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This article is about nooplasis. That is, the article outlines a general model about the dynamic organization and development of mind and it draws the implications of this model for learning and instructions. This is done in terms of 10 postulates concerned with the architecture of mind, its development and dynamics, and the nature of learning, and a general postulate concerned with the dynamic relations between the various systems of mind and also mind and education. Specifically, the model postulates that the mind involves systems oriented to the understanding of the environment and of itself, in addition to general processing functions. It is also postulated that the development of each of the systems is partially autonomous and partially constrained by the development of the other systems, and that it involves both system-specific and system-wide mechanisms of development and learning. Finally, it is argued that these postulates suggest a model of constrained constructivism which leads to a conception of learning in schools which differs considerably from what is suggested by the Piagetian or the Vygotskian conception of constructivism.

This paper invokes cognitive developmental theory as a means for preparing citizens to deal with and resolve conflicts within or across nations. We take the centuries-old Greek-Turkish dispute as an example. We first outline a theory of intellectual development postulating that mental changes emerge in response to changing developmental priorities in successive life periods, namely, interaction control in infancy, attention control and representational awareness in preschool, inferential control and cognitive management in primary school, and advanced forms of reasoning and self-evaluation in adolescence. Based on this model, we outline a control theory of wisdom postulating that different aspects of wisdom emerge during development as different levels of control of relations with others: trust and care for others in infancy, taking the other's perspective, reflectivity, and empathy in preschool, rationality and understanding the rules underlying individual and group interactions in primary school, and understanding the general principles of societal operation explaining the differences in approach and interest between groups in adolescence and early adulthood. We also outline the educational implications of this theory for the education of citizens by capitalizing on intellectual strengths at successive developmental periods to comprehensively understand the world and to act prudently when dealing with interpersonal and social or national conflict. Finally, the paper discusses the political constraints and implications of this theory. This is the first attempt to derive wisdom from the development of cognitive and personality processes from infancy through early adulthood and to connect it to serious world problems.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that empirically delimited structures of mind are also differentiable by means of systematic logical analysis. In the sake of this aim, the paper first summarizes Demetriou's theory of cognitive organization and growth. This theory assumes that the mind is a multistructural entity that develops across three fronts: the processing system that constrains processing potentials, a set of specialized structural systems (SSSs) that guide processing within different reality and knowledge domains, and a hypecognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. In the second part the paper focuses on the SSSs, which are the target of our logical analysis, and it summarizes a series of empirical studies demonstrating their autonomous operation. The third part develops the logical proof showing that each SSS involves a kernel element that cannot be reduced to standard logic or to any other SSS. The implications of this analysis for the general theory of knowledge and cognitive development are discussed in the concluding part of the paper.

The relations between the developing mind and developing brain are explored. We outline a theory of intellectual development postulating that the mind comprises four systems of processes (domain-specific, attention and working memory, reasoning, and cognizance) developing in four cycles (episodic, realistic, rule-based, and principle-based representations, emerging at birth, 2, 6, and 11 years, respectively), with two phases in each. Changes in reasoning relate to processing efficiency in the first phase and working memory in the second phase. Awareness of mental processes is recycled with the changes in each cycle and drives their integration into the representational unit of the next cycle. Brain research shows that each type of processes is served by specialized brain networks. Domain-specific processes are rooted in sensory cortices; working memory processes are mainly rooted in hippocampal, parietal, and prefrontal cortices; abstraction and alignment processes are rooted in parietal, frontal, and prefrontal and medial cortices. Information entering these networks is available to awareness processes. Brain networks change along the four cycles, in precision, connectivity, and brain rhythms. Principles of mind-brain interaction are discussed.

Rapuc et al. (Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 2023) found that Full‐Scale IQ of preterm children is significantly lower than full‐term children. Also, although the structure of intelligence appeared to involve the same clusters of cognitive ability, relations between abilities were stronger in preterm children, implying that abilities are more differentiated in full‐term than in preterm children. This commentary examined if these findings hold when different modelling methods are used. Instead of the network analysis used in the target article (Rapuc et al., 2023), I used confirmatory factor analysis and special forms of structural equation modelling designed to capture interactions between processes and their differentiation from general cognitive ability. I found, in line with the target article, that premature children scored lower overall in cognitive ability, and that cognitive processes are more strongly related in preterm than in full‐term children. However, in contrast to the target article, specific abilities tended to differentiate with increasing general ability in preterm rather than in full‐term children. In full‐term children, increases in specific abilities were commensurate with increases in general ability. These differences may reflect slower development in preterm children and stronger dependence on executive processes dominating in preschool. Clinical implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study trained children to master logical fallacies and examined how learning is related to processing efficiency and fluid intelligence (gf). A total of one hundred and eighty 8- and 11-year-old children living in Cyprus were allocated to a control, a limited (LI), and a full instruction (FI) group. The LI group learned the notion of logical contradiction and the logical structure of the schemes involved. The FI group learned, additionally, to recognize other deductive reasoning principles. Reasoning improved proportionally to training. Awareness improved equally in LI and FI. Changes in reasoning and awareness changes were related to attention control and gf. Awareness mediated the influence of training on reasoning but not vice versa, suggesting that awareness is necessary for conditional reasoning. Implications are discussed.