Search

The rise of populism has reignited scholarly interest in the paradox of societal advancement leading to frustration and social tension. Globalization and digitalization have increased social opportunities for parts of the population, but a substantial portion of society feels disadvantaged, resulting in discontent. This study, rooted in Boudon's model of relative deprivation, examines the mechanisms that fuel this frustration. We conducted an online experiment involving 2114 US-based MTurk participants, in which we manipulated the availability of status positions to create varying degrees of upward social mobility. We also varied group sizes to ensure robustness. We assessed relative deprivation with structural, subjective, and behavioral measures. For example, frustration was measured using the "joy-of-destruction game," in which subjects had to make the costly decision to destroy part of another player's winnings. Contrary to the model's prediction, we found that the proportion of individuals who were worse off, the losers, decreased consistently as mobility increased. This outcome can be attributed to overentry in conditions of low mobility and underentry in conditions of intermediate or high mobility. The losers displayed increased frustration and hostility towards noncompetitors and winners. Intriguingly, winners also exhibited heightened hostility. However, at the aggregate level, hostile behavior did not surge as conditions improved. In our exploratory analyses at the individual level, we identified several distinct patterns. Risk-tolerant individuals and women were more likely to enter competition. Conversely, those with advanced education levels showed a decreased inclination to competitiveness. Risk-tolerant individuals reported greater feelings of frustration and displayed increased hostility. This effect was also observed particularly among politically right-leaning individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In crisis situations, people have to change their behavior. A collective learning process begins and new patterns of order emerge. Externalities of behavior lead to the emergence of new social norms. But are the social norms also followed? A closer examination must take into account the different character of social norms. Following the theory of Ullmann-Margalit, coordination norms or conventions have different consequences for norm-oriented behavior than cooperation norms. This distinction is also important for lawmaking. There is no "free-rider problem" with coordination norms, but there is one with cooperation norms. This paper examines the question of the characteristics of new norms which emerged during the first wave of the COVID-19 crisis, such as the requirement for distance, the obligation to wear masks and cooperation in the digital tracing of infection chains. This study is based on how Germany has coped with the first wave of the pandemic in spring 2020. However, the analysis leads to conditions which in general may explain the degree of compliance with different types of new social norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do people adorn themselves with elaborate body piercings or tattoos, wear obstructing garbs, engage in life-threatening competitions and other wasteful and harmful but socially stipulated practices? Norms of cooperation and coordination, which promote the efficient attainment of collective benefits, can be explained by theories of collective action. However, social norms prescribing wasteful and harmful behaviours have eluded such explanations. We argue that signalling theory constitutes the basis for the understanding of the emergence of such norms, which we call signalling norms. Signalling norms emerge as a result of the uncertainty about who is a friend and who is a foe. The need to overcome this uncertainty arises when different groups compete for scarce resources and individuals must be able to identify, trust and cooperate with their fellow group members. After reviewing the mechanisms that explain the emergence of cooperation and coordination norms, we introduce the notion of signalling norms as markers of group distinction. We argue that adherence to signalling norms constitutes a commitment promoting parochial cooperation rather than a quality-revealing signal facilitating partner choice. We formalize our argument in a game-theoretic model that allows us to specify the boundary conditions for the emergence of signalling norms. Our paper concludes with a discussion of potential applications of our model and a comparison of signalling norms with related concepts. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several special questioning techniques have been developed in order to counteract misreporting to sensitive survey questions, for example, on criminal behavior. However, doubts have been raised concerning their validity and practical value as well as the strategy of testing their validity using the "more-is-better" assumption in comparative survey experiments. This is because such techniques can be prone to generating false positive estimates, that is, counting "innocent" respondents as "guilty" ones. This article investigates the occurrence of false positive estimates by comparing direct questioning, the crosswise model (CM), and the item count technique (ICT). We analyze data from two online surveys (N  = 2,607 and 3,203) carried out in Germany and Switzerland. Respondents answered three questions regarding traits for which it is known that their prevalence in reality is zero. The results show that CM suffers more from false positive estimates than ICT. CM estimates amount to up to 15 percent for a given true value of zero. The mean of the ICT estimates is not significantly different from zero. We further examine factors causing the biased estimates of CM and show that speeding