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ABSTRACT It is possible to argue that there exists a push-pull balance in the EU's democratic conditionality that the EU has been applying since the South European states applied for [...]

The decline in American public opinion for support of the U.S. policy of promoting democracy abroad is presented discussing the reasons for it.

The views between two Koreas might affect their development of rational, balanced and incremental rapprochement processes. Ideas given by political forces with regard to unification and integration of Korea are mentioned.

The relationship between economic development and democratization offers a central focus in linking comparative and international politics. Analysts agree that economic development facilitates democratization but that the relationship is considerably less than perfect. Should advocates of the democratic peace argument prove to be correct in emphasizing the role of regime type in pacifying international politics, an obvious question becomes, What else drives democratization besides economic development? In this article, the authors explore the relationship between domestic development, in the form of economic growth and democratization, and international conditions. They suggest that a number of international factors, such as external threat, conflict, and trade openness, can aid or abet democratization and economic growth. To systematically analyze one facet of this proposition they use both robust regression and generalized estimating equations and find that the international environment significantly alters democracy. External threats from other states tend to decrease democracy. Keywords: democracy, development, threat, international

INTRODUCTION I. THE INSTITUTIONAL TURN IN COSMOPOLITAN THEORY A. From Individual to Institutional Duties B. The Relevance of Plausibility Constraints II. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND COSMOPOLITAN DUTY A. The Source and [...]

Recent reforms have been designed to enhance the power of the European Parliament to counter criticisms of a 'democratic deficit' in the European Union (EU). We examine how citizens now view these institutions and whether such evaluations influence their satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU. Previous research has maintained that evaluations of the quality of democracy are difficult to assess because opinions about the EU largely reflect opinions about national institutions. Our results indicate that this is not necessarily the case, particularly among those who are politically aware. Those with high levels of political knowledge rely more heavily on evaluations of EU institutions when assessing democracy in the EU. We also find evidence that evaluations of democratic performance in the EU are motivated by the economic benefits and costs associated with membership. The implications for the democratic deficit and the satisfaction with democracy measure are discussed. Keywords: democratic deficit, European Union, political knowledge, public support, satisfaction with democracy

The theme of this Tenth Anniversary issue, "Globalization and Governance: The Prospects for Democracy," is a fitting and timely topic. By way of introduction, this article will begin by discussing [...]

The Democratic Peace Proposition, which states that no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other, has been questioned by scholars who claim that such pacific behavior among free states does not apply to lower forms of conflict. In particular, Kegley and Hermann contend that democracies intervene in the affairs of other liberal states via overt military acts or covert machinations. In many cases, they argue that dyadic democratic interventions (DDIs) occur more frequently than would be expected given the number of jointly democratic dyads in the international system. I examine their research design and suggest changes to their concepts of states, interventions, and regime type, as well as their sample size and definition of dyads in the international system. I implement these changes and retest such arguments on a sample of interventions from 1945 to 1991. I find 11 cases where a democracy intervenes against another democracy, but these cases are rare in comparison to interventions conducted by democratic and/or autocratic states in undemocratic states, or by autocratic states against democratic states. Furthermore, these DDIs are less likely to occur than the presence of democracy in the international system would suggest.

While constructivist scholars have recognized an important role for norms in international relations, they have not considered the changing proportion of democratic states in the international system as a potential source of norm formation. I argue that democratic norms become international norms as the proportion of democratic states in the international system increases, focusing on the democratic norm of third-party dispute resolution. I reach the novel conclusion that nondemocratic states are more likely to behave like democratic states, adopting democratic norms, as the proportion of democracies increases. Empirical analysis of peaceful settlement attempts of territorial claims in the Americas supports this hypothesis. Third-party settlement is sixteen times more likely for nondemocratic dyads when the proportion of democracies in the system is 50 percent than when the proportion is zero. My theory and empirical results offer new insight into the democratic peace literature and the constructivist literature on international norms.

