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Studies of constitutions in authoritarian regimes reveal a new finding hiding in plain sight: that the military is often a key constitutional actor. The question of how the military uses law and constitutions to enable and facilitate its influence in constitution making and constitutional practice is under-researched. The military demands scholarly attention because of the unprecedented opportunities for the military in governance due to the rise of populism and the decline of democracy, internal conflict, efforts at counter-terrorism and anti-trafficking, and the COVID-19 global pandemic. I review the literature across law and the social sciences on the constitution and the military in authoritarian regimes. In doing so, I demonstrate that the military is an important, yet overlooked, constitutional actor; that civilian control of the military by law is never absolute but a matter of degree and changes over time; and that histories of military rule and military use of law and constitutions matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 16 January 2024, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE ODIHR) published its Guidelines on Democratic Law-making for Better Laws. The creation of the Guidelines was driven by the acknowledgment that strengthening democratic institutions and processes is essential in the era of democratic and constitutional erosion and decay and the recognition that contemporary law-making displays several weaknesses. Based on its decades of experience in assessing legislation and legislative processes in the OSCE participating states, ODIHR intended to provide an overview of the guiding principles of the law-making process that ensure that both the process and the resulting laws comply with the requirements of democracy, the rule of law and human rights commitments. The Guidelines offer a new and rich source of inspiration for scholars devoted to strengthening democracy. This paper identifies new(er) avenues for research in democratic erosion and revival, institutional protection of the democratic legislative process, constitutional change, and the impact of constitutional rights. Further, based on some non-OSCE participating states related examples, it shows how the potential inspirational reach of the Guidelines and the research paths it potentially encourage might go beyond the geographic scope of the OSCE participating states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article challenges one of the most robust commonplaces in the study of Indian Constitutional Law, viz. that Directive Principles of State Policy under Article IV cannot be enforced by the judiciary. Through a careful reading of the Constitution's text and structure, as well as an investigation of relevant precedents within India, the United States, and other common-law jurisdictions, it argues: (1) Article 39A commands 'the State' to promote justice on the basis of equal opportunity, in particular through legal services enacted through legislation or other methods; (2) The judiciary is part of the State that Article 39A commands; (3) Courts, then, must use their powers to fulfill Article 39A even if that Article is not judicially enforceable; (4) The judiciary has authority over the maintenance and integrity of the legal system; (5) It also has its own authority to spend money to maintain and improve that system; and (6) it has the authority to allocate funds to pay lawyers and other legal personnel in civil cases if it believes that doing so will strengthen the legal system and fulfill its Article 39A mandate. The Constitution's promise of the right to counsel in civil cases thus lies well within the judicial power to accomplish. The Article suggests areas where the judiciary should use this power, e.g., family law, housing, and the environment. It also raises important questions about the very nature of Directive Principles and the meaning of judicial 'enforcement.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the revision of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, due to the developments that took place in the management of the executive branch, article (130) mentioned the issue of the resignation of the president, only in short terms. In this paper, it is stipulated that "the president submits his resignation to the leader and continues to perform his duties until his resignation is accepted." Therefore, there was no specific reference to the terms and procedures for the president's resignation. It was also not mentioned that the law determines the details of this issue. Although there has been no case of the resignation of the president in the Islamic Republic of Iran, we cannot ignore the research on the terms and procedures for the resignation of this political official. Based on this, this paper, using a descriptive-analytical method and adopting a comparative approach, discusses the subject of the terms and procedures for the resignation of the president and, inspired by the constitutions of different countries, triesto present a clear outline regarding the above-mentioned subject.

