application of concepts to intuitions. Kant introduces schema as a medium between intuitions and concepts and focuses on the schemata of pure concepts, suggesting that the transcendental schema is a procedure by which pure concepts apply to intuitions. Kant has emphasized inner sense and I complement his seemingly internal account by stressing the role of homogeneous intuitions, in the guise of domesticated intuitions, in schematic procedures. The normativity of inference derives from normative indifference of steps, based on cognitive indifference that exploits homogeneous and domesticated intuitions., Chapter 4 examines the concept of causality in relation to intuitions. Causality is a concept of relation; while cause is a power to produce its effect. I understand causality as a relation between two series of events or occurrences that are quantitatively synchronizable covariant, which can be tested and modified through empirical intuitions., In Chapter 2, I examine how intuitions function in mathematical and scientific inferences as well as in cognition in general. Intuitions and concepts in mathematics are the paradigm of concepts and intuitions in other kinds of cognition. In natural sciences, intuitions are concentrated on a homogeneous quality that scientific concepts postulate. Scientific inferences having these intuitions as the base of computability can be uniformly performed by all cognizers. Ordinary concepts can be considered as exhibited in the intuitions that belong to diverse but respectively homogeneous qualities. All of us have an inferential ability to achieve universally valid judgments acknowledged and recognized by each other. I understand this ability of inferential universality as the essence of Kant's transcendental idealism about cognitive subject and I call it cognitive machinery., The fifth and last chapter examines the concept of purposiveness in relation to mechanical causality. Unlike transcendental causality that is a constitutive principle of cognition, purposiveness is only a regulative principle for the power of judgment. Mechanical causality is a kind of causality through the mechanism of nature. It cannot adequately explain organized beings as we judge them. Then Kant envisages an intentional causality; with its constitutive character deprived, we have the concept of purposiveness. Intuition underlies such a conceptualization of purposiveness in contrast with mechanical causality. A mechanical cause can be given in intuition since we can locate it in a time-series powered by fundamental forces. But purposiveness cannot be given in intuition in Kant's times. Thus Kant asserts that organized beings as natural ends are inexplicable by mechanical causes alone and introduces the purposiveness