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Avi Loeb has defended the hypothesis that the interstellar object, ‘Oumuamua, detected in 2017, is in fact an extraterrestrial artefact. His hypothesis has been widely rejected by the scientific community. On examination however it is not clear why. The puzzle is at the level of argument structure. The scientific community's responses to Loeb's hypothesis appear to point to explanations of ‘Oumuamua's properties that are mere possibilities. Yet this is something that Loeb does not contest. I appeal to broadly philosophical considerations to understand and bolster the response to Loeb. These considerations concern the structure of his argument, the role of prior confidences within it, and the presence of ‘unconceived alternative’ explanations. I then generalise. ‘Oumuamua will surely not be the last object that does not admit of straightforward natural explanation and that is claimed to be evidence of an extraterrestrial artefact. I use the preceding discussion of Loeb's argument and the scientific community's response to make some general remarks for future debate about similar cases.

Chromosome 15q11-q13 duplication syndrome (Dup15q) is a neurodevelopmental disorder caused by maternal duplications of this region. Autism and epilepsy are key features of Dup15q, but affected individuals also exhibit intellectual disability and developmental delay. UBE3A, the gene encoding the ubiquitin protein ligase E3A, is likely a major driver of Dup15q because individuals with maternal, but not paternal 15q duplications have the disorder, and UBE3A is the only imprinted gene expressed solely from the maternal allele in mature neurons. Nevertheless, the exact role of UBE3A is yet to be determined. To establish whether UBE3A overexpression is required for Dup15q neuronal deficits, UBE3A expression was manipulated in patient-derived induced pluripotent stem cell (iPSC) lines using antisense oligonucleotides. Dup15q neurons exhibited hyperexcitability features compared to genome-edited isogenic control neurons, and this phenotype was generally prevented by normalizing UBE3A levels throughout in vitro development. Overexpression of UBE3A in an iPSC line with a paternal duplication resulted in a profile similar to that of Dup15q neurons except for synaptic phenotypes. These results indicate that UBE3A overexpression is necessary for most Dup15q cellular phenotypes. However, the inability of UBE3A overexpression to recapitulate synaptic phenotypes suggests an important role for non-imprinted genes in the disorder.

Traditional arguments for moral error theory are based on identifying a problem with the metaphysics of moral properties. I provide a new argument that is based on the inconsistency of first‐order moral judgments. I illustrate this using impossibility results in population axiology.

That the interstellar object 1I/2017 U1 (‘Oumuamua) could be an extraterrestrial artefact is an unorthodox hypothesis. From a philosophical perspective, however, the structure of the underlying argument for the hypothesis is flawed.

In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore’s Paradox. It is that Moore’s Paradox is explained by the existence of a constitutive norm on belief. I focus on a constitutive norm relates that relates belief to knowledge. I develop this explanation. I then present a challenge to it. Norm-based explanations of Moore’s Paradox must appeal to a ‘linking principle’ that explains what is wrong with violating the constitutive norm. But it is difficult to articulate a plausible candidate linking-principle. I show this by canvassing the obvious candidates and articulating the problems with each.

The relationship between sustainable development's prime goal, human wellbeing, and the natural environment has been narrowly conceived. This paper focuses on the possibility and the implications of treating the natural environment as a ‘constituent’, or internal element, of the concepts of wellbeing and poverty, as opposed to a ‘determinant’, or instrumental, external factor. Our review of philosophical accounts and conceptual frameworks of wellbeing and poverty suggests that treating the environment as a constituent element is philosophically sound, conceptually robust and empirically grounded. We argue that failing to consider these missing environmental aspects can result in an incomplete capturing of the multiple dimensions of wellbeing and poverty, and their underlying drivers. This broader framing of the environment–wellbeing relationship has the potential to inform a new generation of individual level wellbeing and poverty indicators, creating measures of multidimensional poverty that reflect the broadened scope ambitiously articulated in the Sustainable Development Goals. Copyright © 2017 The Authors. Sustainable Development published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

An alternative argument is provided for rejecting internalism-parity. It is claimed that, from the perspective of internalism-based moral error theorists, categorical reasons for action are more problematic than categorical reasons for belief. This is because there are considerably stronger arguments for thinking that one’s reasons for action are constitutively dependent on one’s desires than for thinking that one’s reasons for belief are constitutively dependent on one’s desires. Three such arguments are considered: from action-explanation, from reasoning, and from paradigmatic-ascriptions. It is claimed that the first of these three arguments clearly does not apply to reasons for belief as to reasons for action. The applicability of the second and third arguments is harder to ascertain.

In this chapter it is supposed that the arguments of all previous chapters have failed. It is supposed that epistemic reasons are genuinely and irreducibly normative, and that the epistemic error theory is false. It is argued that this could still be compatible with the moral error theory. This is referred to as ‘the puzzling combination’. The puzzling combination will be possible in the event that moral error theorists argue for their view by appeal to ‘debunking and dispensability’ arguments. Some basic objections to these arguments are discussed. The moves that would need to be made if ‘debunking and dispensability’ arguments were to be successful in defence of the puzzling combination are articulated.

Any case against the argument from analogy appears to rely on the assumption that the evidential-support relation is not itself a normative relation. This chapter identifies three ways in which one might challenge this assumption and responds to each. In doing so it claims that existing responses to this problem in the literature are insufficient: they rely on objective conceptions of probability that are ill-suited to account for epistemic probabilities. It claims that epistemic error theorists may be forced to deny that there are any evidential-support relations but that, surprisingly, this is less of a concession than it may at first appear.