Natural resources are the foundation for all life on earth, which all living creatures depend on to exist. Thus, it is subject to many sorts of laws and policies. Globally, constitutions follow different approaches to dealing with their respective country's natural resources, which are rooted in the diverging cultures, political, economic, and legal systems, as well as in the distinct historical developments of the diverse constitutional orders. Accordingly, the present contribution discusses the prominent similarities between the inclusion of provisions relating to ownership, exploitation and exploration, and the use of natural resources, be they renewable or non-renewable, but also notes the different perspectives adopted and methods of protection applied in the analysed countries' constitutions. The countries discussed in this paper are South Africa and Chad; Brazil, Cuba, and Bolivia; India and Iran; Germany; and Australia. This paper begins by, firstly, defining 'natural resources' and delineating its overlapping concepts. Secondly, the framework for comparison of the analysed countries is set out. Thirdly, the countries selected are separately discussed. Lastly, the comparative analysis is presented with a few concluding observations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In a world grappling with unprecedented challenges, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015, to be achieved by 2030, stand as a beacon of hope, envisioning a future where prosperity, equity, and environmental sustainability coalesce. As the outcome of the 2023 SDG New York Summit (18-19 September) showed, the path to achieving these ambitious goals remains uneven, with persistent gaps in poverty eradication, climate action, and other critical areas. While legal frameworks, such as national development plans and international treaties, play a role, integrating the SDGs into the very foundation of governance –the constitution –offers a potentially powerful solution. Elevating the SDGs to constitutional principles grants them binding legal force, making governments accountable for their implementation. Additionally, integrating human rights and environmental protection principles embedded within the SDGs strengthens existing constitutional guarantees and opens avenues for legal challenges against unsustainable policies. Domestic policies must align with these 'constitutionalised goals', leading to a more holistic approach to sustainable development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparative law in general and comparative constitutional law in particular is a thriving field of legal scholarship in many states. The basic idea of investigating and studying the norms and institutions of other societies has been used to draw good practices and lessons that can assist in resolving contemporary political, social and legal problems in a particular society. While it is true that the use of comparative law in domestic jurisdictions should be socially and culturally grounded, it has been instrumental for developing optimal normative standards in many states. This includes an increasing academic interest to understand the normative and institutional challenges of different polities in order to entrench constitutional democracy and enhance the protection of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, there is also a significant misconception and overstated criticism on the use of comparative law by many scholars. This is all the more evident when it comes to the legal practice in Ethiopia. In this article, I analyze the different arguments presented for and against the use of the comparative method, and argue that there is a continued relevance of comparative constitutional law in Ethiopian legal practice. The fledgling jurisprudence and growing reliance of Ethiopian courts on international human rights law in some of their cases is testament to the continued relevance of international and comparative law in Ethiopia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this Article we analyze whether and how the legal reactions to COVID-19 brought permanent changes to three main areas that are at the very basis of the study of comparative constitutional law: the horizontal separation of powers in different forms of government; the vertical separation of powers and its effects on forms of state; and the reviewability of limitations to human rights and personal freedoms by bodies exercising constitutional review. Rather than just examining and categorizing the reactions, we search for the political, institutional, factual, and sometimes even cultural rationales at the basis of each trend. Our claim is that COVID-19 was a driving force for relevant changes in the three analyzed areas, but we also recognize that these changes did not come “out of the blue,” as they were already “latent” in considered legal systems. The analysis demonstrates that the traditional categories we use to classify the forms of government, forms of state, and the mechanisms of constitutional review, although being useful paradigms to study these topics, have in themselves the potential to be “stretched,” and even unhinged, when global and long-lasting emergencies, as COVID-19, are in place.