into our account of organized beings., The subject of this study is the role of intuition in Kant's conceptualization of causality and purposiveness. In Chapter 1, I interpret Kant's Copernican revolution as a strategy to reverse cognitive procedure, not from object to cognition, but from cognition to object. So Kant starts from the products of human reason, such as mathematics and sciences. Kant bases the foundation of knowledge on an inferential procedure open to all cognizers. Intuition plays a pivotal role in such a procedure., Chen, Huping., "March 2008.", Adviser: Tze-wan Kwan., Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-03, Section: A, page: 0894., Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008., Includes bibliographical references (p. 261-266)., Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web., s in English and Chinese., School code: 1307., isbn: 9781109047882, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

劉保禧., "2008年11月"., "2008 nian 11 yue"., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-109)., s in Chinese and English., Liu Baoxi., 摘要 --- p.i, 導論 --- p.1, Chapter 第一章: --- 自我問題與此在詮釋 --- p.7, Chapter 1.1 --- 自我問題與存在問題 --- p.7, Chapter 1.2 --- 此在分析與哲學人類學 --- p.13, Chapter 1.2.1 --- 存活與一己性：本己或非本己的條件 --- p.15, Chapter 1.3 --- 詮釋(學)作爲自我問題的線索 --- p.20, Chapter 1.3.1 --- 領悟 --- p.21, Chapter 1.3.2 --- 解釋 --- p.24, Chapter 1.3.3 --- 兩種解釋與兩種詮釋(學) --- p.28, Chapter 1.3.4 --- 詮釋循環 --- p.29, Chapter 1.4 --- 小結：存在論差異的循環性質 --- p.31, Chapter 第二章: --- 世界與日常狀態 --- p.33, Chapter 2.1 --- 在世界之中存在 --- p.34, Chapter 2.1.1 --- 周圍世界與用具 --- p.35, Chapter 2.1.2 --- 世界的詮釋槪念 --- p.37, Chapter 2.2 --- 日常狀態 --- p.38, Chapter 2.2.1 --- 「首先並經常」 --- p.40, Chapter 2.2.2 --- 共在 --- p.41, Chapter 2.2.3 --- 常人 --- p.46, Chapter 2.2.4 --- 沉淪 --- p.49, Chapter 2.2.5 --- 日常狀態與存活模態 --- p.54, Chapter 2.2.6 --- 日常狀態與自我問題 --- p.59, Chapter 2.3 --- 小結：此在自我的三元結構 --- p.61, Chapter 第三章： --- 關切與決斷 --- p.64, Chapter 3.1 --- 關切 --- p.65, Chapter 3.1.1 --- 關切、世界與日常狀態 --- p.67, Chapter 3.1.2 --- 關切與自我性 --- p.70, Chapter 3.2 --- 決斷 --- p.79, Chapter 3.2.1 --- 決斷與憂虞 --- p.80, Chapter 3.2.2 --- 決斷與先行 --- p.84, Chapter 3.2.3 --- 決斷與詮釋處境 --- p.90, Chapter 3.3 --- 小結：本己狀態「之後」？ --- p.97, Chapter 第四章: --- 結論 --- p.100, Chapter 4.1 --- 本文之貢獻 --- p.100, Chapter 4.2 --- 檢討與後續討論 --- p.103, 參考書目 --- p.106, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5893813, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Lie, Nga Sze., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 103-111)., s in English and Chinese., p.i, Chapter 1 --- Introduction and Preliminary Discussions --- p.1, Chapter 1.1 --- Introduction --- p.1, Chapter 1.1.1 --- Overview of the Thesis --- p.2, Chapter 1.1.2 --- Background --- p.3, Chapter 1.1.3 --- About Chapter 3: Details of the Theory --- p.4, Chapter 1.1.4 --- About Chapter 4: Defects of the Theory --- p.7, Chapter 1.2 --- Preliminary Discussions --- p.12, Chapter 1.2.1 --- number --- p.12, Chapter 1.2.2 --- mathematical existence and abstract reality --- p.12, Chapter 1.2.3 --- finite/infinite --- p.12, Chapter 1.2.4 --- actually/potentially infinite --- p.13, Chapter 1.2.5 --- denumerability --- p.13, Chapter 1.3 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.14, Chapter 2 --- Mapping Mathematical Philosophies --- p.15, Chapter 2.1 --- Preview --- p.15, Chapter 2.1.1 --- Nominalism --- p.16, Chapter 2.1.2 --- Conceptualism --- p.16, Chapter 2.1.3 --- Intuitionism --- p.17, Chapter 2.1.4 --- Realism --- p.18, Chapter 2.1.5 --- Empiricism --- p.19, Chapter 2.1.6 --- Logicism --- p.19, Chapter 2.1.7 --- Neo-logicism --- p.21, Chapter 2.1.8 --- Formalism --- p.21, Chapter 2.1.9 --- Practicism --- p.23, Chapter 2.2 --- Central Problem of Philosophy of Mathematics --- p.23, Chapter 2.3 --- Metaphysics --- p.24, Chapter 2.3.1 --- Abstractism --- p.24, Chapter 2.3.2 --- Abstractist Schools --- p.25, Chapter 2.3.3 --- Non-abstractism --- p.25, Chapter 2.3.4 --- Non-abstractist Schools --- p.26, Chapter 2.4 --- Semantics --- p.26, Chapter 2.4.1 --- Literalism --- p.26, Chapter 2.4.2 --- Literalistic schools --- p.27, Chapter 2.4.3 --- Non-literalism --- p.27, Chapter 2.4.4 --- Non-literalistic schools --- p.27, Chapter 2.5 --- Epistemology --- p.28, Chapter 2.5.1 --- Scepticism --- p.28, Chapter 2.5.2 --- Scepticist Schools --- p.28, Chapter 2.5.3 --- Non-scepticism --- p.29, Chapter 2.5.4 --- Non-scepticist Schools --- p.29, Chapter 2.6 --- Foundations of Mathematics --- p.30, Chapter 2.6.1 --- Foundationalism --- p.31, Chapter 2.6.2 --- Foundationalist Schools --- p.32, Chapter 2.6.3 --- N on-foundationalism --- p.33, Chapter 2.6.4 --- Non-foundationalist schools --- p.33, Chapter 2.7 --- Finitistic Considerations --- p.33, Chapter 2.7.1 --- Finitism --- p.41, Chapter 2.7.2 --- Finitist Schools --- p.42, Chapter 2.7.3 --- Non-finitism --- p.44, Chapter 2.7.4 --- Non-finitist Schools --- p.44, Chapter 2.8 --- Finitistic Reconsiderations --- p.44, Chapter 2.8.1 --- C-finitism --- p.45, Chapter 2.8.2 --- C-finitist Schools --- p.45, Chapter 2.8.3 --- Non-C-finitism --- p.46, Chapter 2.8.4 --- Non-C-finitist Schools --- p.46, Chapter 2.9 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.47, Chapter 3 --- Principles of Transfinite Theory --- p.48, Chapter 3.0.1 --- Historical Notes on Infinity --- p.48, Chapter 3.0.2 --- Cantor´ةs Proof --- p.49, Chapter 3.1 --- The Domain Principle --- p.51, Chapter 3.1.1 --- Variables and Domain --- p.53, Chapter 3.1.2 --- Attack and Defense --- p.54, Chapter 3.2 --- The