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This paper examines the concept of group knowledge. I start by noticing that we often seem compelled to attribute epistemic attitudes to groups, even when those attitudes differ from the ones held by their individual members. However, it is also the case that ideally responsible agents are subjected to a ‘deflationary pressure’ to ground those attitudes in concrete individuals. In the light of this, I argue that epistemically responsible groups should be conceived of as dynamic entities. Correlatively, group knowledge can be defined in terms of a family of possible paths between distributed and common knowledge. Finally I show that the Logic of Public Announcements can be used in this context as adequate tool to monitor the satisfaction of normative requirements by epistemically responsible individuals

We take up the challenge of developing an international network with capacity to survey the world's scientists on an ongoing basis, providing rich datasets regarding the opinions of scientists and scientific sub-communities, both at a time and also over time. The novel methodology employed sees local coordinators, at each institution in the network, sending survey invitation emails internally to scientists at their home institution. The emails link to a '10 second survey', where the participant is presented with a single statement to consider, and a standard five-point Likert scale. In June 2023, a group of 30 philosophers and social scientists invited 20,085 scientists across 30 institutions in 12 countries to participate, gathering 6,807 responses to the statement Science has put it beyond reasonable doubt that COVID-19 is caused by a virus. The study demonstrates that it is possible to establish a global network to quickly ascertain scientific opinion on a large international scale, with high response rate, low opt-out rate, and in a way that allows for significant (perhaps indefinite) repeatability. Measuring scientific opinion in this new way would be a valuable complement to currently available approaches, potentially informing policy decisions and public understanding across diverse fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores a game-theoretic analysis of social interactions in which each agent's well-being depends crucially, and exclusively, on the well-being of another agent. Topics discussed include the von Neumann Morgenstern utility theorem; the idea that in some interactions, preferences are not just unknown, but ontologically undetermined, and different types of payoff ungroundedness and altruism.

In a recent paper Samir Okasha has suggested an application of Arrow's impossibility theorem to theory choice. When epistemic virtues are interpreted as 'voters' in charge of ranking competing theories, and there are more than two theories at stake, the final ordering is bound to coincide with the one proposed by one of the voters (the dictator), provided a number of seemingly reasonable conditions are in place. In a similar spirit, Jacob Stegenga has shown that Arrow's theorem applies to the amalgamation of evidence; the 'voters' here are the different sources of evidence. As with Okasha's proposal, it is not clear how to avoid Arrow's pessimistic conclusion. In this paper we develop a novel argument that purports to show that, in typical examples, Arrow's result does not obtain when dealing with evidence amalgamation. The reason is that we cannot escape the well-known Duhem problem: the evidence actually confirms (or disconfirms) complex conjunctions that include various auxiliary hypotheses. We argue that confirmational holism induces us to restrict the domain of a reasonable amalgamation function, thus violating one of Arrow's conditions. The upshot is that we are now able to see the Duhem problem under a different, positive light – namely, as a phenomenon that makes the aggregation of the evidence possible in the first place, when there are at least three options on the table. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I comment on M.Á. Fernández's paper on veritism and the value of understanding. I begin by observing that veritism relies on a definition of epistemic value that threatens to trivialize the discussion. Then I proceed to examine Fernandez's arguments with some detail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author comments on the reasons and epistemic rationality based on the Reason-Knowledge Principle (RKP) proposition of John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley on the correlation of knowledge and action. The author believes that Hawthorne and Stanley should not raise probability claims as reasons if they still cannot prove such claims. She also argues that if probability judgments are taken to translate personal measures, then the RKP is still insufficient to what people need.