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Probabilistic Discrete Choice Models (PDCM) have been extensively used to interpret the behavior of heterogeneous decision makers that face discrete alternatives. The classification approach of Logical Analysis of Data (LAD) uses discrete optimization to generate patterns, which are logic formulas characterizing the different classes. Patterns can be seen as rules explaining the phenomenon under analysis. In this work we discuss how LAD can be used as the first phase of the specification of PDCM. Since in this task the number of patterns generated may be extremely large, and many of them may be nearly equivalent, additional processing is necessary to obtain practically meaningful information. Hence, we propose computationally viable techniques to obtain small sets of patterns that constitute meaningful representations of the phenomenon and allow to discover significant associations between subsets of explanatory variables and the output. We consider the complex socio-economic problem of the analysis of the utilization of the Internet in Italy, using real data gathered by the Italian National Institute of Statistics.

We define a supervised market mechanism to deal with the airport slot allocation problem. This mechanism is based on the principles underlying the AIP model for regulation of radio spectrum. Incentive prices for airport slots should reflect an estimate of the marginal value of each slot to end users. We compute this value by assessing the downgrade in the provision of the air transport service, both in terms of quantity (i.e. number of transported passengers) and quality (i.e. passenger travel times), should access to any given slot be denied. Incentive prices consider interdependencies among slots at different airports. We argue that, in principle, incentive prices may better align private and social decisions over the use of slots compared with the outcomes of pure market interactions (such as auctions and trading).

The objective of this paper is to analyze the international settlement system and its implications for the development of a global telecommunications network in an industry scenario that is moving beyond international accounting rates. The international dimension of funding developing countries’ universal service policies is then discussed. It is pointed out that increasing competition in international markets, diverting traffic flows and retail price collection from developing to rich countries could lower the total revenue that the former obtain from international services, even when the received net settlement payments increase. The expected international settlement reforms asked for by the ITU and the US federal regulator could also intensify this phenomenon. Therefore, our conclusion is that such reforms may require adequate safeguards to deliver financial support to developing world network infrastructure, also considering the positive externalities accruing to rich countries. Der vorliegende Aufsatz analysiert das internationale System der Ausgleichszahlungen und seine Auswirkungen auf die Entwicklung eines globalen Telekommunikationsnetzwerkes. Dies geschieht anhand eines Szenarios, das über internationale Verrechnungssätze hinausgeht. Die internationale Dimension der Finanzierung von Universaldienststrategien in Entwicklungsländern wird anschließend diskutiert. Es wird darauf hingewiesen, dass der sich verschärfende Wettbewerb auf internationalen Märkten, der Kommunikationsströme und Einnahmen von den sich entwickelnden auf die reichen Länder verlagert, zur Verringerung der Gesamteinnhamen der ärmeren Länder führen kann, auch wenn die erhaltenen Netto-Ausgleichszahlungen steigen. Die erwartete Reform des Systems der Ausgleichszahlungen, das die ITU und die US-amerikanische Regulierungsbehörde anstreben, könnten dieses Phänomen weiter verstärken. Die Schlussfolgerung der Autoren lautet daher, dass diese Reformen adäquatebegelitende Maßnahmen erfordern, die den Aufbau einer internationalen Netzinfrastruktur finanziell unterstützen. Hier sollten auch die positiven Externalitäten, die den reichen Ländern zugute kommen, berücksichtigt werden.

We provide a general procedure to deal with the airport slot allocation problem, which applies the principles underlying the Administered Incentive Pricing model for regulation of radio spectrum in electronic communications markets. In particular, we propose an incentive pricing mechanism that generates an efficient slot allocation, where prices are built on a measure of the best use of each slot in serving end users. Incentive prices are set by considering the structure of the air transport network (and thus interdependencies among slots at different airports) in a given region, and the effect on both quantity and quality of passenger air transport in the region. Therefore, incentive prices should better align private and social decisions over the use of slots compared with pure market mechanisms (auctions and trading).

In this paper we study the economic behaviour of the suppliers of a set of advanced telecommunications services with a joint adoption cost (common access facilities, learning process, etc.). In fixing the two-part tariffs for their services the suppliers have to share the burden of leaving to the users a surplus sufficient to cover the adoption cost. The lack of coordination in supplying a critical mass of services or in the pricing decisions has high changes to result in suboptimal or unviable diffusion of the new technology as a whole. We present a static optimization model of user behaviour, and derive access and usage demand with a two-part tariff and a joint adoption cost. We compare noncooperative and cooperative market equilibria in a duopoly with perfect information; finally we discuss the extension of our analysis to the case of imperfect information in a dynamic setting.

In this paper, a discrete time model for the adoption of a new telecommunication service is proposed. We analyze the interaction of three sets of agents involved in the process: users, information providers, and network providers. We consider the effects of the network constraint and of the expectations of the users and suppliers.

In this paper different approaches to the modelling of the market penetration of new goods, processes and brands are briefly discussed. A warning is given on the use of purely descriptive models based on the common features (the s- shaped market penetration curve) of phenomena that widely differ in causes and possible controls; diffusion and capacity expansion models are compared to this end. An optimal pricing exercise is finally presented to clarify the importance of interpretative and control models in technological forecasting problems.