Enumeral Principle --- p.56, Chapter 3.2.1 --- Cantor´ةs Ordinal Theory of Numbers --- p.58, Chapter 3.2.2 --- A Well-ordered Set --- p.59, Chapter 3.2.3 --- An Enumeral --- p.59, Chapter 3.2.4 --- An Ordinal Number --- p.60, Chapter 3.2.5 --- Attack and Defense --- p.60, Chapter 3.3 --- The Abstraction Principle --- p.63, Chapter 3.3.1 --- Cantor´ةs Cardinal Theory of Numbers --- p.64, Chapter 3.3.2 --- An Abstract One --- p.65, Chapter 3.3.3 --- One-one Correspondence --- p.65, Chapter 3.3.4 --- A Cardinal Number --- p.65, Chapter 3.3.5 --- Attack and Defense --- p.65, Chapter 3.4 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.68, Chapter 4 --- Problems in Transfinite Theory --- p.70, Chapter 4.1 --- Structure and Procedure --- p.70, Chapter 4.1.1 --- Free Mathematics --- p.72, Chapter 4.1.2 --- Non-constructive Proof --- p.75, Chapter 4.2 --- Number and Numerosity --- p.85, Chapter 4.2.1 --- Weak Reductionism --- p.85, Chapter 4.2.2 --- Non-Cantorian Sets --- p.87, Chapter 4.2.3 --- Intension in an Extensional Theory --- p.89, Chapter 4.3 --- Conceivability and Comparability --- p.95, Chapter 4.3.1 --- Tension with Absolute Infinity --- p.95, Chapter 4.4 --- Conclusion --- p.100, Bibliography --- p.103, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896870, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Wong, Po Lam., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008., Includes bibliographical references (p. 81-83)., s in English and Chinese., Table of Contents, Introduction --- p.1, Chapter I. --- Preliminary Analysis --- p.3, Chapter a) --- The Importance of the Problem of Practical Primacy --- p.3, Chapter b) --- "“Reason,´ح “Speculative，´ح “Theoretical´ح and “Practical´ح" --- p.5, Chapter i) --- The Concept “Reason´ح --- p.5, Chapter ii) --- “Speculative，´ح “Theoretical´ح and “Practical´ح --- p.7, Chapter c) --- Reason´ةs Interest --- p.13, Chapter d) --- Two Perspectives of the Problem of the Primacy --- p.17, Chapter II. --- Unity and Teleology of Reason as a whole --- p.21, Chapter a) --- Preliminary --- p.21, Chapter i) --- Unity of Reason and Moral Theology --- p.21, Chapter ii) --- An Inconsistency presented in Groundwork and the Second Critique --- p.23, Chapter b) --- Arguments for the Unity of Reason in the First and Second Critiques --- p.25, Chapter i) --- Argument from Similarity --- p.25, Chapter ii) --- Primacy of the Practical in the First and Second Critiques --- p.28, Chapter iii) --- Other Considerations for the Unity of Reason --- p.32, Chapter c) --- New Approach to the Unity of Reason --- p.36, Chapter i) --- Failure in the Argument from Similarity --- p.37, Chapter ii) --- Idea of a Fundamental Power as a Key to the Problem of the Unity of Reason --- p.38, Chapter