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According to explanationist theories of evidence, fact-finders reason by evaluating the 'goodness' of different narratives that explain the evidence. One standard is external coherence: does the narrative fit with what the fact-finder knows or assumes about the world? This study uses qualitative content analysis to examine how District Court judges draw inferences directly from 'background knowledge' in 119 Finnish rape cases and how these inferences are contested by dissenting and appellate judges. The results show that especially the complainant's behaviour was frequently evaluated against behavioural scripts and other background beliefs. Outspoken reliance on rape myths was relatively rare, and myths were explicitly resisted as often as they were relied upon. Where judges used stereotypical behaviour to support the rape complainant's testimony, this reasoning could be explained by the search for optimum (explanatory) coherence or the Finnish legal principle that a rape complainant's testimony requires supporting evidence. Judges also used estimates of prior probabilities to inform their reasoning; few behaviours are impossible, but some actions are 'more coherent' with rape than with non-rape, or vice versa. Accruing the type of knowledge necessary (and usually unavailable) for probabilistic reasoning is therefore necessary also for explanationist reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationale: The coherence theory of truth, the epistemology of evidence-based medicine, mathematical statistics, and axiomatic mathematics., Aims and Objectives: To explore mathematical misconceptions inhering in randomised controlled trial designs, suggest improvements, encourage meta-methodological discussions and call for further interdisciplinary studies., Method: Mathematical-statistical analyses and science-philosophical considerations., Results: Randomisation does not (necessarily) generate equal samples, ergo, outcomes of usual RCTs are not as reliable as they claim. Moreover, ignoring initial sample discrepancies may cause inaccuracies similar to type I and type II errors. Insufficient awareness of these flaws harms final RCT statements about significance and evidence levels, hence their loss of trustworthiness. Statistical parameters such as the standard error of the mean may help to estimate the expected distinction between random samples., Conclusion: Researchers in EBM should be aware of systemic misconceptions in RCT standards. Pre-measurement can reduce shortcomings, e.g. through calculation how sample differences impact on usual RCT processing, or randomisation is given up in favour of mathematical minimisation of sample differences, i.e. optimising statistical sample equality. Moreover, the promising future of dynamic simulation models is highlighted., (© 2024 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Copyright of Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia is the property of Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Discusiones Filosóficas is the property of Universidad de Caldas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Inconsistency is often considered an indication of deceit. The conceptualization of consistency used in deception research, however, has not made a clear distinction between two concepts long differentiated by philosophers: coherence and correspondence. The existing literature suggests that coherence is not generally useful for deception detection. Correspondence, however, appears to be quite useful. The present research developed a model of how correspondence is utilized to make judgments, and this article reports on four studies designed to elaborate on the model. The results suggest that judges attend strongly to correspondence and that they do so in an additive fashion. As noncorrespondent information accumulates, an increasingly smaller proportion of judges make truthful assessments of guilty suspects. This work provides a basic framework for examining how information is utilized to make deception judgments and forms the correspondence and coherence module of truth-default theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we present a non-trivial and expressively complete paraconsistent naïve theory of truth, as a step in the route towards semantic closure. We achieve this goal by expressing self-reference with a weak procedure, that uses equivalences between expressions of the language, as opposed to a strong procedure, that uses identities. Finally, we make some remarks regarding the sense in which the theory of truth discussed has a property closely related to functional completeness, and we present a sound and complete three-sided sequent calculus for this expressively rich theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on a study related to analysis of F. P. Ramsey's approach towards belief and inquiry. Topics discussed include assessment of Donald Davidson perspective over determination of truth for pragmatist literature; observation of Ramsey over an opposition of coherence theory of truth partisan towards truth defenders; and contribution of epistemological lessons for entitlement of impossibility with belief leads to objectively truth.

