Search

We extend the small country trade model with firm heterogeneity (Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare, 2013) to incorporate offshoring (along with final goods trade). We derive the firm-level employment implications of output and input trade and trade costs to provide a guide for our empirical work using Korean firm-level data for the period 2006-2016. A key theoretical result is that the impact of a change in offshoring cost on employment depends crucially on the net substitutability between inputs where net substitutability is the difference between the elasticities of input substitution and output substitution. Empirically we find that a decrease in the input trade cost reduces employment and the impact is stronger the greater the net substitutability between inputs. Exporting almost always leads to higher employment. Our 2SLS results with firm-level imports (in place of trade costs) do not contradict our results with trade costs. However, using propensity score matching, we find that being an importer, on average, is associated with greater employment, with the magnitude of this positive employment effect being greater for exporting firms and in industries with lower net substitutability among inputs.

This paper studies the effects of cultural identity on electoral and policy outcomes when voters are “behavioral.” Building on the evidence that voters assess political or economic events through the lens of their partisan identifications, we analyze an election between two office-motivated candidates in which voters over-reward or under-punish the candidate that shares their cultural identity. Focusing on issues with cultural as well as distributional implications for voters such as immigration and the cultural divide based on nativism as the source of identity politics, we find that the candidates’ equilibrium policies are always preferred by the electorally dominant cultural group to the policy that would be optimal if policies only had distributional consequences. We also show that candidates do not necessarily target their own cultural bases in equilibrium. Furthermore, stronger identity politics increases policy polarization. Our findings contribute to the debates on the decoupling of voting behavior from economic interests, and the rise of immigration, trade protectionism, or engagement with global governing institutions as electoral issues that can shift historical voting patterns.

Issue: Jan-Feb 2021 India currently faces the twin problems of slow job creation and slow economic growth. Even when economic growth has been rapid, India has made slow progress in the creation of quality jobs. To address these issues, I first draw inferences from India’s post-independence economic history. The main lesson is that trade reforms have been followed by high rates of growth, while restrictive trade policies have led to slow growth. For the creation of quality jobs, I emphasize the importance of the exports of labour-intensive manufactures. To dig deeper, the evidence on structural change and its determinants is presented, followed by some relevant theory. Policy recommendations presented include tariff reductions, labour law reforms, setting up Autonomous Economic Zones (AEZs) and signing preferential trade agreements.

While the role of lobbying in trade policy determination has been studied in a formal way since the early 1980s, it was the pathbreaking 1994 work by Grossman and Helpman in the following decade that led many scholars, using that framework (often with some modifications), to study many interesting political economy issues in the trade policy arena. Importantly, Grossman and Helpman were also the first to provide microfoundations to lobbying within a multisectoral, specific-factors framework. Moreover, the industry-level protection they derive is an empirically estimable function of measurable industry characteristics and other political and economic factors. With everything else held constant, organized sectors are able to obtain higher protection than unorganized sectors, with organized-sector protection inversely related to import penetration and import demand elasticity. Grossman and Helpman’s work gave an impetus to theory-driven empirical work in the political economy of trade policy, including the empirical investigation of the Grossman–Helpman model itself and its many extensions. There is now also a fairly large literature trying to explain the unrealistically high empirical estimates of the model’s parameters (representing the proportion of population politically organized and the weight the government attaches to aggregate welfare relative to political contributions). Extensions for empirical investigation that include bringing in competition between upstream and downstream lobbies, imperfect capturing of nontariff barrier (NTB) rents by the government, foreign lobbies, the possibility of misclassfication of sectors into organized and unorganized, and so forth partially correct the unrealistic parameter estimates. In addition, there are extensions that have been applied toward explaining policy changes and puzzles. Those extensions deal with lobby formation, trade agreements, unilateralism versus reciprocity in trade policy, lobbying for protection in declining industries, firm-level lobbying, the choice of policy instruments, and so forth. Despite so much work already done on lobbying and trade policy, the existing literature is deficient in the study of the choice of instruments, the antitrade bias in trade policy, and informational lobbying.