d) --- Unification of Reason --- p.42, Chapter i) --- Unification of Reason in the First and Second Critiques --- p.42, Chapter ii) --- Theoretical Reason: From Empirical Laws to Teleological Order of Nature --- p.46, Chapter iii) --- The Ideas of a Moral World and a Wise Creator --- p.54, Chapter iv) --- Primacy of the Practical Reconsidered --- p.60, Chapter III. --- The Superiority of the Practical on Moral Theology --- p.62, Chapter a) --- The Moral Proof for the Existence of God --- p.62, Chapter b) --- The Distinction of Knowledge and Faith --- p.68, Chapter c) --- The Postulate of the Existence of God --- p.73, Conclusion --- p.80, References --- p.81, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896818, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

李國威., "2008年11月"., "2008 nian 11 yue"., Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008., Includes bibliographical references (leaves 164-168)., s in Chinese and English., Li Guowei., 摘要 --- p.3, p.3, 導論 --- p.8, Chapter 甲、 --- 寫作背景 --- p.8, Chapter 乙、 --- 論旨細節 --- p.12, Chapter 丙、 --- 論文佈局 --- p.19, Chapter 甲部： --- 早期墨家的人性論 --- p.21, Chapter 甲、 --- 要旨回顧 --- p.21, Chapter 乙、 --- 理路鋪陳 --- p.21, Chapter 一、 --- 墨家如無人性論所弓丨發的問題 --- p.22, Chapter 二、 --- 「自利假說」如爲真所弓丨發的問題 --- p.23, Chapter 三、 --- 「先前性向說」如爲真所弓丨發的問題 --- p.23, Chapter 第一章： --- 墨家無人性論? --- p.26, Chapter 甲、 --- 徐氏的觀點；「人性」的歧義 --- p.26, Chapter 乙、 --- 蔡氏的觀點；「根據」的歧義 --- p.28, Chapter 丙、 --- 萬氏的觀點；斷言的轉變 --- p.30, Chapter 一、 --- 「人性」意義的釐清 --- p.31, Chapter 二、 --- 萬氏斷言的漏洞 --- p.32, Chapter 三、 --- 斷言內涵的轉變 --- p.34, Chapter 四、 --- 人類道德性向的性質 --- p.35, Chapter 五、 --- 道德性向的作用 --- p.39, Chapter 六、 --- 道德性向的補充：道德客觀主義的傾向 --- p.40, Chapter 七、 --- 其他性向的作用 --- p.46, Chapter 八、 --- 反駁萬氏斷言的破壞性論果 --- p.47, Chapter 九、 --- 德福一致的世界觀 --- p.48, Chapter 十、 --- 各種性向在社會轉變中所可能扮演的角色 --- p.50, Chapter 丁、 --- 結語：可塑性的限制及必要 --- p.51, Chapter 第二章： --- 墨家認爲自利是人類主要的推動力來源? --- p.53, Chapter 甲、 --- 「自利假說」的內涵 --- p.53, Chapter 乙、 --- 「自利假說」的證據之一：早期墨家的政治理論 --- p.54, Chapter 一、 --- 「自利假說」於此不能成立的表面理由 --- p.55, Chapter 二、 --- 「以利訓義」的還原主義式退守方法及其限制 --- p.56, Chapter 三、 --- 對於方氏第一道問題的回應 --- p.58, Chapter 四、 --- 對於方氏第二道問題的回應 --- p.63, Chapter 丙、 --- 「自利假說」的證據之二 ：「兼愛」「難而不可」的回應 --- p.64, Chapter 一、 --- 「難而不可」的反駁之內容回顧及解說 --- p.64, Chapter 二、 --- 「自利假說」在上述四項斷言中的位置 --- p.66, Chapter 三、 --- 「難而不可」之論的核心 --- p.67, Chapter 四、 --- 小結 --- p.70, Chapter 丁、 --- 「自利假說」的證據之三：「託友論證」 --- p.72, Chapter 一、 --- 「託友論證」的回顧 --- p.72, Chapter 二、 --- 「託友論證」的要旨 --- p.73, Chapter 三、 --- 「託友論證」的效力 --- p.74, Chapter 四、 --- 「自利假說」以外的詮釋選項 --- p.75, Chapter 戊、 --- 結語：「自利」在《墨子》中的地位 --- p.75, Chapter 第三章： --- 墨子不相信人類共有一些先前的性向用以實踐「兼愛」？ --- p.77, Chapter 甲、 --- 「先前性向說」的論據 --- p.77, Chapter 一、 --- 反面證據 --- p.77, Chapter 二、 --- 正面證據 --- p.78, Chapter 乙、 --- 對於「先前性向說」的論據之反駁 --- p.78, Chapter 一、 --- 「自利」這種先前性向的作用 --- p.78, Chapter 二、 --- 先前已有的道德性向之作用 --- p.79, Chapter 三、 --- 正面證據中最後兩點的比喻之解說 --- p.82, Chapter 四、 --- 「親疏有序」的情感性向與「兼愛」的實踐 --- p.83, Chapter 丙、 --- 「先前性向說」所構成的問題之癥結所在 --- p.84, Chapter 一、 --- 基於心理狀態不同的行爲區分 --- p.85, Chapter 二、 --- 兼愛」實踐的歸類及當中蘊含的問題 --- p.85, Chapter 丁、 --- 各家對於「兼愛」的詮釋 --- p.86, Chapter 戊、 --- 「先前性向說」所構成的破壞力 --- p.88, Chapter 一、 --- 由自利性向所發動的「兼愛」所蘊含的問題 --- p.89, Chapter 二、 --- 由道德性向所發動的「兼愛」所蕴含的問題 --- p.90, Chapter 三、 --- 對於上述問題的可能回應及由此弓丨伸的後果 --- p.91, Chapter 己、 --- 回應的第一步：「兼愛」的本義 --- p.92, Chapter 一、 --- 「兼愛」的新詮釋 --- p.92, Chapter 二、 --- 與新詮釋相左的文句所構成的問題 --- p.93, Chapter 三、 --- 以上問題的回應 --- p.94, Chapter 四、 --- 節約風¯‘ة與新詮釋之間的張力 --- p.95, Chapter 五、 --- 「孝子」之義與「孝子」之事 --- p.97, Chapter 六、 --- 「託友論證」與新詮釋之間的張力 --- p.101, Chapter 七、 --- 「朋友」之義與「朋友」之事 --- p.101, Chapter 八、 --- 家庭在「兼愛」的實踐當中所處的地位 --- p.103, Chapter 九、 --- 與新詮釋相左的文句之新解：一種思考模式 --- p.104, Chapter 十、 --- 「兼愛」與情感的關係 --- p.105, Chapter 十一、 --- 「交相利」的意義 --- p.108, Chapter 庚、 --- 回應的第二步：道德判斷、行爲與動機三者的關係 --- p.109, Chapter 一、 --- 早期墨家所謂的道德欲求之性質 --- p.110, Chapter 二、 --- 從倪氏思路發展下來的攻擊所要面對的兩難 --- p.111, Chapter 三、 --- 對倪式攻擊所作的修補 --- p.113, Chapter 四、 --- 可能回應之一：推翻上文的詮釋 --- p.114, Chapter 五、 --- 可能回應之二：採取道德判斷的「非認知主義」 --- p.115, Chapter 六、 --- 可能回應之三：承認「反休謨主義」 --- p.117, Chapter 七、 --- 支持「反休謨主義」的理據 --- p.118, Chapter 八、 --- 早期墨家對於道德判斷、行爲及動機關係的立場 --- p.119, Chapter 辛、 --- 回應的第三步：關於工夫的觀點 --- p.120, Chapter 一、 --- 餘下的兩點問題 --- p.121, Chapter 二、 --- 對於第一點的回應：情感性向的調度 --- p.121, Chapter 三、 --- 對於第二點的回應：「依法練習」的重要性 --- p.122, Chapter 壬、 --- 結語：「一本」與「二本」 --- p.126, Chapter 乙部： --- 早期墨家的工夫論 --- p.129, Chapter 甲、 --- 「工夫」意義的限定 --- p.129, Chapter 乙、 --- 背景淺介 --- p.130, Chapter 第四章： --- 早期墨家所提倡之工夫的性質及內容 --- p.131, Chapter 甲、 --- 外在型工夫的推動效力 --- p.131, Chapter 一、 --- 傳統的觀點 --- p.131, Chapter 二、 --- 支持外在型工夫具有推動效力的理由 --- p.132, Chapter 乙、 --- 外在型工夫的道德價値 --- p.134, Chapter 一、 --- 傳統的觀點 --- p.134, Chapter 二、 --- 支持外在型工夫具有道德價値的理由 --- p.135, Chapter 丙、 --- 早期墨家所建議的工夫之一 ：「賞罰毀譽」 --- p.138, Chapter 一、 --- 「賞罰毀譽」在早期墨家工夫論中的位置及作用 --- p.140, Chapter 二、 --- 節約風¯‘ة對「賞罰毀譽」所構成的問題 --- p.141, Chapter 丁、 --- 早期墨家所建議的工夫之二 ：「¯‘ة同制度」 --- p.144, Chapter 一、 --- 「¯‘ة同制度」的新詮釋 --- p.147, Chapter 二、 --- 「集體學習」可能潛在的問題 --- p.149, Chapter 三、 --- 「¯‘ة同制度」的具體操作 --- p.152, Chapter 四、 --- 「¯‘ة同制度」對於人類性向的影響 --- p.153, Chapter 五、 --- 人民在「¯‘ة同制度」中所起的作用 --- p.155, Chapter 六、 --- 小結 --- p.156, Chapter 戊、 --- 結語：終極「法儀」所可能弓丨伸的問題 --- p.157, 結論 --- p.159, Chapter 甲、 --- 人性論、工夫論及規範理論的關係 --- p.159, Chapter 乙、 --- 「合理性」的意義 --- p.160, Chapter 丙、 --- 早期墨家的人性論、工夫論及主要規範的槪要回顧 --- p.161, Chapter 丁、 --- 三道假然句式的真確性 --- p.162, 附錄, 參考文獻目錄 --- p.164, 外文著作之學者的中外文姓名對照表 --- p.167, 鳴謝 --- p.168, http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896800, Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)