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We address an open problem in the philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI): how to justify the epistemic attitudes we have towards the trustworthiness of AI systems. The problem is important, as providing reasons to believe that AI systems are worthy of trust is key to appropriately rely on these systems in human-AI interactions. In our approach, we consider the trustworthiness of an AI as a time-relative, composite property of the system with two distinct facets. One is the actual trustworthiness of the AI and the other is the perceived trustworthiness of the system as assessed by its users while interacting with it. We show that credences, namely, beliefs we hold with a degree of confidence, are the appropriate attitude for capturing the facets of the trustworthiness of an AI over time. Then, we introduce a reliabilistic account providing justification to the credences in the trustworthiness of AI, which we derive from Tang’s probabilistic theory of justified credence. Our account stipulates that a credence in the trustworthiness of an AI system is justified if and only if it is caused by an assessment process that tends to result in a high proportion of credences for which the actual and perceived trustworthiness of the AI are calibrated. This approach informs research on the ethics of AI and human-AI interactions by providing actionable recommendations on how to measure the reliability of the process through which users perceive the trustworthiness of the system, investigating its calibration to the actual levels of trustworthiness of the AI as well as users’ appropriate reliance on the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does religious belief differ in any interesting way from other kinds of belief? For now, take ‘belief' to mean how one takes the world to be, on the basis of which they act. Call beliefs like this ‘ordinary beliefs'. There are also more complicated, or abstract, beliefs. Call such beliefs ‘non-ordinary beliefs’. Are religious beliefs different in any significant or interesting way from what we call ‘standard belief’? Our analysis shows that they are not. Although the content of religious belief is different, and sometimes so is the function, religious beliefs are still mental, dispositional attitudes that aim to provide a correct representation of the world. Therefore, religious beliefs are best understood as a sub-category of standard beliefs, alongside ordinary and non-ordinary beliefs. This account of religious belief provides further insight into the meaning of belief and supports a revision of a strict demarcation between standard and non-standard beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Chapter 6 of Objects of Credence , Anna Mahtani argues that the opacity of credence raises difficulties for the Principal Principle and proposes a revised principle relating credence and chance that avoids it. In this comment on her book, I both defend Mahtani's proposed principle against a charge of triviality and argue that the opacity of belief does not threaten the role of chance in guiding credence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stalnaker's 'Assertion' (1978 [1999]) offers a classic account of diagonalization as an approach to the meaning of a declarative sentence in context. Here I explore the relationship between diagonalization and some puzzles in Mahtani's book The Objects of Credence. Diagonalization can influence how we think about both credence and desirability, so it influences both components of a standard expected utility equation. In that vein, I touch on two of Mahtani's case-studies, chance and the finite version of the Two Envelope Paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely thought that chance should be understood in reductionist terms: claims about chance should be understood as claims that certain patterns of events are instantiated. There are many possible reductionist theories of chance, differing as to which possible pattern of events they take to be chance-making. It is also widely taken to be a norm of rationality that credence should defer to chance: special cases aside, rationality requires that one's credence function, when conditionalized on the chance-making facts, should coincide with the objective chance function. It is a shortcoming of a theory of chance if it implies that this norm of rationality is unsatisfiable. The primary goal of this paper is to show, on the basis of considerations concerning computability and inductive learning, that this shortcoming is more common than one would have hoped. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract The aim of this paper is to delve into the epistemological challenge surrounding the qualitative and quantitative aspects of belief and credence through a decision-theoretic framework: belief emerges as a cognitive process balancing the urge for information and the fear of error. The first part is primarily historical, and delves into the philosophy of science and its concern about the acceptance of probabilistic hypothesis. In the second part, the focus shifts from the philosophy of science to contemporary epistemology, specifically the rationality of belief and credence. The main outcome of this paper lies in highlighting how the decision-theoretic approach illuminates the nature of belief rationality, exploring the connection between belief and credence, the context-dependent nature of belief, and the significance of deductive closure as rational requirements.

Previous literature supports the importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) by demonstrating its effects on various aspects of firm performance. However, the extent to which CSR contributes to social well-being, its original objective, has rarely been examined. The current research investigates the impact of customers’ perceived CSR of service firms on customer happiness. Two studies confirm our proposition that perceived CSR increases customer happiness by enhancing perceptions of warmth and competence associated with the service company. Furthermore, we examine how the type of service moderates this effect. Specifically, we find that the indirect effects of CSR on customer happiness through perceptions of warmth and competence are stronger for credence services than for experience services. This research makes theoretical contributions to the literature on CSR, happiness, and service, and offers practical implications for marketing tactics, including fostering long-term customer relationships and monitoring the effectiveness of CSR activities and corporate budget allocations.