We estimate the extent to which firms responded to tariff reductions associated with China's WTO entry by altering labour's share of value. Firm‐level regressions indicate that firms in industries subject to tariff cuts raised labour's share relative to economy‐wide trends, both through input choices and rent sharing. Our estimates suggest that, on average, an industry that experienced no reductions in output or input tariffs would have a 15.7% lower labour share of value in 2007 than it actually did, assuming the same economy‐wide trends. There is significant variation across firms: the impact attenuates with geographic remoteness and union presence and strengthens with foreign ownership.

Using six waves of the Swedish National Election Studies (SNES) survey data, we investigate the determinants of attitudes towards globalization barriers (trade and immigration) and how important these attitudes are in how people vote. In line with the existing results in the literature, we find that more educated and richer voters support freer trade and more immigration. We also find that conservative voters in Sweden are more likely to prefer freer trade but higher immigration barriers. Once various economic and demographic determinants of globalization barrier preferences along with voters’ ideologies on a liberal-conservative spectrum are controlled for in the analysis of voting behavior, trade barrier preferences lose their statistical significance while attitudes towards immigration barriers remain significant. This suggests that immigration attitudes affect voting behavior through channels involving identity-driven factors that are different from the channels through which more traditional electoral issues, such as trade barriers, work. Focusing on the anti-globalization Swedish Democrats, we confirm that voters with a greater preference for barriers to immigration were more likely to switch their votes to this party from the 2014 to the 2018 election.

We present a theoretical model (adapted from the structural gravity model by Anderson and van Wincoop, American Economic Review, 93, 2003, 170) to capture the effects of terrorism on air passenger traffic between nations affected by terrorism. We then use equations derived from this model, in conjunction with alternative functional forms for trade costs, to estimate the effects of terrorism on bilateral air passenger service flows from 58 source countries to 26 destination countries during 2000–14. An additional small‐scale terrorist incident in the origin country and destination country together results in a reduction in bilateral air passenger travel by, at least, 1.3% and 0.81%, respectively, for pairs of countries located 1,000 and 2,000 km or less apart. The adverse impact of transnational terrorism is approximately five times larger. Terrorism adversely impacts bilateral air passenger travel both by reducing national output and especially by increasing psychological distress. Last but not the least, international air passenger travel is found to be extremely sensitive to fatal terrorist attacks and terrorist attacks on targets such as airports, travel or tourists.

We exploit exogenous variation in tariffs to examine the impact of import competition on unionization and union wages in a developing country. Using a combination of nationally representative household data (National Sample Survey Organization) and nationally representative industry-level data (Annual Survey of Industries) from India, we find that net-import industries that experienced larger cuts in tariffs also experienced larger declines in unionization. In addition, we find that these industries also experienced larger increases in union wages. These results are consistent with the predictions of an efficient bargaining framework that we extend to endogenize the union formation decision by allowing for a fixed cost of union formation. We also conduct a back-of-the-envelope calculation to show that the total wage gains to unionized workers marginally exceed the total wage losses to deunionized workers.

This study first documents robust evidence that the COVID-19 death ratio and infection ratio are positively associated with income inequality, higher non-White/White residential segregation index, and higher percentage of adults aged 65 and below without health insurance. Second, death and infection ratios also increase with the share of ethnic non-White minorities in a county’s population, possibly representing the racial bias of policy, law, governance, and culture that disadvantages ethnic minorities, leading to structural health inequalities. Finally, our results are consistent with a significant spatial-spillover effect of the novel coronavirus and the previously documented characteristics of COVID-19 decedents and patients.

We present a model of offshoring of tasks to a developing nation characterized by a minimum-wage formal sector and a flexible-wage informal sector. Some offshored tasks are outsourced by the formal sector to the lower-wage informal sector.

This paper theoretically studies the consequences of partisanship with an application to environmental policy. We model an election between a right-wing and a left-wing candidate who strategically propose environmental policies to gain the support of an electorate divided based on their climate change beliefs and productive assets. While environmental regulations imply a trade-off between a more sustainable environment and higher incomes for all voters, climate change believers have a higher belief in human activity-induced climate change, which translates into greater expected environmental benefits from policy, and high-asset voters care relatively more about mitigating economic costs. Voters view the left-wing candidate as more effective in addressing environmental challenges, whereas her right-wing opponent is the better candidate to deliver relief from the economic burden of regulations. In equilibrium, there exists policy divergence and the right-wing candidate always proposes the more pro-industry policy. We find that higher asset inequality moves equilibrium policies in a pro-industry direction as long as high-asset voters are ideologically more homogeneous than low-asset ones. Equilibrium policies become further polarized with greater partisanship as those voters with the same climate change belief hold similar ideologies.