through the questionnaire (random answering) and problems with the measurement procedure—namely regarding the unrelated questions—are responsible. Our findings suggest that CM is problematic and should not be used or evaluated without the possibility of accounting for false positives. For ICT, the issue is less severe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social norms promote cooperation in everyday life because many people are willing to negatively sanction norm breakers at a cost to themselves. However, a norm violation may persist if only one person is required to sanction the norm breaker and everyone expects someone else to do it. Here we employ the volunteer’s dilemma game (VOD) to model this diffusion of responsibility in social norm enforcement. The symmetric VOD is a binary choice game in which all actors have the same costs of and benefits from cooperation and only one actor’s cooperation is required to provide the collective good for the group. The asymmetric VOD differs from the symmetric VOD in one (strong) actor having lower costs of cooperation. In a laboratory experiment, we find that, in line with the diffusion of responsibility hypothesis, subjects’ propensities to sanction the norm breaker decrease with group size in the symmetric VOD. In the asymmetric VOD, groups tacitly coordinate on the strong subject to sanction the norm breaker alone. Although at first lower in larger groups, strong subjects’ sanctioning rates increase over time and reach equally high levels across different group sizes. Our results show that heterogeneous groups can be more effective in achieving norm compliance than groups of all equals because they naturally evade diffusion of responsibility in social norm enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The tension between individual and collective interests and the provision of sanctioning mechanisms have been identified as important building blocks of a theory of norm emergence. Correspondingly, most investigations focus on how social norms emerge through explicit bargaining and social exchange to overcome this tension, and how sanctions enforce norm compliance. However, sanctioning presupposes the existence of the behavior at which it is directed, and the question of how behavior worth sanctioning can emerge tacitly if communication is not possible has hitherto received little attention. Here, we argue that game theory offers an ideal framework for theorizing about emergent behavioral regularities and show how latent norms can emerge from actors' recurring encounters in similar social dilemmas. We conduct two experiments in which small groups of subjects interact repeatedly in a volunteer's dilemma. We vary the heterogeneity of group members in terms of their costs of cooperation and the way they encounter each other in subsequent interactions. Our results show that subjects in homogeneous groups take turns at cooperating, whereas in heterogeneous groups mostly the subjects with the lowest costs cooperate. The emergence of solitary cooperation is moderated by the way subjects encounter each other again and their other-regarding preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Norm violations can be contagious. Previous research analyzed two mechanisms of why knowledge about others’ norm violations triggers its spread: (1) actors lower their subjective beliefs about the probability or severity of punishment or (2) they condition their compliance on others’ compliance. While earlier field studies could hardly disentangle both effects, we use a laboratory experiment which eliminates any punishment threat. Subjects (n = 466) can throw a die and are paid according to their reported number. Our design rules out any possibility of personal identification so that subjects can lie about their thrown number and claim inflated payoffs without risking detection. The aggregate distribution of reported payoffs allows the estimation of the extent to which the honesty norm is violated. We compare two treatment conditions in which subjects are informed about lying behavior of others with a control condition without information feedback. Observations from a subsequent die throw reveal that knowledge about liars triggers the spread of lying compared to the control condition. Results from a follow-up experiment show that this effect is moderated by subjects’ beliefs about the prevalence of norm violations of others. Our results demonstrate the contagiousness of norm violations, where actors imitate norm violations of others under the exclusion of strategic motives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretical propositions stressing the importance of trust, reciprocity, and reputation for cooperation in social exchange relations are deeply rooted in classical sociological thought. Today’s online markets provide a unique opportunity to test these theories using unobtrusive data. Our study investigates the mechanisms promoting cooperation in an online-auction market where most transactions can be conceived as one-time-only exchanges. We first give a systematic account of the theoretical arguments explaining the process of cooperative transactions. Then, using a large dataset comprising 14,627 mobile phone auctions and 339,517 DVD auctions, we test key hypotheses about the effects of traders’ reputations on auction outcomes and traders’ motives for leaving feedback. Our statistical analyses show that sellers with better reputations have higher sales and obtain higher prices. Furthermore, we observe a high rate of participation in the feedback system, which is largely consistent with strong reciprocity—a predisposition to unconditionally reward (or punish) one’s interaction partner’s cooperation (or defection)—and altruism—a predisposition to increase one’s own utility by elevating an interaction partner’s utility. Our study demonstrates how strong reciprocity and altruism can mitigate the free-rider problem in the feedback system to create reputational incentives for mutually beneficial online trade. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Studies mainly from the United States provide evidence that children of divorced parents face a higher risk of divorce in their own marriages. We estimate and analyze the effects of divorce transmission using comparative individual data from the United Nations for 13 eastern and western European countries as well as for Canada and the United States. We find substantial and highly statistically significant transmission effects in all samples. This shows that the intergenerational transmission of divorce is a widespread phenomenon observed without a single exception in our data covering a large number of countries with differing historical, institutional, and cultural contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, “Benford’s law” is applied to the “randomized response technique” (RRT) to increase the validity of answers to sensitive questions. Using the Newcomb–Benford distribution as a randomizing device has several advantages. It is easy to explain and follow the procedure, as no physical device such as a coin or a dice is necessary and the method guarantees full anonymity. As is well known, the price for the anonymity of the RRT is a decrease in the efficiency of the estimator. However, because of the subjective overestimation of certain numbers (Benford illusion), the conflict between the variance of the estimates and the degree of anonymity is less pronounced compared to other RRT methods. The suggested RRT variant has the potential to improve the efficiency of the estimator. Moreover, the assumption is that this method works well with self-administered questionnaires. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Digits in statistical data produced by natural or social processes are often distributed in a manner described by 'Benford's law'. Recently, a test against this distribution was used to identify fraudulent accounting data. This test is based on the supposition that first, second, third, and other digits in real data follow the Benford distribution while the digits in fabricated data do not. Is it possible to apply Benford tests to detect fabricated or falsified scientific data as well as fraudulent financial data? We approached this question in two ways. First, we examined the use of the Benford distribution as a standard by checking the frequencies of the nine possible first and ten possible second digits in published statistical estimates. Second, we conducted experiments in which subjects were asked to fabricate statistical estimates (regression coefficients). The digits in these experimental data were scrutinized for possible deviations from the Benford distribution. There were two main findings. First, both digits of the published regression coefficients were approximately Benford distributed or at least followed a pattern of monotonic decline. Second, the experimental results yielded new insights into the strengths and weaknesses of Benford tests. Surprisingly, first digits of faked data also exhibited a pattern of monotonic decline, while second, third, and fourth digits were distributed less in accordance with Benford's law. At least in the case of regression coefficients, there were indications that checks for digit-preference anomalies should focus less on the first (i.e. leftmost) and more on later digits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In two experiments, the existence and extent of altruistic reciprocity is explored in the context of a simple experimental game, "the sequential dictator." Findings show that altruistic reciprocity is frequent and robust, and the reciprocity norm does not erode if stakes are raised. Implications of the findings for social theory and further empirical research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from the June 1980 Current Population Survey, Morgan, Lye, and Condran (1988) reported that families with a daughter have a higher divorce risk than families with a son. They attribute this finding to the higher involvement of fathers in raising a son, which in turn promotes marital stability. We investigate the relation between gender composition of children and parents’ divorce risk with cross-national data from the Fertility and Family Survey. These data, which cover 16 European countries, Canada, and the United States, do not support a general hypothesis that sons contribute more to marital stability than daughters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The low-cost hypothesis predicts that the strength of effects of environmental concern on environmental behavior diminishes with increasing behavioral costs. Thus, environmental concern influences environmental behavior primarily in situations and under conditions connected with low costs and little inconvenience for individual actors. In a first step, we develop and specify this hypothesis. Referring to two procedures, we then test it on the basis of an environmental survey of a random sample of 2307 respondents from the German population. The empirical evidence is positive. The low-cost hypothesis is not confined to the area of environmental research. It points to general limits of attitude-research (in high- cost situations) and to general limits of rational-choice theory (in low-cost situations), and suggests a strategy for integrating research in social psychology, sociology, and economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the relation between a nation's wealth and the public's degree of environmental concern by using data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Results of the International Social Survey; Evidence from the `Health-of-Planet' Survey; Conclusion.