This paper aims to flesh out the celebrated notion of reflective equilibrium within a probabilistic framework for epistemic rationality. On the account developed here, an agent’s attitudes are in reflective equilibrium when there is a certain sort of harmony between the agent’s credences, on the one hand, and what the agent accepts, on the other hand. Somewhat more precisely, reflective equilibrium is taken to consist in the agent accepting, or being prepared to accept, all and only claims that follow from a maximally comprehensive theory that is more probable than any other such theory. Drawing on previous work, the paper shows that when an agent is in reflective equilibrium in this sense, the set of claims they accept or are prepared to accept is bound to be logically consistent and closed under logical implication. The paper also argues that this account can explain various features of philosophical argumentation in which the notion of reflective equilibrium features centrally, such as the emphasis on evaluating philosophical theories holistically rather than in a piecemeal fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to an increasingly popular view in epistemology and philosophy of mind, beliefs are sensitive to contextual factors such as practical factors and salient error possibilities. A prominent version of this view, called credal sensitivism, holds that the context-sensitivity of belief is due to the context-sensitivity of degrees of belief or credence. Credal sensitivism comes in two variants: while credence-one sensitivism (COS) holds that maximal confidence (credence one) is necessary for belief, threshold credal sensitivism (TCS) holds that belief consists in having credence above some threshold, where this threshold doesn't require maximal confidence. In this paper, I argue that COS has difficulties in accounting for three important features about belief: (i) the compatibility between believing p and assigning non-zero credence to certain error possibilities that one takes to entail not-p, (ii) the fact that outright beliefs can occur in different strengths, and (iii) beliefs held by unconscious subjects. I also argue that TCS can easily avoid these problems. Finally, I consider an alleged advantage of COS over TCS in terms of explaining beliefs about lotteries. I argue that lottery cases are rather more problematic for COS than TCS. In conclusion, TCS is the most plausible version of credal sensitivitism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the thesis of doxastic wronging, our beliefs can non-derivatively wrong others. A recent criticism of this view claims that proponents of the doxastic wronging thesis have no principled grounds for denying that credences can likewise non-derivatively wrong, so they must countenance pervasive conflicts between morality and epistemic rationality. This paper defends the thesis of doxastic wronging from this objection by arguing that belief bears distinctive relationships to inquiry and blame that can explain why beliefs, but not credences, can non-derivatively wrong. First, forming a belief (but not updating one's credence) closes inquiry, and suspending judgment (but not updating one's credence) opens inquiry. Consequently, beliefs can distinctively wrong others by prematurely closing inquiry or inappropriately opening inquiry. Second, beliefs (but not credences) can constitute blame. Unfittingly blaming someone can wrong them, and hence beliefs which constitute unfitting blame can distinctively wrong. In addition to defending the claim that only beliefs can non-derivatively wrong, this paper gestures towards an ethics of belief which attends to the relationship between belief and attitudes such as inquiry, faith, trust, and blame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are essentially two ways to develop the Peircean idea that future contingents are all false. One is to provide a quantificational semantics for "will," as is usually done. The other is to define a quantificational postsemantics based on a linear semantics for "will." As we will suggest, the second option, although less conventional, is more plausible than the first in some crucial respects. The postsemantic approach overcomes three major troubles that have been raised in connection with Peirceanism: the apparent scopelessness of "will" with respect to negation, the failure of Future Excluded Middle, and the so-called zero credence problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BackgroundTo summarize the four recent sodium-glucose cotransporter 2 inhibitor (SGLT2i) trials: Dapagliflozin Effect on CardiovascuLAR Events (DECLARE-TIMI 58), CANagliflozin CardioVascular Assessment Study (CANVAS) Program, Empagliflozin Cardiovascular Outcome Event Trial in Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus Patients-Removing Excess Glucose (EMPA-REG OUTCOME), Canagliflozin and Renal Events in Diabetes with Established Nephropathy Clinical Evaluation (CREDENCE), and explore the potential determinants for their cardiovascular, renal, and safety outcomes.ResultsThe composite renal outcome event rates per 1000 patient-years for drug and placebo, as well as the corresponding relative risk reductions, were 3.7, 7.0, 47%; 5.5, 9.0, 40%; 6.3, 11.5, 46%; 43.2, 61.2, 30% for DECLARE-TIMI 58, CANVAS, EMPA-REG OUTCOME, and CREDENCE, respectively (event definitions varied across trials). The major adverse cardiovascular (CV) event rates per 1000 patient-years for drug and placebo, as well as the corresponding relative risk reductions, were 22.6, 24.2, 7%; 26.9, 31.5, 14%; 37.4, 43.9, 14%; 38.7, 48.7, 20% for DECLARE-TIMI 58, CANVAS, EMPA-REG OUTCOME, and CREDENCE, respectively. DECLARE-TIMI 58 had the fewest cardiorenal events and CREDENCE the most. These differences were presumably due to varying inclusion criteria resulting in DECLARE-TIMI 58 having the best baseline renal filtration function and CREDENCE the worst (mean estimated glomerular filtration rate 85.2, 76.5, 74, 56.2 mL/min/1.73 m2 for DECLARE-TIMI 58, CANVAS, EMPA-REG OUTCOME, and CREDENCE, respectively). Additionally, CREDENCE had considerably higher rates of albuminuria (median urinary albumin-creatinine ratios (UACR) were 927, 12.3, and 13.1 mg/g for CREDENCE, CANVAS, and DECLARE-TIMI 58, respectively; EMPA-REG OUTCOME had 59.4% UACR  30-300, 11.0% UACR > 300 mg/g).ConclusionsDapagliflozin, empagliflozin, and canagliflozin have internally and externally consistent and biologically plausible class effects on cardiorenal outcomes. Baseline renal filtration function and degree of albuminuria are the most significant indicators of risk for both CV and renal events. Thus, these two factors also anticipate the greatest clinical benefit for SGLT2i.