Preambles of constitutions tend to express general principles, overarching values, and aspirational ideas that underpin the whole constitution. Whether they are deemed legally binding or not, their special character seems to suggest that constitutional preambles should be difficult to amend and that amendment of them should occur only rarely. Attention seldom extends beyond this, however: there is a distinct lack of comprehensive comparative analysis of amendments to constitutional preambles, with these preambles remaining the least researched part of constitutions. The paper represents an effort to fill this void by presenting a comparative empirical analysis of amendments to constitutional preambles around the world. After providing an overview of what sets constitutional preambles apart from the main body of constitutions and analysing their overall amendability, it reports specific results from empirical research into amendments to constitutional preambles, which identified 55 constitutional events occurring since 1949 that have resulted in some change in a constitutional preamble. The paper offers a typology of those amendments, from 42 countries, which involves 20 general characteristic elements of preambles, of which amendments related to political movements, ideology, or ideologues / political leaders were identified as most frequent. Lastly, it directs focus to the socio-political and other factors that lead to amendments in constitutional preambles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the Platonic roots and the Aristotelian essence of such a leading academic subject as comparative law. Comparative law is not a creation of the 20th century, even though modern comparative law, as we know it, has indeed matured and developed in the 20th century. The journey of comparative law commences with Plato and Aristotle, even though it was Aristotle that seems to have placed comparative law on its academic rails through his extensive, systematic, and rigorous comparative exploration of constitutions. Nevertheless, Plato must have inspired his best student, Aristotle, in the examination of comparative legal matter. Equally, the mastermind and the driving spirit behind the subject of comparative law, as it came to flourish in modernity, seems to have been Aristotle. Generations of comparative lawyers from Lambert and Salleiles to Zweigert, Kötz, and David effectively cultivated a subject which is quintessentially Aristotelian, despite the subject's apparent Platonic roots. This exposition proves, substantiates, and analyses the Aristotelian spirit of our subject, a subject which has inspired the discipline of law, Academia, and the world, the article taking a balanced approach between the subject's Platonic roots and the subject's Aristotelian essence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legislative initiation, in the sense of presenting a proposal for a new law or amending existing laws, is considered the first stage in the legislative process in any legal system. Based on the theory of separation of powers, the exercise of legislation power belongs to the legislative branch. However, nowadays it is accepted in parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems that the executive branch can also play a role in initiating legislation. The legal systems of Iraq and Egypt are among the systems that have recognized the joint competence of the legislative and executive powers in the process of initiating legislation. In this context, Article 74 of the Iranian Constitution is worthy of attention as it is devoted to the issue of legislative initiative and the joint role of the legislative and executive powers in presenting draft laws. Using a descriptiveanalytical method, this paper has tried to evaluate the evolution of the constitutional laws of Iraq and Egypt on this issue. The Paper aims to draw lessons from the Iraqi and Egyptian systems in terms of reforming the process of legislative initiative in Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Direito e Práxis is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article addresses the question of how the EU's legal constraints can be overcome in the governance of Global Spaces. It shows, first, that EU law is part of a trend of including language relating to Global Spaces in constitutional documents. The article subsequently highlights a tension specific to the EU as a non-state entity. While the EU Treaties enshrine grand foreign policy ambitions, which are impossible to achieve without a proactive role across the Global Spaces, EU law imposes several obstacles that complicate the pursuit of these ambitions. These concern particularly the need to base EU actions on powers conferred by the member states, the parallel international presence of the Union and the member states, and difficulties for the EU to join relevant international agreements and institutions. The article argues that through legal creativity, these constraints can be largely overcome, enabling the EU to pursue its ambitions nonetheless. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this Article we analyze whether and how the legal reactions to COVID-19 brought permanent changes to three main areas that are at the very basis of the study of comparative constitutional law: the horizontal separation of powers in different forms of government; the vertical separation of powers and its effects on forms of state; and the reviewability of limitations to human rights and personal freedoms by bodies exercising constitutional review. Rather than just examining and categorizing the reactions, we search for the political, institutional, factual, and sometimes even cultural rationales at the basis of each trend. Our claim is that COVID-19 was a driving force for relevant changes in the three analyzed areas, but we also recognize that these changes did not come "out of the blue," as they were already "latent" in considered legal systems. The analysis demonstrates that the traditional categories we use to classify the forms of government, forms of state, and the mechanisms of constitutional review, although being useful paradigms to study these topics, have in themselves the potential to be "stretched," and even unhinged, when global and long-lasting emergencies, as COVID-19, are in place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the emerging field of comparative constitutional law has been swept by a new approach with a scientific allure known as the Large-N approach. The methodology of this approach requires flattening the world of constitutional law by reducing the meaning of constitutional determinations into countable data. One of the difficulties in resisting this trend is that while many constitutional scholars have offered accounts that do not flatten the world of constitutional law, their methodology remains unarticulated and rarely discussed. Paul Kahn is one of the few scholars who offered an account of how to conduct non-doctrinal research of constitutional law. This Article aims to distil several principles of Kahn’s methodology, discuss its limitations, and demonstrate why it is superior to the Large-N approach. To achieve these goals, I chose to focus on three books on the German constitutional system that are based on dissertations written at Yale University, where Kahn teaches. Based on my discussion of these three books, I argue that Kahn’s methodology offers an approach which I dub the “Rich Picture” approach (or Rich-P). The Rich-P approach exposes that participants in a constitutional discourses understand constitutional materials, such as constitutional documents or judicial opinions, through a conceptual array that varies between legal orders. Without acknowledging the conceptual “eyeglasses” we wear when investigating constitutional determinations, measurements of the entire world of constitutionalism may lead to catchy soundbites and tweets, but to conclusions that are misleading at best.

This article deals specifically with the current phenomenon of the judicialisation of social rights in Brazilian and German Constitutional Courts, taking as practical example the right to health. A progressive increase in the number of lawsuits in Brazil involving health insurance plans, expensive and experimental medicines and hospital admissions has been noted in the last years. The main obstacles to the judicial realization of social rights in Brazil are the alleged violation of the principle of separation of powers - branches of state - for decisions regarding the allocation of public financial resources, the absence of a previously prepared public policy and the impossibility of universalizing social demands due to economic-financial limitations. Nevertheless, the legal categories of the 'existential minimum' and the 'duty of progressivity' have been used in the most recent decisions of the Brazilian Supreme Court as a way of realising social rights under strong influence of the German Federal Constitutional Court and international human rights law. Finally, the situation of Brazil before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding the implementation of social rights in a structural context of exclusion and poverty is analysed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a theory of the order of power to explain the dynamics and interaction between the political and legal orders in China's courts. This theory posits that the political order is embodied in the extensive administrative ranking system (ARS) of the People's Republic of China and has a systematic impact on the legal order regardless of the subject matter. The ARS is a system that regulates power relations between various institutional and personal actors in all key power fields, including courts. According to this theory, power, as stratified by the ARS, relativizes law during the processes of legal implementation, application, and enforcement. This theory provides a coherent explanation of judicial behavioural patterns in different subject matters, such as the centralization of criminal investigations in some crimes but not others, the distribution of corruption in China's courts, and the outcome patterns of administrative litigation. Whilst the conventional wisdom sees that the political and the legal orders in China's courts are partitioned based on the subject matter, this theory asserts the opposite: the impact of the political order is systemic, comprehensive, and applicable to the entire legal field. This article fills a knowledge gap in Chinese law and politics, where the ARS has received little attention except for recent studies on administrative litigation. The article also identifies two overlooked but distinctive features of the ARS—its multidimensionality and interconnectivity—our understanding of which is disproportionately poor in relation to their significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This overview article introduces the special issue on 'The Directive Constitution in the varieties of constitutionalism". which revisits debates on the constituiqdo dirigente in Portugal and Brazil, analyses the genealogy, substance and evolution of the concept, and compares it to its Anglophone sibling transformative constitutionalism. The article argues that studying directive constitutionalism makes important contributions to comparative constitutional scholarship, especially to debates on constitutional typology and non-liberal varieties of constitutionalism. to the literature on constitutional transfers and the