In this paper I seek to defend an epistemology that does not confine itself to the knowledge of propositions. The first section motivates this move, especially from the standpoint of the philosophy of science. The second section presents the notion of operational coherence as the key to understanding how knowledge resides in activities. The third section presents a proposal for making sense of truth on the basis of operational coherence. The final section briefly reconsiders the relation between knowledge-as-ability and knowledge-as-information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the truth-conduciveness problem of coherentism, the coherence theory of justification can hardly show that coherentist justification is truth-conducive. This problem is generally conceived as the most recalcitrant problem with the coherence theory. The purpose of this paper is to show that it does not pose a serious problem for a certain version of coherentism, namely a Sellarsian explanatory coherence theory of justification combined with the deflationary theory of truth. On this version of coherentism, our epistemic goal is to gradually improve our conceptual framework so as to maximize its explanatory coherence, and there is no substantial norm of truth independent of the norms of justification, so that we cannot evaluate the truth-conduciveness of a belief independently of the norms of justification. I argue that this version of coherentism can cope with the truth-conduciveness problem. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper, we share results from a classroom intervention that used a conceptual representation to support reasoning about ecosystems. Engaging students in modeling allows them to make their ideas visible while being malleable and available for discussion, which enables students to make meaning out of systems. Further, the Components-Mechanisms-Phenomena (CMP) conceptual representation was designed to enable students to construct coherent mental models. Following our intervention, students deepened their understanding of ecosystem dynamics when compared to students who engaged in traditional instruction without use of the CMP conceptual representation. We discuss our results in terms of data that helped guide the design of the intervention and we describe a theoretical perspective that can be used to guide future instruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Under the view of dynamical system theory, expertise in sports emerges from the interaction of multiple constraints. At an individual level, important interactions amongst constraints could include the relationships that evolve between one's family, playmates/coaches, and specific training activities. Or more broadly, other environmental constraints can be the strong socio-cultural-historical contexts that influence expertise development in sports around the world, such as rugby (e.g. New Zealand) and football (e.g. Brazil). An increasing number of studies have demonstrated the influence of environmental constraints on the development of sport expertise. Whilst making important contributions to knowledge, such studies have been limited in scope and fail to consider in depth how informal and even aversive learning environment constraints affect skills development. Objective: The objective of this paper is to outline a new contextualised approach to studying socio-cultural constraints on individuals, proposing an interpretive, multi-method approach to holistically investigate the interacting constraints on an athlete's development pathway. Aims: We explain a rationale for adopting an interpretive research paradigm (in contrast to traditional positivist approaches) for exploring socio-cultural constraints. The epistemological and methodological assumptions of Bronfenbrenner's Bioecological Model of Human Development are proposed as an underpinning framework for data collection and organisation of material. We advocate for ethnographic strategies of inquiry, followed by a discussion of potential methods for generating and analysing data: contextual analysis, participant-observation, and open-ended interviews. Finally, we discuss evaluation criteria for this contextualised approach viewed from a coherence theory of truth. Purpose: This position statement seeks to: (1) promote methodological possibilities to investigate the effect of socio cultural constraints on expertise acquisition in sport and (2) offer significant new theoretical and epistemological insights from the constraints-led approach to expertise and to integrate some of the interdisciplinary differences that exist in the body of sciences. Final thoughts: Our tentative contribution to the development of the proposed contextualised skill acquisition research framework is to build bridges across the methodological boundaries between sociology and motor learning in the first instance, rather than offering a unifying approach for the whole field. We hope that this position statement will provide a foundation for future related empirical papers and to stimulate other researchers to consider the framework for their own investigations of motor learning in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study was to investigate epistemological beliefs and programme coherence in nursing, social work and general teacher-training programmes. An abstract theoretical knowledge base is a key characteristic of professions. However, reports have shown a gap between professional education and professional practice. Data used in this study are taken from surveys among students, college teachers and placement supervisors. The results of this study do not corroborate with the notion of clashing epistemological beliefs between the educational field and the field of practice. However, the results do indicate that the way theories are taught and how students study may influence student views of the importance of theoretical knowledge for professional practice. The general teacher-training programme, more than the other programmes, faces challenges in linking theory to practice. The nursing programme also encounters difficulties in college teachers being able to relate some of the nursing-specific theories to practice in the classroom setting. Moreover, the findings imply that not only programme coherence, but also students' study efforts might be essential aspects in explaining why some students do not perceive theoretical knowledge as important for professional practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A fundamental debate in the philosophy of science is whether our central concepts are true or only useful instruments to help predict and manipulate the world. The first position is termed ‘realism’ and the second ‘instrumentalism’. Strong support for the instrumentalist position comes from the ‘pessimistic induction’ (PI) argument. Given that many key scientific concepts once considered true (e.g. humors, ether, epicycles, phlogiston) are now considered false, how, the argument goes, can we assert that our current concepts are true? The PI argument applies strongly to psychiatric diagnoses. Given our long history of abandoned diagnoses, arguments that we have finally ‘gotten it right’ and developed definitive psychiatric categories that correspond to observer-independent reality are difficult to defend. For our current diagnostic categories, we should settle for a less ambitious vision of truth. For this, the coherence theory, which postulates that something is true when it fits well with the other things we confidently know about the world, can serve us well. Using the coherence theory, a diagnosis is real to the extent that it is well integrated into our accumulating scientific data base. Furthermore, the coherence theory establishes a framework for us to evaluate our diagnostic categories and can provide a set of criteria, closely related to our concept of validators, for deciding when they are getting better. Finally, we need be much less skeptical about the truth status of the aggregate concept of psychiatric illness than we are regarding the specific categories in our current nosology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although many scholars take a foundationalist approach to the theory of knowledge in Republic V-VII, few if any have responded to a growing number of coherentist interpretations, which hold that, for Plato, justification rests not on a first principle but rather on the coherence of a sufficiently large number of beliefs. This paper argues that the structure of knowledge in the Republic analogies is incompatible with the coherentist reading. Plato's analogies provide ample evidence that he holds something, at the very least, approximating a foundationalist first principle. In addition, this paper puts forward a Platonic solution to the regress problem. It argues that the form of the good is plausibly self-justifying. Because the form of the good serves as the 'measure' by which the philosopher is able to determine the goodness, fittingness, and truth of all that he encounters (517b), it seems reasonable to conclude that the philosopher's ultimate source of justification - what it is that puts an end to the search for explanations and serves as an explanation of his claim to know the form of the good - is nothing other than the form of the good itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we show that the coherence measures of Olsson (J Philos 94:246-272, ), Shogenji (Log Anal 59:338-345, ), and Fitelson (Log Anal 63:194-199, ) satisfy the two most important adequacy requirements for the purpose of assessing theories. Following Hempel (Synthese 12:439-469, ), Levi (Gambling with truth, New York, A. A. Knopf, ), and recently Huber (Synthese 161:89-118, ) we require, as minimal or necessary conditions, that adequate assessment functions favor true theories over false theories and true and informative theories over true but uninformative theories. We then demonstrate that the coherence measures of Olsson, Shogenji, and Fitelson satisfy these minimal conditions if we confront the hypotheses with a separating sequence of observational statements. In the concluding remarks we set out the philosophical relevance, and limitations, of the formal results. Inter alia, we discuss the problematic implications of our precondition that competing hypotheses must be confronted with a separating sequence of observational statements, which also leads us to discuss theory assessment in the context of scientific antirealism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that coherence is truth- conducive in that coherence implies an increase in the probability of truth. Central to my argument is a certain principle for transitivity in probabilistic support. I then address a question concerning the truth-conduciveness of coherence as it relates to (something else I argue for) the truth-conduciveness of consistency, and consider how the truth-conduciveness of coherence bears on coherentist theories of justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laurence BonJour's (1985) coherence theory of empirical knowledge relies heavily on a traditional foundationalist theory of a priori knowledge. He argues that a foundationalist, rationalist theory of a priori justification is indispensable for a coherence theory. BonJour (1998) continues this theme, arguing that a traditional account of a priori justification is indispensable for the justification of putative a priori truths, the justification of any non-observational belief and the justification of reasoning itself. While BonJour's indispensability arguments have received some critical discussion (Gendler 2001; Harman 2001; Beebe 2008), no one has investigated the indispensability arguments from a coherentist perspective. This perspective offers a fruitful take on Bonjour's arguments, because he does not appreciate the depth of the coherentist alternative to the traditional empiricist-rationalist debate. This is surprising on account of Bonjour's previous defense of coherentism. Two significant conclusions emerge: first, Bonjour's indispensability arguments beg central questions about an explanationist form of coherentism; second, Bonjour's original defense of coherentism took on board certain assumptions that inevitably led to the demise of his form of coherentism. The positive conclusion of this article is that explanatory coherentism is more coherent than Bonjour's indispensability arguments assume, and more coherent than Bonjour's earlier coherentist epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relevance of the Dutch Book Argument (DBA) in showing the rationality that credences have certain structures. It explores the different belief structures that operate in different behavioral situations and result to misleading appearance of inconsistent beliefs. It suggests that the DBA has failed in showing that all probabilistic coherence or incoherent credences are irrational.

