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1. The Near-Infrared Gatherer of Helium Transits (NIGHT)

Author

Jentink, Casper Farret, Pepe, Francesco, Lovis, Christophe, Bovay, Sébastien, Wildi, François, Chazelas, Bruno, Sordet, Michaël, Artigau, Étienne, Doyon, René, Baron, Frédérique, Bourrier, Vincent, Allart, Romain, and Cochard, François

Subjects
Astrophysics - Instrumentation and Methods for Astrophysics, Astrophysics - Earth and Planetary Astrophysics
Abstract

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the subsystems of the NIGHT instrument. NIGHT (the Near Infrared Gatherer of Helium Transits) is a narrowband, high-resolution spectrograph, marking the first dedicated survey instrument for exoplanetary atmosphere observations. Developed through a collaboration between the Observatory of Geneva and the Universite de Montreal, NIGHT aims to conduct an extensive statistical survey of helium atmospheres around 100+ exoplanets over several years. The instrument will report new detections of helium in exoplanet atmospheres and perform temporal monitoring of a subset of these. NIGHT measures absorption from the metastable helium state during exoplanet transits, observable in a triplet of lines around 1083nm. The instrument comprises a vacuum enclosure housing the spectrograph, a front end unit for fiber injection at the telescope's focal plane, and a calibration and control rack containing calibration light sources and control hardware. The spectrograph is optimized for efficiency, achieving a uniform throughput of approximately 71%. The primary disperser employs a VPH grating in a unique double-pass configuration, enabling a spectral resolution of 75,000 while maintaining high throughput. The detector is a HAWAII-1 infrared array, cooled to 85K, with the spectrograph operating at room temperature. Thanks to its relatively high throughput, NIGHT on a 2m class telescope is predicted to be as sensitive as existing instruments on 4m class telescopes. The front end unit injects starlight and sky background into two separate fibers leading to the spectrograph. It also performs near-infrared guiding and includes a mechanism for injecting calibration light. The assembly and optical alignment of NIGHT's spectrograph and front end unit are scheduled for July to September 2024, with the first light anticipated before early 2025., Comment: 12 pages, 8 figures

Published
2024
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9. Mise en place d’une expérience avec le grand public : entre recherche, vulgarisation et pédagogie

Author

Lohéac, Youenn, Alia, Hayyan, Bazart, Cécile, Bchir, Mohamed Ali, Blondel, Serge, Bonescu, Mihaela, Bornier, Alexandrine, Brouard, Joëlle, Chappe, Nathalie, Cochard, François, Flage, Alexandre, Galeotti, Fabio, Hollandts, Xavier, Hopfensitz, Astrid, Jacquemet, Nicolas, Lec, Fabrice Le, Lefebvre, Marianne, Leplat, Mélody, Mantilla, Cesar, Mateu, Guillermo, Peron, Guillaume, Peterle, Emmanuel, Petit, Emmanuel, Raiber, Eva, Rosaz, Julie, Rozan, Anne, Tisserand, Jean-Christian, Villeval, Marie Claire, Willinger, Marc, Zylbersztejn, Adam, and Sutan, Angela

Published
2017

13. Trusting behavior in a repeated investment game

Author

Cochard, Francois, Van, Phu Nguyen, and Willinger, Marc

Subjects
Faith -- Management, Interpersonal relations, Company business management, Business, Economics
Abstract

Development of faith when associates intermingle is examined. Findings of the investment game are illustrated.