This paper examines the connection between lies, deception, and self-deception. Understanding this connection is important because the consensus is that you cannot deceive yourself by lying since you cannot make yourself believe as true a proposition you already believe is false – and, as a liar, you must assert a proposition you believe is false. My solution involves refining our analysis of lying: people can lie by asserting what they confidently believe is true. Thus, self-deceivers need not replace one belief with another; rather, they may just increase existing credence in a proposition they already believe is true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Food credence attributes (e.g., food safety, organic, and carbon neutral production methods) are quality characteristics of products that cannot be assessed by buyers at the point of sale without additional information (e.g., certification labels). Hence, the ability to access credence attributes of a particular product can result in a situation termed as asymmetric distributed information among supply chain stakeholders (e.g., producers, processors, wholesalers, retailers, consumer) where one party of a market transaction is in possession of more information about a product than the other party. This situation can lead to potential inefficiencies, e.g., misinformation, risk of food borne illness, or opportunistic behavior such as fraud. The present study sought to develop a conceptual framework that describes a) the motivation for key stakeholders to participate in the market for food credence attributes, b) the type of food credence attributes that key stakeholders provide, and c) current mechanisms to address the issue of information asymmetry among the stakeholders in the food system. The study was conducted using an integrative literature review. The developed framework consists of two components: a) the food supply chain and b) the attribute assurance system among which multiple links exist. The findings suggest that retailers, processors, NGOs, and government authorities are influential stakeholders within the supply chain of food credence attributes by imposing food quality standards which can address information asymmetry among food actors. While the credence attribute assurance system (e.g., food standards, third party food attribute assurance providers) can potentially address the issue of asymmetric information among market stakeholders, a range of issues remain. These include food standards as a potential market entry barrier for food producers and distributors, limited food standard harmonization, and communication challenges of food attribute assurance (e.g., consumers' signal processing, signal use and trust). The syntheses presented in this study contributes to stakeholders' (e.g., supply chain actors, scientists, policy makers) improved understanding about the components of the credence food system and their integration as well as the drivers for change in this system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Suppose you're certain that a claim—say, 'Frida is tall'—does not have a determinate truth value. What attitude should you take towards it? This is the question of the cognitive role of indeterminacy. This paper presents a puzzle for theories of cognitive role. Many of these theories vindicate a seemingly plausible principle: if you are fully certain that A, you are rationally required to be fully certain that A is determinate. Call this principle 'Certainty'. We show that Certainty, in combination with some minimal side premises, entails a very implausible claim: whenever you're certain that it's indeterminate whether A, it is rationally required that you reject A. This is a surprising result, which requires abandoning at least some intuitive views about indeterminacy and cognitive role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show a somewhat surprising result concerning the relationship between the Principal Principle and its allegedly generalized form. Then, we formulate a few desiderata concerning chance-credence norms and argue that none of the norms widely discussed in the literature satisfies all of them. We suggest that the New Principle comes out as the best contender. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scoring rules measure the accuracy or epistemic utility of a credence assignment. A significant literature uses plausible conditions on scoring rules on finite sample spaces to argue for both probabilism—the doctrine that credences ought to satisfy the axioms of probabilism—and for the optimality of Bayesian update as a response to evidence. I prove a number of formal results regarding scoring rules on infinite sample spaces that impact the extension of these arguments to infinite sample spaces. A common condition in the arguments for probabilism and Bayesian update is strict propriety: that according to each probabilistic credence, the expected accuracy of any other credence is worse. Much of the discussion needs to divide depending on whether we require finite or countable additivity of our probabilities. I show that in a number of natural infinite finitely additive cases, there simply do not exist strictly proper scoring rules, and the prospects for arguments for probabilism and Bayesian update are limited. In many natural infinite countably additive cases, on the other hand, there do exist strictly proper scoring rules that are continuous on the probabilities, and which support arguments for Bayesian update, but which do not support arguments for probabilism. There may be more hope for accuracy-based arguments if we drop the assumption that scores are extended-real-valued. I sketch a framework for scoring rules whose values are nets of extended reals, and show the existence of a strictly proper net-valued scoring rules in all infinite cases, both for f.a. and c.a. probabilities. These can be used in an argument for Bayesian update, but it is not at present known what is to be said about probabilism in this case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The series of the cardiovascular outcome trails have demonstrated the nephroprotective properties of the gliflozins. Canagliflozin in the CREDENCE, which was the first study with a primary focus on the evaluation of the nephroprotective properties of gliflozin, have demonstrated the possibility to slow the progression of the renal disease. The paper summarizes the additional data from the CREDENCE trail: assessment of the efficacy of canagliflozin by initial eGFR; efficacy in individuals with GFR

