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The article argues that the U.S. should be re-evaluating its outdated standard in determining competence to stand trial and its implications for self-representation. Topics discussed include history of the standards used to determine whether a defendant is fit to enter a plea and competent to stand trial in the U.S. and Great Britain; and the negative impacts of that case "Dusky v. United States" on the U.S.'s judicial system.

Built into the foundation of the U.S. criminal justice system is the idea that defendants must be able to participate in the trials against them. The right not to stand trial unless competent is premised on the idea that it is fundamentally unfair for defendants to stand trial unless they are able to participate in their trial in at least some capacity. Likewise, the right to counsel is based on a conception of defendants controlling at least some decisions in their case. These rights express an ideal that is foundational to our criminal system: defendant participation must be protected. Ultimately, though, the criminal system does not do a sufficient job of protecting that ideal throughout the criminal process. Instead, the criminal system is punctuated with procedural rules and constitutional standards that actually erode defendants' ability to participate in the trials that affect their lives. In accordance with the ideal evident in the competency standard and the right to counsel, we should build a criminal justice system that allows for defendants to participate in meaningful and impactful ways. This Note first seeks out the doctrines that reveal the underlying ideal of defendant participation, and then examines the procedural rules and constitutional standards that prevent the actualization of that ideal. Ultimately, it concludes that these rules and standards must be changed to preserve the ideal of defendant participation throughout the criminal process. It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.¹ The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. The counsel provision supplements this design. It speaks of the assistance of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant.² [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though correctional facilities are one of the largest providers of mental health care in the country, the treatment provided often fails to address the needs of many mentally ill inmates. Indeed, after receiving treatment at a state mental health facility, many pretrial detainees who have been recently restored to competency revert to an incompetent state—or decompensate—upon their return to jail, at which point they must return to the state treatment facility to be restored to competency once again. This Note is the first to explore this “decompensation cycle,” highlighting the significance of the problem and demonstrating how mental health treatment provided by correctional facilities, or the lack thereof, can lead to decompensation. Ultimately, this Note argues that the decompensation cycle and inadequate mental health treatment provided to recently restored pretrial detainees violates the Due Process Clause. Therefore, courts must step in and require jails to maintain the treatment regimen recommended by the state competency treatment facility. Furthermore, this Note advocates for the use of telemedicine in correctional facilities as one way to improve treatment and end the decompensation cycle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the proposed elimination of a legal presumption which is used in juvenile delinquency cases in the U.S. and presumes that all juveniles are competent to stand trial, and it mentions the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the 1960 case Dusky v. United States which deals with the concept of adult competency. Intellectual deficiencies among children and adults are mentioned, along with the legal rights of juveniles in places such as Europe, Asia, and South America.

The article discusses the need of the U.S. to reform the standards in determining competence to stand trial and its implications for self-representation, as of January 2016. Topics discussed include history of British and American laws used to determine whether a defendant is fit to enter a plea and competent to stand trial; and the impacts of the court case "Dusky v. United States" on the U.S.'s judicial system.

The article focuses on the issue of recognition of a substantive due process right by courts to competence in removal proceedings. Topics discussed include the necessity of competence to protect the fairness and accuracy of the proceedings and constitutional rights, consequences of a finding of incompetence, and the role of mental competence in juvenile delinquency adjudications, capital habeas proceedings and quasi-criminal removal proceedings. It mentions the case Dusky v. United States.