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Lacking the power to enforce its decisions, the Supreme Court must rely on other actors to ensure that its dictates are carried out. One such actor is the president, who can support or oppose the Court's decisions in his public speeches in an effort to promote or hinder their implementation. Using an original dataset, we investigate the tone of presidential speeches about Supreme Court cases to understand why sitting presidents target Supreme Court decisions in their public rhetoric. We find that presidents discuss cases based primarily on their ideological (dis)agreement with the decision, whether the decision declared a law unconstitutional, and whether the case was decided by a minimum winning coalition. These results inform our understanding of presidential speechmaking, executive-judicial relations, and the ways in which presidents implement legal decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings of Supreme Court nominees act as a mechanism by which the public, through its representatives on the Committee, shapes, debates, and changes constitutional meaning. To evaluate this perspective, we investigate the extent to which the issues addressed at the hearings track both public opinion and Supreme Court precedents from 1955-2006. In so doing, we contribute to two literatures. First, we expand on our knowledge of how public opinion is communicated to the justices by analyzing the extent to which the issues raised at hearings reflect the salient political topics of the day. Second, we advance our understanding of the impact of Court decisions by exploring how recent Supreme Court precedents influence the dialogue at confirmation hearings. Our results indicate that both public opinion and Supreme Court precedents play an important role in shaping the dialogue at confirmation hearings, highlighting the roles of the citizenry and the Supreme Court in directing the future of constitutional change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although scholars have long studied why presidents "go public" on a host of topics, no research has specifically investigated presidential statements about Supreme Court cases. To examine this significant issue, we have cataloged the number of times presidents have commented publicly on Supreme Court cases from the Eisenhower to Obama administrations. We posit that presidents discuss judicial decisions primarily to assist in their pursuit of policy and reelection goals, and to enhance their historical legacy. Our empirical findings lend support to our expectations, revealing that reelection years, media attention to the Court's decisions, and partisanship shape the volume of monthly presidential remarks on Supreme Court cases. Taken as a whole, this research contributes to our understanding of presidential speechmaking, executive-judicial branch interactions, and the methods presidents use to implement Supreme Court decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have dedicated substantial research efforts to investigating whether interest group amicus curiae briefs influence the behavior of Supreme Court justices. Despite this, there has been little systematic attention devoted to exploring what is arguably the most important aspect of the Court's policy outputs - its majority opinions. We remedy this state of affairs by using plagiarism detection software to assess the ability of amicus briefs to shape the content of judicial opinions. Our findings indicate that the justices incorporate language from amicus briefs into their opinions based primarily on the extent to which amicus briefs contribute to their ability to make effective law and policy. These results add fresh insight into how interest groups influence the development of federal law by the Supreme Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines the applicability of cognitive dissonance theory to explain a judge's decision to author or join a separate opinion. I propose that, following a counter-attitudinal vote, a judge will endeavor to reduce the aversive consequences of being viewed as an inconsistent decision maker by justifying his or her attitudinally incongruent vote choice to the public in a separate opinion. I test this possibility by examining U.S. Supreme Court justices' decisions to author or join concurring and dissenting opinions during the 1946-2001 terms. The empirical results provide qualified support for the use of separate opinions as dissonance reduction mechanisms, suggesting that dissonance theory is both applicable to the actions of elite decision makers and enjoys validity outside of a laboratory setting. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though there is an extensive literature focused on the participation and efficacy of amici curiae in the U.S. Supreme Court, there is exceedingly little rigorous analysis of amici curiae in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. This deficit is troubling in several regards, including the fact that much more amicus activity occurs in the latter than in the former. In this paper, we contribute to the amelioration of this deficiency by systematically analyzing the influence of amicus curiae briefs on U.S. Court of Appeals decision making using Kuersten and Haire's (2007) Update to the Appeals Court Data Base (1997-2002) in conjunction with data gathered from Westlaw and PACER. Our empirical analysis reveals that amicus briefs filed in support of the appellant enhance the likelihood of that litigant's probability of success but that amicus briefs filed in support of the appellee have no effect on litigation outcomes. We conclude that amici can help level the playing field between appellants and appellees by serving to counter the propensity to affirm in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories of counteractive lobbying assert that interest groups lobby for the purpose of neutralizing the advocacy efforts of their opponents. We examine the applicability of counteractive lobbying to explain interest group amicus curiae participation in the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on the merits. Testing the counteractive lobbying hypotheses from 1953-2001, we provide strong support for the contention that interest groups engage in counteractive lobbying in the nation's highest court. Our findings indicate that, like the elected branches of government, the Supreme Court is properly viewed as a battleground for public policy in which organized interests clash in their attempts to etch their policy preferences into law. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disputes involving the boundaries of state versus federal power make up a substantial portion of the Supreme Court's docket and have undergone extensive analysis. Yet, the conventional wisdom regarding the justices' choices in these cases is that they are highly inconsistent. I argue that this is primarily a function of the failure of scholars to develop a comprehensive model of the justices' federalism decision making. To remedy this, I introduce an integrated model of the individual justices' choices in these cases, which is then subjected to empirical testing in the Rehnquist Court era (1986-2004). I explore a host of determinants of the justices' decision making, including attitudinal, institutional, legal, and personal attributes, as well as the role of organized interests in the Court. The findings reveal that the choices justices make in these cases are not as discordant as most commentators suggest. Rather, they are relatively predictable through the application of an integrated model of judicial choice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite that fact that amicus curiae participation is the most common method of interest group activity in the judicial arena, there is little consensus as to whether this means of participation influences the decision making of the U.S. Supreme Court. To redress this state of affairs, this research investigates the affect of amicus briefs on the ideological direction of the CourtÂ’s decisions, with particular attention given to theoretical and methodological issues that have gone unexplored in previous studies. Analyzing group influence during the 1946-1995 terms, the results provide particularly robust evidence that pressure groups are effective in shaping the CourtÂ’s policy outputs. These findings therefore indicate that elite decision makers can be influenced by persuasive argumentation presented by organized interests. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents research which assessed the Solicitor General's amicus curiae strategies in the U.S. Supreme Court. Factors that contributed to the decision of a Solicitor General to participate as amicus curiae in the Supreme Court; Analysis of the influence of Solicitor General on justices' decision making.