In various Asian countries, international trade has raised productivity, lowered markups through import competition (while increasing them through cheaper inputs that can be imported), raised wages, expanded employment, and, above all, reduced poverty. This is in sharp contrast to the impact of trade in some of the Latin American countries, which suggests exercising caution in extrapolating results to Asian countries that have not yet been studied. There are also a few adverse consequences of trade that have already been found for Asia. Apart from raising inequality, trade can increase informality, especially in the presence of labor-market rigidities. Additionally, there are the adverse effects stemming from trade adjustment as a result of worker mobility costs. In this context, this study discusses various policies that researchers have recommended.

This paper explores the impact of structural reforms on a comprehensive set of macro-level labor-market outcomes, including the unemployment rate, the average wage index, and overall and female employment levels and labor force participation rates. Together these outcome variables capture the overall health of the labor market and the aggregate welfare of workers. Yet, there seems to be no other comprehensive empirical investigation in the existing literature of the impact of structural reforms at the cross-country macro level on labor-market outcomes other than the unemployment rate. Data were collected from a variety of sources, including the World Bank World Development Indicators, the International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics, and the International Labor Organization Key Indicators of the Labor Market. The resulting dataset covers up to 88 countries, the majority being developing, for 10 years on either side of structural reforms that took place between 1960 and 2001. After documenting the average trends across countries in the labor-market outcomes up to 10 years on either side of each country’s structural reform year, the authors run fixed-effects ordinary least squares as well as instrumental variables regressions to account for the likely endogeneity of structural reforms to labor-market outcomes. Overall the results suggest that structural reforms lead to positive outcomes for labor. Unlike related literature, the paper does not find conclusive evidence on unemployment. Redistributive effects in favor of workers, along the lines of the Stolper-Samuelson effect, may be at work.

The topics in this issue include the political economy of economic reforms, privatization and labor, structural change and growth, democracy and policy volatility, the role of trade intermediaries in the avoidance of export taxes, and the impact of the middle class on democratization and the international propagation of democratic values.

We present a model which considers both regulatory burden of offshoring barriers and possible terms of trade gains from such barriers. Non-tariff barriers are shown to be unambiguously welfare-reducing, and tariff barriers raise welfare only when associated terms-of-trade gains exceed resulting regulatory burdens, in which case there is a positive optimal offshoring tax. Otherwise, free trade is optimal. Welfare reductions from an offshoring tax are more likely with several developed nations engaging in offshoring. We derive and characterize the Nash equilibrium in such a case.

We examine the impact of trade reforms initiated in 1991 on labor's share in revenue among a sample of Indian firms. Theoretically, trade reforms will affect this share by reducing firm-level price–cost markups as well as the bargaining power of workers. A simple model suggests that these changes can have ambiguous effects on firm-level labor share and that the net effect of trade reforms will depend on the labor intensity of production. Using firm-level data from India, our empirical results suggest that trade liberalization led to an increase in labor's share in revenue for small, labor-intensive firms but a reduction in this share in the case of larger, less labor-intensive firms. These results are robust to controlling for alternative sources of heterogeneity and to the use of long-lagged tariffs as instruments. We also find that trade liberalization, on average, led to a decline in the bargaining power of workers.

In this paper, we reexamine closely the empirical evidence for the home-market effect (HME) found by Hanson and Xiang (American Economic Review, 2004). We first show that evidence for the HME from their difference-in-difference gravity equation is sensitive to the way the independent variable of interest (i.e. the log of the ratio of GDPs of exporter pairs) is created. Moreover, regardless of how the sample is configured, the HME is found only in particular sub-samples of country pairs. Second, we find no evidence of the HME when we estimate the difference-in-difference gravity model on a truncated sample of positive trade flows. We also find that the magnitude of the estimated HME is sensitive to the value imputed to zero trade flows. Monte Carlo simulations show that the truncated OLS, the Eaton-Tamura Tobit and the Heckman sample-selection estimators outperform (in terms of both the bias and variation of the gravity estimates) Hanson and Xiang’s difference-in-difference estimator. Truncated OLS, ET-Tobit and Heckman estimation of the gravity equation using Hanson and Xiang’s data yield no evidence of the HME. Finally, evidence from data on exports from non-OECD countries and from Canadian provinces to the US states provides no support for the home-market effect.

