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Cesario argues that experimental studies of bias tell us little about why group disparities exist. We argue that Cesario's alternative approach implicitly frames understanding of group disparities as a false binary between “bias” and “group differences.” This, we suggest, will contribute little to our understanding of the complex dynamics that produce group disparities, and risks inappropriately rationalizing them.

Why does workplace gender diversity matter? Here, we provide a review of the literature on both justice‐based and organizational benefits of workplace gender diversity that, importantly, is informed by evidence regarding sex differences and their relationship with vocational behavior and outcomes. This review indicates that the sexes are neither distinctly different, nor so similar as to be fungible. Justice‐based gains of workplace gender diversity include that it may cause less sex discrimination and may combat androcentrism in products and services. We then consider potential instrumental benefits of workplace gender diversity to organizations, including for team and firm performance, innovation, occupational well‐being, and corporate governance. The evidence of positive association is currently strongest for occupational well‐being and governance. We recommend that policy makers ground gender diversity initiatives in this comprehensive and evidence‐based understanding of the benefits of workplace gender diversity.

Heated debates are taking place over the question: Who is a woman? Many of these are over inclusion criteria for policies that seek to promote equality, safety and/or privacy for girls and women by excluding boys and men. Science cannot resolve these debates, but its concepts and data can offer useful insights and information for policy makers who have to make principled and workable policy decisions about inclusion criteria. To assist policy makers in this difficult task, we begin by reviewing three key concepts that are often misunderstood and conflated: sex, gender, and gender identity. We then review key issues that policy makers should consider: the purpose(s) of the specific policy and whether it relates to sex, gender, and/or gender identity, and the distributions of benefits and costs for all stakeholders. As these considerations sometimes point to a conflict of interests, we end with some suggestions for how such conflicts might be ameliorated. Although we do not offer solutions to these difficult policy decisions, we hope that this article will help reduce misunderstandings, and facilitate open discussion and good decision making in this contentious policy context.

W poniższym artykule przedstawiam dane na poparcie twierdzenia o wpływie naukowych opisów grup społecznych na same te grupy oraz na badane zjawiska mentalne. Zarówno w nauce, jak i w popularnym przekazie medialnym powszechna jest kontrowersyjna hipoteza o istnieniu głęboko zakorzenionych różnic między mózgami mężczyzn i kobiet, które przyczyniają się do powstawania różnic w zachowaniach typowych dla danej płci. Przedstawiam dowody na to, że takie stwierdzenia, niezależnie od ich zasadności naukowej, mogą podtrzymywać istnienie różnic płciowych, które mają wyjaśniać. Przekonuję, że choć potrzeba dalszych badań, powyższe twierdzenia mogą stać się samospełniającą się przepowiednią, oddziałując na odbiór społeczny, zachowania oraz nastawienie. Rzeczywisty wpływ efektów badań naukowych na nasze umysły i społeczeństwo oraz to, że wszystkie hipotezy naukowe podlegają dyskusji i podważaniu, wskazuje na potrzebę rozważenia przez naukowców etycznych implikacji ich pracy.

The article discusses the key role of the environment in the development of the evolutionary behaviors and gender inequality based on Charles Darwin's theory of sexual selection. It explains the behavior differences and gender gaps between men and women reflects the evolved pattern across the animal kingdom. It explores the role of the environment in shaping adaptive behaviors and stereotype of the daring promiscuous male against the cautious chaste female.

This Lancet issue on women in medicine seeks to address some confronting topics: from a “system imbued with gender bias” to the “unequal distribution of power within societies”. These important ideas can at times feel like endangered concepts: in discussions about equality in recent decades, principles of equity and social justice have been increasingly crowded out by market logic and rhetoric. Consider journalist Anand Giridharadas's account of a breakout session at a Clinton Global Initiative conference on harnessing the power of girls and women for sustainable development. As Giridharadas describes it, the discussion emphasised the competitive advantage and business opportunities to be reaped from women's rise. That female empowerment is smart for business is, Giridharadas wryly observes, “the highest praise a cause could receive”. And, while there can be value in pointing out the economic benefits of doing the right thing, the business-case approach makes striving for equality seem discretionary; just one of many things an organisation could do to increase its performance or competitive advantage. As Giridharadas ironically suggests: “If the logic of our time had applied to the facts of an earlier age, someone would have put out a report suggesting that ending slavery was great for reducing the trade deficit.”