The article focuses on a study which examined factors that affect the consistency of judicial choices. Among the factors that are hypothesized to influence the consistency of the voting behavior of justices include attributes of the justices, cases and the information surrounding each case. To test the validity of the proposed hypotheses, justices' voting behavior in cases decided during the 1946-2001 terms were examined.

Recent analyses of amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court confirm that this method of interest group participation influences litigation success. However, none of these studies examine the affect of amicus briefs on the decision making of the individual justices. A byproduct of this is that scholars have yet to develop explanations for the influence of amicus briefs consistent with existing theories of the choices justices make. This paper attempts to remedy this state of affairs by developing a theoretical framework in which the influence of amicus participation is viewed in light of two theories of judicial choice: the legal and attitudinal models. I consider amicus briefs as sources of legal and political information for the justices and examine whether their influence is mediated by judicial ideology (e.g., dependent upon the congruence of the information in the briefs with the policy preferences of the justices). I subject my hypotheses to empirical validation by examining the votes of all justices during the 1953-1997 terms in free expression law, which allows me to control for additional influences on judicial decision making, such as case factors and precedent. The results indicate that, while amicus briefs play a significant role in judicial decision making, attitudes do not act as a mediating variable as to how the justices respond to the information contained in the briefs. Rather, these results are consistent with the legal model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the fact that numerous studies examining the effectiveness of amicus curiae briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court exist, there is little consensus among judicial scholars regarding whether or not this method of interest group participation influences the decision making of the justices. This paper attempts to remedy this state of affairs by developing two competing theories as to why amicus briefs might influence the justices' decision making. Building on intuitions from the attitudinal model and the cognitive response model developed in social psychology, I posit that amicus briefs are efficacious because they provide the justices with information that helps them locate their policy preferences. Accordingly, I argue that the presence of amicus briefs in a case enables the justices to better employ their policy preferences, thus allowing them to make their decisions more coherently based on their attitudes and values. In this sense, attitudes act as a mediating variable as to how the justices are expected to respond to amicus briefs. Building on intuitions from the legal model, I posit that amicus briefs are effective because they provide the justices with legal, political, and social scientific evidence that serves to buttress the arguments of the direct parties to litigation. As such, I argue that the presence of amicus briefs should influence the justices uniformly, regardless of their ideological predispositions. I subject these arguments to empirical validation by examining the votes of all justices during the 1946-1995 terms, with special attention given to civil rights and liberties law. The results indicate that ideology does not play a mediating role in regards to how the justices respond to the information contained in amicus filings. Rather, the influence of amicus briefs is best explained through the legal persuasion framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interest groups pursue their goals in a variety of venues, including the courts. At the United States Supreme Court, the predominant method of interest group participation is the amicus curiae brief (Epstein 1991). Since the 1960s interest groups participating as amici curiae have increased remarkably, with briefs now present in over eighty percent of cases given full treatment by the Court (Kearney and Merrill 2000). While scholars have accumulated a reasonably large body of work on amicus briefs, questions still remain regarding whether or not amicus briefs influence the decision making of Supreme Court justices, perhaps because much of the prior work on amicus briefs has been without strong theoretical foundation. Building on intuitions from the attitudinal model, I posit that amicus briefs are efficacious because they provide the justices with information that helps them locate their policy preferences. Accordingly, I argue that the presence of amicus briefs in a case enables the justices to reinforce and update their policy preferences, thus allowing them to make their decisions more coherently based on their attitudes and values. I subject this argument to empirical validation by examining all cases decided in the U.S. Supreme Court during the 1953-1995 terms. The results indicate that all justices respond to the presence of amicus briefs, even those briefs that are not congruent with their ideological predispositions. However, as theorized, liberal briefs are more influential for liberal justices than conservative briefs, while conservative briefs are much more influential for conservative justices than liberal briefs. While the findings suggest that ideology plays a mediating role in regards to how the justices respond to interest group pressures, they also reveal that attitudes offer only a partial explanation for the influence of interest groups in the Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have devoted a great deal of research to investigating the role and influence of the U.S. Solicitor General (SG) as amicus curiae in the Supreme Court. Yet, we know little about the SG's decision to file an amicus brief and how this relates to the SG's success on the merits. We fill this void by examining legal, political, and administrative factors that affect the SG's decision to participate as amicus curiae. We subject our hypotheses to empirical testing utilizing data on the 1953-1999 Supreme Court terms by linking the SG's decision to file an amicus brief to the SG's ultimate success on the merits, employing a Heckman-style selection model. We find that the SG's decision to file an amicus brief, and the SG's success on the merits, is influenced by legal, political, and administrative considerations, suggesting that the SG is best viewed through the incorporation of a variety of theoretical perspectives. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]