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This paper examines the interaction between religion and law as alternativemechanisms for controlling behavior. The model involves a prisoners' dilemma game played by randomly paired members of society. Religious believers cooperate reflexively, but are subject to exploitation by nonbelievers. Law enforcement emerges when the gain to believers from deterrence of nonbelievers exceeds enforcement costs. The results show that some minimal amount of religious belief is a prerequisite for law to emerge, but a high level of belief precludes its emergence. Thus, religion is both a complement and substitute for law. We present empirical evidence to support the argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author discusses reasons behind little importance given to entrepreneurs in economics literature and ignorance of their role in an economy by economists. The author tries to uncover some analytical shortcoming of neoclassical economics in order to account for its unsatisfactory approach to entrepreneurship. The absence of entrepreneurs in economics literature is attributed to three major factors. The first factor has to do with the modern theory of the firm which carried with it assumptions that were incompatible with the exercise of entrepreneurship. The second set of explanation argues that so long as economic analysis is preoccupied with the nature of static equilibrium under conditions of perfect competition, there is no room for a theory of entrepreneurship. The third factor explaining absence of entrepreneurship from economic literature is the method of economics which attempted to emulate the physical sciences by incorporating the mathematical model and thus squeezing the role of an entrepreneur.