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9. List of Contributors to Volume 1

Author

Holguín-Veras, José, primary, Ramírez-Ríos, Diana G., additional, Goldmann, Kathrin, additional, Sieg, Gernot, additional, Vassallo, José Manuel, additional, Thompson, Russell G., additional, Batarce, Marco, additional, de Palma, André, additional, Monardo, Julien, additional, Wan, Yulai, additional, Yang, Dong, additional, Giesen, Ricardo, additional, Farren, Darío, additional, Franco, Sofia F., additional, Bates, John J., additional, Mandell, Svante, additional, Hjorth, Katrine, additional, Hörcher, Daniel, additional, Picard, Nathalie, additional, De Borger, Bruno, additional, Proost, Stef, additional, Peer, Stefanie, additional, Nelson, Jon P., additional, Andersson, Henrik, additional, Espino, Raquel, additional, Ortúzar, Juan de Dios, additional, Rizzi, Luis I., additional, Small, Kenneth A, additional, Lindsey, Robin, additional, Raux, Charles, additional, Eliasson, Jonas, additional, de Rus, Ginés, additional, Abegaz, Dereje, additional, Tang, Yili, additional, Albalate, Daniel, additional, Gragera, Albert, additional, Daly, Andrew, additional, Fox, James, additional, Mulalic, Ismir, additional, Rouwendal, Jan, additional, Dunkerley, Fay, additional, Rohr, Charlene, additional, Wardman, Mark, additional, Lehner, Stephan, additional, Minken, Harald, additional, Hultkrantz, Lars, additional, Toner, Jeremy, additional, Kilani, Moez, additional, Grisolia, Jose M., additional, Willis, Ken, additional, Tikoudis, Ioannis, additional, Van Dender, Kurt, additional, Ison, Stephen, additional, Budd, Lucy, additional, Bernardo, Valeria, additional, Fageda, Xavier, additional, Flores-Fillol, Ricardo, additional, Fosgerau, Mogens, additional, Pilegaard, Ninette, additional, Fung, Chau Man, additional, Welde, Morten, additional, Odeck, James, additional, Laird, James, additional, Johnson, Daniel, additional, Silva, Hugo E., additional, Guo, Qianwen, additional, Li, Zhongfei, additional, Pereira, Rafael H.M., additional, Karner, Alex, additional, Mouter, Niek, additional, Graham, Daniel J., additional, Holl, Adelheid, additional, Nyström, Johan, additional, Li, Zhi-Chun, additional, Chen, Ya-Juan, additional, de Jong, Gerard, additional, Marcucci, Edoardo, additional, Gatta, Valerio, additional, Le Pira, Michela, additional, Vigren, Andreas, additional, Anas, Alex, additional, Melo, Patricia C., additional, Venables, Anthony J., additional, Matas, Anna, additional, Asensio, Javier, additional, van de Velde, Didier, additional, Hirschhorn, Fabio, additional, D’Alfonso, Tiziana, additional, Catalano, Giuseppe, additional, Armstrong, John, additional, Preston, John, additional, Meunier, David, additional, Quinet, Emile, additional, Zhang, Anming, additional, Zhang, Yahua, additional, Huang, Zhibin, additional, Czerny, Achim I., additional, Lang, Hao, additional, Zhang, Guoquan, additional, Law, Colin C.H., additional, Yang, Hangjun, additional, Nash, Chris, additional, Smith, Andrew, additional, van Wee, Bert, additional, Odolinski, Kristofer, additional, Wheat, Phill, additional, Strandenes, Siri Pettersen, additional, Cullinane, Kevin P.B., additional, Lam, Jasmine Siu Lee, additional, Link, Heike, additional, Ivanova, Olga, additional, Ponti, Marco, additional, Worsley, Tom, additional, Savage, Ian, additional, Franklin, Joel P., additional, Whitehead, Jake, additional, Plötz, Patrick, additional, Jochem, Patrick, additional, Sprei, Frances, additional, tschke, Elisabeth Dü, additional, Cantos-Sánchez, Pedro, additional, Bösch, Patrick M., additional, Becker, Felix, additional, Becker, Henrik, additional, Axhausen, Kay W., additional, Bröcker, Johannes, additional, Flügel, Stefan, additional, Halse, Askill H., additional, De Ceuster, Griet, additional, Mayeres, Inge, additional, Beria, Paolo, additional, Lu, Jing, additional, Meng, Yucan, additional, Jiang, Changmin, additional, Lv, Cheng, additional, Rich, Jeppe, additional, Jochem, Patrick E.P., additional, Dütschke, Elisabeth, additional, Gagnepain, Philippe, additional, Ivaldi, Marc, additional, Gössling, Stefan, additional, Shaheen, Susan, additional, Cohen, Adam, additional, Santos, Georgina, additional, Jokinen, Jani-Pekka, additional, Sörensen, Leif, additional, Schlüter, Jan, additional, Boffa, Federico, additional, Iozzi, Alberto, additional, Nagurney, Anna, additional, and Nagurney, Ladimer S., additional

