Search

The historical tendency to view medicine as both an art and a science may have contributed to a disinclination among clinicians towards cognitive science. In particular, this has had an impact on the approach towards the diagnostic process which is a barometer of clinical decision-making behaviour and is increasingly seen as a yardstick of clinician calibration and performance. The process itself is more complicated and complex than was previously imagined, with multiple variables that are difficult to predict, are interactive, and show nonlinearity. They appear to characterise a complex adaptive system. Many aspects of the diagnostic process, including the psychophysics of signal detection and discrimination, ergonomics, probability theory, decision analysis, factor analysis, causal analysis and more recent developments in judgement and decision-making (JDM), especially including the domain of heuristics and cognitive and affective biases, appear fundamental to a good understanding of it. A preliminary analysis of factors such as manifestness of illness and others that may impede clinicians' awareness and understanding of these issues is proposed here. It seems essential that medical trainees be explicitly and systematically exposed to specific areas of cognitive science during the undergraduate curriculum, and learn to incorporate them into clinical reasoning and decision-making. Importantly, this understanding is needed for the development of cognitive bias mitigation and improved calibration of JDM in clinical practice.

Diagnostic errors comprise the leading threat to patient safety in healthcare today. Learning how to extract the lessons from cases where diagnosis succeeds or fails is a promising approach to improve diagnostic safety going forward. We present up-to-date and authoritative guidance on how the existing approaches to conducting root cause analyses (RCA's) can be modified to study cases involving diagnosis. There are several diffierences: In cases involving diagnosis, the investigation should begin immediately after the incident, and clinicians involved in the case should be members of the RCA team. The review must include consideration of how the clinical reasoning process went astray (or succeeded), and use a human-factors perspective to consider the system-related contextual factors in the diagnostic process. We present detailed instructions for conducting RCA's of cases involving diagnosis, with advice on how to identify root causes and contributing factors and select appropriate interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IntroductionAlthough patient safety has improved steadily, harm remains a substantial global challenge. Additionally, safety needs to be ensured not only in hospitals but also across the continuum of care. Better understanding of the complex cognitive factors influencing health care-related decisions and organizational cultures could lead to more rational approaches, and thereby to further improvement.HypothesisA model integrating the concepts underlying Reason's Swiss cheese theory and the cognitive-affective biases plus cascade could advance the understanding of cognitive-affective processes that underlie decisions and organizational cultures across the continuum of care.MethodsThematic analysis, qualitative information from several sources being used to support argumentation.DiscussionComplex covert cognitive phenomena underlie decisions influencing health care. In the integrated model, the Swiss cheese slices represent dynamic cognitive-affective (mental) gates: Reason's successive layers of defence. Like firewalls and antivirus programs, cognitive-affective gates normally allow the passage of rational decisions but block or counter unsounds ones. Gates can be breached (ie, holes created) at one or more levels of organizations, teams, and individuals, by (1) any element of cognitive-affective biases plus (conflicts of interest and cognitive biases being the best studied) and (2) other potential error-provoking factors. Conversely, flawed decisions can be blocked and consequences minimized; for example, by addressing cognitive biases plus and error-provoking factors, and being constantly mindful. Informed shared decision making is a neglected but critical layer of defence (cognitive-affective gate). The integrated model can be custom tailored to specific situations, and the underlying principles applied to all methods for improving safety. The model may also provide a framework for developing and evaluating strategies to optimize organizational cultures and decisions.LimitationsThe concept is abstract, the model is virtual, and the best supportive evidence is qualitative and indirect.ConclusionsThe proposed model may help enhance rational decision making across the continuum of care, thereby improving patient safety globally.