The gendered marketing of children’s toys is under considerable scrutiny, as reflected by numerous consumer-led campaigns and vigorous media debates. This article seeks to assist stakeholders to better understand the ethical and scientific assumptions that underlie the two opposing positions in this debate, and assess their relative strength. There is apparent consensus in the underlying ethical foundations of the debate, with all commentators seeming to endorse the values of corporate social responsibility and gender equality. However, the debate splits over three critical points of empirical disagreement: whether gendered toy marketing influences children’s toy preferences or simply reflects boys’ and girls’ fundamentally different interests; whether the effects of gendered toy marketing are negative, neutral or beneficial; and whether a shift to gender-neutral marketing would be economically viable. We assess the three points of disagreement against the available evidence and shared ethical principles underlying the debate, and conclude that current defences of gendered toy marketing fail.

We investigated whether risk-taking measures inadvertently focus on behaviors that are more normative for men, resulting in the overestimation of gender differences. Using a popular measure of risk-taking (Domain-Specific Risk-Taking) in Study 1 ( N = 99), we found that conventionally used behaviors were more normative for men, while, overall, newly developed behaviors were not. In Studies 2 ( N = 114) and 3 ( N = 124), we demonstrate that differences in normativity are reflected in gender differences in self-reported risk-taking, which are dependent on the specific items used. Study 3 further demonstrates that conventional, masculine risk behaviors are perceived as more risky than newly generated, more feminine items, even when risks are matched. We conclude that there is confirmation bias in risk-taking measurement.

The new skepticism about practical reason is predicated upon empirical findings which challenge the primacy traditionally afforded to reasoning in contexts of normative deliberation. These findings, which are associated with dual-process theories of cognition, are taken to support two skeptical claims: our reasons for action are not what we take them to be, and reasoning is an unreliable means for arriving at reliable judgments. After providing a critical overview of empirically based skepticism and its implications, we argue that skeptics underestimate the role that reasoning processes play in moral deliberation. We then canvass ways in which threats to the reliability of individual-level moral reasoning can be countenanced by social-level practices such as “nudging,” inter-agent reasoning, and testimonial expertise.

It has been argued that gender essentialism impedes progress towards greater gender equality. Here we present a new gender essentialism scale (GES), and validate it in two large nationally representative samples from Denmark and Australia. In both samples the GES was highly reliable and predicted lack of support for sex-role egalitarianism and support for gender discrimination, as well as perceived fairness of gender-based treatment in the Australian sample, independently of two established predictors (i.e., social dominance orientation and conservative political orientation). In addition, gender essentialism assessed by the GES moderated some manifestations of the backlash effect: high essentialists were more likely to respond negatively towards a power-seeking female political candidate relative to a male candidate. Given the implications for possible workplace interventions, further work could usefully explore whether gender essentialism moderates other well-established forms of gender bias.

In this commentary we expand on Liben’s exploration of the effects of differing gender conceptualizations – gender essentialism and gender constructivism – on the single-sex education debate within the United States. We examine these conceptualizations in the context of current behavioral and neuroscientific research, which we argue undermines an essentialist view of males and females, while supporting an expanded constructivist version of the account endorsed by Liben. We then extend Liben’s work to argue that gender essentialism has indirectly facilitated popularization of neuroscientific research used to support claims of brain-based evidence in favor of single-sex education. Finally, we develop Liben’s observations regarding the association of gender essentialism with negative attitudes towards reducing gender-differentiation, by examining the relation between gender essentialism and the folk concept of innateness. This reveals the empirical challenge to essentialist arguments that social interventions designed to reduce gender-differentiation go against nature.

Common understanding of human sex-linked behaviors is that proximal mechanisms of genetic and hormonal sex, ultimately shaped by the differential reproductive challenges of ancestral males and females, act on the brain to transfer sex-linked predispositions across generations. Here, we extend the debate on the role of nature and nurture in the development of traits in the lifetime of an individual, to their role in the cross-generation transfer of traits. Advances in evolutionary theory that posit the environment as a source of trans-generational stability, and new understanding of sex effects on the brain, suggest that the cross-generation stability of sex-linked patterns of behavior are sometimes better explained in terms of inherited socioenvironmental conditions, with biological sex fostering intrageneration variability.

The neuroscientific investigation of sex differences has an unsavoury past, in which scientific claims reinforced and legitimated gender roles in ways that were not scientifically justified. Feminist critics have recently argued that the current use of functional neuroimaging technology in sex differences research largely follows that tradition. These charges of ‘neurosexism’ have been countered with arguments that the research being done is informative and valuable and that an over-emphasis on the perils, rather than the promise, of such research threatens to hinder scientific progress. To investigate the validity of these contrasting concerns, recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations of sex differences and citation practices were systematically examined. In line with the notion of neurosexism, the research was found to support the influence of false-positive claims of sex differences in the brain, to enable the proliferation of untested, stereotype-consistent functional interpretations, and to pay insufficient attention to the potential plasticity of sex differences in both brain and mind. This, it is argued, creates a literature biased toward the presentation of sex differences in the brain as extensive, functionally significant, and fixed—and therefore implicitly supportive of a gender essentialist perspective. It is suggested that taking feminist criticisms into account would bring about substantial improvement in the quality of the science, as well as a reduction in socially harmful consequences.