Published
2004

14. New concept of spectrograph for Near-Earth Asteroids observations

Author

Birlan, Mirel, Colas, Francois, Cochard, Francois, Benoit Carry, Vernazza, Pierre, Fornasier, Sonia, Perna, Davide, Institut de Mécanique Céleste et de Calcul des Ephémérides (IMCCE), Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Observatoire de Paris, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université de Lille-Sorbonne Université (SU)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Joseph Louis LAGRANGE (LAGRANGE), Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) (UNS), COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Observatoire de la Côte d'Azur, COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)-Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire d'Astrophysique de Marseille (LAM), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-Centre National d'Études Spatiales [Toulouse] (CNES), Laboratoire Energie Signal Images et Automatique [Univ Ngaoundéré] (LESIA), Université de Ngaoundéré/University of Ngaoundéré [Cameroun] (UN), Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)-Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) (UNS), COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Observatoire de la Côte d'Azur, Université Côte d'Azur (UCA)-COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) (COMUE UCA)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Aix Marseille Université (AMU)-Institut national des sciences de l'Univers (INSU - CNRS)-Centre National d'Études Spatiales [Toulouse] (CNES)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) (UNS)

Subjects
asteroids, instrumentation, [SDU.STU.PL]Sciences of the Universe [physics]/Earth Sciences/Planetology, spectrograph
Abstract

International audience; The article presents the concept of a new spectrograph designed to observe asteroids. The main objective of this instrument is the coverage in one shot of the wavelengths interval of the visible and near-infrared, between 0.5 and 1.6 μm. The spectrograph is designed to observe in low resolution and to characterize the minerals at the surface of asteroids

Published
2017

15. Nonpoint source pollution: An experimental investigation of the Average Pigouvian Tax

Author

Sarr, Hamet, Bchir, Mohamed, Cochard, Francois, Rozan, Anne, Gestion Territoriale de l'Eau et de l'environnement ( UMR GESTE ), École Nationale du Génie de l'Eau et de l'Environnement de Strasbourg ( ENGEES ) -Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture ( IRSTEA ), Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC ( CRESE ), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté ( UBFC ) -Université de Franche-Comté ( UFC ), Laboratoire Chrono-environnement ( LCE ), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté ( UBFC ) -Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ) -Université de Franche-Comté ( UFC ), Gestion Territoriale de l'Eau et de l'environnement (UMR GESTE), École Nationale du Génie de l'Eau et de l'Environnement de Strasbourg (ENGEES)-Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture (IRSTEA), Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (EA 3190) (CRESE), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)-Université de Franche-Comté (UFC), Laboratoire Chrono-environnement - UFC (UMR 6249) (LCE), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Franche-Comté (UFC), Université de Franche-Comté (UFC), and Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)-Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)

Subjects
social dilemma, [QFIN.PR]Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/Pricing of Securities [q-fin.PR], JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H23 - Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies, JEL : H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H23 - Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies, cooperation, JEL : C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, costly communication, [ QFIN.PR ] Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/Pricing of Securities [q-fin.PR], JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q53 - Air Pollution • Water Pollution • Noise • Hazardous Waste • Solid Waste • Recycling, JEL : Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q53 - Air Pollution • Water Pollution • Noise • Hazardous Waste • Solid Waste • Recycling, ambient tax, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior, nonpoint source pollution, vote, cheap talk
Abstract

The “Average Pigouvian Tax” (APT) was proposed by Suter et al. (2008) to reduce the financial burden of the standard ambient tax. This instrument consists in a standard ambient tax divided by the number of firms, which requires polluters to cooperate in order to achieve the social optimum. To enable polluters to cooperate, communication is allowed. We introduce different types of communication: cheap talk, exogenous costly communication (communication is imposed), and endogenous costly communication (conducted on a voluntary basis after a vote). Our experiment confirms that the instrument induces polluters to reduce their emissions under cheap talk. However, we find that group emissions are less reduced when communication is costly. This result still holds even when we endogenize communication by introducing a voting phase.