The social inheritance of divorce is one factor contributing to the upward trend in marriage dissolution rates during the last few decades. Several studies confirm the transmission hypothesis for U.S. marriages. We investigate the intergenerational transmission of divorce risk among German first marriages using multivariate event-history techniques. Our data are from the 7,200 respondents of the German Family Survey. The historical circumstances of postwar Germany allow a comparison between families dissolved by war and families dissolved by divorce. Respondents whose parental families dissolved by the death of a parent have only slightly higher divorce risks than respondents who grew up in two-parent families. There is, however, a large gap in marital instability for respondents from divorced-parent families compared with respondents from two-parent families and families with a widowed parent. Hence, the inheritance of divorce cannot be explained simply by the absence of a parent. The data suggest that differences in personal investments in the marriage partnership may partially explain the transmission effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The log-logistic distribution is a widely used model in event history analysis. It is well-known that the log-logistic model is able to model social processes with monotonically decreasing, as well as nonmonotonic, reversed U-type hazard rates. In this article two three-parameter generalizations are very flexible in describing a great variety of processes with reversed U-type hazard rates. In addition, the first generalized model allows for separating upward rate shifts (intensity effects) from horizontal rate shifts (timing effects). With the second model it is possible to model immunity, that is, allow for the fact that some persons might not have an event at all. The usefulness of these models will be illustrated by an application to demographic data from the United State and Germany: The effects of education on marriage rates are analyzed. Finally, the relationship between the proposed hazard rate models and certain social diffusion processes is investigated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A field experiment was conducted in Germany to explore whether driver characteristics and the social status of cars are related to an aggressive response. Drivers waiting at a traffic light (N = 57) were blocked by an experimental car. The amount of time that elapsed until the drivers responded by honking their horns or beaming their headlights was recorded, and bivariate and multivariate methods of survival analysis were used to analyze the data. The status of the blocked cars was positively correlated with the tendency toward an aggressive response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conflict game simulating social traps in which a collective good can be provided by a volunteer is discussed and some solution concepts are analyzed. There is a greater incentive for "free riding" than for the production of the collective good at the cost of the volunteer However, if everybody defects, all players will lose. Such a result is frequently produced by "diffusion of responsibility" as described by Darley and Latane (1968). In contrast to other social traps, a dominant strategy does not exist. Also, the mixed-equilibrium strategy yields very low payoffs. The expected gain is not greater than the payoff achieved by the nonequilibrium maximin strategy. Superrationality might be a way out of the trap. However, this concept lacks the desirable equilibrium property. Only in the free communication version of the game can a definitive answer to the question of a rational strategy be given. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social scientists are frequently confronted with event history data which might be explained by a stochastic process. Examples are deviant behavior, occupational or geographic mobility, marriage dissolution, etc. Sometimes the assumption that the propensity to leave a position depends on the duration in that position seems to be realistic. In these examples one might expect that the rate of leaving a position initially increases, eventually reaches a maximum, and finally decreases again. The extended Poisson model studied in this paper exhibits such a pattern. If arrival time data are available, the parameters of the model can be estimated by maximum likelihood techniques. This model is applied to study deviant behavior and occupational mobility. The results are compared with those from alternative extensions of the Poisson process. Finally, further implications and extensions of this model are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central equation of the deterministic diffusion model of Pitcher, Hamblin, and Miller (1978) is formulated as a time--inhomogeneous stochastic process. It will be shown that the stochastic process leads to a negative binomial distribution. The deterministic diffusion function can be derived from the stochastic model and is identical to the expected value as a function of time. Therefore the deterministic model is supported in terms of the underlying stochastic process. Moreover the stochastic model allows the prediction of the distribution for any point in time and the construction of prediction intervals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the environmental attitudes and ecological behavior of the general public. The authors start from the premise that research efforts should be primarily interested not in attitudinal factors such as environmental concern or environmental awareness, but in actual behavior of people in the context of their daily life. In line with numerous previous studies, the authors show that environmental attitudes and behavior are indeed inconsistent in many respects. The main arguments given by the authors are, first, to get a better understanding of the discrepancies between environmental consciousness and behavior, it will be necessary to break down the global concept of environmental behavior into behavioral patterns in different substantive settings, such as consumer behavior, recycling behavior, or transportation and mobility behavior. Second, a theoretical orientation looking at environmental behavior from a broader rational choice perspective that can help clarify some of the problems of the seemingly incongruent attitudes and behaviors in the area of environmental protection.