In this article I flesh out support for observations that scientific accounts of social groups can influence the very groups and mental phenomena under investigation. The controversial hypothesis that there are hardwired differences between the brains of males and females that contribute to sex differences in gender-typed behaviour is common in both the scientific and popular media. Here I present evidence that such claims, quite independently of their scientific validity, have scope to sustain the very sex differences they seek to explain. I argue that, while further research is required, such claims can have self-fulfilling effects via their influence on social perception, behaviour and attitudes. The real effects of the products of scientists’ research on our minds and society, together with the fact that all scientific hypotheses are subject to dispute and disconfirmation, point to a need for scientists to consider the ethical implications of their work.

Neuroimaging research is yielding reports of sex differences in the brain. Yet the likelihood of spurious findings of sex differences, the teething problems of new technology, the obscurity of the relation between brain structure and psychological function, and difficulties inferring mental states from neuroimaging data all require us to be considerably cautious in interpreting such results. Unfortunately, these issues are often overlooked in popular accounts. Together with a tendency for people to regard neuroscientific information as more scientific than behavioral data, and as indicative of male and female “nature,” these issues point to the worrisome possibility of public misunderstanding of what contemporary neuroscience tells us about gender.

The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions. We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.

A number of recent popular books about gender differences have drawn on the neuroscientific literature to support the claim that certain psychological differences between the sexes are ‘hard-wired’. This article highlights some of the ethical implications that arise from both factual and conceptual errors propagated by such books.

Ambler (in this issue) has been very quick to comment on our recent paper in this journal (Nairn & Fine, IJA, 27(3), 2008) in which we discuss the implications of recent findings from the cognitive sciences for the ethics of advertising to children. We welcome this opportunity to address some of the many misunderstandings, misattributions and misplaced criticisms that constitute Ambler’s commentary, as well as to re-emphasise and expand on some of the important points from our paper. First, we briefly review the line of argument of our original paper. Those who have read Ambler’s response need fear no boredom through repetition, as our thesis bears little resemblance to the version of it provided by Ambler. Next, we address the seven issues characterised by Ambler as ‘contentious’, a description that turns out to depend on fundamental mischaracterisations of our account. Finally, we reiterate the central conceptual and practical points of our paper. Discussion of the effects and ethics of marketing to chi...

The debate surrounding the ethics of advertising to children generally centres on the age at which children have developed sufficient cognitive resources both to understand the persuasive intent of marketing messages and to critically evaluate them. In this paper we argue that this debate requires urgent updating to take into account recent and significant findings from psychology and neuroscience. Substantial evidence now shows that judgements and behaviours, including those relating to consumption, can be strongly influenced by implicitly acquired affective associations, rather than via consciously mediated persuasive information. Contemporary advertising formats typically targeted at children are particularly likely to ‘implicitly persuade’ in this way. The implications for the ethical and empirical agenda are profound, pointing the way for a re-evaluation of what constitutes responsible children’s advertising, a new research agenda and a new approach to media literacy strategies.

Introduction: There is substantial evidence that patients with delusions exhibit a reasoning bias - known as the "jumping to conclusions" (JTC) bias - which leads them to accept hypotheses as correct on the basis of less evidence than controls. We address three questions concerning the JTC bias that require clarification. Firstly, what is the best measure of the JTC bias? Second, is the JTC bias correlated specifically with delusions, or only with the symptomatology of schizophrenia? And third, is the bias enhanced by emotionally salient material? Methods To address these questions, we conducted a series of meta-analyses of studies that used the Beads task to compare the probabilistic reasoning styles of individuals with and without delusions. Results We found that only one of four measures of the JTC bias - "draws to decision" -reached significance. The JTC bias exhibited by delusional subjects - as measured by draws to decision - did not appear to be solely an epiphenomenal effect of schizophrenic symptomatology, and was not amplified by emotionally salient material. Conclusions A tendency to gather less evidence in the Beads task is reliably associated with the presence of delusional symptomatology. In contrast, certainty on the task, and responses to contradictory evidence, do not discriminate well between those with and without delusions. The implications for the underlying basis of the JTC bias, and its role in the formation and maintenance of delusions, are discussed.

According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally arises from automatic ‘moral intuitions’. Private moral reasoning—when it occurs—is biased and post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's intuitions. It is argued here, however, that moral reasoning is not inevitably subserviant to moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Social cognitive research shows that moral reasoning may sometimes disrupt the automatic process of judgment formation described by the SIM. Furthermore, it seems that automatic judgments may reflect the ‘automatization’ of judgment goals based on prior moral reasoning. In line with this role for private moral reasoning in judgment formation, it is argued that moral reasoning can, under the right circumstances, be sufficiently unbiased to effectively challenge an individual's moral beliefs. Thus the social cognitive literature indicates a greater and more direct role for private moral reaso...