Much theoretical and empirical work has been devoted to the study of democratic consolidation. Most of this literature, however, ignores international influences on the consolidation process. This lack investigation is especially troublesome given assertions by policymakers that outside assistance, including membership in international organizations, can support the consolidation process. I develop and test a theory of how membership in regional organizations can influence the process of democratic consolidation. I contend that regional los are not an outside entity forcing their preferences upon new democratic regimes, but that regional los are used by young democratic regimes to consolidate reforms through multiple causal mechanisms. I discuss both the demand for regional organizations as well as supply-side factors. I test the argument using event history analysis to analyze a sample of democracies from 1950 to 1992. I find that the joining of certain regional organizations is associated with increased longevity for new democracies.

This article examines the anti-globalization movement, with the author arguing that active resistance is a form of globalization and reinvention of anarchism. Issues include protest movements as conforming to the political status qua, the role of transnational corporations and international organizations in the spread of capitalism, anarchy as a peace movement, and the need to practice direct democracy.

This article discusses government in the Arab nation-states. The author, maintaining the world has seen modest gains in the strengthening of democracy worldwide, argues Arab countries remain far behind in recognizing the benefits of freedom and democracy.

Since President Ronald Reagan announced his commitment to the promotion of democracy in a speech to the British Parliament in 1982, there has been a bipartisan consensus in Washington that [...]

An enduring tenet of the post-Cold War era is that globalization be a catalyst for democratization.In one formulation when democratic ideals sweep (or even trickle) across borders into authoritarian states, [...]

There is a growing trend to incorporate the right of democratic governance into international law. However, results from the United Nations Commission on Human Rights suggest consensus on terminology about democratic concepts is an ongoing process.

Democracy means that political power is authorized and controlled by the people over whom it is exercised, and this in such a way as to give these persons roughly equal [...]

This article discusses the concept among the North of providing political aid to the South, in order to promote democracy by targeting government institutions and civil society organizations. The author uses foreign aid to South Africa since the end of apartheid in 1994 as an example of how Northern intervention to promote democracy can have negative implications for the emancipation of the government receiving assistance.

Most new democracies face serious internal, ethnic/separatist conflicts; in addition, some face international threats. The literature on the growth of democracy in the global system and its impact on world politics does not fully account for the dual threats all states must address in managing their security. Based on theoretical work by Starr (1994) which describes the 'common logic' of conflict processes in war and revolution, we outline a model of how states respond to security threats from both external and internal sources. Using computer simulation, we analyze the model and evaluate the relative importance for state security of factors such as system size, numbers of democracies in the system, extraction/allocation strategy pursued by new democracies, and government legitimacy level. Our results show that new democracies thrive in systems that are predominantly democratic. Also, ally support can provide crucial resources for new democracies facing internal threats. Finally, 'endangered' democracies can recover security by attempting to buy off domestic threats rather than deter them, and by improving legitimacy.

The South Africa/Canada Program on Governance is a CIDA-funded initiative that assisted South Africa's transition to democracy in 1993 and 1994 and since then has supported the country's leaders in building the basic systems of government. It has done this by making available to senior South African elected and appointed officials Canadian public-service practitioner advice, focusing always on the key people, key places, and core processes of government. The program has provided advice on constitutional arrangements, the establishment of a representative public service, support to the centre of government, planning and budgeting, and services delivery through its special advisers resident in Johannesburg, through workshops, through study visits to Canada for South Africans, and through the assignment of Canadian public servants to carry out projects in South Africa. Much of its work has been carried out under the auspices of twinning arrangements between six Canadian provinces and six South African provinces and their respective national departments of public works. As the program draws to an end, the authors, two of the program's special advisers, argue that in addition to providing important assistance during the transition to democracy, the program has been successful in a number of identifiable ways by supporting good governance in South Africa. They also argue that there is good reason for continued Canadian assistance in this area.