Published
2021
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18. Prices, capacities and service quality in a congestible Bertrand duopoly

Author

De Borger, Bruno and Van Dender, Kurt

Subjects
congestion, price-capacity games, imperfect competition
Abstract

We study the duopolistic interaction between congestible facilities that supply perfect substitutes. Firms are assumed to make sequential decisions on capacities and prices. Since the outcomes directly affect consumers’ time cost of accessing or using a facility, the capacity sharing rule is endogenous. We study this two-stage game for different firm objectives and compare the duopoly outcomes with those under monopoly and at the social optimum. Our findings include the following. First, for profit maximizing firms both capacity provision and service quality, defined as the inverse of time costs of using the facility, are distorted under duopoly: they are below the socially optimal levels. This contrasts with the monopoly outcome, where pricing and capacity provision are such that the monopolist does provide the socially optimal level of service quality. Second, duopoly prices are lower than monopoly prices, but higher than in the social optimum. Hence, while price competition between duopolists yields benefits for consumer, capacity competition is harmful. Third, price-capacity competition implies that higher capacity costs may lead to higher profits for both facilities. Finally, if firms also care about output, this mainly affects pricing behavior; strategic interaction in capacities are much less affected. If duopolists attach a higher weight to output and a correspondingly lower weight to profits, this leads to a deterioration of the quality of service.

Published
2005

50. Covid-19 externality and optimal transport policy : Department of Economics Discussion Paper

Author

De Borger, Bruno and Proost, Stefaan

Abstract

Covid-19 has important implications for transport policy and in particular for public transport (PT) operations. PT use increases the objective risk of transmitting the infection to others but it also increases the perceived risks for passengers. We use the perceived risk as the measure of the externality because isolating the objective transmission risk in PT tends to be very difficult. Increased teleworking and the perceived high infection transmission risk by potential passengers have drastically reduced demand in many cities. In this paper, we use a simple model to study the effect of these changes on second-best optimal pricing and frequency of public transport trips, assuming under-priced car use. A numerical application reflecting the public transport situation in Brussel is provided. Results include the following. First, we show that more telework and the increased perceived crowding cost associated with the infection risk have opposite effects on the fare, so that it may be optimal for the PT-firm not to change the fare at all; a similar argument may hold for the frequency. Second, holding the fare and frequency constant at their pre-Covid second-best optimal values we find that, surprisingly, more telework reduces the public transport deficit. Third, extending the model to allow for passengers with different vulnerability and different behaviour towards Covid-19, we show that fare differences between different types of passengers are unwarranted unless for each type separate vehicles can be used. Allowing fare and frequency differentiation implies that, unsurprisingly, at the optimum, occupancy rates will be lower for the vulnerable passenger. They will face higher fares only if their risk perception is sufficiently higher than that of the non-vulnerable, and car use is not too much under-priced. Fourth, more restrictive social distancing on train wagons for the vulnerable raises the fare for vulnerable passengers, and it implies that more wagons are reserved for the vulnerable. Lastly, a separating equilibrium implies that fares for trips in the wagons intended for the vulnerable are sufficiently higher than fares in the wagons for the non-vulnerable to prevent non-vulnerable passengers to use wagons reserved for the vulnerable. ispartof: FEB Research Report Department of Economics status: published

Published
2021

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