This paper examines how coherence of the contents of evidence affects the transmission of probabilistic support from the evidence to the hypothesis. It is argued that coherence of the contents in the sense of the ratio of the positive intersection reduces the transmission of probabilistic support, though this negative impact of coherence may be offset by other aspects of the relations among the contents. It is argued further that there is no broader conception of coherence whose impact on the transmission of probabilistic support is never offset by other aspects of the relations among the contents. The paper also examines reasons for the contrary impression that coherence of the contents increases the transmission of probabilistic support, especially in the special case where the hypothesis to evaluate is the conjunction of the contents of evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Trans/Form/Ação is the property of Trans/Form/Acao and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Limite is the property of Universidad de Tarapaca, Departamento de Filosofia y Psicologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

While historically prominent theories of truth such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism diverge in many ways, they converge in at least one fundamental respect. They are all monist theories of truth. They incorporate the thesis that there is one property—and one property only—in virtue of which propositions can be true. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. This article offers a survey of recent work on alethic pluralism—presenting various incarnations of the view, objections leveled against them, and various lines of response available to pluralists. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this paper we critically examine and seek to extend Philip Kitcher's Ethical Project to weave together a distinctive naturalistic conception of how ethics came to occupy the place it does in our lives and how the existing ethical project should be revised and extended into the future. Although we endorse his insight that ethical progress is better conceived of as the improvement of an existing state than an incremental approach towards a fixed endpoint, we nonetheless go on to argue that the metaethical apparatus Kitcher constructs around this creative metaethical proposal simply cannot do the work that he demands of it. The prospect of fundamental conflict between different functions of the ethical project requires Kitcher to appeal to a particular normative stance in order to judge specific changes in the ethical project to be genuinely progressive, and we argue that the virtues of continuity and coherence to which he appeals can only specify rather than justify the normative stance he favors. We conclude by suggesting an alternative approach for ethical naturalists that seems to us ultimately more promising than Kitcher's own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent publications, Kit Fine devises a classification of A-theories of time and defends a non-standard A-theory he calls fragmentalism, according to which reality as a whole is incoherent but fragments into classes of mutually coherent tensed facts. We argue that Fine's classification in not exhaustive, as it ignores another non-standard A-theory we dub dynamic absolutism, according to which there are tensed facts that stay numerically the same and yet undergo qualitative changes as time goes by. We expound this theory in some detail and argue that it is a serious alternative to the positions identified by Fine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper characterizes the optimal composition of a group for making a combined forecast. In the model, individual forecasters have types defined according to a statistical criterion we call type coherence. Members of the same type have identical expected accuracy, and forecasters within a type have higher covariance than forecasters of different types. We derive the optimal group composition as a function of predictive accuracy, between- and within-type covariance, and group size. Group size plays a critical role in determining the optimal group: in small groups the most accurate type should be in the majority, whereas in large groups the type with the least within-type covariance should dominate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

abstract The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid rise of varieties of historicism in Germany, during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, and subsequently in England and America, resulted in a radical transformation of the principles of coherence and methods of analysis within biblical studies.1This paper will argue that the foundational 'subject/object' metaphysics of historicism has been subverted over the past century. For this reason, historical positivism should no longer be accorded the status of 'normative paradigm' and 'gatekeeper' over and against other interpretive approaches. This paper next lays out five principles for a renewed practice of historical inquiry. It argues, first, that historical inquiry continues to serve a vital function within biblical studies in its ability to call attention to historical difference, and, thereby, to contribute to a strategy of resistance to ideology and to totalizing theories; second, that the traditional appeal to historical 'context' and 'author' in the interpretation of texts continues to be a useful practice - despite the provisional and constructed nature of both - as a way of taking into account extra-lingual reference and of avoiding presentism; third, that the substitution of new 'grand narratives' of Christian origins in place of the (quasi-theological) 'historical' narrative of traditional Christianity - under the claim of historical objectivity - should be abandoned because the very concept of 'origins' is the result of a literalizing of a metaphor. Such totalizing narratives always reduce history's inherent polycentricism. Fourth, I will argue that the continued use of historicism in the antiquarian attempt to reconstruct the past, disconnected from both a quest for social justice and a desire for personal self-creation, represents a form of thought that alienates scholars from themselves and from their real material contexts. Finally, and following on the previous point, this paper submits that the practice of historical analysis has an ethical dimension by virtue of the fact that the personhood of the biblical historian is indissolubly linked to other dimensions of life including the social and ethical aspects of life. These added dimensions complicate the making of choices, which is implicit within all practices of interpretation. These five principles are here suggested as points of departure for the reconceptualization of the scope and function of historical inquiry within the discipline of New Testament studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a case study related to coherence theory in support of epistemology is presented. Seven systematic reviews were conducted to show that principles of the coherence theory could be applied to specific beliefs in healthcare. The systematic reviews were related to various aspects of the clinical use of glass-ionomer cements (GICs) and dental caries. It states that scepticism towards clinical procedures's benefits may epistemologically be refuted on basis of logical coherence.