In a long sequence of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma played by a pair of subjects, "lock-in" effects are frequently observed both on the CC and on the DD outcome. That is, in the course of the sequence either CC or DD becomes predominant sometimes persisting to the end. A lock-in on CC can be explained by a deterrence effect: The subjects learn that defection to D, although immediately advantageous if the co-player continues with C, is likely to be followed by retaliation. A lock-in on DD can be explained by the inhibition of unilateral C (the "peace initiative"), which is associated with the sucker's payoff. In the present experiment, subjects played repeated round robin sequences of Prisoner's Dilemma with other subjects in their experimental group. Prominent lock-in effects were observed when the subjects were informed on each play how their current co-players chose when paired with other subjects but not when no such information was given. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A coalition is usually assumed to involve as an agreement, explicit or implicit, among several actors (individuals or organizations) to cooperate in pursuit of a common interest. Typically members of a coalition regard such cooperation in their own individual interest only if others continue to cooperate. Thus violation of the agreement holding the coalition together by some members often instigates others to defect, and the process becomes self-reinforcing. The effect is demonstrated in an experiment with a Tragedy of the Commons type game, in which one of the players, a confederate of the experimenter, (the "stooge") grossly violates apparent expectations of the others. Measures of the amount of cooperation (or noncooperation) before and after the stooge's intervention are related to the presence or absence of preliminary discussion and to the number of players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the intertemporal common-pool resource game, non-cooperative behavior produces externalities reducing subjects' payoffs in both the present and the future. In this paper, we investigate through two experiments whether binding contracts, non-binding promises and social feedback help to promote sustainable behavior. We find that cooperation is higher in groups where a contract can be signed or where subjects made a promise to cooperate throughout the experiment. However, not all groups sign the contract unanimously and subjects who made a promise adjust their cooperation downwards over time. We find no difference between the control condition without any regulation and the treatment condition in which subjects receive feedback on their past behavior in private. However, if received feedback can be learned by all group members, cooperation is significantly higher. Our findings show that non-binding promises and social feedback increase cooperation, but the former only in the short-run and the latter only if made public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peer-punishment is effective in promoting cooperation, but the costs associated with punishing defectors often exceed the benefits for the group. It has been argued that centralized punishment institutions can overcome the detrimental effects of peer-punishment. However, this argument presupposes the existence of a legitimate authority and leaves an unresolved gap in the transition from peer-punishment to centralized punishment. Here we show that the origins of centralized punishment could lie in individuals' distinct ability to punish defectors. In our laboratory experiment, we vary the structure of the punishment situation to disentangle the effects of punitive preferences, monetary incentives, and individual punishment costs on the punishment of defectors. We find that actors tacitly coordinate on the strongest group member to punish defectors, even if the strongest individual incurs a net loss from punishment. Such coordination leads to a more effective and more efficient provision of a cooperative environment than we observe in groups of all equals. Our results show that even an arbitrary assignment of an individual to a focal position in the social hierarchy can trigger the endogenous emergence of more centralized forms of punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents an introduction to the February 1998 issue of the journal "Rationality and Society."

An abstract of the study "Individual Heterogeneity and Costly Punishment: A Volunteer's Dilemma," by Wojtek Przepiorka, et al. is presented.

This section presents papers dealing with the application of rational choice to environmental related behavior. One uses the social customs approach first developed in 1980 to take into account social norms for predicting environmental behavior. The concept is rooted in economics in the sense that actors maximize utility given some constraints. However, the individual is assumed to interact with others, whereby a process of relative positioning takes place within a rational-choice model. In their contribution, the relationship between the most widely used action theory in social psychology, which is the theory of planned behavior, and rational choice were first shown. The rational-actor theory contains direct measurements of preferences and restrictions including social norms. Also, the longitudinal intervention study of travel-mode choice was used in a region to demonstrate simultaneously how the measurement model, the structural relations between the latent constructs and the bridge assumptions between the policy measure and the theoretical concepts can be empirically rested. C. Lüdeman, in his paper, addresses the issue of framing and bounded rationality in the sense of restricted information processing capacity.