Published
2016

16. What if women earned more than their spouse? An experimental investigation of work division in couples

Author

Cochard, Francois, Couprie, Hélène, Hopfensitz, Astrid, Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (EA 3190) (CRESE), Université de Franche-Comté (UFC), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)-Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC), Théorie économique, modélisation et applications (THEMA), Université de Cergy Pontoise (UCP), Université Paris-Seine-Université Paris-Seine-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées, Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)-Université de Franche-Comté (UFC), Laboratoire Chrono-environnement - UFC (UMR 6249) (LCE), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Franche-Comté (UFC), Béal, Sylvain, Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC ( CRESE ), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté ( UBFC ) -Université de Franche-Comté ( UFC ), Laboratoire Chrono-environnement ( LCE ), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté ( UBFC ) -Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ) -Université de Franche-Comté ( UFC ), Théorie économique, modélisation et applications ( THEMA ), Université de Cergy Pontoise ( UCP ), Université Paris-Seine-Université Paris-Seine-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ), Toulouse School of Economics ( TSE ), and Toulouse School of Economics

Subjects
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C99 - Other, [ QFIN.PM ] Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/Portfolio Management [q-fin.PM], [QFIN.PM]Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/Portfolio Management [q-fin.PM], JEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics/D.D1.D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation, JEL : C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C99 - Other, jel:C99, [QFIN.PM] Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/Portfolio Management [q-fin.PM], jel:D13, Work division, Time allocation, Experiment on couples, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics/D.D1.D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation, jel:J16, Experiment on couples, Time allocation, Work division, JEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J1 - Demographic Economics/J.J1.J16 - Economics of Gender • Non-labor Discrimination, JEL : J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J1 - Demographic Economics/J.J1.J16 - Economics of Gender • Non-labor Discrimination
Abstract

Female specialization on household work and male specialization on labor-market work is a widely observed phenomenon across time and countries. Gender differences regarding characteristics (preferences, productivity) and context (wage rates, social norms) are generally recognized to explain this fact. We experimentally investigate work division by true co-habiting couples participating in a newly developed specialization task. Efficiency in this task comes at the cost of inequality, giving higher earnings to the “advantaged” player. We compare behavior when men (or women) are in the advantaged position, which correspond to the traditional (or power) couple case where he (or she) earns more. We show that women do not contribute more than men to the household public good whatever the situation. This result allows us to rule-out some of the standard explanations of the work division puzzle.

Published
2015

17. Equality-Efficiency Trade-off within French and German Couples – A Comparative Experimental Study

Author

Beblo, Miriam, Beninger, Denis, Cochard, Francois, Couprie, Helene, and Hopfensitz, Astrid

Subjects
jel:C92, jel:C71, Intra-household allocation, Inequality aversion, Pareto efficiency, social norms, jel:C91, Intra-household allocation, Inequality aversion, Pareto efficiency, social norms, C91, ddc:330, C92, D13, B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE, jel:D13
Abstract

We present the results of an experiment that measures social preferences within couples in a context where intra-household pay-off inequality can be reduced at the cost of diminishing household income. We measure social norms regarding this efficiency-equality trade-off and implement a cross-country comparison between France and Germany. In particular, we show that German households are more inequality averse and are thus less efficient than French households. A decomposition of this difference reveals that approximately 40% is driven by diverging sample compositions in the two countries, while 60% of the initial French/German difference remains unexplained. Beliefs differ significantly from observed behavior in both countries. Efficient choices are overestimated in the German sample and underestimated in the French.

Published
2012

18. Pollution diffuse aux nitrates et incitations économiques

Author

Willinger, Marc, Verchère, Alban, Spaeter, Sandrine, Cochard, Francois, Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) (CRESE), Université de Franche-Comté (UFC), Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC)-Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] (UBFC), Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne (CREUSET), Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Université Montpellier 1 (UM1)-Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 (UPVM)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques (Montpellier SupAgro)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), and Cet article s'inscrit dans le cadre du Programme Sciences Economiques Et Environnement (S3E) du Ministère de l'Ecologie, du Développement et de l'Aménagement Durables (MEDAD), que nous tenons à remercier pour son soutien.