ABSTRACT Aims/Introduction The sodium–glucose cotransporter 2 inhibitor, canagliflozin, reduced kidney failure and cardiovascular events in the Canagliflozin and Renal Events in Diabetes with Established Nephropathy Clinical Evaluation (CREDENCE) trial. We carried out a post‐hoc analysis to evaluate the efficacy and safety of canagliflozin in a subgroup of participants in East and South‐East Asian (EA) countries who are at high risk of renal complications. Materials and Methods Participants with an estimated glomerular filtration rate of 30 to 300–5,000 mg/g were randomized to 100 mg of canagliflozin or a placebo. The effects of canagliflozin treatment on pre‐specified efficacy and safety outcomes were examined using Cox proportional hazards regression between participants from EA countries (China, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan) and the remaining participants. Results Of 4,401 participants, 604 (13.7%) were from EA countries; 301 and 303 were assigned to the canagliflozin and placebo groups, respectively. Canagliflozin lowered the risk of primary outcome (composite of end‐stage kidney disease, doubling of serum creatinine level, or renal or cardiovascular death) in EA participants (hazard ratio 0.54, 95% confidence interval 0.35–0.84). The effects of canagliflozin on renal and cardiovascular outcomes in EA participants were generally similar to those of the remaining participants. Safety outcomes were similar between the EA and non‐EA participants. Conclusions In the CREDENCE trial, the risk of renal and cardiovascular events was safely reduced in participants from EA countries at high risk of renal events.

Although much has been written about divine knowledge, and some on divine beliefs, virtually nothing has been written about divine credences. In this article we comparatively assess four views on divine credences: (1) God has only beliefs, not credences; (2) God has both beliefs and credences; (3) God has only credences, not beliefs; and (4) God has neither credences nor beliefs, only knowledge. We weigh the costs and benefits of these four views and draw connections to current discussions in philosophical theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the literature on the relationship between belief and credence has focused on the reduction question: that is, whether either belief or credence reduces to the other. This debate, while important, only scratches the surface of the belief‐credence connection. Even on the anti‐reductive dualist view, belief and credence could still be very tightly connected. Here, I explore questions about the belief‐credence connection that go beyond reduction. This paper is dedicated to what I call the independence question: just how independent are belief and credence? I look at this question from two angles: a descriptive one (as a psychological matter, how much can belief and credence come apart?) and a normative one (for a rational person, how closely connected are belief and credence?) I argue that those committed to minimal normative independence should accept more radical normative independence, and that cases of descriptive independence support belief‐credence dualism. This suggests that belief and credence are more independent than one might think. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background The nonsteroidal mineralocorticoid receptor antagonist finerenone and the sodium–glucose cotransporter-2 inhibitor (SGLT-2i) canagliflozin reduce cardiorenal risk in albuminuric patients with chronic kidney disease (CKD) and type 2 diabetes (T2D). At first glance, the results of Finerenone in Reducing Kidney Failure and Disease Progression in Diabetic Kidney Disease (FIDELIO-DKD) (ClinicalTrials.gov , NCT02540993) and Canagliflozin and Renal Events in Diabetes with Established Nephropathy Clinical Evaluation (CREDENCE) appear disparate. In FIDELIO-DKD, the primary endpoint had an 18% [95% confidence interval (CI) 7–27] relative risk reduction; in CREDENCE, the primary endpoint had a 30% (95% CI 18–41) relative risk reduction. Unlike CREDENCE, the FIDELIO-DKD trial included patients with high albuminuria but excluded patients with symptomatic heart failure with reduced ejection fraction. The primary endpoint in the FIDELIO-DKD trial was kidney specific and included a sustained decline in the estimated glomerular filtration rate (eGFR) of ≥40% from baseline. In contrast, the primary endpoint in the CREDENCE trial included a sustained decline in eGFR of ≥57% from baseline and cardiovascular (CV) death. This post hoc exploratory analysis investigated how differences in trial design—inclusion/exclusion criteria and definition of primary outcomes—influenced observed treatment effects. Methods Patients from FIDELIO-DKD who met the CKD inclusion criteria of the CREDENCE study (urine albumin: creatinine ratio >300–5000 mg/g and an eGFR of 30–<90 mL/min/1.73 m2 at screening) were included in this analysis. The primary endpoint was a cardiorenal composite (CV death, kidney failure, eGFR decrease of ≥57% sustained for ≥4 weeks or renal death). Patients with symptomatic heart failure with reduced ejection fraction were excluded from