political economy of legal knowledge. and to normative critiques of non-liberal varieties of constitutionalism in the face of democratic decline and authoritarian challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the emerging field of comparative constitutional law has been swept by a new approach with a scientific allure known as the Large-N approach. The methodology of this approach requires flattening the world of constitutional law by reducing the meaning of constitutional determinations into countable data. One of the difficulties in resisting this trend is that while many constitutional scholars have offered accounts that do not flatten the world of constitutional law, their methodology remains unarticulated and rarely discussed. Paul Kahn is one of the few scholars who offered an account of how to conduct non-doctrinal research of constitutional law. This Article aims to distil several principles of Kahn's methodology, discuss its limitations, and demonstrate why it is superior to the Large-N approach. To achieve these goals, I chose to focus on three books on the German constitutional system that are based on dissertations written at Yale University, where Kahn teaches. Based on my discussion of these three books, I argue that Kahn's methodology offers an approach which I dub the "Rich Picture" approach (or Rich-P). The Rich-P approach exposes that participants in a constitutional discourses understand constitutional materials, such as constitutional documents or judicial opinions, through a conceptual array that varies between legal orders. Without acknowledging the conceptual "eyeglasses" we wear when investigating constitutional determinations, measurements of the entire world of constitutionalism may lead to catchy soundbites and tweets, but to conclusions that are misleading at best. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anales de Derecho is the property of Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Murcia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Polish Constitution does not expressly postulate the term of constitutional identity, however the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland has elaborated this concept in detail in its case law. This framework has been used to justify internal reforms; however, it has been mostly applied as a constitutional argument for the protection of national sovereignty within the European legal space. Similarly, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has stated: The constitutional identity of Hungary does not constitute the exhaustive and closed list of values, but some of its elements may be highlighted as examples, which are identical with the recently acknowledged constitutional values: the fundamental rights; the separation of powers; the republican form of state; the freedom of religion; the rule of law; parliamentarian; equality under the law; the respect of the judicial power; and the protection of the nationalities living together with us. My study aims to make a comparison between the relevant case-law of the two constitutional courts and provide some recommendations on how constitutional identity should be reconceptualized; separated more clearly from other forms of identity; and how it could fulfil its task more efficiently at the edge of the national and European legal orders with the help of European-wide standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Direito e Práxis is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article focuses on Latin American constitutionalism with two goals in mind. The first goal is to identify narratives of constitutional mixity or hybridity that have been influential in Latin America, something that habilitates a comparative analysis with references to mixed or hybrid constitutionalism in other scenarios. One narrative underlines the combination of U.S.-inspired constitutionalism with background civil law systems. Another narrative highlights the way classic regional constitutional designs feature a liberal-conservative hybridation that, some claim, continue to influence constitutional dynamics up to this day. And the third narrative is associated with the establishment in regional countries of hybrid or mixed systems of judicial review. The second goal of the article, more methodological in kind, is to explore what do Latin American narratives on mixity teach in the way to clarifying the nature and implications of exercises constitutional taxonomy. As it emerges, constitutional taxonomy is a way of organizing and generating knowledge which is useful to describe, but most meaningful when addressed to provide an explanation, which is often just an antechamber to normative evaluation. Whether a particular exercise of constitutional taxonomy makes sense in a particular scenario, however, is a different matter, and the article suggests that describing, explaining and evaluating Latin American constitutions as hybrid is illuminating but also problematic in a number of ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate constitutionalism is a relatively novel legal field that has nonetheless adopted a very distinct character. Picking up on the classical liberal tack, it is marked by a distrust of state power as it relates to climate action or inaction. This is a venerable approach. In his 1967 classic, MJC Vile recounts that the 'great theme of the advocates of constitutionalism [had been] the frank acknowledgement of the role of government in society, linked with the determination to bring that government under control and to place limits on the exercise of its power'. This mode of distrust has been ported to the climate constitutionalism literature and in particular its focus on adjudication of constitutional rights provisions for climate purposes. This, we argue, is but one aspect of climate constitutionalism that no longer speaks to the needs of the world when we think about the relationship between climate change, the doctrines and institutions of comparative constitutional law, and the underpinning theory of constitutionalism for this relationship. The institutional dimension of the constitutional management of climate change must go beyond courts and rights to processes and institutions in the two political branches of the state. The normative theory of climate constitutionalism—why should climate change be a constitutional subject on a global scale?