In modelling epistemic judgements on normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—such as sports and games, etiquette, fashion, and the law—as has been done in earlier chapters it has been assumed that the final or basic epistemic value is true belief. This chapter considers objections to this from knowledge-first and anti-consequentialist conceptions of epistemic norms. It presents reasons for scepticism about these views and claims that these alternatives are still compatible with the basic view in the book of the contrast between epistemic norms and moral norms and so with its rejection of the parity premise.

It is sometimes claimed that ‘belief aims at truth’ in a sense that explains the existence and nature of epistemic norms. Furthermore it is sometimes claimed that there is no analogous explanation of moral norms. In this chapter it is asked whether these claims represent an alternative means of rejecting the parity premise to the basic rationale—comparing epistemic judgements to normative or evaluative judgements within ‘institutions’—offered in chapters 3 and 5. It is argued that they do not. Three different readings of ‘belief aims at truth’ are identified. None are found to be plausible as an alternative route to rejection of the parity premise.

Two varieties of moral error theory are identified. According to the first—the internalism-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of categorical normative reasons for action. These are incompatible with plausible constraints on the relationship between one’s reasons and one’s psychology. So they do not exist. According to the second—the irreducibility-based error theory—moral judgements are committed to the existence of irreducibly normative properties and relations. These are incompatible with plausible assumptions about the constituents of the world. So they do not exist. The differences and commonalities between these two varieties of moral error theory are identified.

The argument from analogy is presented in a favourable light in order to properly assess it. It is comprised of two premises. According to the parity premise, the arguments for a moral error theory would entail an epistemic error theory. According to the epistemic existence premise an epistemic error theory is false. It is argued that the parity premise can be given two readings. The first reading—internalism-parity—targets the internalism-based moral error theory. The second reading—irreducibility-parity—targets the irreducibility-based moral error theory. Both readings are motivated. It is claimed that they are plausible and that the argument from analogy represents a strong case against the moral error theory.

It has been argued that the epistemic error theory is incompatible with the ‘essentially normative’ nature of belief itself. Two versions of this objection to the epistemic error theory are presented. Neither is found to be plausible. The most plausible is based on the view that the concept of belief is essentially normative. It is claimed that this view is under-motivated and would, in any case, be unlikely to cause the problems for epistemic error theorists that it is sometimes claimed to. Some alternative objections to the epistemic error theory based on the nature of thought and deliberation are briefly considered.

Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist. As a consequence those judgments – and those of us who make them – are systematically mistaken. This is the moral error theory. One of the most interesting and important reasons for rejecting it is that its truth would entail a highly implausible error theory of epistemic judgments. These are judgments about what one ought to believe given one’s evidence. This is the argument from analogy. The aim of this book is to systematise and assess it. It is argued that it fails. The analogy between moral judgment and epistemic judgment is misconceived. The moral error theory could yet be true.

Some subjectivist views of practical reasons entail that some people, in some cases, lack sufficient reasons to act as morality requires of them. This is often thought to form the basis of an objection to these subjectivist views: ‘the amoralism objection’. This objection has been developed at length by Julia Markovits in her recent book Moral Reason. But Markovits—alongside many other proponents of this objection—does not explicitly consider that her objection is premised on a claim that her opponents deny on first-order grounds, often as part of a socially and politically motivated revisionism about the assessment of agents and their actions. As such, the amoralism objection as she presents it misses its dialectical mark. This has interesting consequences for subjectivism—and the methodology behind it—more generally.

Arguments for some controversial positions in metaethics—typically moral scepticism or the moral error theory—are sometimes thought to overreach. They appear to entail sceptical or error‐theoretic views about non‐moral branches of thought in a sense that is costly or implausible. If this is true, those metaethical arguments should be rejected. This is the companions in guilt strategy in metaethics. In this article, the contemporary use of the companions in guilt strategy is explored and assessed. The methodology of the strategy is discussed, and criteria for assessing specific instances of its use are identified. Prominent instances of its use in the contemporary literature are then examined. The focus is on those that take (a) epistemic judgment, (b) prudential judgment, and (c) mathematical judgment as “companions,” with a view to undermining the moral error theory and moral scepticism, respectively.

According to constitutivists about epistemic normativity, epistemic normativity is explained by the nature of belief. Specifically, it is explained by the fact that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a normative relation to truth. We ask whether there are persuasive arguments for the claim that belief stands in such a relation to truth. We examine and critique two arguments for this claim. The first is based on the transparency of belief. The second is based on Moore-paradoxical sentences. We develop a common objection to both. Both arguments are reliant on implausible claims about the relation between accepting a norm and being motivated by it. This point has sometimes been made in connection with the transparency of belief. But its development and application to Moore-paradoxical sentences are, we believe, novel.

In engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like. For example, some claim that such a life is quite good by contemporary standards, and use this to defend classical utilitarianism, whereas others claim that it is not, and use this to uphold the challenge that the repugnant conclusion poses to classical utilitarianism. I argue that many of these claims—by both sides—are not well-founded. We have no sufficiently clear sense of what a minimally good life is like. It is a result of this that the repugnant conclusion doesn’t license us in drawing any interesting conclusions.

Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are not. If they are not, then the companions in guilt argument fails. If they are, then a reduction of epistemic reasons to evidential support relations becomes available and, consequently, epistemic reasons cease to be a viable ‘companion’ for moral reasons. I recommend this structure of argument over existing strategies within the literature and defend my claims against recent objections from companions in guilt theorists.