Als Fortsetzung des in Heft 3/2014 erschienenen Berichtes über die neue Messehalle 3A in Nürnberg wird auf die Besonderheiten der Ausführungsplanung und Ausführung in den Bereichen Grundbau, Massivbau und Stahlbau eingegangen. Eine eigenständige Ingenieuraufgabe stellte der termingerechte Umgang mit den schwierigen Baugrundverhältnissen sowie den anspruchsvollen und hochbewehrten Betongeometrien des fugenlosen Riegelbauwerkes mit höchsten Sichtbetonanforderungen dar. Auch für den filigranen Stahlbau war eine umfassende ingenieurtechnische Bearbeitung erforderlich. Weitere Schwerpunkte des Berichtes bilden daher die Ermittlung der dreidimensional überhöhten spannungslosen Werkstattform sowie die ungewöhnlichen und komplexen Bauzustände und Baubehelfe. South Extension of Nuremberg Fairground - Construction of Hall 3A The second part of the report about Hall 3A focuses on distinctive features in the detailed design and the erection on site, regarding the aspects of geotechnics, concrete and steel construction. The construction work can be divided into two parts: the just in time design of the foundation slab due to sophisticated subsoil-conditions and the challenging, heavily reinforced and complex concrete structures of the joint-less edge wing with exposed concrete of highest quality stand for the first part. The second part focuses on the filigree steel construction and the thoroughly detailed design for all building stages, as there are: calculation of the stress free three dimensional-presetted fabrication geometry, numerous, exceptional and complex states of construction and temporary erection stages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Health data bear great promises for a healthier and happier life, but they also make us vulnerable. Making use of millions or billions of data points, Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are now creating new benefits. For sure, harvesting Big Data can have great potentials for the health system, too. It can support accurate diagnoses, better treatments and greater cost effectiveness. However, it can also have undesirable implications, often in the sense of undesired side effects, which may in fact be terrible. Examples for this, as discussed in this article, are discrimination, the mechanisation of death, and genetic, social, behavioural or technological selection, which may imply eugenic effects or social Darwinism. As many unintended effects become visible only after years, we still lack sufficient criteria, long-term experience and advanced methods to reliably exclude that things may go terribly wrong. Handing over decision-making, responsibility or control to machines, could be dangerous and irresponsible. It would also be in serious conflict with human rights and our constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In the Carbon2Chem® joint research project, mathematical models are involved to simulate operation scenarios of cross‐industrial networks, especially chemical plants implemented in a steel mill environment. In order to achieve an optimal model‐based system integration approach, a distributed co‐simulation environment is introduced. In particular this enables model suppliers and integrators to exchange co‐simulation units without having to disclose sensitive information and intellectual property. Here, the architecture and preliminary results of such an environment which is based on a classical waveform relaxation algorithm are described. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on a study in two European cities, Mainz in Germany and Zurich in Switzerland, the article investigates both acoustical and non-acoustical factors affecting indoor annoyance due to residential road traffic and aircraft noise. We specifically focus on three factors: (1) the role of windows as a feature of the building where people live; (2) the role of individual environmental concern as a general attitude; and (3) the role of household income as an indicator of socioeconomic resources. Empirical results show that closed windows in general and closed high-quality windows in particular are an important barrier against outdoor road traffic and aircraft noise, as well as a helpful subjective coping tool against corresponding annoyances. Environmental concern, too, proves to be a significant predictor of noise annoyance. Environmentally highly concerned people articulate feelings of annoyance more often than environmentally less concerned ones. As expected income is negatively related to road traffic noise annoyance. However, we find a positive association of income with annoyance from aircraft noise. Although objective exposure to aircraft noise is lower for high-income households, they feel stronger annoyed by noise from airplanes. Income shows various indirect effects on noise annoyance. A comparative analysis of road traffic and aircraft noise annoyance yields similarities, but also remarkable differences in terms of their influence factors. • High-quality windows strongly reduce indoor noise annoyance. • Environmentally concerned people articulate more often noise annoyance. • Income shows direct and several indirect effects on noise annoyance. • Better-off households feel more annoyed, but are less exposed to aircraft noise. • Road traffic and aircraft noise annoyance have partly different influence factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]