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We study a dynamic model of collective action in which agents interact and learn through a co-evolving social network. We consider two alternative scenarios that differ on how agents form their expectations: while in a "benchmark" agents are assumed completely informed of the prevailing state, in the other context agents shape their expectations through a combination of local observation and social learning a la DeGroot. We completely characterize the long-run behavior of the system in both cases and show that only in the latter scenario (arguably the most realistic) there is a significant long-run probability of successful collective action within a meaningful time scale. This, we argue, sheds light on the puzzle of how large populations can “achieve” collective action. Finally, we illustrate the empirical potential of the model by showing that it can be efficiently estimated for the so-called Egyptian Arab Spring using largescale cross-sectional data from Twitter.

Dertwinkel-Kalt et al. (2022) examine the effect of concentration bias - the tendency to overweight advantages that are concentrated in time relative to costs that are spread over multiple time periods - on intertemporal choice in a laboratory experiment. In their preferred empirical specification, the authors report that concentration bias leads to a 22.4% higher willingness to work than explained by a standard model of intertemporal discounting. We conduct a computational replication of the main results of the paper using the same procedures and original data. Our results confirm the sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the author’s reported estimates across each of their five main findings.

Increased competition for viewers’ time is threatening the viability of publicservice broadcasters (PSBs) around the world. Changing regulations regarding advertising minutes might increase revenues, but little is known about the structure of advertising demand. To address this problem, we collect a unique dataset on monthly impacts (quantities) and prices of UK television channels between 2002 and 2009 to estimate the (inverse) demand for advertising on both public and commercial broadcasters. We find that increasing PSB advertising minutes to the level permitted for non-PSBs would increase PSB and industry revenue by 10.5% and 6.7%.

We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual’s (a) opportunity to commit to their partner, (b) the cost of dissolving committed partnerships, and (c) the distribution of these dissolution costs between partners. Our findings show that pledges of commitment alone can increase cooperation and welfare in committed partnerships . The introduction of relatively large and equally split costs yields similar gains. In contrast, when costs to dissolve committed partnerships fall solely on the individual choosing to break up, pledges of commitment fail to improve cooperation and welfare.