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SummarySHEA endorses adhering to the recommendations by the CDC and ACIP for immunizations of all children and adults. All persons providing clinical care should be familiar with these recommendations and should routinely assess immunization compliance of their patients and strongly recommend all routine immunizations to patients. All healthcare personnel (HCP) should be immunized against vaccine-preventable diseases as recommended by the CDC/ACIP (unless immunity is demonstrated by another recommended method). SHEA endorses the policy that immunization should be a condition of employment or functioning (students, contract workers, volunteers, etc) at a healthcare facility. Only recognized medical contraindications should be accepted for not receiving recommended immunizations.

Background: Outbreaks of infections in healthcare negatively impact patient outcomes and experience. Transparency is critical to engendering trust and optimizing health. Consistent guidance is not available regarding when to report a possible outbreak of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) to public health and when to notify a limited population or to publicly disclose the occurrence of HAI. Recent analyses of state public health policies revealed that most states address reporting of outbreaks using terms such as clusters, unusual occurrences, or incidences over baseline. Specific wording about healthcare outbreaks or guidance for notifying patients or public is often absent. Thus, HAI outbreak notification and disclosure guidance and practices vary significantly around the country. A best-practice guidance document will provide clarity for when such reporting should occur. Methods: The Council for Outbreak Response: HAI and Antimicrobial-Resistant Pathogens (CORHA) has undertaken the task of developing this guidance by forming a multidiscipline policy work group with representation from its partner organizations. This work group has been tasked with creating a general framework that will guide notification and disclosure in the context of a possible HAI outbreak. The draft guidance document has been developed over several months of telephone and in-person conferences among work group members. Results: The standardized actions stemming from the guiding principles and recommended practices for conducting step 1 (immediate notification, initial and critical communications that occur when an outbreak is first suspected), were arranged in a table format with rows representing stakeholders and constituents to be notified and columns demonstrating the actions to be taken (Fig. 1). As an investigation progresses, notification should be revisited, especially if an investigation’s scope expands. The principles and practices for step 2 (expanded notification) have also been drafted in a table format. Next, the draft guidance addresses step 3 (public disclosure), outlining indications, practical guidance, and considerations in an outline and/or summary format. Real-world examples demonstrating application of the framework are being developed as supplementary resources to the framework. Current work group activities include engaging bioethicists, media reporters and patient advocates to review and comment on the guidance to ensure that it is clear, consistent and practical. Discussion: The draft guidance provides a framework for standardized actions for HAI outbreak notification and disclosure in a stepwise fashion, modeling public health practices and grounded in bioethical principles. The final product will provide valuable, practical advice for effectively sharing information with affected or potentially affected individuals and their caregivers in a timely manner.Funding: NoneDisclosures: Dawn Terashita reports that her spouse has received honoraria rom the speaker’s bureaus of Novo Nordisk and Abbott.

BACKGROUNDWe identified an outbreak of AmpC–producingEscherichia coliinfections resistant to third-generation cephalosporins and carbapenems (CR) among 7 patients who had undergone endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography at hospital A during November 2012–August 2013. Gene sequencing revealed a shared novel mutation in ablaCMYgene and a distinctivefumC/ fimHtyping profile.OBJECTIVETo determine the extent and epidemiologic characteristics of the outbreak, identify potential sources of transmission, design and implement infection control measures, and determine the association between the CRE. coliand AmpCE. colicirculating at hospital A.METHODSWe reviewed laboratory, medical, and endoscopy reports, and endoscope reprocessing procedures. We obtained cultures from endoscopes after reprocessing as well as environmental samples and conducted pulsed-field gel electrophoresis and gene sequencing on phenotypic AmpC isolates from patients and endoscopes. Cases were those infected with phenotypic AmpC isolates (both carbapenem-susceptible and CR) and identicalblaCMY-2,fumC, andfimHalleles or related pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns.RESULTSThirty-five of 49 AmpCE. colitested met the case definition, including all CR isolates. All cases had complicated biliary disease and had undergone at least 1 endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography at hospital A. Mortality at 30 days was 16% for all patients and 56% for CR patients. Two of 8 reprocessed endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatography scopes harbored AmpC that matched case isolates by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. Environmental cultures were negative. No breaches in infection control were identified. Endoscopic reprocessing exceeded manufacturer’s recommended cleaning guidelines.CONCLUSIONRecommended reprocessing guidelines are not sufficient.Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol2015;00(0): 1–9

Background Because of their complex design, duodenoscopes have been long recognized to be difficult to fully disinfect and may play a role in transmission of bacteria between patients. Recent reports of duodenoscope-associated carbapenem-resistant enterobacteriaceae transmission have confirmed these suspicions. An outbreak of a multidrug resistant strain of Escherichia coli was recently reported at our institution. Herein we report the results of our investigation and the process improvements that we deployed in an effort to contain the outbreak. Methods A full investigation into the environment, endoscopists, infection control practices, high-level disinfection process as well as endoscopes was undertaken in conjunction with the local county health authority and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Duodenoscopes were cultured and quarantined for 48 hours until negative cultures were obtained. Ergonomic changes were made to the endoscope reprocessing area, duodenoscopes were returned for routine maintenance, and surveillance cultures were obtained from all patients undergoing ERCP. Results Between November 2012 and August 2013, 32 patients were found to harbor 1 of 2 clonal strains of multidrug-resistant E coli , all of whom had undergone ERCP or duodenoscopy. A total of 1149 ERCPs were performed during this time period. Seven patients died within 31 days of the organism being identified in culture, 16 patients died overall by March 2015. The exact contribution of E coli to death is unclear because most patients had underlying late-stage malignancy or other severe medical comorbidities. No breach in high-level disinfection protocol or infection control practices was identified. The clonal strain of E coli was identified in culture on 4 of 8 duodenoscopes, 3 of which required critical repairs despite lack of obvious malfunction. The defect rate in high-level disinfection of duodenoscopes was 2% over a 1-year period. The implemented quality improvements, subsequent to which 1625 ERCPs have been performed, were successful in halting the outbreak. Conclusions The existing manufacturer-recommended high-level disinfection protocols for duodenoscopes are inadequate. Although the ultimate solution may be a design change to the instrument, the timeline for such a change appears long and potentially difficult to exact. In the interim, a reliable method to ensure that bacterial pathogens are not present on the duodenoscope after high-level disinfection is needed.