—should address itself to the matter of how that question can be answered from a wider and more pluralistic set of normative standpoints than simply only liberalism. In other words, how can climate constitutionalism be normatively justified beyond, although not against, liberalism? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By reviewing and analyzing the solutions contained in the reference constitutions of European countries, the author tries to systematize forms of irregular circumstances that are regulated at the constitutional level. A grouping was observed in models according to which there are general provisions on irregular circumstances, as well as those that contain provisions that are individually dedicated to the state of emergency, war and natural disaster. The rule that refers to the general frequency of mutual borrowing of solutions in the constitutions of European countries does not deviate significantly even in the area of regulation of irregular situations. The structure and normative systematics of constitutional acts often indicate whether the author of the constitution pays equal attention to different forms of irregular circumstances, as well as whether he treats them together or separately. Constitutions establish the basis for declaring individual forms of irregular circumstances, as well as entities authorized to make decisions on their introduction and abolition. Restrictions on human rights and basic freedoms are an important topic in constitutional regulation that has points of contact with the irregular situation, and the authors of the paper have given special attention to them.

Copyright of Latin American Law Review is the property of Universidad de los Andes and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Canada has been at the forefront of the recognition of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights (ESC rights) in the international scene. As a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,1 Canada has, over the years, implemented in legislation and case-law some ESC rights such as the right to health, education and social welfare.While ESC rights were not explicitly identified in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2 which forms part of the Canadian Constitution, ESC rights in different forms have received some protection in the Canadian legal order. An analysis of the Canadian record with respect to ESC rights demonstrates the immense gap between a glorified image of Canada as an international human rights proponent (the ‘utopia’) and the actual implementation of internationally recognized human rights in Canada (the ‘reality’). As Canada is bound to face major transformational changes to its economy and social fabric in the years to come, the Courts will have to adapt quickly and efficiently to ensure a smooth transition. This paper overviews the evolution of the case-law on ESC rights in Canada in light of its international obligations, and suggests, the relevant ESC rights jurisprudence signals a disconnect with Canada’s international obligation ‘requiring progressive implementation to the maximum of available resources by all appropriate means.’

Copyright of Zagreb Law Review is the property of University of Zagreb Law School / Pravni fakultet Sveucilista u Zagrebu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article argues for reopening a serious discussion on the methodology of comparative studies on constitutional orders. Following this lead, it aims to reconstruct and critically discuss Michael W. Dowdle’s concept of constitutional listening. This concept contains a broad vision of conducting comparative studies of constitutional matters. Particular attention will be devoted to the empathic-based approach to other constitutional orders, which employs the Davinsonian principle of charity. This thread is one of the most interesting but controversial of Dowdle’s proposals. The article contains a general assessment of the concept of empathy-based constitutional listening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors describe the history of comparative constitutional law research conducted at the Jagiellonian University after the Second World War. The authors’ comments also serve as a pretext to describe the research activities of the Chair in Comparative Constitutional Law on its 20th anniversary. In 2021 the chair staff celebrated this anniversary by organising a nationwide seminar, which inspired this special issue of the Przegląd Konstytucyjny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparative research of the case-law of constitutional courts concerning the membership of a given state in the EU (referred to in the article as “European” case-law of constitutional courts) requires taking into account various contexts in which this case-law is involved. The aim of this article is to indicate and analyze the most important of them, namely: the systemic context, the temporal context, the political context (including related problem of the politicization of the constitutional court), and the theoretical context. Moreover, the article draws attention to the necessity