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Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stood steadfast with the United States in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. On 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the terrorist attacks against the United States, the alliance invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its history. Since then, NATO has taken a variety of steps to engage more fully in the global war on terrorism, including a declaration that tacking terrorism was NATO’s new mission. On a more concrete level, alliance members adopted a package of measures during the Prague Summit in November 2002 that are designed to strengthen NATO’s preparedness and ability to take on the challenges associated with terrorism. But beyond the rhetoric and posturing, is the alliance really ready?in terms of having the appropriate command and force structure?to tackle this new threat? If the last major alliance effort to address a change in the threat environment is any indicator, NATO may not be ready to decisively face down terrorism for quite some time. In the 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO recognized the significant changes in the threat environment brought about by the end of the Cold War. New threats, ethnic and religious strife chief among them, were noted by the alliance in public documents and pronouncements. Accordingly, the alliance recognized that new command and force structures would be necessary to meet the new threats. Nevertheless, it took the alliance another 12 years before it had those command and force structures?centered on NATO Rapid Deployment Corps (NRDCs)?in place to deal with new post-Cold War security challenges. Why did this change in command and force structures take so long after the alliance recognized the changed security environment? My paper will argue that although external threat factors initiate reviews of NATO doctrine and force structure, the outcomes of those reviews are delayed and decisively shaped by organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics factors. By extending this model to the current focus on the terrorism?arguably as great a watershed in the threat environment as the end of the Cold War?the clearest implication is that NATO may not be prepared to respond to this new security challenge in the short run because it may lack appropriate processes, structures, and forces even though it recognizes the inadequacy of its existing security tools. Extending the model further, the paper will argue that NATO is likely to stumble through the short term, employing ad hoc or stopgap tactics and solutions as was seen in the alliance’s response to Balkans crises in the 1990s. Like state actors in the international environment, NATO seems ready and able to fight the last war, but not necessarily the next one. The paper will argue that if NATO wishes to remain relevant to security in the twenty-first century and provide for European security?particularly in the war on terrorism?it will have to develop more effective means for evolving its doctrine and its force structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]