Summary We study the role of factor market imperfections in determining industry-level capital intensities. Using cross-country panel data on manufacturing industries, we find that labor market imperfections arising from labor regulation have a greater influence on capital intensity than do credit market imperfections. Less restrictive labor regulations are associated with lower capital intensity in manufacturing, especially in middle-income and developing economies and in sectors that either require more frequent labor adjustment or are more unskilled labor intensive. This suggests that stringent labor regulations can impose costs on labor use, thereby curtailing gains from trade based on factor-abundance driven comparative advantage.

This chapter discusses how trade can affect poverty through a large number of channels, based on growth, efficiency and distribution. The redistributive channels also affect inequality. Case studies of China and India show that the country with the greater rise in inequality, namely China, has grown faster and seen bigger poverty reductions. Cross-country regressions also show the possibility of a poverty reducing impact of trade reforms. And, there exists considerable evidence for specifically the growth channel. Most of the intra-country studies, both direct, reduced-form ones, as well as those based on empirical general-equilibrium analysis, also provide strong support for the poverty-reducing effects of trade. Moving to inequality, many aspects, such as wage inequality, overall income inequality and labor shares, have been studied. The chapter shows that the evidence on the impact of trade on inequality has been quite mixed.

This paper presents a theoretical model (adapted from the structural gravity model by Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) to capture the effects of terrorism on air passenger traffic between nations affected by terrorism. We then use equations derived from this model, in conjunction with alternative functional forms for trade costs, to estimate the effects of terrorism on bilateral air passenger flows from 57 source countries to 25 destination countries for the period of 2000 to 2014. We find that an additional terrorist incident results in approximately a 1.2% decrease in the bilateral air passenger transport per unit distance while doubling of the accumulated terrorist incidents during the past 5 years reduces it by 18%. Terrorism adversely impacts the bilateral air passenger transport per unit distance both by reducing national output and especially by increasing psychological distress, which could be an important contributing factor in perceived travel costs. Last but not the least, we show that the responsiveness of international air travel to terrorism critically depends on the nature of the terrorist attacks. Specifically, international air passenger transport is found to be extremely sensitive to fatal terrorist attacks and terrorist attacks of targets such as airports, transportation or tourists.

Abstract: Fairness considerations are introduced into the determination of wages in a two factor Pissarides-style model of search unemployment to study its implications for the unemployment rates of unskilled and skilled workers in both the closed economy case and when the economy can offshore some inputs. Both fairness concerns and offshoring of jobs done by unskilled workers create the overhiring effect for skilled workers. An increase in the concern for fairness in the closed economy increases the cost of hiring unskilled workers and increases the unemployment rates of both types of workers; however, wage inequality decreases. In the open economy case, an increase in the concern for fairness leads to greater offshoring which prevents skilled unemployment from increasing, but the unemployment of unskilled workers increases. A reduction in the cost of offshoring also increases offshoring and increases the unemployment of unskilled workers, but has a positive effect on skilled workers. Due to the presence of an overhiring effect in the hiring of skilled workers for both offshoring and non-offshoring firms, skilled workers experience higher wages and lower unemployment. The opposite movements in skilled and unskilled unemployment render the net effect ambiguous. Even though wage inequality increases, the impact on the wages of unskilled workers is ambiguous.

Barring very few exceptions, international trade has never and nowhere been free, even though only under extraordinary circumstances are deviations from free trade optimal. To explain this puzzle, an entire literature on the political economy of trade policy has emerged over the last three decades. In this literature, one common feature is that trade policies are chosen not with the aim of maximizing national economic efficiency and aggregate welfare, but set by politicians and policy makers whose objective functions diverge from aggregate welfare. Trade policies, in this view, are often used as indirect tools to redistribute income to certain targeted groups. The identity of these groups depends on (a) the type of political economy framework (lobbying or majority voting) assumed, (b) the actual economic, political, and geographic characteristics of the various sectors in the economy that determine which of them are politically organized, and (c) the political and economic ideology of the government…