Subjects
Pollution diffuse, Nitrates, Eau, Incitations, Incentives, Water, Agriculture, Nitrate, Non-point source pollution, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Abstract

International audience; Despite the fact that up to now France has never used economic incentives to manage nitrate NPS pollution, this article reconsiders the potential of these instruments. The analysis is carried out on the basis of our European neighbours' experience —whenever possible—, or of theoretical advances and lab experiments. In particular, our analysis of several field experiments suggests that devices proposed to farmers must be the most efficient as possible, but also that they must be fair in order to mitigate social acceptability issues. However, the most ambitious devices have high costs of implementation, which can dissuade the regulator to use them. Hence, it becomes important to find means of reducing them. We tackle this question by describing two promising solutions: On the one hand, the introduction of retroactive audits, on the other hand, the use of ambient inspections.; Bien que la France ait écarté jusqu'ici l'idée de recourir à des instruments incitatifs pour réduire la pollution diffuse aux nitrates, cet article revient sur le potentiel de ces instruments tels qu'ils ont été employés par certains de nos voisins européens ou à défaut, tels qu'ils ont été conçus et testés en laboratoire. Il ressort en particulier de l'analyse de plusieurs expériences menées sur le terrain que les dispositifs doivent être les plus efficients possibles, mais aussi paraître justes aux acteurs, sans quoi se pose la question de leur acceptabilité. Pour autant, les dispositifs les plus ambitieux ont des coûts de mis en œuvre élevés qui peuvent dissuader les régulateurs. Il convient donc de trouver des moyens de les réduire, question que nous abordons ici en évoquant alors deux pistes prometteuses : l'introduction de la rétroactivité dans les contrôles d'une part et le recours à des inspections ambiantes de l'autre.

Published
2009
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19. On the Acceptability of the Ambient Tax Mechanism: An Experimental Investigation

Author

Boun My, Kene, Cochard, Francois, Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (BETA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université de Strasbourg (UNISTRA)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Max Planck Institute of Economics, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Economie des Ressources Naturelles (LERNA), Université Toulouse Capitole (UT Capitole), and Université de Toulouse (UT)-Université de Toulouse (UT)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA)

Subjects
jel:C92, JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior, 05 social sciences, Nonpoint Source Pollution, Group Decision Making, Experiments, Acceptability of fiscal instruments, ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, jel:Q5, ComputingMilieux_GENERAL, JEL: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics, 13. Climate action, jel:H3, 0502 economics and business, [SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration, 050202 agricultural economics & policy, 050207 economics, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
Abstract

International audience; Regulation of non-point emission problems such as pesticide and nitrogen pollution of lakesand ground water is a major policy challenge. The emissions-based instruments that economistsusually advocate for cost-effective pollution control are not feasible since emissions are unobserv-able. Among the policy instruments suggested by the theoretical literature on non-point manage-ment, the tax schemes applied to ambient concentrations (“ambient taxes” for short) have drawnparticular interest. While the relative efficiency of ambient based taxes has been demonstratedexperimentally, the instrument may raise serious acceptability problems. In particular, individualswho take costly actions to improve their environmental performance could find themselves subjectto larger rather than smaller penalties due to environmental shirking on the part of others. Ourobjective in this paper is to assess the acceptability of the ambient tax. Concretely, we ask subjectsto choose between (A) an ambient tax and (B) an individual tax system. In case (A), they actuallyparticipate in a game in which their payoff depends on all participants’ decisions and on naturalvariability as would be the case in the real world if an ambient tax was implemented. In case(B) they simply earn a sure payoff, which is supposed to reflect their maximal profit under theindividual tax system. We take the percentage of agents preferring the ambient tax to a given surepayoff level as an indicator of the acceptability of the ambient tax given this sure payoff level. Ourexperimental results mitigate the common belief that ambient taxes are totally unacceptable. Ifthe “sure” alternative to the ambient tax policy is very costly for the polluters, for example becauseit involves high inspection costs, polluters might eventually prefer being liable to an ambient tax.

Published
2007
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