A debate exists over whether (and to what degree) the democratic peace is explained by joint democracy or by a lack of motives for conflict between states that happen to be democratic. Gartzke (1998) applies expected utility theory to the democratic peace and shows that an index of states' preference similarity based on United Nations General Assembly roll-call votes (AFFINITY) accounts for much of the lack of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between democracies. Oneal and Russett (1997b, 1998, 1999) respond by arguing that UN voting is itself a function of regime type - that democracy 'causes' AFFINITY. Oneal and Russett seek to demonstrate their thesis by regressing AFFINITY on democracy and other variables from a standard model of the democratic peace. I replicate results reported by Oneal and Russett and then extend the analysis in several ways. I find that the residuals from Oneal and Russett's regression of AFFINITY remain highly significant as a predictor of the absence of MIDs. Further, significance for democracy is shown to be fragile and subject to variable construction, model specification, and the choice of estimation procedure.

Issues regarding the replacement of the Christian Church by Americansim and the attempt to bring individualism and the doctrine of global citizenship to countries throughout the world are discussed.

The uniquely American spirit of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) substantially defined the character of the US in the 20th century, and they also defined US international contributions. Alexis de Tocqueville noted in the early 19th century Americans often formed independent associations. Such associations acted as a moral force in a country with strong economic and political power. NGOs battled against the Vietnam War in the 1960s and influenced the formation of such international organizations as Amnesty International.

The issue of how and whether the international community should promote constitutional democracy globally has been discussed at length in U.S. academic and policy circles. While disagreement still exists on [...]

The world-wide ramifications of conflict in Yugoslavia that marked the beginning and end of the 20th century says more about democracy then the rhetoric of American diplomats. There is little reason to believe that democracy will be a political foundation for nation-states in the 21st century. In fact, American in the last half of the century has done more to hinder than advance democracy in the world arena.

The trend towards the globalization of economic relations opens up more opportunities for monitoring human rights conditions in different countries. The US can use its status as premier information technology harbinger to showcase its democratic values. Rather than imposing human rights ideals through economic sanctions, the US would do well to stimulate the peoples of authoritarian states to work for the recognition of their own rights. This in effect would lead to the grassroot transformation of repressive states and circumvent the ephemeral changes brought about by foreign policies., The state, according to any number of accounts, is under assault on a variety of fronts. The forces of globalization coinciding with the end of the Cold War have engendered [...]

abstract

abstract

It has often been said that the closest thing we have to an empirical law in international relations is that democracies do not fight against each other. This study adds to the literature on democratic peace by focusing on the crisis behaviour of democracies and nondemocracies. International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project data are used to conduct a quantitative analysis of states' crisis activity from 1918 to 1988. Strong support emerges for the three hypotheses of the study. First, it is clear that democracies initiate fewer crises than nondemocracies. However, democracies tend to escalate crises to higher levels of severity. Finally, democracies eventually win the crises in which they become involved. The conclusion is that democratic leaders face strong incentives to 'select' winnable crises against nondemocratic states because of the audience costs they face, but when the opponent is another democracy, the domestic audience expects leaders to compromise.

The international community has undertaken various actions to ensure the restoration of democratic governments that were threatened or overthrown by opposing forces during the post-Cold War era. Countries have continually fought for democracy by imposing economic sanctions, military actions and suspension of aid when democratically-elected officials were forcibly removed from office. This shows the international community's willingness to respond to democratic threats in light of the realization that all people have the right to constitutional democracy.

A rapidly growing body of research suggests that democracy enhances prospects for the peaceful settlement of interstate conflicts. To what extent can democracy also be linked with increased international cooperation? Building upon the literature on political cooperation as well as recent discussions of the 'democratic peace,' this study offers a plausibility probe of the hypothesis that democracy increases the likelihood of interstate agreement. The analysis, which draws upon a data set covering dyadic interactions among Mercosur nations during the 1947-1985 period, utilizes both logistic regression and negative binomial regression methods to assess the relationship between democracy and cooperation. The findings offer only limited support for the hypothesis that democracy promotes cooperation and challenge the recent literature on the relative peace among democracies in several theoretically suggestive ways. The study points to the potential fruitfulness of more extensive and rigorous research on the nexus between domestic institutions and international cooperation.