FIDELIO-DKD. Therefore, in a sensitivity analysis, we further adjusted for the baseline prevalence of heart failure. Results Of 4619/5674 (81.4%) patients who met the subgroup inclusion criteria, 49.6% were treated with finerenone and 50.4% received placebo. The rate of the cardiorenal composite endpoint was 43.9/1000 patient-years with finerenone compared with 59.5/1000 patient-years with placebo. The relative risk was significantly reduced by 26% with finerenone versus placebo [hazard ratio (HR) 0.74 (95% CI 0.63–0.87)]. In CREDENCE, the rate of the cardiorenal composite endpoint was 43.2/1000 patient-years with canagliflozin compared with 61.2/1000 patient-years with placebo; a 30% risk reduction was observed with canagliflozin [HR 0.70 (95% CI 0.59–0.82)]. Conclusions This analysis highlights the pitfalls of direct comparisons between trials. When key differences in trial design are considered, FIDELIO-DKD and CREDENCE demonstrate cardiorenal benefits of a similar magnitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Network analysis of Word of Mouth (WOM) examines how customers exchange opinions within their social networks. Compared to standard survey questions, which typically measure the likelihood to recommend, the network approach provides more metrics (e.g., average path length, clustering coefficient, density, average degree) that can be used to diagnose customer chatter. Unfortunately, traditional WOM has not benefitted from network analysis, which usually is applied to online WOM due to the availability of stored data. Despite the pervasiveness of online WOM, recent commercial reports reveal that traditional WOM still surpasses online WOM by a large margin. Traditional WOM is also perceived as more trustworthy and persuasive than online WOM. Thus, given the heavy reliance on traditional WOM and the advances made in network analysis that deal with online WOM, the main purpose of this study is to demonstrate that network analysis is a viable option for gaining insights in traditional WOM. This is the first study to utilize a survey method for collecting WOM network data for a wide range of products, which allows a direct comparison of their network structures. While network analysis may be more demanding on the researcher and the respondents, as the study illustrates, it also is more diagnostic than a standard survey. The main study utilized network analysis by using an alter-alter method, which was used to map the WOM networks structures for multiple products. Specifically, we examined the WOM networks structure as a function of product type (search, experience, and credence products) and opinion valence (positive vs. negative). The results reveal that WOM networks are affected primarily by product type. People are most likely to share opinions about experience products, followed by opinions about search products, and least likely to talk about credence products. The effect of opinion valence is limited. These findings are of practical relevance because they show that WOM can be managed by including search, experience, or credence qualities in promotional messages. This study also is the first to compare WOM networks to the existing social network, which can serve as a benchmark for evaluating WOM campaigns. The results reveal that for most products, people do not utilize all of their social connections for WOM, but there are exceptions, such as sharing a positive opinion about a movie, where WOM chatter can exceed the social network. Introducing a new method for studying traditional WOM also brings new research questions, and the study concludes with limitations and future research directions. Overall, the conclusion is that network analysis is a viable technique for studying traditional WOM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A question of recent interest in epistemology and philosophy of mind is that of how belief and credence relate to each other. A number of philosophers argue for a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, what it is to have a credence just is to have a particular kind of belief—that is, a belief whose content involves probabilities or epistemic modals. Here, I argue against the belief-first view: specifically, I argue that it cannot account for agents who have credences in propositions that they barely comprehend. I conclude that, no matter how credences differ from beliefs, they do not differ in virtue of adding additional content to the believed proposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we argue that our conception of and intuitions about paradoxes are themselves paradoxical. Specifically, we argue that our commitment to the existence and nature of paradoxes is inconsistent with a norm of rationality—which is a paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay discusses the difficulty to reconcile two paradigms about beliefs: the binary or categorical paradigm of yes/no beliefs and the probabilistic paradigm of degrees of belief. The possibility for someone to hold beliefs of both types simultaneously is challenged by the lottery paradox, and more recently by a general impossibility theorem by Dietrich and List. The nature, relevance, and implications of the tension are explained and assessed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that social deliberation may increase an agent’s confidence and credence under certain circumstances. An agent considers a proposition H and assigns a probability to it. However, she is not fully confident that she herself is reliable in this assignment. She then endorses H during deliberation with another person, expecting him to raise serious objections. To her surprise, however, the other person does not raise any objections to H. How should her attitudes toward H change? It seems plausible that she should (i) increase the credence she assigns to H and, at the same time, (ii) increase the reliability she assigns to herself concerning H (i.e. her confidence). A Bayesian model helps us to investigate under what conditions, if any, this is rational. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aims/Introduction: The sodium–glucose cotransporter 2 inhibitor, canagliflozin, reduced kidney failure and cardiovascular events in the Canagliflozin and Renal Events in Diabetes with Established Nephropathy Clinical Evaluation (CREDENCE) trial. We carried out a post‐hoc analysis to evaluate the efficacy and safety of canagliflozin in a subgroup of participants in East and South‐East Asian (EA) countries who are at high risk of renal complications. Materials and Methods: Participants with an estimated glomerular filtration rate of 30 to <90 mL/min/1.73 m2 and urinary albumin‐to‐creatinine ratio of >300–5,000 mg/g were randomized to 100 mg of canagliflozin or a placebo. The effects of canagliflozin treatment on pre‐specified efficacy and safety outcomes were examined using Cox proportional hazards regression between participants from EA countries (China, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan) and the remaining participants. Results: Of 4,401 participants, 604 (13.7%) were from EA countries; 301 and 303 were assigned to the canagliflozin and placebo groups, respectively. Canagliflozin lowered the risk of primary outcome (composite of end‐stage kidney disease, doubling of serum creatinine level, or renal or cardiovascular death) in EA participants (hazard ratio 0.54, 95% confidence interval 0.35–0.84). The effects of canagliflozin on renal and cardiovascular outcomes in EA participants were generally similar to those of the remaining participants. Safety outcomes were similar between the EA and non‐EA participants. Conclusions: In the CREDENCE trial, the risk of renal and cardiovascular events was safely reduced in participants from EA countries at high risk of renal events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents Clement of Alexandria as a witness to epistemological debates in Greek philosophy and as a creative appropriator of Greek epistemological language. Focusing on three concepts discussed in the second book of the Stromateis - πίστις, πρόληψις, and ἀπόδειξις - it analyses Clement's engagement with them against the background of their Peripatetic, Epicurean, and Galenic sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radical moral encroachment is the view that belief itself is morally evaluable, and that some moral properties of belief itself make a difference to epistemic rationality. To date, almost all proponents of radical moral encroachment hold to an asymmetry thesis: the moral encroaches on rational belief, but not on rational credence. In this paper, we argue against the asymmetry thesis; we show that, insofar as one accepts the most prominent arguments for radical moral encroachment on belief, one should likewise accept radical moral encroachment on credence. We outline and reject potential attempts to establish a basis for asymmetry between the attitude types. Then, we explore the merits and demerits of the two available responses to our symmetry claim: (1) embracing radical moral encroachment on credence and (2) denying radical moral encroachment on belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often loosely said that Ramsey (in: Braithwaite (ed) The foundations of mathematics and other logical essays, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Abingdon, pp 156–198, 1931) and de Finetti (in: Kyburg, Smokler (eds) Studies in subjective probability, Kreiger Publishing, Huntington, 1937) proved that if your credences are inconsistent, then you will be willing to accept a Dutch Book, a wager portfolio that is sure to result in a loss. Of course, their theorems are true, but the claim about acceptance of Dutch Books assumes a particular method of calculating expected utilities given the inconsistent credences. I will argue that there are better ways of calculating expected utilities given a potentially inconsistent credence assignment, and that for a large class of credences—a class that includes many inconsistent examples—these ways are immune to Dutch Books and single-shot domination failures. The crucial move is to replace Finite Additivity with Monotonicity (if A ⊆ B , then P (A) ≤ P (B) ) and then calculate expected utilities for positive U via the formula ∫ 0 ∞ P (U > y) d y . This shows that Dutch Book arguments for probabilism, the thesis that one's credences should be consistent, do not establish their conclusion. Finally, I will consider a modified argument based on multi-step domination failure that does better, but nonetheless is not as compelling as the Dutch Book arguments appeared to be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract The 5th Cardiovascular Outcome Trial (CVOT) Summit was held in Munich on October 24th–25th, 2019. As in previous years, this summit served as a reference meeting for in-depth discussions on the topic of recently completed and presented CVOTs. This year, focus was placed on the CVOTs CAROLINA, CREDENCE, DAPA-HF, REWIND, and PIONEER-6. Trial implications for diabetes management and the impact on new treatment algorithms were highlighted for diabetologists, cardiologists, endocrinologists, nephrologists, and general practitioners. Discussions evolved from CVOTs to additional therapy options for heart failure (ARNI), knowledge gained for the treatment and prevention of heart failure and diabetic kidney disease in populations with and without diabetes, particularly using SGLT-2 inhibitors and GLP-1 receptor agonists. Furthermore, the ever increasing impact of CVOTs and substances tested for primary prevention and primary care was discussed. The 6th Cardiovascular Outcome Trial Summit will be held in Munich on October 29th–30th, 2020 ( https://www.cvot.org ).

