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This contribution develops previous work analysing forms of misconduct by knowledge-intensive professional business services (P-KIBS) firms, globally located and client-interactive on all five continents. Here we focus on accountancy partnerships, having previously investigated management consultancies. In the former, the infractions range from condoning systematic cheating at accountancy examinations, to unchecked client accountancy estimates signed-off as satisfactory, to covering up inflated budgetary estimates, to advising clients on fraudulent practice, to advising on tax evasion, to acting complicitly in corrupt government practices, including engaging in 'state capture' by channelling internal state revenue into private holding bank accounts. Because the litany of misconduct is too enormous for encompassing in a single contribution and in the spirit of this task, the spotlight is only on a few cases that represent typical 'creative economy' companies contracted to 'Big 4' accountancy P-KIBS in relation to sustainability and social equity issues. For interpretation of data discovery, we utilize evolutionary 'pattern recognition' methodology set within a 'Thirdspace-assemblage' theoretical framework. As a test, we sketch the 'sustainability' complexities of the Pacific Gas & Electricity (PG&E) and Deloitte/Lloyds Register relationship. Among the 'creativity' studies reported are the PWC-Walt Disney, KPMG-Conviviality and their EY-KPMG-Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon scandals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this contribution, an investigation is made into the abandonment of a very large infrastructural investment by the UK government. It was the HS2 (High Speed 2) train 'assemblage' for the 345 miles from Leeds in the North to London. It occurred in the belief that such expenditure would 'level-up' the worsening regional economic disparities between the two regions and render the North (dubbed the 'Northern Powerhouse' by successive governments) 'competitive'. In reality, there was no evidence in support of the idea that a faster rail service would have this effect. Critics realized London's advantage could not be competed against. This was because its advantage as an unregulated 'tax haven' had been entrenched since even before William the Conqueror's invasion in 1066. Our take on this débâcle is that it was caused by hubris on the part of successive governments, culminating in the growth of distrust between politicians and the people, including 'experts' who were singled out for special ministerial disdain. The analysis explores 'assemblage' theory and its psychological origins, in which desire has come to substitute for thought in the UK political arena. Accordingly, desire has been swallowed up by 'competitiveness', meaning mistakes were made due to hubris, narcissism and criminality because of the politics of 'we know better' on the part of the political élite. The cost of these mistakes was upwards of £36 billion for the biggest UK rail infrastructure project in a hundred years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This editorial is intended to provide a brief overview of the evolution of a selection of European space economies and policies introduced to mitigate the devastating effects of at least five crises most have faced in the past decade or more. In a time of great fragility in economy, politics and society, concatenations of the five crises and more have challenged planners to come up with new solutions to long-standing urban and regional problems (otherwise 'opportunities'). The five crises focused on here are: Green Transition; Great Financial Crisis; Euro Crisis; Migration and Refugee Asylum Crisis; COVID-19 Crisis. Occasional papers in the Special Issue that follows refer to other crisis effects such as; Ukraine resistance to its war against the Russian invasion; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict of October 2023; Austerity policies and associated urban and regional disparities with inter-regional tensions; and the socio-economic effects of liberalization of Eastern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea to be explored in this contribution is that to understand change as society evolves is useless without Learning that a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing and may look 'smart' but is likely to be unwise. This in turn requires an understanding of why the label 'knowledge economy' came into substantial usage by opinion-formers at about the same time. Thus a first wave of injunctions in favour of 'Learning' by governments and corporate leaders occurred about 30 years ago. The change in question was led by information technology and the production and consumption practices it entailed. In a second wave of 'Learning from Leaders', especially how to be 'Smart', the lesson quickly became 'Learning from Losers'. Here some of the most-vaunted - for example – 'smart' visions for various functions nevertheless failed to deliver. Perhaps the greatest failure to learn has been the sight and sound of 'Flailing by Failing' from Science Policy 'led' governments in response to the SARS2-Covid-19 pandemic when the lessons of at least moderate success involved 'Learning from Life' after being prepared by previous experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]