For over a decade, neuroimaging (NI) technologies have had an increasing impact in the study of complex cognitive and social processes. In this emerging field of social cognitive neuroscience, a central goal should be to increase the understanding of the interaction between the neurobiology of the individual and the environment in which s/he develops and functions. The study of the relationship between sex and gender could offer a valuable example of such research. We identify here four main principles that should inform NI research. First, the principle of overlap, arising from evidence of significant overlap of female/male distributions on measures of many gendered behaviours. Second, the principle of mosaicism, arising from evidence that for both behaviour and brain, each individual manifests a complex and idiosyncratic combination of feminine and masculine characteristics. Third, the principle of contingency, arising from evidence that female/male behavioural differences are contingent on time, place, social group and context. Fourth, the principle of entanglement, arising from an awareness that the neural phenotypes that NI techniques measure are a function of the interactive and reciprocal influence of biology and environment. These important principles have emerged and become well-established over the past few decades, but their implications are often not reflected in the design and interpretation of NI sex/gender research. We therefore offer a set of guidelines for researchers to ensure that NI sex/gender research is appropriately designed and interpreted. We hope this ‘toolkit’ will also be of use to editorial boards and journal reviewers, as well as those who view, communicate and interpret such research.

Why is popular understanding of female-male differences still based on rigid models of development, even though contemporary developmental sciences emphasize plasticity? Is it because the science of sex differences still works from the same rigid models?

The Empathizing/Systemizing (E/S) hypothesis developed by BaronCohen and colleagues has two main goals: first, to explain the presence of brain, cognitive, and behavioral differences between the sexes; and second, to explain the pattern of symptoms associated with autistic syndromes. These two goals are connected, since Baron-Cohen argues that autism is the expression of an “extreme male brain” (e.g. Baron-Cohen 2002). Briefly, the E/S hypothesis proposes that levels of fetal testosterone (fT) influence brain development in such a way that lower levels of fT (more common in females) result in a ‘female brain’ that is “predominantly hard-wired for empathy” (Baron-Cohen 2003: 1). Empathizing is defined as “the drive to identify another’s mental states and to respond to these with an appropriate emotion, in order to predict and to respond to the behavior of another person” (BaronCohen, Knickmeyer, and Belmonte 2005: 820). By contrast, higher levels of fT (more common in males) result in a ‘male brain’ that is “predominantly hard-wired for understanding and building systems” (Baron-Cohen 2003: 1). Systemizing is defined as “the drive to analyze a system in terms of the rules that govern the system, in order to predict the behavior of the system” (Baron-Cohen, Knickmeyer, and Belmonte 2005: 820).

There is a long history of scientific inquiry about what role biological sex plays in differences between brain function in human males and females. Greater knowledge of the influence of biological sex on the human brain promises much-needed insights into brain function and especially dysfunctions that differentially affect the sexes ( 1 ). Certainly, advancing technologies and an increasing wealth of data (with more sophisticated analyses) should prompt robust future research—carefully conducted and well replicated—that can elucidate sex effects in the brain. However, this field of research has spurred an equally long history of debate as to whether inherent differences in brains of males and females predispose the sexes to stereotypical behaviors, or whether such claims reinforce and legitimate traditional gender stereotypes and roles in ways that are not scientifically justified—so-called neurosexism. Although this topic remains controversial, a commonly held belief is that the psyches of females and males are highly distinct. These differences are perceived as natural, fixed, and invariant across time and place ( 2 ), presumably due to unique female versus male brain circuitry that is largely fixed by a sexually differentiated genetic blueprint. A major challenge in the field is to crtically view previous experimental findings, as well as design future studies, outside the framework of this dichotomous model. Here, gender scholarship can hasten scientific progress by revealing the implicit assumptions that can give rise to inadvertent neurosexism.

Fine talks about the rising segregation of toys and books for boys and girls. In a recent UK parliamentary debate politicians Jenny Willott, Elizabeth Truss and Chi Onwurah xpressed concern that the pinkification of toys for girls was adding to gender inequality in careers in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. Willott, for instance, drawing on a basic tenet of early education, observed that children learn through play; it's how they develop skills and interests. But the detrimental effects of this kind of marketing, though clearly only one factor in a mix of many influences on the young, may run broader and deeper. It polarises children into stereotypes. These gender stereotypes, acquired in childhood, underlie a host of well-documented biases against women in traditionally masculine domains and roles and hinder men from sharing more in the responsibilities and rewards of domestic life.