Food credence attributes (e.g., food safety, organic, and carbon neutral production methods) are quality characteristics of products that cannot be assessed by buyers at the point of sale without additional information (e.g., certification labels). Hence, the ability to access credence attributes of a particular product can result in a situation termed as asymmetric distributed information among supply chain stakeholders (e.g., producers, processors, wholesalers, retailers, consumer) where one party of a market transaction is in possession of more information about a product than the other party. This situation can lead to potential inefficiencies, e.g., misinformation, risk of food borne illness, or opportunistic behavior such as fraud. The present study sought to develop a conceptual framework that describes a) the motivation for key stakeholders to participate in the market for food credence attributes, b) the type of food credence attributes that key stakeholders provide, and c) current mechanisms to address the issue of information asymmetry among the stakeholders in the food system. The study was conducted using an integrative literature review. The developed framework consists of two components: a) the food supply chain and b) the attribute assurance system among which multiple links exist. The findings suggest that retailers, processors, NGOs, and government authorities are influential stakeholders within the supply chain of food credence attributes by imposing food quality standards which can address information asymmetry among food actors. While the credence attribute assurance system (e.g., food standards, third party food attribute assurance providers) can potentially address the issue of asymmetric information among market stakeholders, a range of issues remain. These include food standards as a potential market entry barrier for food producers and distributors, limited food standard harmonization, and communication challenges of food attribute assurance (e.g., consumers’ signal processing, signal use and trust). The syntheses presented in this study contributes to stakeholders’ (e.g., supply chain actors, scientists, policy makers) improved understanding about the components of the credence food system and their integration as well as the drivers for change in this system.

A probability distribution is regular if it does not assign probability zero to any possible event. Williamson (Analysis, 67, 173–180, 2007) argued that we should not require probabilities to be regular, for if we do, certain "isomorphic" physical events (infinite sequences of coin flip outcomes) must have different probabilities, which is implausible. His remarks suggest an assumption that chances are determined by intrinsic, qualitative circumstances. Weintraub (Analysis, 68, 247–250, 2008) responds that Williamson's coin flip events differ in their inclusion relations to each other, or the inclusion relations between their times, and this can account for their differences in probability. Haverkamp and Schulz (Erkenntnis, 76, 395–402, 2012) rebut Weintraub, but their rebuttal fails because the events in their example are even less symmetric than Williamson's. However, Weintraub's argument also fails, for it ignores the distinction between intrinsic, qualitative differences and relations of time and bare identity. Weintraub could rescue her argument by claiming that the events differ in duration, under a non-standard and problematic conception of duration. However, we can modify Williamson's example with Special Relativity so that there is no absolute inclusion relation between the times, and neither event has longer duration except relative to certain reference frames. Hence, Weintraub's responses do not apply unless chance is observer-relative, which is also problematic. Finally, another symmetry argument defeats even the appeal to frame-dependent durations, for there the events have the same finite duration and are entirely disjoint, as are their respective times and places. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Richard Bradley's landmark book Decision Theory with a Human Face makes seminal contributions to nearly every major area of decision theory, as well as most areas of formal epistemology and many areas of semantics. In addition to sketching Bradley's distinctive semantics for conditional beliefs and desires, I will explain his theory of conditional desire, focusing particularly on his claim that we should not desire events, either positively or negatively, under the supposition that they will occur. I shall argue, to the contrary, that permitting non-trivial desirabilities for events whose occurrence is known or assumed is both more intuitively plausible and more theoretically fruitful than Bradley's approach. In the course of the discussion I will contrast Bradley's broadly evidentialist picture of decision theory with my own more orthodox causal approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a prominent thought, in one's practical reasoning one should rely only on what one knows (Fantl and McGrath 2002; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008; Williamson 2000, 2005a, 2017). Yet for many choices, the relevant information is uncertain. This has led Schiffer (2007, 189) to the following objection: oftentimes, we are fully rational in reasoning from uncertain premises which we do not know. For example, we may decide to take an umbrella based on a 0.4 credence that it will rain. There are various ways proponents of a knowledge norm for practical reasoning can respond. One option is to say that the right way of dealing with uncertain information requires knowledge of probabilities (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, 581–85). Another option is to say that credences can be knowledge because they really are beliefs with an unusual kind of content that consists of a set of probability spaces (Moss 2018, chap. 9). Mixed accounts are possible as well (Weisberg 2013). On neither of the accounts in the literature, however, can reasoning from uncertain premises be taken as reasoning based on a graded attitude, a credence, toward an ordinary proposition. To make room for this possibility, I argue that reliance comes in degrees. The knowledge norm is only plausible when taken to be concerned with full reliance.Partial reliance, on the other hand, goes hand in hand with credence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The adjective 'is justified' has all the hallmarks of a gradable adjective. But the relationship between gradable uses and straightforward predications of the form 'x is justified' has been underexplored by epistemologists. In this paper we undertake to do some ground clearing as a prelude to better understanding this relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a puzzle which lends support to two theses. First, that there is no formal reduction of a rational agent's beliefs to her credences, because belief and credence are each responsive to different features of a body of evidence. Second, that if our traditional understanding of our practices of holding each other responsible is correct, then belief has a distinctive role to play, even for ideally rational agents, that cannot be played by credence. The question of which avenues remain for the credence-only theorist is considered. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.