to contextualize “constitutional borrowings”, which acquires special meaning in connection with the perceived phenomenon of abuse of the “comparative argument”. Sometimes the distinguished contexts overlap, for example in the case of the temporal context and political context, but their separation allows for a better understanding of the complexity of comparative research on the European acquis constitutionnel. The specificity of this subject of legal-comparative research proves the correctness of the thesis that the contemporary constitutional comparative law must face several challenges. The first is the integration of the classical “horizontal” comparative method with the “vertical” dimension related to the influence of international and supranational norms on national constitutional systems. The second challenge is related to supporting an interdisciplinary approach to comparative constitutional law, which will take into account the perspective of social sciences, such as political science, sociology or history. The third challenge, then, is related to establishing the right balance between focusing on specific (not only) legal issues related to the analyzed issue and taking into account a broader vision of the directions of changes in European constitutionalism. The fourth challenge, in turn, concerns the popularization of the results of scientific research related to comparative studies of the “European” acquis constitutionnel. The last (and perhaps the most difficult) challenge facing the comparative research of “European” case law of constitutional courts is an attempt to answer the question to what extent this diverse jurisprudence conglomerate is a manifestation of the stability of constitutional law and the constitution, and to what extent it is a driving force for dynamic changes in contemporary public law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Australian and Indian legal systems share much in common given their shared colonial history. However, despite the similarities, both jurisdictions have adopted vastly different approaches in protecting their people under the auspices of constitutional guarantees and the protection of fundamental human rights. This paper will discuss how each jurisdiction protects the fundamental human rights and basic freedoms under their respective constitutions and whether these protections are adequate. The few constitutional guarantees that exist in Australia will be contrasted to the robust fundamental rights enshrined in the Indian constitution. It will be concluded that India sets a stronger example than Australia when it comes to constitutional rights and guarantees for three main reasons; first, the different vision of the constitutional framers of India and Australia; second, India's Constitution is easier to amend and therefore better placed to evolve and reflect changing societal norms; and finally, the divergent approaches of the Judiciary illustrate the broader interpretation of the scope of constitutional rights by the Indian judiciary. India and Australia can learn much from each other and the ways in which each country protects fundamental rights and basic freedoms are no exception to this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to their common history, Finland and Sweden share many similarities. However, important differences have also developed in constitutional law, political culture and governance models. These differences have affected the implementation of international trends in the governance of higher education in the two countries. Both the Finnish and Swedish governments have strived to give institutions of higher education more formal autonomy through legislative and constitutional measures while increasing the external representations in their governing boards. However, in Finland, strong constitutional safeguards for university autonomy have counteracted the growth of external influence. The differences between the countries in this regard have their roots in political culture. There is a stronger emphasis on the division of power in Finland, as in other states that have experienced periods of political turmoil, while in Sweden, long dominated by strong social democracy, checks and balances have been considered undemocratic obstacles to the will of the people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The new European economic governance has made the creation or reform of independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) compulsory, in particular for Eurozone countries. While these institutions have been subject to extensive investigation by the economic literature, a constitutional analysis of their prospective and actual impact on national legal systems is lacking. In fact, depending on their design and powers, they could alter the ordinary inter-institutional dynamics on budgetary decisions. IFIs could redress the marginalization of parliaments in budgetary procedures in so far as they are able to offer reliable and independent information from the executive, and should mechanisms of "comply or explain" be put in place. By contrast, in the event an IFI operates within the executive branch and is not autonomous in the exercise of its mandate, parliamentary accountability could be further jeopardized. IFIs could also affect democratic rule-making over the budget, should their technocratic determinations be able to replace those of the budgetary authorities. Through a comparative constitutional analysis and based on selected case studies—France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands—the article aims to assess the constitutional impact of IFIs on parliaments and on the problem of information asymmetry on the budget. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]