The article offers the author's insights regarding the Fourth Meditation Cartesian circle. He argues that the new Cartesian circle serves as a stepping stone toward the rehabilitation of the much-maligned interpretation of Descartes as holding a coherence theory of truth. He believes that the separation of God and philosophy is the fundamental insight of Descartes. Moreover, he adds that Harry Frankfurt renounced the coherentist interpretation of Descartes.

Tononi has proposed a fundamental theory of consciousness he terms Integrated Information Theory (IIT). IIT purports to explain the quantity of conscious experience by linking it with integrated information: information shared by the system as a whole and quantified by adopting a modified version of Shannon's definition of information. Since the fundamental aspect of IIT is information the theory allows for the multiple realizability of consciousness. While there are several concepts within IIT that need further theoretical development, the main failings of the theory are an absence of a link between conscious experience and awareness and the use of Shannon's limited data based definition of information. These limitations prevent the theory from satisfying Chalmers' principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance which any functionalist theory should obey. It is not clear whether IIT can be repaired without simply reducing the theory to a general statement of computational functionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the concept of coherence and its role in legal reasoning. First, it identifies some problem areas confronting coherence theories of legal reasoning about both disputed questions of fact and disputed questions of law. Second, with a view to solving these problems, it proposes a coherence model of legal reasoning. The main tenet of this coherence model is that a belief about the law and the facts under dispute is justified if it is 'optimally coherent,' that is, if it is such that an epistemically responsible legal decision-maker would have accepted it as justified by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. Last, looking beyond the coherence theory, the paper explores the implications of the version of legal coherentism proposed for a general theory of legal reasoning and rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most foundationalists allow that relations of coherence among antecedently justified beliefs can enhance their overall level of justification or warrant. In light of this, some coherentists ask the following question: if coherence can elevate the epistemic status of a set of beliefs, what prevents it from generating warrant entirely on its own? Why do we need the foundationalist's basic beliefs? I address that question here, drawing lessons from an instructive series of attempts to reconstruct within the probability calculus the classical problem of independent witnesses who corroborate each other's testimony. Starred section headings indicate sections omitted here, but available on the author's USC website. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bevir has argued that Quentin Skinner's attack on the alleged 'myth of coherence' in the history of ideas depends on mistaken views of the nature of mind, namely a focus on illocutionary intentions at the expense of beliefs. An attempt is made to clarify just what the myth of coherence is and what kind of coherence is at issue, with a view to assessing the criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recently emergent functional neuroimaging literature has described the functional anatomical correlates of deception among healthy volunteers, most often implicating the ventrolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices. To date, there have been no such imaging studies of people with severe mental illness. To discover whether the brains of people with schizophrenia would manifest a similar functional anatomical distinction between the states of truthfulness and deceit. It is hypothesised that, as with healthy people, persons with schizophrenia will show activation in the ventrolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices when lying. Fifty-two people satisfying Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder-IV criteria for schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging at 3 T while responding truthfully or with lies to questions concerning their recent actions. Half the sample was concurrently experiencing delusions. As hypothesised, patients exhibited greater activity in ventrolateral prefrontal cortices while lying. Truthful responses were not associated with any areas of relatively increased activation. The presence or absence of delusions did not substantially affect these findings, although subtle laterality effects were discernible upon post hoc analyses. As in healthy cohorts, the brains of people with schizophrenia exhibit a functional anatomical distinction between the states of truthfulness and deceit. Furthermore, this distinction pertains even in the presence of delusions. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the use of probability theory in understanding and evaluating the coherence theory of justification. It explores the core commitments of coherentism and the different challenges confronting coherence theory based on the theorems of probability. Moreover, it argues that foundationalism provides a reasonable account of the structure of one's actual beliefs.

Suyûtî has indicated in his annotation on Baydawi's Qur'anic commentary to some ideas that exist in this commentary which belong to the Mu'tazilah. His student Shâmî has collected these different and criticized ideas in a booklet. An Ottoman scholar, Hocazâdah Muhammad Wacîh has written an another booklet about these ideas that are in this booklet. Zabîdî has written an onother booklet to take consideration these ideas which exist this booklet. In this article, the Mu'tazilitah effects on the Baydawi's Qur'anic commentary are taken under study in the limit of this annotation and these three booklets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]