Patients with Type 2 Diabetes (T2D) are at risk of developing macrovascular (cardiac, cerebrovascular, peripheral arterial disease) and microvascular (nephropathy, neuropathy, retinopathy) complications. Glycemic control improves only microvascular outcomes. However, some SGLT-2 inhibitors and GLP1-R agonists have proven beneficial in macrovascular conditions. Canagliflozin is an SGLT2 inhibitor that provides sustained reductions in HbA1c, blood pressure and weight. Remarkably, as CANVAS program and CREDENCE trial demonstrated, canagliflozin promotes significant reductions in the frequency of atherosclerotic cardiovascular events, hospitalizations for heart failure and renal outcomes. In addition, real-world studies have confirmed the results of clinical trials in clinical practice. Therefore, canagliflozin should be considered a first-line therapy in the management of T2D patients in order to reduce both micro- and macrovascular complications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1970's, a controversy arose about a probability problem posed by Irving Copi. One side argued that a common spontaneous intuition about the problem is correct; the other side argued that this intuition is mistaken. Here, I argue (1) that the naïve intuition yields the correct answer, but accidentally and for a wrong reason; (2) that a more reflective intuition yields a wrong answer, and hence, is also mistaken; and (3) that an even more reflective intuition yields the correct answer for a correct reason. This warrants what I call optimistic fallibilism concerning intuitions about probability: although intuition is certainly prone to error in this domain, intuition has the capacity for self-correction. A naïve intuition that is mistaken can be replaced by a distinct, reflective intuition; and a reflective intuition that is mistaken can be replaced by another reflective intuition – with the process ultimately yielding a sound intuition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Would consumers experience the same psychological processes when adopting AI service robots in different service areas? Results of multigroup structural equation modeling (n = 517) indicate that consumers' psychological processes are not the same in different service areas. Specifically, how consumers perceive AI service robots' usefulness is shown to be a significant underlying mechanism affecting consumers' attitudes toward adopting AI service robots in a service setting with a credence attribute (e.g., a hospital), but is not significant for a service setting with an experience attribute (e.g., a café). Furthermore, regardless of the different service settings, both privacy concerns and trust toward AI technology are shown to be significant antecedents, consistent with previous literature. Our results provide empirical insights at the intersection of psychology, marketing, and AI technology on how consumers adapt to using service robots across different service areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A popular model of normative decision-making under uncertainty suggests choosing the option with the maximum expected moral choice-worthiness (MEC), where the choice-worthiness values from each moral theory, which are assumed commensurable, are weighted by credence and combined. This study adds descriptive uncertainty about the non-moral facts of a situation into the model by treating choice-worthiness as a random variable. When agents face greater descriptive uncertainty, the choice-worthiness random variable will have a greater spread and a larger standard deviation. MEC, as a decision rule, is sensitive only to the expected value of the random variable and not to its standard deviation. For example, MEC is insensitive to cases where an option with a large degree of descriptive uncertainty may have a higher probability of being below some threshold of impermissibility than does an option with less dispersion, even though the latter has a higher expected choice-worthiness. When applied to the same situation, similar moral theories will have statistically correlated choice-worthiness values. This correlation affects the dispersion of the credence-weighted sum of the random variables but not its expected value. Thus, MEC is insensitive to aspects of the normative situation to which a good decision-rule should be sensitive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conditionalization is a norm that governs the rational reallocation of credence. I distinguish between factive and non-factive formulations of Conditionalization. Factive formulations assume that the conditioning proposition is true. Non-factive formulations allow that the conditioning proposition may be false. I argue that non-factive formulations provide a better foundation for philosophical and scientific applications of Bayesian decision theory. I furthermore argue that previous formulations of Conditionalization, factive and non-factive alike, have almost universally ignored, downplayed, or mishandled a crucial causal aspect of Conditionalization. To formulate Conditionalization adequately, one must explicitly address the causal structure of the transition from old credences to new credences. I offer a formulation of Conditionalization that takes these considerations into account, and I compare my preferred formulation with some prominent formulations found in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]